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Abstract
The powerful hold of the Italian Christian Demo­
cratic Party on post-war government entitles it to recogni­
tion as, in many ways, the most successful party in Western 
Europe. At the same time, the party is unique in having 
mass support whilst being identified with the political 
'centre'. This study focuses on the relationship between 
these two aspects of Italian politics.
The thesis starts by examining the importance of 
spatial terminology in analyses of Italian politics and 
proposes that 'the centre' has two distinct, if not unrelat­
ed, meanings. Drawing on this idea the thesis seeks to show 
that the evolution of the Italian party system can be under­
stood through an analysis of two strategies which have 
dominated the Christian Democratic Party: the centre politi­
cal strategy and the centre party strategy, each rooted in a 
different understanding of the centre.
In studying these strategies, party competition is 
emphasised as the means by which Italian multi-partism has 
been bound into a unified, if internally contradictory 
system; whilst a study of economic policy-making exemplifies 
the complex inter-relationship which has seen this ' contra­
dictory unity' contribute to the nation-building process. 
The thesis contributes to the debate about the nature of 
Christian Democracy and party competition in Italy, and 
to the debate within comparative politics about the nature 
of party system structure.
Acknowledgements
The award from the Economic and Social Research Coun­
cil was decisive in allowing me to start a PhD and I 
am grateful to all those who made the award possible.
My warmest thanks go to Professor Gordon Smith. 
During the MSc course in West European Politics with 
which I preceded this thesis he forced me to at least 
rethink some of my prejudices, and his supervision of 
my PhD was challenging and stimulating. Howard Machin 
too provided invaluable help both as joint supervisor 
and in providing more general support, particularly 
with regard to finding part-time jobs whilst complet­
ing my thesis.
I was also encouraged by, and would like in particular 
to thank, Professor Jean Blondel of the European 
University Institute where I spent several months in 
1988, and Professor Angelo Panebianco of Bologna 
University who read a draft of the thesis whilst at 
the LSE's International Relations Centre.
Finally, I must thank my wife, Patrizia. She has put 
up with my thesis and kept me in the style to which I 
had grown accustomed before returning to live on a 
'grant1, but most of all she has continued to be a 
priceless companion.
TRENT!NO* 
/ALTO  ^
pA a d i g e^
UALLE D' AOSTA
OMBARDI UENET1
PI-EMONTE
OMAGHAEMILIA
MARCHE
MBRI
LAZIO IOLI
UGLIA
CAMPANIA
SARDEGNA
CALABRIA
SICILIA
<C> George Philip & Son Limited.
CONTENTS
Title Page ............................................... i
Abstract ................................................  ii
Acknowledgments ............   iii
Map .....................................................  iv
Contents Summary .........................................  v
Summary of Figures and Tables ............................  x
Abbreviations/Glossary ..................................  xi
CHAPTER TITLES
PREFACE ..................................................  1
INTRODUCTION: ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY: THE
NATURE OF ITS SUCCESS ..............  12
CHAPTER 1: APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING THE
ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM ...........  24
CHAPTER 2: THE CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRISM, 1943-47 ........ 69
CHAPTER 3: TRANSFORMATION & CRISIS OF CENTRISM, 1947-53 . 133
CHAPTER 4: IMPERFECT CONSOLIDATION, CENTRISM, 1953-64 165
CHAPTER 5: A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY? --  201
CHAPTER 6: THE DC REJECTION OF BIPOLARITY: THE
DEFEAT OF THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE .......  263
CHAPTER 7: ' BIPOLAR GOVERNMENT': THE TRANSFORMATION
OF CENTRE DOMINATION IN THE 1980s ......  310
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION .................................  370
APPENDICES: ............................................  386
BIBLIOGRAPHY: ..........................................  426
BREAKDOWN OF INDIVIDUAL CHAPTERS
INTRODUCTION: ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY: THE
NATURE OF ITS SUCCESS ...............  12
I POLITICAL SUCCESS, PARTY SUCCESS & THE PARTY SYSTEM 12
II STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS ............................ 18
ENDNOTES ................................................  22
CHAPTER 1: APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING
THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM ............  24
I LEFT, CENTRE AND RIGHT IN ITALIAN POLITICS ......... 24
II POWER AND POLITICAL BLOCKS ......................... 29
A. Two Concepts of Power.......................... 29
B. Blocks and 'Polarisation* ...................... 30
C. Block Interaction & Block Structure ............ 31
D. Block Differentiation: Ideology as Policy or Image? .... 33
E. Government/Opposition Relations ................  34
III EXISTING THEORIES OF THE DC AND THE
ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM ....................  35
A. Sartori: the Mechanics of Centre Placement ..... 36
B. Galli and the Dualist Model of Politics ........ 39
C. Farneti's Synthesis and 'Democraticity1 ........ 41
v
D. Pizzorno's Critique: the catch-all party system . 45
E. Summary ........................................  47
IV THE PROBLEMS OF THE EXISTING MODELS ................ 48
A. Sartori: legitimacy and electoral volatility .... 48
B. Galli: Left/Right Conflict, 'Normal* & Difficult 50
C. Farneti: Consensus & the Inexistent Party System 52
D. Pizzorno: Unity and Dissensus ..................  53
V THE PARTY SYSTEM AS CONTRADICTORY UNITY:
TWO MEANINGS OF THE CENTRE ...............  54
A. The Centre block...............................  54
B. The Relational Centre...........................  56
C. Contradictory Unity ............................  61
D. Centre Domination and nation-Building ...........  61
ENDNOTES ................................................  64
CHAPTER 2: THE CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRISM. 1943-47   69
I THE POLITICO-CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF DC CENTRISM ... 70
A. Sub-Cultures and Block Structure ...............  70
1. Conservatism in Italy.....................  71
2. A Catholic block? .........................  72
3. The lay/liberal tradition................  72
4. The socialist sub-culture.................  73
5. Summary .................................. ’. 73
B. The Catholic 'Third Way* .......................  74
1. The vacuum on the right ..................  74
2. The Catholic World .......................  79
a. Two strands of Catholic mobilisation .. 80
b. Papal power and its limits ...........  82
c. Catholic-Communism: A common enemy .... 85
d. Catholic unity: Montini and the DC .... 86
e. Tardini*s political scepticism .......  87
f. The 'Roman * party...................  88
g. Catholic trade unionism ..............  89
h. The 'Third Way' & catholic integralism 90
i. Catholicism and heteronomy ...........  93
C. Political Opportunity ..........................  95
1. The DC and political mediation............  95
2. Party system structure: the 'blueprint' .... 99
D. Summary .......................................  100
II THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRISM...........  101
A. Building a Political Class: Anti-Fascism, 1943-8 103
1. The CLN: the self-assertion of a new
political elite ...................  103
2. The consolidation of a political class .... 107
B. Political Responsibility and Leadership .......  113
1. Leadership autonomy......................  113
2. The exclusion crisis and centrism........  116
C. Organising a Party Democracy ..................  118
1. The extension of political control
into society......................  119
2. Elections: establishing party control ....  121
III CONCLUSION........................................ 125
ENDNOTES ..............................................  126
VI
CHAPTER 3: THE TRANSFORMATION AND CRISIS OF
CENTRISM. 1947-53 ..................  133
I CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION: EXCLUSIONARY CENTRISM .. 135
A. The Exclusion of the Left? ....................  137
B. Exclusion and the DC.......................  141
II CENTRIST GOVERNMENT ............................... 144
A. Social Reform: The limits of Voluntarism ......  144
B. The Threat of the Clerical Right ..............  148
C. Reformist Government: A minimalist strategy .... 152
III THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRISM................  154
A. Centrism: Ideal Types, and Reality ............  154
1. Democratically ambiguous centrism ........  154
2. Two democratic ideal types ...............  155
3. Resume ...................................  157
B. Decisive Government, Weak Political Formula .... 158
1. Centrist government, left political culture 158
2. The strength of weakness .................  159
IV CONCLUSION ........................................ 160
ENDNOTES ..............................................  161
CHAPTER 4: IMPERFECT CONSOLIDATION. CENTRISM 1953-68 . . . 165
I THE MODERN STATE AND PARTIES IN ITALY ............  167
A. The Climax and Collapse of Clericalism....  168
1. The Church abandons partisan politics ....  169
2. Consolidation of a secular state culture .. 170
3. The end of 'closed Catholicism1 ..........  172
B. The Institutional Development of A Pluralist State 174
C. Fanfani's Ambivalent Christian State Socialism . 176
1. Low politics and the opposition ..........  177
2. Fanfani's challenge to the left ..........  180
II THE 'OPENING TO THE LEFT’ ........................  185
A. Transformism Under Duress: From Tambroni
to De Lorenzo .....................  186
B. The 'Centre-Left': An Interim Political Solution .. 190
III THE 'THIRD PHASE'? ...............................  193
ENDNOTES ...............................................  197
CHAPTER 5: A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY? ... 201
I CLEAVAGE & UNITY: A PREVIEW (Mastropaolo & Slater) 202
II RECONSTRUCTION ...................................  206
A. The Inheritance ............................... 207
B. The Ideological Debate ........................ 209
C. The Primacy of Politics, 1945-53 .............. 211
1. Economic policy-making, 1945-47 ..........  212
2. The baseline of economic boom, 1947/48 .... 215
3. European integration .....................  218
4. De Gasperi: the political economy of
a statesman........  224
D. Reconstruction - a Conclusion ................  229
III MODERNISATION AND POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE:
Fanfani and the Strong State..................  230
A. The DC and the Economy Under Fanfani .........  232
Vii
1. Territorial management................... 232
2. Governing the oligopoly sector........... 234
3. Governing the micro-sector ............... 238
B. The Assault on the DC's Policy-Making Primacy .. 243
1. The Centre-Left.........................  243
2. The private sector asserts itself ........ 246
3. The unions assert themselves  ......... 251
IV CENTRISM AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY 253 
ENDNOTES ............................................... 256
CHAPTER 6: THE DC REJECTION OF BIPOLARITY: THE DEFEAT
OF THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE .............  263
I THE REVITALISATION OF THE BIPOLAR DYNAMIC AND
THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S RESPONSE..............  264
A. Italy was not Germany.........................  265
B. The PCI and ‘Centrifugation' ..................  266
II THE DC AT THE CENTRE OF THE STORM................. 270
A. Ferment in the Catholic World.................  271
B. Moro's ‘switch to the left' ................... 272
C. Fanfani's Ambitions ..........................  275
D. Andreotti: Conservative Centrism .............. 278
E. Fanfani's Final Fling ........................  281
F. The Problem of DC Legitimacy .................. 285
III POLITICAL CONFRONTATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMATION 287
A. Moro's Strategic Aims ........................  288
B. Refoundation and Confrontation ................ 291
C. The Relegitimation of Party Government........ 298
IV A WATERSHED: THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE IN RETROSPECT 301
A. A Culmination ................................  301
B. A Watershed..................................  303
ENDNOTES ............................................... 306
CHAPTER 7: ‘ BIPOLAR GOVERNMENT' AND ITS LIMITS: THE
TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRE DOMINATION IN THE 1980s .. 310
I BIPOLAR GOVERNMENT: THE PSI CHALLENGE TO THE DC ... 312
A. Craxi and Structural Opportunity..............  313
B. Challenging DC/PCI Bipolarity.................  314
C. Challenging DC Centrality.....................  319
1. The Catholic World.......................  319
2. Economic management ......................  323
3. Foreign policy........................... 326
4. Law and order............    327
II THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE........    328
A. Reasserting ‘Centre-Left' Centrism............  329
1. The Preambolo ............................ 329
2. The New Right in Italy? ..................  331
3. The resurgence of the DC-left.............  334
B. The Emergency Anti-Craxi Coalition ............  335
1. De Mita's party-wide support .............  335
2. De Mita and bipolarity...................  337
C. De Mita: Ambiguities and Downfall .............  340
III BETWEEN BIPOLARITY AND DIFFUSION .................. 347
Viii
A. Unity of the Left - the key to bipolarity.....  348
B. Catholic Populism - a Strategy for the 1990s? .. 354
1. The DC's new courting of the PCI .........  355
2. Catholic populism: universal and catch-all 357
3. The inevitability of defeat? .............. 360
IV CONFLICT IN THE 1990s ............................. 362
ENDNOTES ...............................................  363
CHAPTER 8: CONCLUSION   370
I THREE FORMS OF CENTRE DOMINATION .................. 371
II TWO VIEWS OF PARTY SYSTEM STRUCTURE ............... 373
III THE CENTRE AS DYNAMIC CONFLICT-HANDLING........... 375
IV THE EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM......... 379
V THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM TO
NATION- AND STATE-BUILDING...............  382
Notes ..................................................  385
Appendix 1: Post-Fascist Civilian Governments .......... 386
Appendix 2: Christian Democrat Party Secretaries ....... 388
Appenidx 3: Election Results (1946-87)   389
Appendix 4: Party System Structure and Dynamics ........ 390
BIBLIOGRAPHY ...........................................  426
\JC
SUMMARY OF FIGURES AND TABLES
Seating Arrangements, 1983 Chamber of Deputies .... 25
Coalition 'Formulae1: Classic Rendering ..........  26
Amended Postwar Coalition Formulae ...............  28
Mastropaolo & Slater: Distinction and convergence .. 58
Mastropaolo & Slater: DC/PCI Overlap, 1 .. 59
Mastropaolo & Slater: DC/PCI Overlap, 2 .. 60
Results of the 1946 Constituent Assembly Election ... 99
The Parliamentary Balance (PSI/PCI) ................ 344
A Schematic History of the Italian party System ... 380
X
Abbreviations/Glossary
A. Party names
Democrazia Cristiana, or DC: 
Democrazia Proletaria, or DP:
(Fronte) Uomo Qualunque:
Movimento Sociale Italiano, or MSI:
Parti to Comunista Italiano, or PCI: 
Partito di Unita Proletaria, or PdliP: 
Partito Liberale Italiano, or PLI: 
Partito Radicale:
Partito Repubblicano It0 , or PRI: 
Partito Socialiasta Democratico
Italiano, or PSDI: 
Partito Socialista Italiano, or PSI: 
Partito Socialista Italiano di
Unita Proletaria, or PSIUP: 
Partito Socialista Unificato, or PSU:
B. Other
Azione cattolica itali ana, or ACI: 
Associazione cattolica dei lavoratori 
italiani, or ACLI:
ciel1 ini
CGIL
CISL
Comitato di Liberazione Nazionale,
or CLN:
Communione e Liberazione, or Cl:
Missini 
monocolore 
partitocrazia 
pentapartito
P-2, Propaganda-2
quadriparti to
Qualunquisti
UIL
Christian Democratic Party 
Proletarian Democracy 
Party of the Common Man 
Italian Social Movement 
(Neo-Fascist Party) 
Italian Communist Party 
Proletarian Unity Party 
Italian Liberal Party 
Radical Party 
Italian Republican Party 
Italian Social Democratic 
Party
Italian Socialist Party 
Italian Socialist Party of 
Proletarian Unity 
United Socialist Party
Catholic Action
ACLI, the Catholic association 
for workers 
Members of Communione e 
Liberazione 
The communist trade union 
confederation 
The ‘catholic* trade union 
confederation 
Committee of National 
Liberation 
Communion & Liberation 
Members of the MSI 
a ‘one-colour* (DC) government 
party rule (a prejudicial term 
term describing the five party 
coalition of the 1980s 
P-2 (secret anti-democratic 
masonic lodge) 
term describing the four party 
coalition of Centrism 
Members of Uomo Qualunque 
The ‘lay* trade union 
confederation
K * »
Preface
This thesis intends to build on Sartori's notion of 
polarised pluralism and its application to the Italian party 
system. In particular, the intention is to build on Sarto- 
ri's notion of mass ideological polarisation. If it is the 
case that the Italian electorate has been (and perhaps even 
remains) ideologically polarised, then how has the system 
survived? Why has it not broken down, as did other cases, 
such as the Weimar Republic? My answer, and this is the 
major goal of the thesis, is that the Italian system has 
survived because of the behaviour of the elites, and of the 
Christian Democratic elites in particular, and their efforts 
to counter the impact of polarisation.
Though Italy is not a consociational democracy, the way 
in which profound cleavages at the mass level have been 
counteracted by elite cooperation is not entirely dissimilar 
to the process described in Lijphart's model of consocia­
tional democracy.1 My thesis is about how elite cooperation 
has worked in post-war Italy and aims to tell the side of 
the story neglected by dwelling on ideological polarisation 
at the mass level. I intend to outline and analyse the 
counteracting strategies of the Christian Democratic elites 
and to discuss the constraints under which they operated, as 
well as how these have changed over time. Whilst it might 
seem that the elite strategies could be termed ‘consensual1, 
as per Lijphart's development of his consociational theory,2 
I prefer to use the notion of a ‘centre strategy' (which I 
define below). There are two reasons for this.
The first reason for eschewing the expression consensu­
1
al strategy is that whilst the aim of the centre strategy 
has been the promotion of stability, conflict and the denial 
of consensus have been intrinsic components of that strate­
gy. Secondly, the term consensus/consensual is a problemat­
ic one. Consensus is sometimes contrasted to situations of 
conflict, confrontation and polarisation as though consensus 
means stability, and conflict etc. means instability. Yet 
the relationship between stability and conflict is more 
complex than this juxtaposition warrants. Lijphart's con­
sensual type of democracy, for example, is contrasted to a 
'majoritarian1 type, yet cases closest to that type are 
themselves widely regarded as either dependent for their 
functioning on the existence of a particularly high degree 
of consensus, or as promoting consensus - or both. In fact, 
the existence of consensus in modern democracies, often 
presented as a necessary condition for their survival, is a 
matter of controversy. I myself prefer the notion of stable 
dissensus to describe the political culture of these socie­
ties, since it is their stability (which is not the same as 
stasis), and not the question of agreement on 'fundamen­
tals', or lack of it, which is the essential point.
Over the course of this study I will use a number of 
specific concepts in order to develop my argument. In 
particular, the centre strategy is identified as having two 
aspects, the 'centre party strategy' and the 'centre polit­
ical strategy'. These, and a number of related concepts, 
namely those of 'block', 'block structure', 'pole' and 
'centre' are now defined. The first definition is that of 
the centre party strategy.
2
The centre party strategy is that strategy pursued by 
Christian Democratic elites with the aim of establishing and 
maintaining the DC as the predominant party of a centre 
political block. An essential part of this strategy con­
sists in preventing the development of a two-block party 
system. That is to say, seeking to maintain a structure in 
which coalition-building is focused on a centre block be­
cause opposition parties are unable to cooperate sufficient­
ly to ground an alternative government, defines the centre 
party strategy.
The term block is used with reference to the organisa­
tion of the elite structure of the party system. As estab­
lished by Sartori, interaction is a defining feature of any 
party system qua system. However, it is argued, party 
interactions have two dimensions: an intra-elite dimension 
concerned with government, and hence with coalition-building 
and maintenance to sustain the system of parliamentary-based 
party government; and a societal dimension which is oriented 
to the mass public as an 'electorate*, and which is, in 
varying degrees, competitive and ideologically-based. The 
extent to which the elite, or governmental, dimension can be 
distinguished from the electoral and more broadly societal 
dimension is a matter of debate,3 but it is in this distinc­
tion that the concepts of block and block structure are 
rooted.
Block and block structure are terms relating specifi­
cally to the intra-elite, governmental and coalitional 
dimension of party system interaction. At this level of the 
party and political system aggregation is essential to
3
system survival since governments require the support, 
active or passive (as in abstention) of at least fifty per 
cent of the assembly from which they originate. This re­
quirement alone, independently of considerations of ideolog­
ical orientation (whose significance is not denied) encour­
ages the aggregation of parliamentarians into parties, and 
of parties into blocks. The majority requirement also 
creates a situation where the number of ways of building 
government-sustaining blocks is severely limited: in ef­
fect, as the following paragraphs establish, only three 
alternative modes of block-structuring exist. (In reality 
the situation is somewhat more complex, for a degree of 
'fluidity1 may exist given that in concrete cases a certain 
tension may exist as to which of the alternative modes of 
block structuration is effective).
The most obvious block structure is the two-block 
structure. In it party elites have essentially inflexible 
coalition or single-party government arrangements and the 
societal dimension of party interaction is allowed more 
directly to determine government formation, though remaining 
mediated by elite-determined rules, particularly those 
relating to the electoral system. Where the interplay of 
the electoral system and the mobilisational capacities of 
the two blocks allows it, alternation will be a prominent 
feature of the party system. Where alternation takes place 
the two-block system can be regarded as more-or-less bal­
anced1, in contrast to the unbalanced two-block system (such 
as that pertaining in the Northern Ireland Assembly before
4
its dissolution), where alternation is precluded.A
Alternative to the two-block system is the three-block 
system. It also has two major sub-types distinguished by 
the absence or presence of alternation. The centre-dominat­
ed variant sees the centre of the three-blocks able to 
command the support of fifty per cent plus of parliament, 
thus precluding alternation. Where the centre block is not 
thus dominant, there will be an element of alternation (if 
there were not, an unbalanced two-block system would be 
created).
Those three-block systems which do see some element of 
alternation can be regarded as having two sub-types: 'pari­
ty1 and 'flank-dominant'. In the former, the three blocks 
are roughly equal in size (the Dutch party system approxi­
mates this ideal type); in the latter, the left and right 
blocks dominate (the West German party system has approxi­
mated this type). The flank-dominant three-block party 
system may appear to be very similar to the two-block sys­
tem, given the prominence of 'left' and 'right', but it 
rightly belongs to the three-block type given the extent to 
which the elite dimension of interaction, rather than the 
electoral dimension, determines government formation.
Two of the three types of block structure have been 
discussed, the third type is the one-block structure. In a 
model based on interaction there would seem to be no possi­
bility of there being a one-block structure. As Sartori 
correctly demonstrated, there is no such thing as a one-
A. Degrees of 'balance* can be measured in terms of 'proportional ten­
ure' .
5
party party system. However, the block argument is based on 
just one dimension of interaction, the intra-elite dimen­
sion. A brief exploration of the meaning of the one-block 
structure allows some consideration of the relationship 
between the two dimensions of party system interaction. It 
is easy to begin by citing a concrete case. Thus, one-block 
interaction would describe the Austrian Grand Coalition of 
the period 1945-66. What is evident is that the one-block 
structure must contain more than one party if it is not to 
equate to the one-party state. The one-block party system, 
then, must contain at least two parties, thus permitting the 
electoral/societal dimension of interaction to take place. 
The existence of this dimension of interaction maintains the 
possibility that a different mode of intra-elite (ie block) 
interaction will emerge, and indeed in the Austrian case a 
two-block structure did emerge after 1966.
A second variant of the one-block structure would be 
that of Allqemeingkoalitionsfahigkeit. where major parties 
were now excluded from the government, now included, without 
either a two- or three-block structure becoming apparent. 
It is not felt that this ideal type could be found in the 
real world. It assumes the irrelevance of the left-right 
dimension, and this is not considered to be realistic. In 
particular, this dimension is considered to be particularly 
significant for the electoral-societal dimension of party 
system interaction, and as such to act as a constraint on, 
and opportunity for, intra-elite (block) interaction.
It has been established that even the one-block system 
must contain more than one party, for otherwise there is no
6
longer any party systemic interaction. But clearly all 
blocks may be composed of more than one party, not just that 
of the one-block system. We must distinguish between blocks 
and parties. In so far as Sartori refers to coalitional 
groupings of parties as ‘poles', Sartori elides the two. In 
fact, individual parties are poles, that is poles of attrac­
tion for different electorates, so that all blocks are, or 
are potentially, multipolar. The block-based model of party 
system interaction significantly modifies Sartori's pole- 
based approach by making explicit the distinction between 
parties and blocks, and by challenging the reductionist 
fusion of the mass and elite levels of party system interac­
tion which that model entails.
A brief examination of the British case clearly reveals 
the significance of distinguishing between blocks and poles. 
At the intra-elite, governmental level, the British party 
system is clearly a two-block system. But it is a distort­
ing simplification to label this system a two-party system. 
Nor does it greatly further our understanding, useful though 
it is, to distinguish between a two-party system at the 
parliamentary level and a multi-party (more than two) system 
at the electoral level. The British party system is a 
rigidly structured two-block system which is not only a 
multi-party system (ie democratic), but pluri-party ie a 
system with more than two relevant parties. The point is 
that one, at least, of the blocks is multipolar, though the 
predominance of the two leading parties in parliament has 
obscured this. In recent years it has become apparent that 
only one party has been truly predominant, and that the so-
7
called two-party system is markedly unbalanced from a dia­
chronic point of view. In other words, the Liberal (Demo­
cratic) Party has been consistently Relevant*, and this 
relevance could, in the future, force the definitive aban­
donment of the erroneous two-party label. The multipolarity 
of blocks, then, is extremely significant for understanding 
the evolution of block structure and the relationships 
between parties within and between blocks. This brings us, 
finally, to the definition of 'the centre political strate- 
gy'.
The centre political strategy can be defined as a 
strategy which has sought to promote party interaction 
within and across blocks. Such interaction need not be 
'consensual* in the sense of co-operative. Indeed, highly 
aggressive electoral confrontation, self-evidently and 
intentionally antagonistic, may be politically 'centrist' in 
that it promotes party interaction to the detriment of non- 
party, extraparliamentary (or armed 'party') interaction.
Having defined block structure, distinguished blocks 
from poles, and defined, and distinguished between, the 
centre political strategy and the centre party strategy, it 
remains to define the centre. In this thesis the term is 
used in two explicitly distinct ways, to a degree reflecting 
the two dimensions of party system interaction. The first 
use of the term refers to the existence, in a three-block 
system, of a centre-block. Clearly, not all party systems 
have such a centre. Distinct from, but not unrelated to, 
this centre is the 'relational centre'. The relational 
centre exists in all successfully established party systems
8
and its definition is best approached by way of example.
According to Franz-Urban Pappi, the West German party 
system based on the CDU-CSU, the FDP and the SPD was best 
understood as based on their being a triangular relationship 
between the parties (or blocks, as per this analysis), not a 
linear one.4 This being the case, 'the centre1 becomes a 
point in the middle of the triangle, its precise location 
being determined by the relationship pertaining between the 
blocks. Such a centre is existent even in two-block sys­
tems.
The relational centre, then, is distinct from the 
centre block (where it exists), though the block centre and 
the relational centres are clearly not unrelated. As can be 
seen from Pappi's model, determining the nature of the 
relational centre clearly depends on defining the spatial 
locations of the blocks, hence the nature of the relation­
ship between them, and the distance between the blocks.
The nature of the party system blocks in Italy, and of 
the relationship between them, is the subject matter of 
Chapter One. Most of the concepts which I have outlined 
above are found there as part and parcel of the review of 
existing interpretations of the Italian party system and its 
fucntioning. Chapters Two and Three argue that a relational 
centre was established in the decade 1943-53, thus proposing 
that a major political continuity underlies the first post­
war decade, despite the dramatic events of 1947-48. The 
distinction between the relational centre and the centre 
block is crucial to this proposition, since it is argued 
that despite the atmosphere of ideological polarisation
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between the three blocks, they nevertheless remained bound 
together as an interactive unity.
Chapter Four takes this contrast as the basis of an 
argument that post-war Italy has seen an imperfect consoli­
dation of its party system, indeed, of its democracy. In 
particular, that domination of the centre which the centre- 
dominant three-block party system witnesses is shown to 
promote an intense political competitiveness, and hence 
potential for change, which the system*s managers, ie the 
political elites, find extremely difficult to cope with. In 
Chapter Five, unions and business organisations are thus 
shown to have moved into the political limelight in the late 
1960s, challenging the failure of the party system to re­
spond to demands for political innovation. This development 
is shown to counter the hitherto prevailing situation of 
their relative subordination to the political elites.
The profundity of these socio-economic challenges is 
shown, in Chapters Six and Seven, to switch attention back 
to the political system and to the structure of the party 
system. Now, however, attention shifts from examining the 
relationship between the relational centre and the construc­
tion and maintenance of the block centre, towards the sig­
nificance of the asymmetry of the three-block system. Thus 
the trend towards the establishment of a two-block system is 
examined. The peculiar difficulty of coping with change in 
a centre dominant three-block system is, however, shown to 
remain critical, so that at the start of the 1990s block 
structural organisation is highly fluid. A degree of three- 
block structuring remains, encouraged by the DC and PSI,
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Both of whom wish to marginalise the PCI (and MSI), and to 
benefit from the national and international collapse of 
Communism. At the same time, the two-block option is seen 
to remain an attractive possibility for certain elites in 
the DC and other parties. Finally, however, the general 
decomposition of block differentiation is also shown to be 
significant, and this is examined in terms of the relevance 
of the multipolar one-block model of party system structur­
ing.
The conclusion reviews the main themes examined in the 
thesis itself and sketches the historical evolution of party 
system structuring. In so far as post-war Italian politi­
cal development can be 'read off1 as the evolution of the 
relational centre, Italy is argued to have a national iden­
tity created by party system interaction, and therefore to 
be comparable to other multi=party democracies. At the same 
time, the particular articulation of political forces, ie 
the centre-dominant three-block party system, is shown to 
have hindered the development of national unity and in 
particular the construction of a strongly legitimised con­
stitutional state, rendering the Italian case 'peculiar'.
(1) A.Lijphart, Democracy in Plural Societies. New Haven: Yale Univer­
sity Press, 1977.
(2) A.Lijphart, Democracies. Patterns of Ma.ioritarian and Consensus 
Government in Twentv-One Countries. New Haven and London: Yale Universi­
ty Press, 1984.
(3) See P.Mair, 'The Problem of Party System Change', pp.251-276, and 
G.Smith, 'The System Perspective on Party System Change', pp.349-363, in 
Journal of Theoretical Politics. 1:3, 1989, esp. pp.259-260.
(4) F.U.Pappi, 'The West German Party System', in West European Po- 
litcs. 1984, pp.7-26.
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INTRODUCTION ITALIAN CHRISTIAN DEMOCRACY:
THE NATURE OF ITS SUCCESS
I POLITICAL SUCCESS, PARTY SUCCESS AND THE PARTY SYSTEM
Success and disillusion are the fruits which Christian 
Democracy has brought Catholic democrats in Italy. This 
thesis explores the reasons for this paradox, taking as its 
starting point what is arguably the main characteristic of 
Democrazia cristiana (the DC) - its identification as a mass 
centre party. This identification is open to question but, 
as we shall see, this is just one of many aspects of what is 
argued to be the inherently self-contradictory nature of the 
mass centre party.
Before laying out the bases for explaining the contrast 
between success and disillusion it is necessary to indicate 
the very real extent of the DC's success. The Christian 
Democrats have been highly successful as a vote-maximising 
party and as a government-orientated party. Throughout the 
post-war period the DC has been the largest party in parlia­
ment thanks to its ability to gain some two-fifths of the 
vote, and the party has always dominated coalition formation. 
Even when, between 1981 and 1987, it finally ceded the pre­
miership, the party continued to dominate the cabinet, field­
ing as many ministers in its own right as its coalition 
partners in total. By the end of the 1980s the party was 
seen to be reasserting its power.1 Up to 1990, then, post­
war Italy had seen no full-fledged government alternation, no 
Machtwechsel, or change of power, as the evocative German 
expression puts it. In Western Europe, only the Swedish
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Social Democrats have achieved such success, for they gov­
erned for forty four uninterrupted years (1932-76). Yet even 
there the new electoral volatility of the 1970s2 enabled the 
parties of the so-called 'bourgeois block1 to turn the Social 
Democrats out of office in 1976, and to win a further elec­
tion in 1979, thus reinforcing this reverse.
Christian Democrat success in Italy, moreover, with­
stood the transformation of Italy from a largely peasant 
society into an industrial and post-industrial society which 
by the late 1980s, it was claimed, had overtaken Great 
Britain in terms of standard of living and in terms of its 
international standing as the world's fifth industrial power. 
Despite the persisting disparity between north and south, the 
whole country had undergone a profound metamorphosis and, 
contrary to the orthodoxy of an earlier period, it was now 
argued that Italy's political elites could be thought not 
only to have been peculiarly responsive to Italy's social 
transformation, but to have been innovative and effective in 
providing the state with constructive leadership3 in a sus­
tained fashion - perhaps for the first time in its history. 
Thus, Italy's dramatic and successful development in the 
1950s and '60s, which had been presented as a model for 
developing countries,4 was followed by signs of the country's 
economic resilience in the 1980s which led it to again be 
presented as a model - this time to the advanced economies.5 
Such success was thrown into even starker relief by the 
events of 1989/90, when even the Communist regimes of Eastern 
Europe proved more vulnerable than the so-called 'DC regime'.
Against this success, however, the many criticisms
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levelled at Italian government have called into question the 
qualitative nature of the Christian Democratic record. This 
criticism was not only of sufficient strength to force the DC 
to accept the formation of governments led by the party's 
smaller coalition allies in the 1980s, but resulted in the 
party being led through most of that decade by a secretary, 
Ciriaco De Mita, whose disillusion with his own party was 
repeatedly displayed. Yet it is difficult to measure the 
qualitative achievements of government. How, for example, 
does one answer the question of whether the government pro­
vided by the DC was not the best possible in the circum­
stances? The difficulty of finding an answer to this ques­
tion allowed Christian Democratic Party leaders, despite the 
party's setbacks, to continue to assert their pride in the 
accomplishments of their party.
It is argued here that an answer to the problem of how 
to assess DC success lies in consideration of what it means 
to be a mass centre party. The thesis argues that the fact 
that the DC has been just one party in a competitive multi­
party system has forced the Christian Democrats to pursue 
success both for themselves as a party, and for the Italian 
people as a nation. It is with regard to this dual focus on 
party and nation that the 'centrism' of the DC is particular­
ly significant, a point we shall pursue after first consider­
ing an objection to this line of reasoning. It can be argued 
that political parties pursue their own self-interest, and 
that of their backers, entirely without regard for any sup­
posed 'national interest'. This objection to the thesis can 
be carried further by claiming that evidence exists to the
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effect that political parties pursue sectional or partial 
interests on such a sustained basis as to indicate the irrel­
evance of, and hence non-existence of, such a thing as a 
'national interest1. This thesis explicitly counters that 
argument by analysing the DC both as an autonomous actor and 
as a part of an interactive system of parties in which the 
whole is different to the mere sum of the parts.6 It is on 
the basis of the analysis of the DC as a part of a system 
that the thesis reaches conclusions about the contribution of 
the DC to nation- and state-building in Italy.
The thesis examines the problem of the nature of the 
DC's 'success' by distinguishing between a centrist party 
strategy and a centrist political strategy. These concepts 
mirror the distinction made above between the party as an 
autonomous actor and the party as part of a system. In the 
first case the party pursues its sectional, or organisation­
al, self-interest? in the second, the party champions the 
national interest, seeking to provide leadership to the 
state. Of course, the two strategies are intimately inter­
related.
The centrist political strategy can be defined as one 
which seeks to encourage the consolidation of democracy by 
promoting interaction between the relevant parties of a party 
system in the interests of democratic government. This 
strategy is particularly important in the installation and 
consolidation of democracy. Exponents of this strategy seek 
to limit the exclusion of major political parties (their own 
no less than that of other parties) from the political proc­
esses of the multi-party democratic state since such exclu­
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sion is seen as undemocratic and as harmful to political 
stability. By contrast, the centrist party strategy aims to 
exclude opposition parties, on both left and right, from 
government, with the aim of monopolising or dominating gov­
ernment. The effect of this strategy is to create a party 
system structured into three blocks.^
There is an inherent tension between a strategy centred 
on exclusion, and one centred on minimising exclusion. It is 
the initial coincidence and, subsequently, the increasing 
difficulty of combining the two strategies which the major 
part of this thesis examines. The difficulty of maintaining 
this combination has meant that the three-block system has 
been consistently threatened with being replaced by either a 
two-block or by a one-block system, ie, in effect, by a 
system based on alternation between 'left' and 'right1 which 
would at some point cast the DC into the opposition, or by a 
grand coalition which would bring all the relevant parties 
into the government. The existence of these alternative 
modes of structuring the party system is considered to be a 
major source of dynamism in the party system, independent of 
ideology and sociological 'cleavage' structure, even if both 
these factors are important in themselves.
The combination of the inherent disharmony between the 
centrist party strategy and the centrist political strategy, 
and the existence of alternative modes of structuring the
A. The block structure of party systems is a theme of con­
siderable importance in the thesis. For reasons which will 
be made clear, this terminology is preferred to one based on 
the number of 'poles' present in the system.
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party system are argued to have provided the Italian party 
system with great dynamism. As a consequence, the apparent 
stability of the electorate has, it is argued, been based on 
the dynamism of the political elites, not their immobilism.
The difficulty of combining a centrist party strategy 
with a centrist political strategy in a single mass party 
grows over time because its very achievement renders the 
contradiction between them apparent. The establishment of a 
three-block party system as a result of the successful union 
of the two strategies by a mass party is a significant phase 
in the process of installing democracy, and this success 
casts doubt on the democratic legitimacy of excluding opposi­
tion parties which have collaborated in founding that democ­
racy. The consolidation of democracy renders the exclusion­
ary effect of the three-block structure increasingly unjusti­
fiable. As a consequence, the centrist party strategy be­
comes increasingly inimical to a centrist political strategy 
and the qualitative failings of the government are readily 
blamed on government itself, rather than on the difficult 
situation in which successive governments find themselves. 
Thus the stage is set for a restructuring of the party system 
as a one- or two-block system in which the mass centre party 
loses its defining feature by becoming identified with either 
the right or the left, or else by becoming just one of sever­
al centre parties, whether or not there is an actual decline 
in its relative size.
The 'success' of the mass centre party will be judged 
differently by those who favour its political strategy and 
who those who value its party strategy. For the former, the
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eventual restructuring of the party system to allow stable 
alternation will be seen as the party's (and the strategy's) 
crowning success, as well as the means by which the quality 
of government is maintained. For the latter, the quality of 
government depends more simply on who wields it, and a one- 
block structure in which the traditional government party is 
able to continue to dominate will be preferred to the crea­
tion of a two-block structure.
The contradictions of the mass centre party derive not, 
pace Duverger, from the fact that the centre does not exist 
in politics. On the contrary, the first two chapters of the 
thesis argue that the centre necessarily dominates multi­
party systems, even when it is not occupied. However, where 
the centre is apparently occupied, such a 'centre' party 
cannot indefinitely maintain a monopoly of that centre.
II THESIS STRUCTURE
Chapter One examines the theoretical materials concern­
ing the nature of 'the centre' in Italy. First, it simply 
illustrates the importance of the terms left, centre and 
right in Italian politics. It then outlines four major 
theories concerning the nature and functioning of the Italian 
party system, the first three by political scientists, the 
fourth by a sociologist. This last is shown to criticise the 
former for so emphasising political division and fragmenta­
tion that all sense of there being a social 'whole' is lost. 
Finally, my own understanding of the centre as having a 
double significance is elaborated and related to an under­
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standing of the party system as a 'contradictory unity'7. 
This concept, allied to the two meanings of the centre, 
provides a basis for synthesising the contrasting pictures of 
the Italian polity presented by political scientists and 
sociologists, so gaining an improved understanding of the 
Christian Democrats and the nature of party competition in 
Italy.
The subsequent chapters explore the changing meaning of 
the centre in Italian politics and the evolving strategy of 
the Christian Democratic Party. Chapter Two is devoted to 
the crucial initial post-war period of Italian politics. It 
first outlines the organisational and ideological heterogene­
ity of the DC in order to establish the complexity of the 
party and of 'sociological' cleavages. Then, using the 
insights into party system mechanics and strategies formulat­
ed in Chapter One, it focuses on the strategy of encouraging 
'synchronic centrism', or grand coalition, in the period 
1943-47. The importance of this period, often overlooked in 
accounts which focus on the 1948 election as the Republic's 
founding moment, is stressed, yet the entire period 1943-53 
is presented as one of important continuities. This is an 
unusual approach which stems from the logic of the argument 
outlined in the concluding section of Chapter One; the utili­
ty and validity of this logic is scrutinised in Chapter 
Three, where, continuing the argument, centre domination 
established between 1943 and 1947/48 is shown to have been 
maintained through its transformation in the period 1947-53.
Chapter Four analyses the strains put on the DC and the 
party and political systems from 1953 to 1968. By distin­
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guishing between the centrist party strategy, aimed at the 
success of the party as an organisation, and the centrist 
political strategy, understood as a strategy of state leader­
ship, the evolution of the party system and Italian society 
is shown to have changed the significance of the by-now 
well-established centrist strategy of the DC. Whereas the 
unity of the two strategies originally reflected a genuinely 
democratic dialectic within the party itself and within the 
party system, this unity is argued to have come increasingly 
to represent the un- and anti-democratic manipulation of the 
party system by unrepresentative special interests.
In Chapter Five, the essentially chronological ordering 
of the thesis is put to one side in order to examine the 
politics of economic policy-making. The shift in analytical 
approach at this stage is appropriate, for whilst focusing on 
what is accepted as being the prime determinant of left and 
right (attitudes and approaches to economic policy-making) it 
underlines the importance of the political centre and of 
treating the party system as a 'contradictory unity1, yet 
directs attention to non-party actors, and towards the polit­
ical system more generally. In fact, 1969 may be considered 
as a watershed between an earlier period when the parties 
could be considered to dominate, both as collective political 
actors and as policy-makers, and the subsequent period when 
the very principle of party government was challenged. 
Chapter Five thus relates the DC1s centrist economics both to 
its inter-relationship with the other parties in the party 
system, and to the changing relationship between the parties 
and society at large.
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IChapter Six focuses on the trend towards the develop­
ment of a two-block party system, based on the DC and PCI, 
between 1968 and 1979. This development reasserted the 
importance of the political parties and the structure of the 
party system since a 'normalised' two-block structure leading 
to alternation would also have brought wide-ranging social 
changes in its wake. In the event, what is shown to have 
survived is the peculiar hybrid structure of the Italian 
party system, resulting from its suspension between a not- 
quite realised two-block structure and an increasingly 
out-of-equilibrium three block system.
The inability of the PCI successfully to play the role 
required to bring about a two-block structuration of the 
party system is shown, in Chapter Seven, to have provided the 
grounds for Craxi's protagonism, rooted in the position and 
strength of the PSI. The 1980s are shown as a decade in 
which the declining relevance of left and right, as hitherto 
understood and organised, affected Italy no less than the 
rest of Europe, so that a tendency to unipolarism, or the 
presence of a single block was present, in which parties were 
apparently willing to 'play the field' in seeking electoral 
advantage. At the same time, given that in a multi-party 
system government-formation is almost by definition about 
excluding the opposition(s), the ideological positions behind 
block definitions were still emphasised by both the'DC and 
the PSI. Both parties sought to exert maximum damage on 
their common rival, the PCI, despite the fact that circum­
stances, and the PCI itself, had fundamentally changed. In 
1990, the division and weakness of the left was Democrazia
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cristianafs winning card, enabling it to continue to be the 
party of government, the party of the centre, in a situation 
in which both left and right seemed to have been successfully 
marginalised.
Chapter Eight concludes the thesis by restating the 
major themes drawn out in the body of the thesis: the limited 
number of patterns of block structuring available in a party 
system, and the role of party strategy in determining which 
structure of interaction dominates; the distinction between 
the centre block and the party system core, and the rejection 
of polar terminology? the role of the party system as a 
'contradictory unity1 and its bearing on the 'consociational 
democracy theme'. Finally, the evolution of the Italian 
party system is reviewed, and its impact on nation- and 
state-building assessed.
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CHAPTER 1 APPROACHES TO UNDERSTANDING
THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM
De Gasperi, the key founding figure of the Italian 
Christian Democrats, defined his party in 1946 as a 'centre 
party, moving to the left*. In Chapter Two we shall look at 
the precise circumstances in which De Gasperi coined this 
expression. Here, the importance of left/centre/right image­
ry in post-war Italian politics is quickly established, and 
some questions raised about the significance of such imagery 
in shaping both the organisation of government and politics, 
and different understandings of the nature of power. The 
remainder of the Chapter surveys existing theories of the DC 
and the party system, considers their weaknesses, and con­
cludes by outlining a new basis for analysing the Italian 
party and the DC's place in it.
I LEFT, CENTRE AND RIGHT IN ITALIAN POLITICS
Writing on the Italian constitution towards the end of 
the 1980s, David Hine, an experienced commentator on Italian 
government and politics, observed that government in Italy 
had never been of the right/centre-right, since it had always 
had to co-opt the left in some way, indeed including the PCI 
specifically. Governments have thus been Centrist, Centre- 
Left or a grand coalition.1 Writing elsewhere in the same 
period, Hine confirmed that this centrality of government 
reflected, or reinforced, the DC's own centrism, stating that 
the Christian Democratic Party's long-term success derived 
from its centre position in the party spectrum, rather than
24
because of any putat i ve  stabi li ty  of a ' c a p t u r e d 5 
electorate.2 The stability of the Italian electorate is a 
matter of controversy, and the received orthodoxy, estab­
lished in the 1960s, has been subjected to recent revision, 
but we shall deal with this topic later. Here we remain with 
the question of the DC's centrism. What is remarkable about 
Hine's judgments is the fact that they can be made ten to 
fifteen years after the clear-cut parties of the right have 
had any but marginal significance. The DC somehow remains a 
centre party, even the centre party, in a centre dominated 
system, when all but half the electorate, and virtually every 
political party is located more or less to its left. How is 
this kind of alignment possible?
Schematic representation of seating arrangements:
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In order to begin to answer this question it is neces­
sary to understand the so-called coalition 'formulae' which 
have sustained post-war governments. These themselves need 
much explaining, but for the moment they will be described 
rather than analysed and taken as a useful starting point. 
These different ‘government formulae' have been used to 
divide post-war political history into specific periods, and 
conventionally three periods are identified, covering the 
years 1947/48-1980. The period subsequent to 1980 is rather 
'difficult' to classify in the same terms, for reasons which 
we shall explore below.
Coalition 'formulae': classic rendering
) Government parties: PLI, DC, PRI PSDI 
‘Centrism* > Excluded - right: MSI & Monarchists (circa 12%)
1948-63 ) - left : PSI & PCI (circa 36%)
) Government parties: DC, PRI, PSDI, PSI 
‘Centre-Left* > Excluded - right: MSI, Mon. & PLI (circa 13%)
1968-72 ) - left : PCI, PSIUP (circa 32%)
‘Historic ) Government parties: DC, PRI, PSDI, PSI, PLI, PCI
Compromise* > Excluded - right: MSI (circa 6%)
1976 ) - left: Radicals, DP (circa 3%)
Notes: Dates are approximate and refer to election data used to indicate 
electoral support for the excluded left and right.
The term Government parties is rather loose, referring, for the Historic 
Compromise formula, at least, to the legislative coalition rather than 
inclusion in the cabinet.
The terminology of these so-called government formulae, 
ie Centre and Centre-Left pervades Italian popular culture, 
and this periodisation of post-war Italian political history 
is quite standard. Its starting-point is the break of the 
post-war grand coalition, based on the three mass parties,
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the DC, PCI and PSI, and the formation of a series of govern­
ments based on the Christian Democratic Party, and the three 
minor parties: the Liberals, Social Democrats and Republi­
cans. This so-called Centrist formula excluded the Monar­
chists and neo-Fascist MSI on the right, and the Socialists 
and Communists on the left. In the early 1960s, the Liberals 
were swapped for the Socialists, giving rise to the Centre- 
Left. On the basis of this periodisation, Aldo Moro, Italy*s 
leading political figure in the 1960s and *70s, dubbed the 
period that began in, or around, 1976 as the 'third phase1. 
The exact significance this term had for Moro can never be 
known, for he was assassinated in 1978, but it clearly indi­
cated that for him the old coalition formulae were no longer 
adequate.
Clearly too, the expression coincided with the so- 
called Historic Compromise when the PCI all but entered the 
government, and from 1976 the key political question was 
whether a grand coalition would be formed, and whether this 
would be but a stepping stone (as it had been in West Germany 
between 1966-69) to a new coalition formula based on the 
exclusion of the DC. In fact, talk of a grand coalition 
invoked memories of the pre-1947/48 period, suggesting that 
the post-Centre-Left phase was not a third phase at all, but 
a fourth. With Moro1 s death and the end of the Historic 
Compromise a new period can be considered to have started, 
thus giving us five basic governmental formulae with which to 
sum up post-war Italian political history (see over).
The oentaoartito (five party [government]) formula 
contained the four parties of the Centre-Left and the Liber-
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Amended Post-War Coalition Formulae
1. Grand Coalition: based on the CLNA , 1943-47/48
2. Centrism: exclusion of 'extremes1, 1947/8-63
3. Centre-Left: PSI replaces PLI, 1964-76
4. Historic Compromise: unstable stop-gap, 1976-79
5. Pentapartito: Govt, from PSI to PLI, 1979-?
als. As the PLI had shifted its image, in the late 1970s, 
away from being a tough right-of-centre party, there was a 
tendency for the new coalition to be seen as a revamped 
Centre-Left. Both because both the MSI and the PCI remain 
excluded from government and because those parties remain 
identified with the Fascist 'Right1 and the Leninist/Stalin­
ist 'Left', the DC continues to claim to be a centre party, 
or even, in tune with the coalition formula, a party of the 
centre-left, as opportune. Naturally, the DC's opponents 
deny that it is either centre-left or centre, but this argu­
ment has been around for as long as the party system, and is 
the central feature of this inquiry.
What has been established here is simply the pervasive­
ness of left/centre/right terminology in Italian political 
culture and the linkage with coalition formulae. If we are 
to avoid going around in circles, however, it is essential to 
delve more deeply into the relationship between the nature of
A. Committee for National Liberation. This was the umbrella 
organisation which brought together the anti-Fascist parties. 
It included the three mass parties and brought together the 
three major political traditions: socialist, catholic and 
liberal. Its importance is much stressed in Chapter Two.
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the DC itself and its success in maintaining the structure of 
the party system, ie its vestigial three-block division.
II POWER AND POLITICAL BLOCKS
A key to better understanding the nature of the rela­
tionship between the DC and the party system lies in ques­
tioning the significance of the absence of government alter­
nation. Elsewhere, such alternation is a visible indicator 
of change in the balance of political power, even where, as 
in the Netherlands, a significant centre block is always in 
government. Does the absence of alternation in Italy mean 
there has been no change in the balance of political power 
for nearly half a century? The changing coalition formulae 
indicate some movement, yet overall, it is continuity, rather 
than change, which is striking. The DC has always been in 
government, and always been dominant. If a 'balance of 
power* has obtained, what has been the nature of DC power, of 
Christian Democratic Party government? Let us first ask what 
the expression balance of power means.
A. Two Concepts of Power
There are two ways of understanding what constitutes a 
balance of power, each with different implications for the 
way we think about government and political competition, for 
each of the two approaches involves a different understanding 
of the meaning of left, right and centre. Most importantly, 
they form the bases for different renderings of the concept 
of 'polarisation', of the nature of differentiation between
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blocks, and of government/opposition relations.
In the first approach, the balance of power in a three- 
block situation is a 'balance of exclusion1 where each block 
is sovereign and autonomous, distinguished from the others by 
irreconcilable antagonisms. The blocks are locked in combat 
and it is essentially fortuitous that the relative sizes of 
the blocks creates a situation where the strength of the 
centre block allows it to exclude the other two from power.
The alternative approach concedes that government/ 
opposition relations are a battle for power, but sees the 
battle as one in which a mutually beneficent (positive-sum) 
game is played by the blocks. In this version the blocks 
cannot be rigidly separated from one another, nor assumed to 
interact solely according to a zero-sum logic. Thus, the 
balance of power means that the centre block executes poli­
cies which left and/or right will find preferable to possible 
alternatives. In some sense, there is common ground between 
the blocks, with left and right involved in determining what 
the centre block actually does. Block interaction is not a 
naked power struggle, a zero-sum game which risks becoming a 
negative-sum game in which everyone loses. Such a situation 
would approach the 'anti-politics*3 of civil war. The ques­
tion of how close post-war Italy has been to civil war or to 
military involvement in politics is one we shall address in 
considering the creation and maintenance of Italy's multi­
party system.
B. Blocks and 'Polarisation'
In raising the topic of the collapse of constitutional
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politics we must address the concept of 'polarisation1, that 
is the problem of extreme political attitudes and their 
effect on political behaviour. As we shall see in discussing 
Catholic integralism in Chapter Two, all three blocks in 
Italy have been accused of being quasi-totalitarian, and the 
first model of power reflects such judgments. It is this 
model on which Sartori relies when using his key concept, 
'polarisation1. Combined with a unilinear model of political 
space, where left, centre and right are distinct 'poles1 
strung out in a line, the concept gives rise to two problems.
First, in such a model only the wing 'poles' of the 
spectrum can be extreme. This prevents consideration of the 
effect of all three blocks regarding the others as quasi­
total itarian, given the presence in all of elements bent on 
the defeat, domination and exclusion of the other blocks. 
Secondly, and contrarily to the first point, the linear 
tripolar scheme prevents consideration of the possibility 
that the three blocks have much that is positive in common. 
These rather difficult ideas are explained in much greater 
depth in Section V of this chapter where different ways of 
theorising the centre are discussed.
C. Block Interaction and Block Structure
The importance of distinguishing the two approaches to 
understanding power for our understanding of the nature of 
conflict and cooperation can be seen if we make some prelimi­
nary points about block interaction and block structure in 
Italy, particularly regarding the DC/PCI relationship. It is 
extremely doubtful that the DC was an anti-worker party which
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totally rejected the left, just as it is highly dubious to 
see the left as an uncompromising opposition block. For all 
the antagonism, the evidence is surely such that a more 
complex picture is needed in which cooperation is able to 
fully enter the relationship, even whilst acknowledging a 
degree of truth in the argument that such cooperation may be 
intended for ends which are ultimately non- or anti-democrat- 
ic. The significance of cross-block cooperation goes beyond 
this consideration. For one thing, the fact that the Commu­
nist leadership was a remarkably conservative force in the 
1940s, compared with the Socialists (and Actionists), cannot 
be written off with such a limited explanation. On the 
other, the Christian Democratic Party*s struggle to promote 
its identification with the left, in preference to the right, 
has been sustained: from anti-Fascist solidarity in the 
period 1944-47, through the 'opening to the left' in 1963, to 
competition with the Socialist Party in the 1980s as a 
'popular', anti-conservative and even 'social democratic' 
party. Even the rejection of the left during the one phase, 
centrism (1947-63), allowed the DC to defeat and isolate the 
right too, as was clear from 1953.
Given these complexities, we need to know why three 
blocks were formed in the period 1946-53 instead of two, and 
how the block 'managers', the political elites, understood 
this development. Contrary to Sartori's stress on ideologi­
cal polarisation, the simple fact of the number of blocks in 
the Italian party system is the fundamental starting point of 
this analysis. Usually we think in terms of there being a 
left/right dualism, ie two blocks representing left and
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right, so why did three develop in Italy? To avoid a circu­
lar argument, we must avoid taking the post 1947/48 situa­
tion, especially ‘polarisation1, as its own cause, for then 
neither the successful establishment of a parliamentary 
democracy nor the long-term tendency towards the development 
of a one-block party system can be grasped - as Sartori's own 
difficulty in seeing this development makes clear.
D. Block Differentiation: Ideology as Policy and/or Image
It can be argued that, constrained by the ‘realities of 
power1, democratic parties differ little from each other once 
in power.4 As against this argument, much ink has been spilt 
in the political sciences in the attempt to show that ‘par­
ties matter1 in the Lipsetian sense of translating the class 
struggle into democratic politics.5 By the end of the 1980s, 
and starkly contrasting Sartori1s emphasis on polarisation, 
the tendency towards the development of a single political 
block in Italy was so advanced that even there the policy 
versus politics debate was well under way,6 the question 
asked, whether parties did influence policy-making in a 
consistently ideological, or class-based way.
Were it applicable to Italy, the extreme form of this 
argument would reverse the view that three sovereign and 
distinct political blocks have sought to gain power in post­
war Italy in order to put totally opposed policies into 
practice. It would argue, instead, that three vociferous 
teams of politicians have competed to be allowed the right of 
exclusively managing the same state with substantially the 
same policies. In its extreme form this argument is obvious­
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ly unsustainable, but it is a useful to bear it in mind as an 
antidote to dwelling on a class-ideological view of the 
motivation of political elites. As 'ideal types1, the two 
models can be taken as indicating the need to distinguish 
between: one, the extent to which political parties in Italy 
have been ideologically distinct in terms of elite policy- 
intent ions, and two, the extent to which parties have been 
ideologically distinct in order to maintain electoral/mobili- 
sational images.
An important question here is how flexible the DC's 
democratic ideology has been, given the party's ability to 
permit seemingly non-feasible, if limited, forms of coopera­
tion with other parties whilst simultaneously maintaining 
rigidly distinct from them. Typically, ideological incompat­
ibility has been punctiliously delineated precisely at times 
when policy convergence has been pursued. The drawing of a 
sharp distinction between party elites (or at least their 
dominant elements),7 and their militant bases and different 
electorates, traditional and potential, is a matter of great 
importance in examining block interaction.
E. The Government/Opposition Relationship and Political Leadership
In addressing the issue of inter-block relations, it 
should not be forgotten that what is at stake is access to 
governmental power and exclusion from it. Nevertheless, the 
question has to be asked, as to what extent oppositions are 
involved in governmental policy-making, not only in direct 
decision-making processes, but also indirectly. Indirect 
participation can be seen as operating in two forms. On the
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one hand, there is the governments desire to avoid provoking 
or exacerbating tensions? on the other, there is the opposi­
tions tendency to give some sort of support to measures 
which are seen to favour the interests of its own supporters, 
or the collective interest of the polity.
If government/opposition interaction is at all signifi­
cant where government is provided by the operation of a 
multi-party system, a question is raised about the nature of 
political domination, or leadership in such systems. In a 
situation of interactive, multi-party competition, leadership 
is provided by the elites yet arises from horizontal interac­
tion between the elites and vertical interaction between 
elites and society. What, then, is the position of the PCI 
elite? Its relationship with its mass base is one of leader­
ship, but the relationship is one which the other party 
elites may influence. At the same time, the PCI's position 
within the elite level is clearly inferior to that of the 
governing block, yet it is not without influence. This 
complex situation suggests that there is neither DC 'hegemo­
ny1 nor, surely, the equal leadership of a consensual and 
unified cross-party political class.
It is time to consider some of the existing interpreta­
tions of the Italian party system.
II EXISTING THEORIES OF THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC PARTY
AND THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM
Some of the best-known theories of Italian politics 
have focused on the structure of the party system and the 
nature of the parties in it. Thus, Giovanni Sartori developed
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a model of 'polarised pluralism' in which he characterised 
the DC as a centre party in a tripolar system. In this 
system, the centre furnishes the country with its government, 
and that government is confronted by 'bipolar opposition', ie 
opposition on both left and right. By contrast, Giorgio 
Galli presented a model in which the DC is essentially a 
party of the centre-right, not so different from the West 
German Christian Democratic Union or the British Conservative 
Party. Galli stuck closer to the more traditional two-block 
model of party system structuring, based on the simple coun­
tering of left and right to each other as two blocks. Compe­
tition between the two major parties, the PCI and the DC, 
dominated the system, but the domination of the left block by 
the Communists, and the consequent inability to establish a 
'normal' process of political alternation between left and 
right meant that the system was 'blocked'. The system was 
described as one of 'imperfect bipartism'.
Both Sartori's and Galli's models date from the 1960s, 
but in the late 1970s Paolo Farneti gave them new currency. 
In a comprehensive work he produced a synthesis of the two 
theories and updated them historically to produce a model of 
'centripetal pluralism'. These models are examined in some 
detail in this section, along with the critique of party 
system based approaches by Alessandro Pizzorno. Evaluation 
is suspended until Section IV, whilst Section V suggests a 
way of combining the best of all these theories.
A. Sartori: the Mechanics of Centre Placement
Sartori's theory supports the DC's own evaluation of
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itself.8 The Christian Democratic Party is a centre party, 
but Sartori ties this evaluation not to the party's ideology 
and/or practice, so much as to the structure of the party 
system itself. The party system is 'tripolar*, left, right 
and centre each being a 'pole' of attraction for votes, and 
the centre pole is dominated by the DC. Since the centre 
governs, there is a situation of 'bilateral opposition', and 
since the parties of the left and right poles will not coop­
erate to form an alternative government, the centre (essen­
tially the DC) is 'doomed1 to govern.
This situation might be thought of as intrinsically 
unstable since the centre block needs fifty per cent of 
parliamentary seats, plus one, to survive, and it is outnum­
bered two to one by the opposition blocks whose ability to 
gain deputies is not hindered by a remarkably proportional 
electoral system. The government coalition thus competes 
without special constitutional favour in a situation where 
the oppositions are, as Sartori's polar imagery has it, 
(magnetically) attractive. The growth of just one opposi­
tional pole, let alone of both, is likely to have catastroph­
ic consequences for the party system. Moreover, because the 
oppositional 'wing' poles are extremes, the collapse of the 
tripolar system will plunge the entire democratic political 
system into chaos. The potential for distinction between 
catastrophic change of the party system and of the political 
system is lost in Sartori's model for the poles are not 
merely competitive, but virulently so, and this virulence is 
a self-maintaining feature of the system, qua system. The 
'occupation of the centre1 by the DC renders moderate
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centre-left and centre-right stances unattractive, for these 
positions can and will be outbid by more extreme parties. 
Voters and activists in these positions will be forced to 
choose between the centre or the extreme oppositions. Evi­
dence of this development in Italy was the long-term growth 
of the PCI, at the expense of the PSI, on the left, and on 
the other flank, instances like the surge of votes for the 
right in 1953, and the collapse of the Monarchists into the 
arms of the MSI in the early 1970s. Sartori insisted that so 
long as the ‘tripolar1 structure was maintained the imbalance 
between the size of the left and of the right was unimpor­
tant. The existence of even a small right, as surely it was 
from 1976, signalled the maintenance of ideological polarisa­
tion and, consequently, tripolar competition.
A major criticism of Sartori's model has been that it 
emphasised ‘centrifugal1 tendencies, the emptying of the 
centre as voters were attracted to radical alternatives, 
implying system collapse. As the original model was applied 
to Weimar Germany, the Fourth French Republic and Chile, as 
well as Italy, the model encouraged such extrapolation. 
However, confronted by the survival of the Italian system, 
Sartori insisted that there was no reason why the powerful 
centrifugal drives undoubtedly present should necessarily 
triumph over centripetal ones. Ultimately, no system, what­
ever the strength of its structural drives, could determine 
political behaviour. Which political drive dominated any 
polity was open-ended, a matter more for historical determi­
nation than the application of pseudo-scientific political 
laws. Nevertheless, far from stressing the time-bound nature
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of his model, Sartori suggested that in Italy the mechanics 
of the system had resulted in a tripolar structuring of the 
electorate which was self-stabilising, severely limiting the 
power of initiative of the political elites. In this situa­
tion of 'stabilised polarised pluralism*9 the centre pole is 
maintained through desperation, with the alternatives remain­
ing unacceptable because the electorates of the extreme poles 
discourage centripetal behaviour by their elites. The aban­
donment of the Historic Compromise by the Communists in 1979 
was cited by Sartori as strong evidence that long after it 
had been developed his model continued to explain the reali­
ty.
Sartori's work as a political scientist has been 
strongly tied to a methodological emphasis on the autonomy of 
the political and a rejection of the 'sociologisation of 
politics'.10 In drawing attention to the importance of party 
interactions and the expressly political sphere Sartori made 
a major contribution to restating the importance of political 
phenomena as causes, not mere effects, of social phenomena. 
The idea that the structure of the party system can shape the 
'underlying' contours of the electorate is extremely signifi­
cant, as is his stress on the autonomy of the political 
elite(s), and the limitations on that autonomy. In Section 
IV, however, we shall draw attention to the limitations, 
prefigured in the discussion of 'polarisation', of Sartori's 
model.
B. Galli and the Dualist Model of Politics
Sartori's model, so congenial to the Christian Demo­
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crats, particularly in its portrayal of the Communist Party 
(like the MSI) as an 'anti-system party1, was directly con­
fronted by Galli1s model of 'imperfect bipartism1.11 In 
Galli's model, the DC and the PCI were the two parties that 
mattered, the true core of the system. Each one a mass party 
with deep cultural roots penetrating and organising the 
electorate, they confronted each other in an essentially 
bipolar system, just as the CDU-CSU and SPD confronted each 
other in Germany. Party conflict in Italy, as elsewhere in 
Western Europe, was essentially a battle between left and 
right. In saying this, Galli made Italy less of a 'special 
case1, for though centre parties, and even blocks, existed in 
other countries, left/right competition, and alternation, 
were taken as 'normal1. Galli's model thus tended to confirm 
Duverger's dictum that 'the centre does not exist in poli­
tics1, that 'dualism1 is natural, and that a tendency towards 
the 'two-party system' is equally natural.12 Although Du­
verger's dualism has been criticised, the enduring pervasive­
ness of left/right structuring has been amply confirmed, for 
Western Europe at least,13 and similarly the relevance of the 
two-block structure.14
In Galli's model, the imbalance between what Sartori 
called the left and right poles was of fundamental impor­
tance. Sartori's (extreme) right pole was insignificant. The 
Monarchists and the nostalgic neo-Fascist Missini were both 
doomed to fade away, and the PLI, to the extent that it 
belonged on the right rather than the centre, was of marginal 
also importance. It would certainly not prevent the DC's 
centre-right, catch-all nature from becoming progressively
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more obvious, just as the centre-left catch-all nature of the 
Communist Party would become manifest.
Galli's model has clear merits. It stressed the con­
flict between the DC and the PCI to be fundamental, and on 
this basis correctly indicated the long-tern decline of the 
so-called right block. It also offered an opportunity for a 
more subtle, more realistic appraisal of the Communist Party 
as a party whose dominant elites were firmly 'in-system1, 
even if many of its militants and much of its electorate were 
not, so that a potential electorate (for a reformist social 
democratic party) was alienated. Today, we can suggest that 
the Communist Party in Italy bears comparison less with the 
post-war Communist Parties of Eastern Europe than with the 
Fianna Fail of 1920s Ireland. In the latter situation, 
Fianna Fail, after a brief but bitter civil war - something 
which the collaboration of the PCI with the other parties 
helped to avoid in Italy - had first refused to enter the 
parliament, then entered it with its leaders declaring the 
oath of allegiance to be but an 'empty formality'. This 
stance made the party, as those same leaders themselves 
admitted, only a 'slightly constitutional' party.15
C. Farneti's Synthesis and 'Democraticitv'
The two models presented by Sartori and Galli offered 
radically different pictures of the Christian Democratic and 
Communist Parties, and their contemporary political signifi­
cance should not be forgotten. Neither model operated in a 
vacuum. The concepts associated with each were part of an 
intensely political debate which operated between the parties
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and within the parties. They were ‘operative concepts*16 
which affected political development and which contributed to 
the evolution of the parties and the party system. It is 
this material rootedness of the two models which makes them 
complementary, despite their polemical academic and political 
relationship with one another.17 This antagonistic comple­
mentarity was explored in a major work of synthesis by Paolo 
Farneti.
Farneti argued that both Sartori*s and Galli*s models 
captured an essential part of the reality of Italian poli­
tics. The Christian Democratic Party was both a centre party 
and the core party of a centre-right block. Sometimes the 
one identity was more important, sometimes the other, but 
which, at any specific moment, was a matter of political 
contingency.18
Thus a right/centre-right alignment could be identified 
which ran from the MSI through the Monarchists (so long as 
they existed) to the PLI, the DC, the PRI, and possibly the 
PSDI. This confronted a left/centre-left alignment compris­
ing the PCI, PSI and perhaps the PSDI. This dualistic order­
ing of alignments never succeeded in establishing its domi­
nance, a fact which constituted a major failure of strategy 
on the part of the left. Rather, the DC had succeeded in 
maintaining the tripolar division, or organisation, of the 
party system, defeating successive attempts to establish a 
bipolar structure. Nevertheless, the repeated assaults of 
the left, and the identification of the DC substantially with 
the right, meant that in the long run the decisive establish­
ment of a bipolar system became more likely as the extreme
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right block faded into insignificance. Witnessing the fail­
ure of the PCI to achieve this bipolar structure at the end 
of the 1970s and the PSI's new aggressiveness, with Bettino 
Craxi the Socialist leader seeking to establish himself as 
the champion of the so-called 'lay-socialist area1 (the 
Socialists, plus the PSDI, PRI and newly transformed PLI), 
Farneti argued that the tripolar structure could survive, but 
with a radically different content at the level of individual 
parties. A 'reshuffling1 of the multi-party pack could see 
the Socialists displacing the DC as the dominant centre 
party, taking votes from left and right and perhaps expelling 
the DC to the right.
Farneti's emphasis on the importance of the political 
centre was such that he even spoke of unipolarism, or a drift 
towards a single central pole, in contrast to his synthesis 
of Sartori and Galli which focused on the battle between 
tripolarism and bipolarism. Farneti thus argued that whilst 
the centrifugal dynamic had dominated up until 1961, validat­
ing Sartori's model of 'polarised pluralism' for that early 
period, the subsequent domination of the centripetal dynamic 
meant that 'polarised pluralism' had given way to 'centripe­
tal pluralism'. Here, Farneti's work was at one with the 
'end of ideology' thesis of the late 1950s, early 1960s; so 
Farneti, like Galli, was chipping away at the idiosyncrasy of 
the 'Italian case'. More specifically, Farneti's analysis 
confirmed that the Italian electorate, Communist included, 
was subject to the same forces which produced what Otto 
Kirchheimer had called the 'waning of opposition',19 meaning 
its deradicalisation, rather than its quantitative decline.
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The PCI's difficulties in regaining governmental status in 
the 1970s could thus be seen as stemming less from the nature 
of the PCI itself, and more from the self-interest and atti­
tudes of the Christian Democratic Party. What Farneti says 
about centripetalism and unipolarism is clearly of importance 
for the debate about 'depolarisation' in Italy, but as we 
shall see, in Sections IV and V, terms such as polarisation 
and delegitimisation, both used and popularised by Sartori, 
are misleading, and best avoided.
Farneti made an additional general argument about the 
'democraticity' of Italy's post-war coalitional/governmental 
history, that is to say, the responsiveness of government to 
the electorate. He argued that two sets of dynamic interac­
tions, that between the party elites and their militants and 
electorates, and that between party elites, were responsible 
for the general orientation of government policies, and for 
the evolution of those policies over time. Thus, the cen­
trist orientation of governmental coalitions, and the gentle 
oscillation about that centre coincided with the desires of 
the electorate considered as a whole. There was in some 
sense, then, democratic control over government. Farneti 
does not dwell on this point, but the ability of extreme 
multi-party systems to provide responsible party government 
has been argued in other studies, reversing an earlier ortho­
doxy according to which two-party systems were superior, and 
even a precondition for such responsiveness.20 An appraisal 
of the achievements of party government in Italy specifical­
ly, by Gianfranco Pasquino, supports this argument, whilst 
remaining highly critical of the dysfunctions also present in
44
the operation of the party system.21 This indication of the 
party system as capable of establishing some sort of national 
interest is very important. The question is, was it only 
'centripetal* pluralism which generated this possibility, for 
if not, the distinction between the two may be less important 
than Farneti implies. Farneti describes 'centripetal plural­
ism', operative from 1965, as having provided the 'functional 
alternative of that agreement of fundamentals that a well- 
developed process of state and nation-building has engendered 
in much of Western Europe and elsewhere1.22 Section V of 
this chapter asks whether party system interaction prior to 
19 65 did not also lay the bases for such state and nation- 
building.
D. Pizzorno's Critique and the Catch-All Party System
Unlike the three previous authors, who are political 
scientists, Alessandro Pizzorno is a social theorist, and 
Pizzorno challenged the prioritising of the political sphere, 
arguing that this led to the over-emphasis of cleavage and 
fragmentation to the detriment of an appreciation of the 
dimension of state/national unity.23 The stress on cleavage, 
and above all ideological cleavage, has justifiably been 
argued to be common to all models of interpretation devoted 
to the party system,24 and Pizzorno's counter-argument is 
highly germane to the intention of the thesis to examine the 
party system as a contradictory unity.
Pizzorno stresses the unity of the social whole at both 
the elite and the mass level, with the elites playing a 
crucial integrative role. At the elite level he stresses the
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existence of political exchange between the parties, a phe­
nomenon which counters the domination of cleavage and antag­
onistic confrontation. This is a controversial area, but it 
coincides with Hine's discussion of the nature of the Italian 
constitution which pointed to the absence of right/centre- 
right government, and with Farneti's opinion that the shift­
ing coalition formulae reflected developments in the expres­
sion of the national interest. A sort of political 'coges- 
tion1 has been confirmed in a number of other ways, the most 
significant of which is perhaps Sidney Tarrow's examination 
of centre-periphery relations which, contrary to expectation, 
tentatively concludes that that government largess commonly 
associated with clientelism and the corrupt nature of the 
DC's relationship with large parts of its electorate may have 
flowed more strongly to 'Red' areas than 'White'.25
Pizzorno also stresses the integrative role of the 
elites, both as a governmental, and as a politico-electoral, 
force. As regards the governmental contribution, Pizzorno 
emphasises both the importance of national-strategic govern­
ment decisions, particularly those relating to Italy's inser­
tion in the post-war international economy, and the expansion 
of the public sector of the economy. The government acquired 
legitimacy on an individualistic basis by supporting small- 
scale enterprise in industry, commerce and agriculture and 
through the encouragement of individual consumption based on 
economic growth, and though Pizzorno descried the atomisation 
of society and the destruction of collective organisation and 
mobilisation according to coherent politico-economic strate­
gies (since this created problems by virtue of the consequent
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disorganisation of the political sphere) he recognised the 
efficacy of these actions for engendering regime consensus in 
difficult circumstances. As for the politico-electoral 
aspect of elite-led integration, the role of the parties in 
providing political leadership and organising the population 
on a political/electoral basis in an apparently stable and 
disciplined fashion, is seen by Pizzorno as integrative of 
the population, notwithstanding the acknowledged and lamented 
tendency to political disorganisation and fragmentation. 
Indeed, rather as Kirchheimer lamented the apparent waning of 
principled opposition associated with the rise of the more or 
less 'deideologised1 catch-all parties, Pizzorno can be 
paraphrased, as objecting to the development of a 'catch-all 
party system1 in which political dissent was smothered by the 
partitocrazia, the 'rule of parties'.26 In fact, the key 
works by Pizzorno relating to this theme were written in the 
late 1960s and early 1970s when this suffocating leadership 
was being dramatically challenged.27
E. Summary
The pervasiveness of an awareness of the terms left, 
right and centre and the importance of the organisation of 
society into political blocks has been indicated. The 
different way block interactions, and hence government/oppo­
sition interaction can be understood has been briefly exam­
ined, raising a question about the nature of leadership in 
multi-party states, prior to a consideration of how the key 
ideas of left and right have been used by social scientists 
analysing Italian politics. A contrast has been drawn between
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the approach of the political scientist and that of the 
social theorist, with the difference lying in the relative 
weighting of cleavage and of unity within each.
The problem identified by this thesis is the difficulty 
of adequately theorising the relationship between conflict 
and cooperation in the Italian party system. If the Italian 
polity is to be understood as a 'contradictory unity* it has 
to be conceded that as a 'unity* it has indeed been highly 
'contradictory*. What has to be done is to establish how the 
insights of Sartori, Galli and Farneti on the one hand, and 
Pizzorno on the other, can be appreciated as complementary. 
In order to do this I intend, rather briefly, reexamine 
critically the work of these four theorists, laying the basis 
for a new synthesis to be presented in Section V.
IV THE PROBLEMS OF THE EXISTING MODELS
A. Sartori; Problems of Legitimacy and Electoral Volatility
Sartori*s model is starkly drawn. Its beauty is its 
simplicity: the identification of three ideologically and 
constitutionally incompatible blocs where the centre governs 
by excluding the 'anti-system' extremes. The equilibrium 
state (stabilised polarised pluralism) is a 'balance of 
exclusion* in which three forces confront each other as 
autonomous sovereigns (modern princes?) in a game of zero-sum 
politics.
This model certainly captures the ability of the DC 
elite to avoid the party being transformed into a 'normal' 
centre-right party despite significant and repeated pressures
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in this direction. These were particularly strong in the 
early 1950s and in the late 1950s and early 1960s - the two 
crises of Centrism? in the late 1960s early 1970s crisis of 
the Centre-Left? and in the late 1970s/1980s generalised 
crisis of the partitocrazia. Sartori*s model does not satis­
factorily explain the behaviour of the left elites, and its 
depiction of electoral behaviour is over-simplified as a 
result of its lack of even-handedness: it identifies the
'extremes* as 'delegitimising*, and little else, and the 
extremes alone as delegitimising. It is unable to grasp 
either the constructive role played by the Communist Party 
(and in particular the fact that it played a centrist, as 
opposed to extremist, role at critical moments when the PSI, 
largely 'rehabilitated' as a 'legitimate' party in Sartori's 
model, habitually did just the opposite), or the delegitimis­
ing role of the main party of government. One only has to 
look at the regime parties of Eastern Europe to see how 
governing parties can delegitimise themselves quite adequate­
ly, without an opposition to accomplish it for them.28
Consequently, in looking at the electoral level, one 
must ask to what extent it is true that the DC and PCI do 
not, as is commonly held, compete. The model of immobile 
electorates locked into sub-cultural voting patterns as 
portrayed by Galli & Prandi29 and by Barnes30 has been under 
challenge since the 1980s (though it remains a strong element 
of the conventional wisdom).31 Summarising these recent 
developments in psephological analysis, Percy Allum and 
Renato Mannheimer32 wrote that the stable parliamentary 
representation of the post-war period 'was based on electoral
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fluidity and not stability ..1. They also pointed to the 
element of hitherto ignored cross-block volatility which 
modern reinterpretation of the evidence now suggest might 
have been particularly high in the 1950s - precisely when, 
given the Cold War polarisation of the period, the very 
opposite would be consistent with the model of rigid ideolog­
ical division. Such volatility seriously undermines Sartori's 
argument. Apparently the DC has absorbed much of a rightist 
electoral block, transforming it, to an extent, into a compo­
nent of a centrist block, whilst simultaneously competing on 
the left in order to prevent its more progressive electorate 
'jumping ship* to the left block to which it was attracted. 
So much for rigid demarcations between blocks.
B. Galli. Left/Riaht Conflict; normal but difficult
Galli*s model is correct in emphasising the normality 
of politics in Italy in the sense that left/right competition 
is as dominant in Italy as elsewhere in liberal democracies. 
Nevertheless, the abstract two-block model is difficult to 
apply successfully, largely because a significant part of the 
Italian political elite was consciously seeking to reject 
such a dichotomisation of Italian politics.
The question of the relationship between the elites and 
the electoral masses is the key to understanding this prob­
lem. The dominant party elites have been concerned to moder­
ate the behaviour of their less tolerant followers. Thus, 
Farneti has described the DC and PCI as NOT merely having 
been transformed, by a process of 'pariiamentarisation* from 
parties founded on anti-democratic catholic and Leninist
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bases33 to democratically-based parties, but as parties in 
which core elites actively pursued the ‘pariiamentarisation' 
of the political extremes. Thus, political struggle in 
post-war Italy should be seen as taking place not only in a 
horizontal, left/right frame, but also in a vertical 
elite/mass frame. It is neglect of this second dimension, 
which leads Galli to overemphasise the ‘normality1, in com­
parative perspective, of the Christian Democratic Party as a 
centre-right party. Its strenuous opposition to becoming 
such a party can be traced back not only to ideological 
features such as an anti-capitalism which distinguishes it 
from the West German CDU or British Conservative Party), but 
also to its desire to secure the dominance of the reformist 
catholic, liberal and socialist traditions in order to pre­
vent the polarisation of the electorate into juxtaposed 
political blocks. Nor was the PCI entirely external to the 
development of reformist perspectives, either in fact or in 
the strategic considerations of key Christian Democratic 
elites.
Looking at the Italian polity as a whole, we can see 
the DC as standing at the centre of two sets of conflicting 
sociopolitical dynamics, each set of which is itself embat-' 
tied. On the one hand, the Christian Democratic Party has 
been concerned to promote the horizontal integration of the 
political class in order to prevent that disintegration 
towards which Sartori's model of ‘polarised pluralism1 
points, yet such integration has threatened both its command­
ing political position and the rigidly ‘tripolar1 structure 
of the party system, and with it, coalitional and governmen­
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tal norms; on the other, it has been concerned to consolidate 
vertical integration. Clearly, for the DC itself, electoral 
support and a solid rooting of the party in society was 
essential to its survival, but the party sought more than 
this. The vertical integration of society through the party 
system as a whole, and the PCI in particular, was seen as 
crucial, for the leadership and social discipline which the 
Communists were able to exercise was invaluable.
C. Farneti; Consensus and the Non-Existent Party System
Farneti's argument that the DC pursued a strategy aimed 
at establishing and then maintaining a tripolar dynamic 
whilst the left sought to establish a bipolar dynamic, yet 
repeatedly surrendered to the dominant strategy, is a bril­
liant validation of the central arguments of both Sartori and 
Galli. He is, however, mistaken to argue that a party system 
in the proper sense of the word only began to form with the 
emergence of ‘centripetal pluralism' and approached realisa­
tion with the Historic Compromise. Certainly important 
changes took place both in the early 1960s and in the late 
'70s, but a party system was operative from 1948, and in its 
elite components from 1943/44.
Subsequent to Farneti's death in 1980, the argument of 
the ‘non-existent' party system was taken up by Mauro Calise. 
He extended it by indicating the dramatic break-up of the 
Historic Compromise as signalling the failure of the tendency 
towards establishing a national party system and a national 
political culture.34 Behind Farneti's concern with the 
building of a national party system lies a concern with the
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absence of consensus in Italy. We have seen that he saw 
'centripetal pluralism* as a functional alternative for 
consensus in Italy, but we must ask if consensus really is 
necessary for the operation of a party system and/or of 
political leadership. The reason for looking at Pizzorno’s 
critique of the party system approach was precisely his 
emphasis on unity as a missing dimension in it, and it is 
interesting to note that even Farneti essentially ignored the 
period of political unity prior to 1947/48. That Sartori 
pays little attention to this period is not surprising, for 
he is keen to write off any co-operation as no more than a 
combination of insincere political cunning and enforced (and 
therefore irrelevant) necessity. But Farneti*s attitude to 
the Communist Party is far less polemical, and his interest 
in the unity of an interactive system is emphasised by his 
concluding sketch of a tendency to 'unipolarism*.
D. Pizzorno; Unitv and Dissensus
Pizzorno stressed unity against division and fragmenta­
tion, but he hardly thought that Italy was marked by politi­
cal consensus. The concept of the 'catch-all party system', 
with its stress on elite collusion is an important correc­
tive, particularly to Sartori's model, but it grossly under­
estimates the extent to which the party system elites, or 
political class, are and have been competitive, indeed, 
antagonistic. The sort of attack that was made on the PCI by 
the Radicals in the 1970s, accusing it of being a conserva­
tive component of a conservative structure (the partitocra- 
zia) fits this thesis well, but on other counts is clearly
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unjustified.
The thread which unifies all these problems is the 
difficulty of grasping the simultaneously cooperative and 
antagonistic behaviour of the party elites. Section V exam­
ines the relationship between political cooperation and 
conflict by focusing on the party system as a contradictory 
unity whose elements, that is contradiction and unity, are 
defined in terms of two understandings of the centre.
V THE PARTY SYSTEM AS CONTRADICTORY UNITY:
TWO MEANINGS OF THE CENTRE
Given the controversy surrounding the DC's status as a 
centre party it is particularly apt to analyse the Italian 
party system as a contradictory unity whose two elements, 
contradiction and unity, are defined by reference to two 
different concepts of the centre. Moreover, as we shall see, 
in the first definition of the centre the DC is part of a 
'centre block', so its definition as a centre party is indi­
rect, whilst in the second definition the DC is both distinct 
from the centre yet close to it.
A. The Centre Block
Let us first consider the centre as a term indicating 
the presence of a centre block in a party system. Here the 
system has three blocks, not two (left and right) , and the 
term centre defines the block rather than the parties (or 
party) comprising it. The distinction between blocks and 
parties is a subtle but important one which bears directly on
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Sartori's pole-based terminology.
Sartori refers to party systems as bipolar or tripolar, 
but this is misleading on three accounts. First, individual 
parties are 'poles of attraction1, so that it is better to 
consider left and right (and centre where it exists) as 
multi-polar blocks, rather than simply as poles. Secondly, 
block multipolarity indicates the existence of differentia­
tion within blocks whereby the DC could be described as 
centre-right compared to, say, Nenni's Socialists who joined 
the centre block in the 1960s. This is significant both 
because it is suggestive of the fact that the DC could become 
the major party of the right block were a two-block system to 
develop, and because it indicates that blocks may cohere 
through their juxtaposition to other blocks, rather than for 
reasons intrinsic to the block. This point can apply even 
when only two blocks exist, as with the Swedish 'bourgeois 
block*. Thirdly, the polar imagery evokes a vision of lin­
earity. This is intentional on Sartori*s part, but the 
relationship between three blocks in a party system need not 
be linear.35 The relationship might be triangular, though in 
Italy two of the points of the triangle will have nothing to 
do with each other. More radically, Hans Daalder suggests 
that spatial terminology may be 'meaningless' under certain 
conditions,36 and it is certainly extraneous to a 'pure 
mechanical' model of the centre, ie one which does not mix 
spatial and mechanical approaches.A This brings us to the 
second definition of the centre.
A. For further elaboration of the ideas expressed in this section see 
Appendix 4.
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B. The Relational Centre
The idea that the relationship between the blocks need 
not be conceived of as linear suggests that the centre can be 
understood as the outcome of the relationship which parties 
establish between themselves. This second definition of the 
centre can be called the relational centre, and in principle 
this centre cannot be occupied. Any attempt by a party to 
occupy it means that that party moves, thus displacing the 
centre. Of course, one or more parties may be very close to 
the centre, particularly if there is a condition of political 
consensus.
This centre exists in all working party systems, wheth­
er there is a centre block or not. It is, thus, present in 
the two-block system, even where the two blocks are based on 
a segmented society, not a homogeneous one. In other words, 
this centre is an outcome of the interaction between party 
elites rather than a preexistent point represented by a 
median voter. As a point, or 'nexus', of overlaps its nature 
and content is elite-determined.
The possibility that parties can both overlap substan­
tially and be distinctly separated is well illustrated by the 
'salience theory' of party competition. According to this 
theory, parties compete by championing different issues which 
together offer distinct and discrete political alternatives. 
In stressing different issues, parties compete past each 
other, rather than confronting each other along a single 
(linear) dimension.37 In their application of this approach 
to Italy, Mastropaolo and Slater find both that the Italian
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parties have been distinctive in traditional left/ right 
terms, and that there has been significant overlap between 
the DC and the PCI.A This result leads the authors to con­
clude that their work has produced:38
'a finding which has quite revolutionary implica­
tions for the major interpretations of the Italian 
party system discussed above [Sartori and Galli].1
Certainly, the discovery of common ground between parties 
which for Sartori are literally 'poles apart', and for Galli 
represent juxtaposed sub-cultures confirms the value of NOT 
reducing the centre to the centre block. The relational 
centre is the outcome of the interaction of all relevant 
parties in a system, and the parties of the left and right 
blocks have certainly been relevant. Relevant parties, can 
be defined as though able to participate in a political 
block which influences the centre. Such parties are 'core 
parties'. Lest this term be considered rather all-embrac­
ing, let it be said that not all parties are core parties. 
For example, the FPO in Austria is not a core party because 
it has been unable (so far) to constitute a block in its own 
right, or to accede to the right block with the OVP, whilst 
in Italy the collapse of the right block in the 1970s raises 
questions about the MSI's continuing status as a core party 
(but see the Appendix).
A. See pp.58-60 for reproductions of the spatial representa­
tion of their findings.
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Mastropaolo & Slater: Economic Left and Right
Distinction and Convergence
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From: A.Mastropaolo and M.Slater, ‘Italy, 1946-79: Ideological 
Distances and Party Movements* in I.Budge, D.Robertson and D.Hearl 
(eds), Ideology. Strategy and Party Change: Spatial Analyses of Post­
war Election Programmes in 19 Democracies. Cambridge: Cambridge Uni­
versity Press, 1987, p.364.
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C. Contradictory Unity
The relational centre and the block centre are cer­
tainly related. The party or parties of a centre block may 
be very near the relational centre, or simply nearer than 
the flank blocks, but the two concepts are conceptually 
distinct. Whilst the relational centre indicates what a 
party system has in common (and the assumption is that 
without this core of agreement the party system will col­
lapse) , the existence of a centre block is rooted in differ­
entiation, and hence in conflict. The two-block system is 
equally clearly based on differentiation and conflict whilst 
the relational centre remains to confirm a degree of cooper­
ation and consensus. Thus, party systems are contradictory 
unities based on cooperation and antagonism.
Even where a party system is distinguished by a high 
degree of depoliticisation, or consensus, so that all the 
parties crowd the relational centre, parties and blocks will 
still distinguish themselves from each other. Given Sarto- 
ri's point that left and right are 'empty boxes' whose 
content is determined by changing circumstances it is possi­
ble that in some periods it will be rather unclear on what 
basis parties and blocks differentiate themselves, but in so 
far as left and right (and perhaps centre) maintain their 
identities, distinction and conflict continues.
D. Centre Domination and Nation-Building
The opposite situation to consensus would see such 
intense conflict that the party system would disintegrate,
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and the (relational) centreA disappear as party interaction 
ceased. Yet party systems can survive with a high degree of 
conflict, a situation that can be visualised as having the 
parties distant from the centre and/or as having a centre 
that is minimal in content.39 Nevertheless, to the extent 
that the centre still exists, the centre can be regarded as 
ever-present in working party systems, and to that extent to 
'dominate1 where a party system is operative, or 'working1. 
This returns us to the question of political leadership 
and/or political domination in interactive multi-party sys­
tems. What dominates in such a system is no one part, or 
party, nor even block, but the relationship arising from the 
interaction of the whole.
Of course, the question of access to government means 
that some parts are more powerful than others in determining 
the location of the centre. In a perfectly balanced two- 
block system there will be equality if the parties alternate 
at regular, equal, intervals, but this is unlikely.40 In 
the centre-dominant three-block system, such as exists in 
Italy, access to government is dominated by just one block, 
so that the centre is pulled strongly towards the location 
of the centre block. They remain distinct however, for the 
linkages connecting this large and diverse centre-block with 
the other blocks still create a centre divergent from that 
of the centre coalition itself.
That the centre-block and the centre are distinct, but 
closely related, especially where there is a tendency to
A. For the remainder of the chapter the term centre will 
refer to the relational centre.
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consensus, can be linked to Farneti's concept of 'unipolar- 
ism* according to which the Italian parties are converging. 
What they are converging on is both the centre and, in the 
cases of the parties of the left and right blocks, the cen- 
tre-block. But it is unlikely that the parties of the left 
and right blocks will end up as identikit copies of the 
centre block parties, or that all the parties will end so 
similar to each other as to be consonant with the centre, 
negating the distinction between the centre and the centre 
block. Despite convergence differentiation remains. In­
deed, there is reason to believe that consensus gives way to 
new, or renewed, conflicts.
What remains to be asked is whether the convergence of 
the Italian parties on a centre point, or nexus, does not 
indicate some success on the part of Italy's political elite 
in a process of nation-building. Farneti suggested that the 
final establishment of a fully competitive party system 
amounted to a functional alternative to the agreement on 
fundamentals achieved elsewhere through state and nation- 
building. But is it not the case that the construction of a 
party system under difficult circumstances, and the labori­
ous management of its structure and dynamics until a posi­
tion is reached where agreement has moved beyond the minimal 
to the considerable, itself constructs an agreement on 
fundamentals, and is itself a contributor to the process of 
state and nation-building?
In Chapters Two and Three, it is argued that the 
building of the CLN, or Committee for National Liberation, 
amounted to the construction of a grand coalition at the
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elite level. This, coalition, it is further argued, estab­
lished the existence of a relational centre, the result of 
party interaction in an imperfect one-block party system. 
The inability to maintain this coalition threatened the 
centre with destruction but, it is argued, the centre was 
maintained, though its mode of definition transformed, 
through the construction of the three-block system during 
the first legislature (1948-53). Since the 1940s, it is thus 
argued, a 'political class* has existed, defined by its 
antagonistically cooperative management of the structure and 
dynamics of the party system. The 'function' of this class 
has been 'polity management' and its success and failure, 
and that of the DC, it is argued, can be judged in the 
light of its achievements as a state and nation-builder. 
The greatest demonstration of its success would be the 
construction, in the near future, of a successfully alter­
nating two-block party system.
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CHAPTER 2 THE CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRISM. 1943-47
The aim of this chapter is two-fold. In the first 
Section it aims to demonstrate the internal complexity of the 
catholic world and to explore the Christian Democratic Par­
t y ^  relationship with that world and with the other politi­
cal forces active in post-war Italy. In the second, it aims 
to show that it is meaningful to describe the period 1943-47 
as having witnessed the political construction of centrism.
The first Section concentrates on the Christian Demo­
cratic Party. It first looks briefly at the conflict of 
political cultures within Italy, and then concentrates on the 
internal complexities of the catholic world and the nature of 
the DC's relationship with it. This review serves to indi­
cate the resources De Gasperi had available to him in estab­
lishing the party's centrist credentials. Section One con­
cludes by briefly stressing the DC's role as mediator between 
different political traditions and the importance of this 
role in a situation of tension and uncertainty. At its 
simplest, the argument is that the collapse of Fascism 
presented a new political elite with the opportunity to 
establish a new political system. De Gasperi used the inter­
nal diversity of the catholic world, combined with the solid­
ity of Catholicism in the face of adversity, to transform a 
mass movement into a basis for stable political evolution, 
and Togliatti did much the same with the Communist Party and 
socialist tradition. Cooperation between the two leaders 
provoked such opposition that the 1946 Constituent Assembly 
election revealed a three-block structure in the making, with
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the DC being outflanked on the right.
Section Two, however, demonstrates that the actual 
formation of a three-block system was dependent on the prior 
formation of a one-block system. This system, though unsus­
tainable, demonstrated the willingness of key political 
elites to cooperate, thus establishing a relational centre. 
The one-block system based on the CLN thus amounted, it will 
be argued, to the establishment of a period of centrism prior 
to that of the classic centrist phase of 1948-53/63. The 
establishment of the three-block system was a response to the 
fear that the collapse of the one-block system would other­
wise lead to a confrontation between two blocks which would 
trigger a general degeneration of the political process.
I THE POLITICO-CULTURAL FOUNDATIONS OF DC CENTRISM
A. Sub-cultures and Block Structure
Post-war Italy is conventionally described as having 
three political sub-cultures: catholic, socialist and lay- 
liberal, and these are seen as having had a major influence 
on the structure and evolution of the party system. Thus, 
the dominant Christian Democratic Party has been rooted in 
the catholic sub-culture, and the second largest party, the 
PCI, has tended to encapsulate the socialist sub-culture.
The existence of the socialist and lay/liberal cultures 
could suggest that the DC is a centre party because it is 
flanked by them on left and right, like the catholic 
parties/alliance in the Netherlands. However, in Italy the 
lay/liberal parties are weak and the right block has been
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based on an ultra-conservative sub-culture whose relevance 
more or less collapsed in the 1970s. Nevertheless, the DC*s 
identification with the centre cannot simply be attributed to 
the encapsulation of political cultures by parties leading to 
a block structure rooted in socio-cultural cleavages.
Despite the importance of historically deeply-rooted 
sub-cultures to the structuring of party systems in Western 
Europe, they are difficult to use as an explanation of party 
system structure since they are also created and destroyed 
via the party system itself.1 In post-war Italy, sub-cul­
tures and parties have not coincided, and the divergence 
between them has been as important as the prominence and 
distinctiveness of the sub-cultures. Samuel Barnes, who in 
the 1970s made a major contribution to the orthodox thesis of 
electoral stability in Italy through an account of 'institu­
tionalised tradition* himself emphasised this disjuncture in 
an earlier work, contrasting Italy to the Netherlands where 
socio-cultural and political pillars (the zuilen) do coin­
cide.2 The disjuncture is more important than his later work 
would suggest.
1. Conservatism in Italy
The disjuncture between party and sub-culture is most 
evident in the fact that a large part of the DC is widely 
considered to be conservative, yet a conservative sub-culture 
as such does not exist. The right block of the party system 
has been dominated by the ultra-conservative Monarchists and 
the MSI, but this tradition, and the block with it, declined 
into insignificance in the 1970s. The Liberal Party, which 
has stood consistently on the right of the centre block, or
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to its right, has nourished and been nourished by, economic 
conservatism in particular, and the party has been an impor­
tant ally of the conservative forces in the DC, but it has 
failed to create a respectable conservative political block 
to match the political tradition which it represents.
2. A Catholic block?
In the absence of a respectable conservative political 
block, broad-brush comparativists and 'progressives1 have 
identified the catholic sub-culture, or the Christian Demo­
cratic Party more specifically, as conservative. The dis­
tinction between the party and its cultural hinterland is 
significant for the two are not the same thing. Equally, 
however, it is difficult to label either as consistently 
conservative, neither being politically homogeneous or polit­
ically consistent over time.
The most glaring case of non-coincidence between the 
sub-culture and the party is that of the catholic communists, 
or 'catto-communists1 . These are practising Catholics who 
vote communist, but it is equally as important both that the 
so-called 'catholic party' is an amalgam of catholic liber­
als, conservatives and socialists and that this party has 
gained non-catholic support.
3. The lav/liberal tradition
The lay/liberal tradition, unlike the situation in the 
Netherlands, is hardly associated with the right at all. 
Both the Liberal and Republican parties gain their strength 
from the tradition, yet they by no means encapsulate it, and 
the tradition is widely regarded as having been diffused 
throughout the party system. Although the extent to which it
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has done so is the subject of intense controversy, lay-1iber- 
alism in Italy is more a dispersed political tradition than 
it is a party encapsulated political culture.
The divergence between the rightist tendency of the 
Liberals and the centrist, centre-left tendency of the Repub­
lican Party (not to mention the Radicals) gives some indica­
tion of liberalism*s well-recognised political ambiguity,3 
but the liberal tradition also found expression within Ca­
tholicism and communism. Often expressed within Catholicism 
as the 'democratic* tradition, it embraced De Gasperi and 
subsequently found particular expression within factions on 
the DC*s left? whilst some of the Communist Party's major 
leaders, such as Giorgio Amendola, have identified and been 
identified with it.4
4. The socialist sub-culture
The socialist sub-culture has been fragmented since its 
nineteenth century origins, but in the post-war period it has 
seen permanent division between Social Democrats, Socialists, 
Communists and the New Left. These divisions have prevented 
the formation of a single political block, with the Social 
Democrats owing their origins to the decision to oppose the 
formation of a single left block, and the Socialists subse­
quently preferring to join the centre block rather than 
promote the formation of a two-block, left/right system. 
Beyond this, the socialist sub-culture is of course a lay 
sub-culture, and it should not be forgotten that the catholic 
world has its own Christian socialist tradition.
5. Summary
This brief survey of politico-cultural overlap and
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divergences suggests that ideological and/or cultural defini­
tions of left/centre/right distinction will be too rigid to 
understand the complexity of the DC and the Italian party 
system. In contrast to the undeniably intense ideological 
divisions between the political blocks there are also over­
laps and interpenetrations. As a start to analysing the 
Christian Democratic Party and its strategies we will look in 
more detail at the catholic world and its relations with that 
party, focusing on the 1940s and '50s when the foundations of 
the new republic were laid.
B. The Catholic Third Wav
Judgment as to whether the Christian Democratic Party 
offered a progressive, if 'merely' centrist way forward, or a 
conservative reaction, depends on two things: whether one 
sees the DC and/or Catholicism as filling the so-called 
'vacuum on the right' left by the collapse of Fascism, and 
whether one sees the desire to build a 'third way', neither 
socialist nor liberal, as meaningful. Our examination of the 
catholic world and the Christian Democratic Party proceeds by 
looking at these questions.
1. The vacuum on the right
The authority of the Fascist regime began to disintegrate 
long before the Allied invasion of Sicily in July 1943 
prompted the regime's collapse, and in the absence of effec­
tive political leadership the relationship between the Vati­
can and the Italian people was immensely fortified. The war 
came to be seen as having been foisted on the country by a 
bankrupt and isolated government, whilst the identification
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of the Church with Fascism all but disappeared.5
As a clear alternative focus of loyalty the Vatican's 
influence grew to be greater, both domestically and interna­
tionally, than at any other period in modern history.6 The 
leadership capacity of the Church became all that more sig­
nificant as it became apparent that whilst a host of leftist 
forces were waiting the opportunity to lead political devel­
opments, there was little in the way of leadership available 
to the non- or anti-socialist population. There was a vacuum 
on the right which in a significant sense was filled by the 
DC7 and by the catholic world, or more precisely by the DC 
and the Vatican and episcopal elites who, until the 1960s,8 
dominated that world.
The Church initially found little opposition to its 
mobilisational and organisational role in the mid-1940s since 
by 1942/3 it had become a circumspect but clear opposition to 
Fascism.9 Moreover, the traditionally anti-clerical descend­
ants of Liberalism were now significantly less powerful than 
they had been before Fascism, the reverse of the Church's 
position, whilst key figures within it, such as Meuccio 
Ruini, himself a mason, urged believers and non-believers 
alike to recognise the value of having Roman Catholicism as a 
state religion.10 Hostility to Marxism, but also to fascism, 
welded formerly antagonistic elites together. But for the 
left too the anti-Fascist victory brought rapprochement with 
the Church. When crowds flocked to the Pope to show their 
gratitude on the morrow of Rome's liberation, Socialist and 
Communist banners were noticeably present. By 1944, anti­
clericalism was yesterday's battle.11
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Nevertheless, the post-war period is one where, from 
1948, a conservative 'confessional state came into being'12 
which some identified as a clerico-fascist regime.13 If one 
accepts Simone de Beauvoir's dictum that 'the church is not 
on the right - it is the right', then the translation of the 
Church's authority into such a regime will not surprise, and 
the thesis of the coalescence of a cohesively conservative 
bourgeoisie with a monolithic conservative church is common 
to the left and radical lay traditions. Giorgio Galli has 
identified the DC as the beneficiary of a conservative 
'catholic bourgeois electoral block'14, whilst further left 
the DC is accused of effecting a 'reactionary unification of 
the bourgeoisie' with clerico-conservatism.15 Allowing for 
various more and less subtle variations which stress, for 
example, subservience to USA, the role of the DC as a substi­
tute for the state, or the autonomous self-interest of the DC 
elite in realising and perpetuating its rule, the thesis of a 
simple catholic/bourgeois conservative fusion dominates the 
lay history of the Christian Democratic Party.16
This simplification of the historical reality makes it 
impossible to grasp the vast changes which have taken place 
within Catholicism in the twentieth century. John Whyte's 
study of the post-war transformation of West European politi­
cal Catholicism offers a more detailed picture which can 
increase our understanding of Italy's political evolution. 
According to Whyte, the rise of European Christian Democracy 
was a novel and dramatic change within Catholicism which by 
its very progressiveness provoked an internal reaction to it. 
Thus the period up to 1960 can be described as one of 'closed
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Catholicism".17
Armed with this account of the evolution and internal 
tensions within Catholicism, we can reconsider the nature of 
the cultural and political conservatism of the 1950s. The 
triumph of Christian Democracy within Catholicism coincided 
with the exclusion of the left from government in Italy and 
elsewhere so that the substantial defeat of conservative 
Catholicism was obscured. This opacity was reinforced by the 
conservative back-lash which put considerable pressure on the 
DC and did not peak until the early years of the reign of 
John XXIII, just as the Second Vatican Council was about to 
confirm the defeat of conservative Catholicism and the reali­
sation of a 'paradigm shift' within Catholicism.18
To argue that the Church filled the vacuum on the right 
risks ignoring the transformation of Catholicism and reducing 
non-socialist forces to an undifferentiated phenomenon. 
Distinctions within the non-socialist world matter, otherwise 
everything from clerico-fascism to Christian socialism is 
conservative. Carrying the argument a stage further, it is 
also invalid to assume a dialectic between two blocks, one 
conservative and negative, the other progressive and posi­
tive. Many within the socialist tradition abandoned the left 
block for alliance with the DC, uniting with progressive 
figures already there.
Interesting historical evidence points to the impor­
tance of these arguments in early post-war Italy. In early 
1946 a newly founded right-wing journal, L'Idea, attacked the 
DC for leading a conservative mass base onto leftist posi­
tions, foreclosing the possibility of creating a liberal-
77
conservative party. At the same time, and echoing the Jesuit 
journal Civilta cattolica which sought to orientate the DC in 
the same direction, the journal identified PSI leadership as 
having captured a reformist (centre-left) electorate to lead 
it from the far left. These inconsistencies, the journal 
warned, would prevent the emergence of Anglo-Saxon style 
bipartism. The DC should move to the centre-right, where it 
properly belonged.19
This analysis-cum-prognosis is revealing of the impor­
tant distinctions within both left and right in post-war 
Italy and of the fact that these were related to differences 
between elites and electorates. It will be shown that it is 
not proper to write off the PSI or the Communist Party as 
extremist parties since to do so ignores this distinction.
A final word can be said about the conservatism of 
Catholicism in post-war Italy. Martin Clark sees the 
strength of the Catholic Church as giving rise both to a 
‘conservative regime* and the 'rule of the clericals*, yet he 
also stresses that it ‘unexpectedly provided mass backing for 
democracy1 in 1948 and subsequently ‘helped make democracy 
respectable1. This development contrasted strongly with the 
hitherto prevailing catholic doctrine of ‘indifference* to 
the political form of modern states, a doctrine which had 
made the Church vulnerable to the charge of actually favour­
ing authoritarian regimes.20 Since the DC was both the 
vehicle for this transformation and the subject of intense 
Vatican hostility to its assertion of political autonomy, the 
party could be characterised as more progressive than the 
Church from which it sprang.
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This argument can be furthered if one accepts that 
neither the conservatism nor the confessionalisation of 
catholic society in the 1950s were simply the result of DC 
rule. Any government, including a Communist one, would have 
had to recognise the enormous de facto power of the Church in 
the 1950s, and a period of catholic preponderance was proba­
bly inevitable.21 Arturo Jemolo, a noted historian of 
church-state relations in Italy, who is highly critical of 
his countryfs political evolution, wrote in the late 1950s 
that 'confessionalism in the body politic is largely due to 
the pressure of public opinion', and that 'it would be wrong 
to see an expression of government policy' in this.22
Confessionalisation was a deeply rooted phenomenon, and 
what mattered was its long-term development, the nature and 
speed of its evolution and decay. What determined this was 
the way a new political class, by way of the creation of a 
party system, handled the challenge of clericalism to its 
governance of Italian society. This is a major theme of 
Chapters Two to Four of the thesis. What has been estab­
lished so far is firstly the need to differentiate between 
filling the vacuum on the right from the right, and filling 
it from the left, and secondly the clash between the DC and 
conservative sections of the Vatican which meant that backing 
the DC led to important unintended consequences as far as the 
Vatican was concerned.
2. The Catholic World
In the immediate post-war period much of Europe was not only 
physically disorganised and impoverished but also in a state 
of intellectual and cultural shock,23 yet the opportunity for
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renewal was equally unprecedented. In Italy, the removal of 
Fascism released two major forces aspiring to renovate and 
transform Italian and European society. One of these was 
catholic.
a. Two strands of Catholic mobilisation
Through the 1929 Lateran Pacts the Vatican had gained a 
position of political and territorial security which allowed 
it to act, more or less as an equal, in the twentieth century 
environment of nation-states. This was a major step towards 
reintegrating Catholicism with the modern world, for it ended 
the rejection of the Italian state and its withdrawal from 
participation in modern, and in the event democratic, poli­
tics.24 Participation was not to be passive. The Church's 
mission was to rechristianise Italy, Europe and the world. 
The collapse of Fascism coincided with the mobilisation of 
the Church to this end.
This mobilisation was all the more real the nearer to 
Rome one got, but throughout Italy it worked to unite an 
increasingly politically heterogeneous catholic world.25 
Nevertheless, the transformation of the Church into a mobi­
lising machine was simply too diverse in its origins, too 
universal in its intentions, too religious in its self-under- 
standing to be readily tied to, and reduced to, the fortunes 
of any 'mere political1 party. Political and religious 
mobilisation were distinct, even if indissolubly intertwined.
The reversal of the pre-Fascist policy of non­
involvement in politics was absolute, a matter for the whole 
of Catholicism. Despite a new emphasis on the lay organisa­
tions, this totality of mobilisation meant that above all it
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was a matter for the Pope, his bishops and his priests. 
Least of all could it be simply a political movement. Yet 
beyond the traditional Church hierarchy, there were other 
organisations, above all Catholic Action, an instrument which 
was tried and tested and reliably under ecclesiastic control, 
and beyond that a vast diaspora of associations: of school 
teachers, doctors, engineers, housewives and so on. The 
Church had embarked on a new type of crusade in a new type of 
society. But whilst the Church rapidly and skillfully ex­
ploited these organisations and the new technological instru­
ments such as radio and cinema available to it,26 the role 
which political parties (and the DC specifically) would play 
was largely underestimated and misconstrued. The total 
mobilisation threatened to be anti-political,A totally uncom­
promising.
The DC, as it turned out, played a major role in ensur­
ing that this did not happen, yet the assertion of catholic 
unity as partisan political unity, which was critical to the 
DC's success, initially encouraged the precise opposite. 
Although the construction of the DC was well under way at the 
elite level in 1942 it lacked the resources, organisational 
structure and social penetration required to become a modern 
mass-based party able to rely upon a supportive electorate. 
When it came to electoral mobilisation in 1946 and 1948 it 
was utterly dependent on the capacities of the Church. The 
DC had to ensure that it was the political beneficiary of 
what was a supra-political and potentially anti-political
A. In the sense used by B.Crick (discussed p.30 of thesis).
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mobilisation.
Catholic mobilisation was essentially naive of the 
nature of modern politics and apolitical in intention, if 
political de facto.27 Though a variety of political strands 
ranging from catto-communism to clerico-reactionary were 
present in this mobilisation, the problems of mass psychology 
and of organisational institutionalisation in effecting a 
stable and progressive social order were little understood.28 
In the event, this political naivete gave the DC's political­
ly aware elite, and De Gasperi in particular, the opportunity 
to turn catholic mobilisation to its own ends. Having expe­
rienced the Vatican's abandonment of the short-lived Partito 
Popolare Italiano, founded by the priest Don Luigi Sturzo in 
1919, the DC was determined not to risk its own destruction 
through dependency on a fickle Vatican,
b. Papal power and its limits
Despite the DC's desire not to be dependent on the 
Vatican, it had to rely on catholic mobilisation to gain 
electoral support. The fact that Pius XII came to identify 
the Church's welfare with the success of the Christian Demo­
cratic Party was decisive, because within the catholic world 
the Pope's position is such that no-one can openly defy him. 
Yet the Pope's backing had to be fought for, and Pius XII can 
fairly be described as having had a very hostile attitude to 
De Gasperi. The Pope's eventual decision to support the 
principle of catholic political unity was, moreover, a devel­
opment certainly not initiated, and only begrudgingly second­
ed by the Vatican hierarchy whilst, as we shall see, much of 
the rank-and-file priesthood came to see the DC as inadequate
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and unacceptable. Given this convoluted situation, the 
modern understanding of the relationship between the Church 
and the party stresses the party's independence and leader­
ship despite its electoral reliance on the Church. Sas­
soon, in keeping with recent Italian scholarship, thus writes 
that far from being the long-arm of the Church the DC ‘was 
always able to maintain an effective autonomy', and that ‘In 
general political matters ... the Church could do little else 
than follow the lead of the DC'.29 Papal power was heavily 
contextual, and in political matters acted as a veto on 
alternatives to De Gasperi rather than as the prime mover.30
Whilst Pius XII has come to be recognised, even by 
critics, as a very capable moderniser, adapting the Church by 
reinforcing its laicisation, its penetration of society and 
its internationalisation,31 a value consensus about his reign 
does not exist.32 It is, however, clear that even a belated 
and purely instrumental shift towards accepting and then 
‘consecrating' liberal democracy, as in his radio message of 
1944,33 will have had major political and politico-cultural 
consequences. Nevertheless, if his understanding of democra­
cy was as instrumental as is now widely accepted,34 De Gas­
peri 's prestige in resisting the Pope's attempts to dominate 
him grows in importance.
Yet De Gasperi was not the only force which Pius was 
unable to subordinate. Despite the severe repression of 
dissent throughout the 1950s35 neither Pius nor the Vatican 
Curia were ever fully in control of Italian catholic society. 
Catholic intellectuals and activists, especially from Catho­
lic Action and the graduate movement FUCI, had learnt from
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fascism that a strong and free society required the construc­
tion of a powerful system of self-articulation, a lesson that 
tallied with traditional catholic ideas of local autonomy, 
subsidiarity and corporatism. These were ideas consistent 
more with Tocquevillian pluralism than the Pope's hierarchi­
cal vision of society, and this vision of a highly articulat­
ed associationalism, a ‘third way' between liberalism and 
socialism,36 came to be trapped not only by the bounds of 
papal authority, but also within the logic of political 
competition based on the need to maintain catholic unity and 
discipline in the face of Christian Democracy's political 
vulnerability.
Dissent in the face of papal authority and the grip of 
the DC was of both short and long-term significance, even 
though the mass ‘contestation', as it came to be known, 
appeared only in the mid-1960s.37 Those Catholics who main­
tained their radical social vision played a significant role 
in contributing to the preparation of the opening to the left 
in the 1950s. They did this both by maintaining a resolutely 
critical stance towards a party from which they felt unable 
to definitively break yet hated for its corruption and inade­
quacy, thus undermining it electorally, and by maintaining 
catholic links with the left. This situation meant that 
polarisation in the electoral-mobilisational arena was not 
mirrored by a closure of either the DC or the catholic world 
to the other sub-cultures. Both liberal and Christian- 
socialist elements within the party and the catholic world 
rejected the strong conservative elements likewise present in 
each. Already in the late 1950s Italian society could be
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described as less polarised in reality than the crisis-laden 
atmosphere of the party system and elections made it 
appear.38 This factor may be a major element which explains 
the unexpectedly high electoral volatility of the 1950s.
To recapitulate, papal authority was decisive when it 
acted with the grain of political development. It supported 
unity behind De Gasperi, as sought by De Gasperi himself, 
despite the Pope's powerful misgivings. In the following 
sub-sections we shall see that the Pope's support for catho­
lic unity was as significant in curbing attempts to push the 
party to the right as it was in maintaining left-leaning 
critics within the catholic/DC nexus. We shall also see that 
the papal injunction in favour of catholic unity, combined 
with the self-interest of the DC elite in prolonging its 
rule, nevertheless resulted in the fear that a totalitarian 
theocracy was being established,
c. Catholic Communism: A common enemv
The nascent party and the bulk of ecclesiastic elites 
regarded catholic communism with hostility, even if catto- 
communists were tolerated at an early stage and subsequently 
attracted support from unlikely quarters. The movement's 
organisational origins dated to 1937 in Rome, and in 1942 it 
had set itself up as an underground party in Umbria, Emilia- 
Romagna, the Marches and the Abruzzi regions. Originally, it 
was not suppressed because any potential basis for catholic 
mobilisation and penetration of society was welcome in a 
period of looming crisis, but as De Gasperi came to establish 
himself as the major political actor from the catholic uni­
verse, latent papal hostility to the movement became decisive
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in marginalising it. In the face of the Socio-Communist 
challenge it was easy to see that Catholic Communism under­
mined Catholic unity and challenged the very grounds of 
catholic mobilisation.
There is evidence that this hostility to the movement 
was seconded by Togliatti on behalf of the Communist Party, 
and one can see the common link.39 The two parties had the 
same interest in maintaining their uncertain domination 
of the CLN, and especially of excluding a party which by at­
tempting to bridge the differences between them undermined 
both their political and electoral positions. In party form, 
a left-wing Catholicism was still-born, but as a voting 
practice it remained relevant, no doubt making some contribu­
tion to electoral volatility,
d. Catholic unitv; Montini and the DC
By contrast to the Pope's begrudging and even hostile 
backing for De Gasperi, Monsignor Giovanbattista Montini, the 
Assistant Secretary for Ordinary Affairs in the Secretary of 
State's Office, forcefully backed the idea of catholic unity, 
and support for the DC. From 1944 there was no Secretary of 
State, and the two Assistant Secretaries, Montini, and Tardi- 
ni (for Extraordinary Affairs) played a major political role, 
for the Office was responsible for the Vatican's diplomatic 
relations, including those with Italy.
Montini was instrumental in bringing the pope to con­
cede decisional autonomy for political matters to De Gasperi, 
not least by acting as go-between at a time when De Gasperi 
was avoiding contact with the Pope in order to avoid the 
embarrassment of open disagreement.40 One particular occa­
86
sion in which Montini acted in this capacity was most signif­
icant, though its secrecy shrouded it in mystery for a con­
siderable period. In November 1946, Montini conveyed to De 
Gasperi the Pope’s displeasure at De Gasperi's continuation 
of the link with the Marxist parties via the CLN. De Gasperi 
was able to reply that to break the link would seriously 
contradict the Church's own interests, principally because 
the Constituent Assembly had still not agreed on the basis of 
Church/state relations in the future Republic. This, in 
effect, demonstrated De Gasperi's superior mastery of politi­
cal matters, and it may have been this that Montini sought.
Montini was also the most convinced opponent of the 
party organisation of left Catholicism, a position which 
contrasted with support for such 'pluralism* from conserva­
tive elements in the Vatican. Such pluralism threatened to 
transform the DC into a more conservative party which the 
Vatican conservatives then hoped would respond to, or live up 
to, their understanding of what the party should be.41
In this complex situation of intrigue, the Christian 
Democratic Party was both of the catholic world and separate 
from it. Montini used his official position and his reputa­
tion in progressive circles within Catholicism to encourage 
those interested in political and social reform not to reject 
the DC.42 His unequivocal partisan stance was a difficult 
one in a world suspicious of political involvement, and it 
was not shared by his colleague in the State Office, monsi- 
gnor Domenico Tardini.
e. Tardini's political scepticism
Tardini has been widely regarded as one of the Vati­
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can's conservatives, but it is helpful to see his position as 
being apolitical in the sense of opposing partisan politics. 
Of course, his position and behaviour had political effects, 
but Tardini truly believed Catholicism to be greater than, 
and above politics. Openly engaged stances, such as Monti- 
ni's, seemed far from obviously in the Church's best inter­
ests. The same held true of the politicking for the so- 
called 'Roman party' which we shall look at next.
Tardini opposed the identification of the Church with a 
political party. It contradicted the Church's universal 
mission in principle, and risked dragging the Vatican down 
either through the party's direct defeat, or through the 
degradation of the Church's image through over-close associa­
tion with the practices of Realoolitik.43 The unity of 
Catholicism was one thing, whilst its reduction to identifi­
cation with a single party was another. For these reasons, 
Tardini could be found to give some support to conservative 
positions which opposed unity behind the Christian Democratic 
Party.
f. The 'Roman party'
The hard-line conservative position within the catholic 
world has been described by its leading historian as the 
'Roman party'. Of some consequence in the 1940s and '50s, it 
was a clerico-conservative Vatican-based lobby rather than a 
party. Its leading figures were Cardinal Alfredo Ottaviani 
at the Holy Office, father Giacomo Martegani, director of the 
influential Jesuit organ Civilta cattolica. and Cardinal 
Roberto Ronca who acted as a link-man between the religious 
and the political right.44
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Although this group never succeeded in breaking the 
dominance of the idea of catholic unity to form a second 
catholic party to the right of the DC, they were a powerful 
group. Their ideas expressed those of a great many bishops 
and priests, especially those of southern Italy. Although 
the group took an interest in the Christian Democratic Par­
ty's policies and selection of parliamentary candidate's, its 
main aim was to break the party's links with the Marxist and 
lay parties. This involved bitter hostility first to De 
Gasperi's maintenance of the CLN, and subsequently to De 
Gasperi's insistence on 'centrism', the coalition with the 
Liberal, Republican and Social Democrat parties. Coalition 
with the catholic Monarchist and/or neo-Fascist MSI was 
infinitely preferable,
g. Catholic trade-unionism
Catholic trade-unionists were numerous and prominent in 
both the industrial and agricultural spheres and had been an 
important component of the DC's pre-Fascist forerunner, the 
Popular Party. They were essential to the intention to 
create a mass party because of their ability to contend the 
socialist penetration of the working classes. The importance 
of this ability can be seen in the fact that post-war Italy 
has seen the second highest union density in Western Europe, 
and by the fact that in the mid-1960s, when the 'catholic' 
union was at its most powerful, its membership was little 
short of that of the Communist CGIL (2.4 compared to 2.5 
million).
Politically, catholic unionism was highly ambiguous. 
On the one hand, many of its prewar leaders supported the
89
single union formed in 1944 in the name of anti-Fascist unity 
to the extent of favouring long-term collaboration with the 
Communists, both industrially and politically. Moreover, 
'white1 unionism gave organisational back-bone to the tradi­
tional catholic concern with social welfare, reinforcing the 
Christian socialist wing of the DC. However, when the catho­
lic and socialist worlds divided in 1947/48, catholic union­
ists found themselves in a state of extreme competition for 
working class support, so that the DC * s trade-union left 
often came to be a most vigorously anti-communist faction. 
This anti-communism resulted in the organisational division 
of the working class, weakening it considerably, and this 
weakness was compounded by CISL's crypto-corporatist collabo­
ration with the political and industrial elites in the con­
text of a low-wage regime and overwhelming entrepreneurial/ 
managerial domination.
The CISL was also an important component in establish­
ing the DC's lay orientation and, with it, the party's pro- 
Western position. Although conventionally understood as the 
'catholic' union, and giving clear support to the DC through­
out the 1950s, the union specifically and deliberately avoid­
ed joining the Christian international of trade unions when 
it established itself in the aftermath of the break-up of 
trade-union unity in 1948. Its preference for links with the 
American AFL-CIO also contributed to overcoming intense 
anti-Americanism within Catholic Action and ACLI the catholic 
workers' association.4 5
h. The 'Third Wav' and catholic 'integralism'
Opposition to the idea that the DC represented the
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catholic sub-culture was unwelcome for two reasons which were 
diametrically opposed to one another. On the one hand, 
ending the centre-orientated political unity sought by De 
Gasperi meant ending anti-Fascist unity which was held to­
gether, as we shall see, in Part II of this Chapter, by the 
claim to representational monopoly of the country*s two 
dominant political cultures, catholic and socialist, by the 
DC and the PCI. This could have threatened the development 
of political toleration within the CLN, the existence of 
which precluded any attempt at the exclusion of one or the 
other sociopolitical forces through force of arms. Here, 
catholic unity was a means to an end - the stable evolution 
of a pluralist democracy.
On the other hand, catholic unity could be understood 
as part of the universalist and totalising philosophy of 
catholic mobilisation which aimed at re-christianising Ital­
ian society. Here, catholic unity was an end in itself, 
virtuous per se. This idea was closely associated with the 
idea of there being a catholic 'third way*, neither liberal- 
capitalist, nor marxist-socialist, an idea in its turn asso­
ciated with that of 'integralism*.
The idea of the third way was articulated in both 
intellectual and activist catholic movements, thus giving it 
mass resonance, even if one more deeply felt in northern than 
southern Italy. Its core belief was the demonstrable superi­
ority of Catholicism, given that both its adversaries, col­
lectivist Marxism and individualist liberalism had shown 
themselves to be inherently flawed: the crash of 1929 and its 
outcome, above all in Germany, like the revolution of 1917
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and its bloody aftermath, had led to totalitarianism and 
world catastrophe. Now catholic activists were keen to take 
the lead in reorganising society.
Comprising both political and cultural leaders, as well 
as engineers and technocrats, a broad movement of Catholics 
fed into the DC and various state organisations, not least 
IRI (the Industrial Reorganisation Institute, set up in the 
1930s), furnishing organic links between the party, the 
economic world and the Catholic Church. Sharing a belief in 
the need to revitalise a physically and morally devastated 
society through their active participation in the country's 
post-Fascist renaissance, these cadres, according to their 
catholic historian, came to constitute the core of a post-war 
catholic ruling class which was pluralist, technocratic and 
democratic.4 6
Much of this movement had a deep concern with social 
issues and this, together with their interest in organising 
the state orientation of the economy allows them to be iden­
tified in some sense with the 'left', if in an arch-reformist 
and 'top-down' way, not unlike Fabianism in Britain. Howev­
er, in stressing the theoretical self-sufficiency and moral 
superiority of Catholicism, the ideology of the third way did 
more than back up the idea of catholic unity and thereby 
confirm the possibility of an autonomous political mobilisa­
tion of Catholicism. It also courted the danger of integral- 
ism - the promotion of a catholic state predominating over a 
catholic society.
A wide-ranging debate exists as to the precise meaning 
of integralism, and who the term covers,47 but the belief
92
held by opponents of the DC and the Vatican that a signifi­
cant component (perhaps the most significant) of the catholic 
world fostered the idea of a catholic state re-catholicising 
Italian society meant that even, and perhaps especially, 
'social democratic* elements of catholic thought and action 
gained an authoritarian aura.48 This belief came to be of 
major political significance in the 1950s for precisely this 
ambiguity enveloped Amintore Fanfani, the Christian Democrat 
who took over from De Gasperi following the latter*s death in 
1954. Intellectual polarisation in the 1950s was exacerbated 
by the fact that it was not just the communist, but also the 
catholic (and the lay/liberal) tradition which was shot 
through with guasi-totalitarian attitudes.49
i. Catholicism and political heteronomv
De Gasperi*s opposition to the Pope and to the clerico- 
conservative minded Roman party, together with the lay and 
social orientation of the trade-union movement confronted a 
situation of Christian Democratic political dominance 
streaked with authoritarianism and quasi-totalitarian atti­
tudes harboured in the catholic world. How the DC developed, 
particularly in relation to other political forces was in the 
balance. As Fascism collapsed, the catholic world found 
itself in a state of confused resurgence, charged with ideal­
istic social voluntarism and plain desperation, a potentially 
dangerous combination of both intense optimism and profound 
pessimism. The pressures on Catholicism, above all the 
perceived threat of global communism, interacted in favour of 
catholic unity, and De Gasperi was able to capture this, yet 
De Gasperi, for all his deep devotion to the catholic faith
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was also a democrat and a pluralist, opposed to integralism. 
He created and used the autonomy which his political position 
gave him to promote a political dialogue which went against 
the tendency to a clash between opposing totalities.
This strategy was necessary not only to promote stabil­
ity between the political blocks, but even to secure catholic 
unity itself, for this could only be achieved on as wide a 
base as possible. The catholic movement was, as we have 
seen, politically quite heterogeneous, and whilst the DC 
clearly had to be anti-Communist it also had to be open to 
the deeply felt urge for social reform. Interaction with the 
left was necessary both as a political strategy of democratic 
stabilisation and as a party strategy of 'catch-all' aggrega­
tion.
In fact, catholic political thought had not developed 
in a vacuum. Whilst it was distinctive from liberalism and 
socialism in important respects, it was not totally alien to 
them. The dominant leaders of the catholic party did not, 
whatever the rhetoric to the contrary, reject the lay or the 
socialist parties in principle, nor those parties the DC. 
Indeed, they participated in each others' development, with 
the DC playing a key role as a site of mediation which al­
lowed it, in a sense, to replace the CLN when it was no 
longer tenable. It was not a series of political and cultur­
al autonomies that shaped party system development, for the 
core players recognised that their activity was in part ruled 
by others in a system of mutual and partial heteronomy. The 
abolition of the monarchy coincided with a radical end to the 
existence of a single political sovereign. The fount and
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symbol of this new, interactive, system was the Committee for 
National Liberation (CLN) in which liberals, marxists and 
catholics cooperated to determine the evolution of Italian 
society. The CLN was the womb of the Italian party system 
and of modern Italy as a democratically organised society, or 
nation-state.
C. Political Opportunity
The collapse of Fascism and the political vacuum which 
followed provided a clear opportunity for Catholicism to 
take the political stage. We have demonstrated that the 
politico-cultural and organisational background of Christian 
Democracy was heterogeneous, yet tending to unity, and this 
was undoubtedly important in the development of the party's 
spatial image. Nevertheless, it was only in relation to 
other political forces that it could establish itself as a 
centre party in the way that it did. We can understand the 
nature of this developing relationship by considering the 
functions the party took upon itself in relation to those 
other parties, and the structure that emerged in the process.
1. The DC and political mediation
The hostility of Catholicism to liberalism and social­
ism was sufficient to permit the independent development of 
an autonomous political movement. However, catholic politi­
cal culture was far from isolated from the evolution of 
modern European social and political thought and the more 
politically minded elements of Italian Catholicism understood 
themselves as related to the modern development of the demo­
cratic idea. This was most evident in the collaborative
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elaboration of the constitution by catholics, socialists and 
liberals.50
Nevertheless, the tendency towards quasi-totalitarian 
mutual exclusion of the leading political forces was a real 
danger until the electoral crises of 1952-3, and in the 
crucial period immediately following the collapse of Fascism 
the DC assumed a key role in preventing this. Disagreement 
between the hostile politico-cultural blocks was kept within 
bounds where cooperation could continue by the autonomy which 
the party elites exerted vis a vis their respective hinter­
lands. This collaboration was, as has already been indicated 
for the DC, contested within the catholic world, and the same 
was true of the communist world, but the memory of the fail­
ure of catholic and socialist political elites to cooperate 
in the aftermath of World War One, and its consequences, 
inspired the political elites of this new post-war era to 
start afresh. Political cooperation, the joint management of 
social conflict, was seen as the fundamental basis of politi­
cal development.
The arguments of Baget Bozzo and Pietro Scoppola, lead 
ing historians of the Christian Democratic Party, are of 
interest in this context. Baget Bozzo has argued that the DC 
has to be understood as a party defined by its aims rather 
than by its social bases, by what its elites sought to do, 
rather than by what its electoral and interest group linkages 
made it. There is a danger here of voluntarism, a problem 
which affected the DC itself, but we can stress the impor­
tance of the purposive aspects of the party without neglect­
ing material constraints. According to Baget Bozzo, what the
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elites did was mediate between the predominantly backward- 
looking catholic world and the political and economic reali­
ties of modernity.51
This argument stresses the role of parties as actors, 
indeed as leaders, particularly in a situation of acute 
tension, but the DC's relationship with its own world is only 
half the story. Pietro Scoppola has argued for a wider 
appreciation of the insight and modernity of the DC's domi­
nant elites, in particular De Gasperi, in recognising the 
generic mediating and brokerage role of political parties. 
Scoppola stresses the idea that De Gasperi's key intuition 
(and it was not one generally appreciated within the catho­
lic, liberal or socialist worlds) was to perceive the neces­
sity of stabilising the tremendous multiple tensions of 
Italian society through the establishment of modern mass- 
based political parties52, thus creating a competitive 
multi-party system.
Scoppola further argues that De Gasperi's grasp of the 
importance of institutionalising sociopolitical conflict in 
organised and self-disciplined mass parties was more or less 
shared by Togliatti, if from a different theoretical and 
strategic perspective, and that in effect these two leaders 
collaborated to assert the dominance of their nascent mass 
parties in the political sphere, and their joint, if conflic- 
tual, exercise of leadership over Italian society. This 
relationship was, in part, one between a confessional and a 
non- or anti-confessional block, but it was also much more, 
for contrary to Baget Bozzo, the DC was not originally a 
‘Christian party' which subsequently lost its inspiration.
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It was, from the beginning, an essentially lay party which 
aimed at modernising and 'desacralising* the catholic world, 
whilst managing a systematic process of mutual compromise 
between capitalism and democracy.53
Although De Gasperi1s attitude to Communism hardened 
considerably in the early 1950s and the DC went on to evade 
parliament itself in developing its power, the establishment 
of competition and cooperation between political parties as 
the bases for handling conflict were founded in the 1940s, 
principally via the relationship between the DC and the PCI. 
This was a significant political innovation. Even confronted 
by the Fascist regime, political cooperation between its 
enemies in exile had proved difficult54 and as late as 1946 
De Gasperi viewed with concern the return of leaders such as 
Don Sturzo, the founder of the PPI and Carlo Sforza, the 
Republican, from exile. Within Italy, by contrast, liberal, 
communist, socialist and catholic political elites had orga­
nised the Committee of National Liberation as early as 1944 
and claimed the right to govern jointly as an anti-Fascist 
coalition. The CLN was an institution of decisive importance 
in determining the DC*s relations with the catholic world and 
with the other parties and it is the focus of Part II of this 
Chapter. Through it, the DC established its role as mediator 
between Catholicism and modernity and between the different 
political forces within the modern world.
The CLN established the principle of the existence of a 
'centre* in the relational sense outlined in Chapter One, on 
the basis of a core comprising principally the DC and PCI. 
However, the centrism of the DC also contains a significant
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'linear* component which can be shown to be rooted in the 
outcome of the 1946 election of the Constituent Assembly. 
Thanks to this election, catholic political autonomy and the 
belief in Catholicism as a 'third way* came to be structural­
ly inserted into the nascent party system.
2. Party system structure: the blueprint
When the electorate turned out to vote in June 1946, 
the de facto government was the CLN, six parties led by De 
Gasperi comprising Catholics, liberals and socialists/commu­
nists. The election had been preceded by a series of local 
elections which had seen the left making major gains, and De 
Gasperi was keen to distinguish his party from the those of 
the right/centre-right, with which his party was frequently 
associated, without identifying it with the left. He thus 
used the appearance of the small 'conservative* parties to 
distinguish his party as a centre party, confirming its 
pivotal mediating role.
Results of the 1946 Constituent Assembly Election
Blocks Parties Results Sub-totals
(% of vote cast)
Homo qualunque 5.3 )
Right BNL (monarchists) 2.8 > 15
UDN (liberals) 6.8 )
Centre Democrazia cristiana 35.1 35
Republican 4.4 )
Left PSIUP (socialist) 20.7 > 44
PCI (communist) 18.9 )
A number of minor parties are not included.55
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By defining the party system in this way, De Gasperi 
was well on the way to creating the linear three-block sys­
tem, creating the centre as a location, and one which the DC 
all but monopolised. The 1948 election almost put paid to 
this strategy, given the collapse of the right, but the 
right's reemergence in 1953 meant that from 1946 to 1972 a 
block of 10 - 15% of the vote lay to the right of the DC. 
Only from 1976 was that block halved in size and rendered all 
but irrelevant, signalling, as we shall see, a fundamental 
change in the nature of the party system. The DC's vote 
settled at some thirty-eight per cent of the vote for thirty 
odd years, whilst that of the left consistently fell several 
points short of 50 per cent.
The 1946 election presented a rough blue-print for the 
future structure of the party system even though in the key 
1948 election this structure almost collapsed. The right 
block obtained under nine per cent of the vote, and the 
Liberals, who accounted for nearly half of that, were in 
coalition with the DC. Why did the DC, rather than form a 
two-block system based on anti-socialism, consistently seek 
to 'move left', preventing the development of a dualism a la 
Duverger? The answer has much to do with the nature of the 
centrism constructed in the 1943-47 period.
D. Summary
We have seen that the DC was dependent on the catholic 
world for the mobilisation of its electorate and for the 
sense of cultural autonomy that gave it an identity. We have 
also seen, however, that the catholic world was a complex
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structure in evolution in which the Christian Democratic 
Party was both part of that world and yet distinct from it. 
We have seen, furthermore, that this distinction was accentu­
ated internally, and rendered unclear externally, by the 
fact that the DC played a key role in promoting that evolu­
tion, in particular through its relationship with the Marxist 
and lay parties. Dwelling at length on the catholic world 
has allowed us to place the DC in relationship to its ‘inter­
nal ' politico-cultural world, but in order fully to under­
stand that relationship it is necessary to examine the par­
ty's relationship with those lay and Marxist parties which 
constituted its external politico-cultural world. This is 
the subject of Part II of this Chapter.
II THE POLITICAL CONSTRUCTION OF CENTRISM
When the wavering Fascist regime collapsed in July 
1943, supreme political authority formally lay with the king, 
Vittorio Emanuele III, but neither he nor Marshal Pietro 
Badoglio, the former Chief of the General Staff whom he 
appointed as his Prime Minister, were able to assert control 
over a disinterested army, let alone over Italian society. 
The titular holders of Italian sovereign power found them­
selves marginalised, and German invasion forced them to flee 
south, behind the Allied lines.
Over the winter 1943-44, government power lay with the 
two occupation armies which cut Italy in two, but the real 
threat to the future reassertion of royal authority came from 
the overwhelming republicanism of the emergent political
101
elites - the newly invigorated liberal, catholic, socialist 
and communist parties, collectively organised as the CLN. 
Within a year a civilian government, comprising the CLN 
parties, had replaced the royalist government via a coup de 
main which the Americans backed. Based in Rome the CLN 
maintained links with the German-occupied North and estab­
lished itself as the focus of political development despite 
the country's remaining a theatre of war, cut in two by 
contending armies. At the end of 1945, Allied restrictions 
on the CLN's authority were removed, and Italy's new politi­
cal elite gained complete responsibility for the government 
of Italy. Though the continuing Allied military presence was 
a decisive factor in shaping the new political regime, the 
central and most important point was the rapidity of the 
reestablishment of independent statehood.
Formally, the rapid resumption of power and responsi­
bility by a new Italian political elite did not coincide with 
the establishment of a new political regime. In this sense, 
the period 1943-48 was something of an interregnum. Only in 
1948, as a result of constitutional agreement between the 
anti-Fascist parties of the CLN sitting in the Constituent 
Assembly of 1946-47, did a new polity, the Italian Republic, 
came into existence. Nevertheless, the 1943-48 period was 
crucial since the foundations of the Republic were laid 
during it. In particular, the creation of an interactive 
party system in this period as the locus of political legiti­
macy changed the nature of 'sovereignty' from something 
locatable and able to be possessed, to something ever-creat­
ed, ever-contested, the contingent outcome of democratic
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competition.56 This, it will now be shown, is the signifi­
cance of the creation of the relational centre in the CLN 
period; and this is what the transformation of the centre 
into a location, and its appropriation by the DC after 1948, 
threatened to undermine.
This analysis will not focus on an examination of 
'interests1, nor accentuate the significance of political 
'cleavages* based on these. Policy-making, and its impact on 
different groups and classes is therefore not a major issue 
in this chapter. Indeed, it will be argued that political 
differentiation in terms of posing alternative policy orien­
tations linked to class and/or 'interest* based perceptions 
of politics was generally suppressed by party elites. These 
elites, in fact, established themselves as a state-managerial 
class which saw policy choices as ultimately determined by 
the interdependent requirements of managing political and 
economic development.
A. Building a 'Political Class*: Anti-Fascism. 1943-48
This Section will demonstrate first the self-assertion 
of a new political class through the CLN, then the solidifi­
cation of that class in the face of adversity. The two subse­
quent Sections (B and C) will demonstrate the unity of that 
class in dealing with the country*s problems and the subse­
quent division of that class. The significance of this 
division is considered in Chapter Three.
1. The CLN: the self-assertion of a new political elite
The Republican successors to the Fascist regime had 
nothing to do with that regime*s collapse in 1943 but they
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rapidly organised themselves to take advantage of it. As 
early as April 1943, Ivanoe Bonomi, a pre-Fascist Prime 
Minister, brought the leading figures of the main anti-Fas­
cist groups together in the United Freedom Front. This 
established an arena within which liberals, communists and 
Catholics worked together and it was, as noted before, 
strongly influenced by memories of the responsibility of 
parties for the collapse of the liberal regime.
From the time of the king's flight in September 1943, 
the United Freedom Front (UFF) identified itself as the CLN, 
and disputed the legitimacy of the royal government. The 
relevance of the CLN at this time was, however, far from 
established. The Committee lacked international recognition 
and the cooperative propensities of its members were unprov­
en. Moreover, none of the 'parties' in the CLN had a terri­
torially and hierarchically integrated structure of proven 
loyalty to their leadership, and it was highly dubious that 
their supporters wanted them to collaborate with political 
forces traditionally regarded as enemies. In fact, the CLN 
itself, by establishing a justification for differentiated 
positions between the elites and their followers, became the 
basis on which the all-but self-appointed new leaders consol­
idated their leadership over their parties and their socio­
cultural hinterlands.
The driving forces of the CLN were the radical-liberal 
Actionists and the Socialists, and their hostility to the 
royal government initially created a situation of political 
dualism which could have wrecked elite unity. In January 
1944 the First Congress of the CLN parties called for the
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king's immediate abdication and the establishment of a Con­
stituent Assembly to determine the country's future. Given 
continuing Allied support for the monarchy and the military 
division of Italy as late as the spring of 1945, this con­
frontation could have split Italy north/south, with a radi­
cal, republican, socialist and anti-clerical north confront­
ing a conservative, catholic and monarchist south. Such a 
potentially disastrous superimposition of cleavages did not 
take place thanks to the mediation of the catholic and commu­
nist parties and the survival of the CLN.
The catholic leadership knew its movement to be divided 
on the question of the monarchy and back-pedalled whilst 
trying to maintain the pattern of elite collaboration. Its 
position was difficult. Its support for the CLN was decisive 
in ensuring its survival, yet much of the Vatican was hostile 
to such apparently unnecessary collaboration with tradition­
ally anti-clerical liberal and Marxist parties. The DC 
attacked the Socialists for their willingness to see the CLN 
collapse, accusing them of dangerously forcing the pace out 
of a mixture of intellectual adventurism, encouraged by the 
Actionists, and competitive out-bidding vis a vis the PCI. 
It found support for this position from the PCI, even before 
Togliatti's return from exile in Russia,57 but Togliatti's 
return was decisive.
It was Josef Stalin and Palmiro Togliatti who resolved 
the situation by recognising the royalist government, inter­
nationally and domestically, forcing the CLN to revise its 
stance.58 This decisive stand against revolutionary confron­
tation and in favour of continuing CLN cooperation was known
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as the volta di Salerno (Salerno U-turn) and it helped De 
Gasperi maintain his support for the CLN against its oppo­
nents within Catholicism. This decisive stance in favour of 
mutual toleration by the communist and catholic party leaders 
prevented political degeneration, or the militarisation of 
politics.59 The transfer of political initiative from the 
Actionists and Socialists to the DC and PCI in the spring of 
1944 proved permanent, and it determined the success of the 
CLN, though the Actionists and Socialists attempted several 
times to upset it.
De Gasperi1s attitude towards the Communist Party at 
this time was not one of mere collaboration forced by neces­
sity. De Gasperi considered collaboration to be of value in 
itself, and he respected Togliatti*s reciprocation of this 
belief, though his attitude to Togliatti later hardened 
considerably. This respect was eased by the sharp distinc­
tion made between communism and communists. a principle 
established by Maritain, the French catholic philosopher who 
deeply influenced many Christian Democrats, and later made a 
part of papal doctrine.
As the CLN entered the royalist government in April, 
the king was persuaded to abdicate, for only thus could he 
hope to save the institution, but already in June Rome was 
liberated, and this saw Bonomi effect his bloodless coup, 
declaring the CLN to be the new government. US backing 
ensured the success of this move. A new political elite had 
asserted itself, but before it could be confirmed as a new 
political class, the party system core of a new 'stable 
dissensus*, it had to prove itself able to withstand the
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centrifugal pressures that would be put on it by its integra­
tion with Italian society.
2. The consolidation of a political class
Between June 1944 and April 1948 when the first 
Republican legislature was elected, three civilian Prime 
Ministers presided over seven government coalitions, thus 
anticipating political behaviour over the next forty years 
and more. In this period the CLN thus functioned like the 
elite component of a multi-party system. However, the con­
solidation of this system, and of the political class which 
practised it, required electoral confirmation.
Of the CLN's six components, the Christian Democrats, 
Communists, Socialists and Liberals maintained their organi­
sational and political continuity in the long term. The 
Democratic Labour Party was little more than a vehicle for 
Bonomi himself and soon fell apart, some of its left-liberal 
notables in the south joining the Socio-Communist Popular 
Front. The sixth party, the Action Party, though politically 
of great significance, also disappeared. In many ways this 
party spearheaded a widespread determination on the part of 
intellectuals to modernise and democratise Italian society, 
but significantly it lacked a mass base. The composition of 
the delegates at the First CLN Congress is indicative of the 
CLN's initial intellectual voluntarism and the weakness of 
its societal rootedness: the Communists and Socialists had 
twenty two delegates each, the Christian Democrats and Liber­
als twenty and twenty one respectively, and the Labour Demo­
crats nine. The Actionists had twenty six, more than any 
other party, yet two years later dissolved themselves for
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lack of electoral support.60
Formally, the CLN was not able to claim to be sover­
eign. The April 1944 compromise made a future Constituent 
Assembly the focus of political legitimacy, rather than the 
CLN or the monarchy, despite some determined efforts to 
maintain a legal chain of succession.61 The writ of the CLN 
was also limited by the Allied military presence and the 
geo-military division of the country. Nevertheless, the CLN 
had links with the north, both via the individual parties and 
as a collective institution, and its claim to represent the 
entire nation-state was fundamental to its survival in a 
situation of near anarchy.
Political tensions were high, and the CLN was divided 
by major issues. Foremost amongst these were the implementa­
tion of 'anti-Fascist sanctions1 (purges) and the nature of 
the powers and responsibilities of the CLN, and of the local 
CLNs which had sprung up throughout liberated central Italy. 
The local CLNs leaned strongly to the left and not only put 
an end to Fascist injustices, exacting their own justice and 
revenge, but often challenged property rights and the local 
power structure. A grass-roots revolution threatened to take 
place and the Liberals in particular fought to establish the 
provisional nature of the local Committees, and to install 
government appointed prefects and police chiefs. Tensions 
reached a climax in November 1944, provoking Bonomi*s resig­
nation and the formation of a second government which the 
Actionists and Socialists refused to join.
The Communist decision to join the new government 
maintained CLN unity whilst establishing the Actionists and
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Socialists as a sort of 'loyal opposition* which went on to 
participate in subsequent CLN governments. The DC and the 
PCI were now locked together in a firm embrace. From this 
collaboration Togliatti hoped to gain permanent Communist 
participation in government, encouraged by the fact that 
Roosevelt still guided the American administration and looked 
favourably on the idea of a moderate-left government being 
established in Italy to encourage Vatican/Soviet detente. De 
Gasperi, for his part, sought to maintain the unity of the 
emergent political class for the autonomy it gave its con­
stituent parts. The antagonistic cooperation of the DC and 
PCI guaranteed that the political initiative stayed in the 
CLN by giving each party leverage against its own more ex­
tremist and destabilising backers.
The danger that the power of political initiative would 
be displaced elsewhere was real. Hitherto the experience of 
the modern politics of mass enfranchisement in Italy had been 
one of disorder and authoritarianism. The importance of mass 
political parties in securing popular consent was still 
largely ignored or underestimated by the old Liberal elites 
and even by the radical Actionists, not to mention powerful 
figures in the Vatican or Bolshevik-minded Communists. If 
the ferment of a politically disorganised society was to be 
constructively channelled, it had to be mass parties that 
would do that channelling, and the political will of the 
embryonic political class to assert itself on this basis in a 
crucial phase of mobilisation was decisive.
Both De Gasperi and Togliatti understood that their 
ability constructively to guide the vast political upheaval
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taking place, to whatever end, was dependent on their ability 
to maintain the unity of the CLN, or at least its core - the 
DC/PCI coalition. At some stage too, the premiership had to 
pass to one of the mass parties. In the summer of 1945, the 
liberation of northern Italy brought about a radicalisation 
of the political scene which severely tested the two leaders* 
ability to maintain the coalition, but the conclusion to this 
radical phase was marked by the passage of the premiership to 
De Gasperi, a development which Togliatti supported.
During the winter of 1944-45 some Actionists had pro­
posed that an insurrection should follow the end of the war, 
leading to a revolutionary government. These maximalists had 
looked to the PCI for leadership, but the Communist elite in 
Rome had no desire to see the intransigent and confrontation­
al attitudes of many Actionists, Socialists, and northern 
political elites establish their dominance, a stance which 
the outbreak of civil war in Greece had reinforced. Thus the 
Communists avoided preparing for an insurrection and crushed 
the very idea when the moment came for carrying an insurrec­
tion out. Togliatti recognised that his strategy could be 
completely upset by revolutionary haste, acknowledging in 
1946 that even an early national election could have been 
disastrous.62 This behaviour led the Socialists and Action­
ists to call on the CLN parties to distinguish their respec­
tive policy positions and to pursue a more confrontational 
politics. But the summer 1945 'wind from the north* managed 
no more than to install Ferruccio Parri as an ineffective 
Prime Minister.
Parri * s appointment broke the dead-lock created by the
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counter-candidacy of De Gasperi to the candidacy of Pietro 
Nenni, the Socialist leader. Parri was the leader of the 
Actionist partisans and he enjoyed tremendous prestige thanks 
to his personal integrity and courage and to the Actionists* 
contribution to the Resistance, the Resistance being the only 
area in which the Actionists achieved any degree of mass 
organisation. But Parri was a political outsider. Opposed 
by conservatives he lacked a political machine to back him, 
and neither the Socialists nor the Communists gave any 
help.63 By December 1945 the empty radicalism of the Action 
Party had been thoroughly discredited. Parri resigned.
Parri*s government was important because of its fail­
ures. The CLN continued to dominate, whilst radical, party- 
less, tendencies blew themselves out. The radical historian 
Guido Quazza condemned this development as signalling the 
conservative nature of the parties, PCI included, in contrast 
to their radical bases. But as pointed out by Scoppola, 
Quazza underestimates the degree of conservatism and reaction 
latent in society.64 The CLN sought a stable political 
evolution which would unite the country and avoid civil war.
On Parri*s resignation, the PCI backed the nomination 
of De Gasperi as Prime Minister. Ironically enough, De 
Gasperi's success was interpreted as a victory for the reac­
tion, even within Catholic Action,65 though not many rea­
lised the historic significance of the move. It was largely 
in retrospect that it came to be widely seen as the moment of 
'Thermidor', of counter-revolution. This interpretation, 
however, fails to note the significance of the passage of 
national political leadership to the 'political secretary' of
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an embryonic mass party. Political leadership by a democrat­
ic mass-based figure relying on party self-discipline and 
party competition had never been seen before in Italy. The 
governing tradition was of leadership by a narrow elite based 
on forcibly imposed social discipline. The deployment of the 
army and the carabinieri on a garrison basis and the institu­
tion of repeated states of siege had been so normal under the 
liberal regime66 that many had scarcely been aware of the 
rise of Fascism, and its attendant violence, as something 
qualitatively new. De Gasperi was the third CLN premier and 
he remained Prime Minister for three national elections and 
through eight coalitions, by the end of which time the bases 
for government by consent, rather than force, had successfuly 
been laid.
But that is to go beyond immediate concerns. De Gas­
peri fs first government was the fourth CLN government, but it 
was the first of a united Italy, and it is on this basis that 
Andreotti's 1989 cabinet was counted as the country's forty- 
ninth (see Appendix 1) . It was because a CLN government led 
by De Gasperi and backed by Togliatti could demonstrate its 
authority at local level - something Parri's had singularly 
failed to do - that the Allies relinquished control of north­
ern Italy at the end of 1945. A new political class had 
consolidated itself by asserting its will to govern. The 
possibility of government based on consent, of the existence 
of a centre, had been established. Now the political class 
had to make sure that its existence was not rendered ephemer­
al. The paese legale had to establish its identity with the 
paese reale. This required both coming to grips with the
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country's problems, and gaining popular backing. These two 
requirements were potentially irreconcilable.
B. Political Responsibility and Leadership
From the beginning of 1946, the CLN bore full responsi­
bility for getting Italy to work. This was a massive prob­
lem: war damage to the means of production and communication 
was immense, unemployment was a long-standing structural 
problem and the state was bankrupt. Mobilisation for war, 
the war itself, partisan warfare, deportation and the de­
struction of homes had wrought social havoc. The provision­
ing of major cities was a crisis surmounted on a day to day 
basis, dependent in the latter half of 1945 on surplus mili­
tary supplies and from 1946 on aid from the Allies.
1. Leadership autonomy
The key to surmounting these problems was political. 
Class cleavage brought anarchy and apathy and threatened to 
paralyse reconstruction. Nobody knew who they were working 
for - the state? themselves? the old bosses? the anarchists? 
The rapid assumption of responsibility for the daily running 
of the country gave the new political class an extremely 
realistic and unadventurous approach to politics. Here, for 
De Gasperi, lay the second reason for wanting the Socialist 
and Communists in government: give them responsibility and 
they would behave responsibly. They had to. The immensity 
of the problems required it, and the dangers of failing to 
cope had been signalled as early as December 1944 when a 
newspaper called Uomo aualuncrue made its appearance. Attack­
ing the new political class as inferior to the country's
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requirements, and as better at providing radical slogans than 
government, it appealed to the 'common man* of its title on a 
populist-reactionary basis. Coining a slogan of its own 
which met with great success, it pronounced 'things were 
better when they were worse1, and in 1945 the paper*s editor 
founded his own political party.67
De Gasperi1s leadership was decisive. Government 
initiatives aimed at promoting reconstruction and seeking 
international support advanced rapidly. Fundamental and 
bitter political issues were fought out and decided within 
the ambit of the government and the Consulta, the advisory 
council of 400 CLN nominees which had been established under 
Parri. Local administration was handed back to state offi­
cials, the CLN figures being ejected, and it was decided to 
hold the local elections before the national one, which would 
elect not a parliament but a Constituent Assembly. On all 
these issues, and others, De Gasperi was presented as the 
personification of reaction, but whilst De Gasperi became the 
focus of the defeated voluntaristic left*s attacks, Nenni and 
Togliatti continued to back him on important decisions whilst 
seeking to win the left electorate to their positions.
All the while the Socialists and Communists were in 
government they, like the DC, were busy extending their 
ability to organise and penetrate Italian society. The basis 
of their cooperation was ultra-competitive, both forces 
hoping to benefit electorally from the resumption of produc­
tion which their truce had enabled. The success of the 
Socialist, Communist and Christian Democrats in replacing the 
Liberals and conservatives as the new political force in
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society was demonstrated in the local elections held in the 
spring of 1946, and confirmed in the national election of 
June, but by late 1946 the ability of these elites to main­
tain their autonomy of their backers was under severe strain.
The DC suffered major losses to the right, whilst Togli- 
atti had already been forced to abandon government in order 
to concentrate on maintaining order within the party. Togli- 
atti's departure coincided with the reshuffle which followed 
the June 1946 Constituent Assembly election, the results of 
which De Gasperi used to exclude the Liberals and crisis- 
wracked Actionists from the cabinet. Many of the key politi­
cal issues - the purges, the question of the monarchy, of 
local government, the purpose of the national election and 
the powers of the Constituent Assembly had all been decided. 
The crucial issue now was the economy. This subject is 
handled at length in Chapter Five.
It can be said here that major decisions which it was 
feared would have been politically destabilising were avoided 
throughout 1946 and early 1947. For the dominant elites of 
the major parties, the inevitability of a continuing role for 
private enterprise and the state was never seriously in 
doubt, and the removal first of the Liberal Party, and then 
of the Finance Minister Epicarmo Corbino in the autumn of 
1946, reinforced this pragmatic, policy-avoiding orientation 
to economic management in the CLN. An ideology of 'produc- 
tivism1, common ground to both Communists and self-interested 
businessmen, if not to laissez faire ideologues, was allowed 
to dominate.68 This was an ideology well-suited to a strate­
gy of simply coping, whilst building party organisations and
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preparing for a future electoral confrontation. Subsequent­
ly, policies could be put into effect on the basis of the 
tremendous flow of detailed information about the material 
condition and the different predispositions of various eco­
nomic actors now becoming available to the government thanks 
to the investigative commissions of the Constituent Assembly.
The survival of the CLN into the spring of 1947 enabled 
the acceptance of the major territorial and institutional 
decisions still outstanding on a consensual basis. Thus the 
Trentino-Alto Adige Accord and the subsequent Paris Peace 
Treaty of 1947, the special arrangements for the regions, 
including Sicily, and the settlement of Article seven of the 
constitution dealing with Church/state relations were all 
settled by the broad coalition.
By the late spring of 1947 the management of both the 
economy and the polity required that the political class 
abandoned its provisional autonomy vis a vis its various 
hinterlands. The conflictual element within the embryonic 
party system had to be given full reign if the autonomy of 
the elites was not to see them pushed aside. The moment of 
the political class' greatest challenge had come. Would it 
be able to close the gap with civil society and yet maintain 
a stable, democratic political system?
2. The exclusion crisis and centrism
In May 1947 De Gasperi resigned, going on to form a 
government composed entirely of Christian Democrats - the 
country*s first monocolore (one colour) government. His 
erstwhile coalition partners, the Socialists and Communists 
were excluded. The exclusion crisis, as it came to be known,
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dramatically increased already high political tensions. The 
period of grand coalition was over, 'synchronic unity* had 
been ruptured. What would follow was unknown.
A radical change of government orientation was indicat­
ed. The government gained the backing not only of the Liber­
als, absent from the two previous governments, but also of 
the monarchists and crualunauisti. Decisive economic policies 
were at last implemented, causing great hardship. Not even 
De Gasperi*s own party was convinced of the wisdom of the 
move, and for months the Liberals, Republicans and the newly 
formed Social Democrats waited to see if the left would be 
able to force themselves back into government.
In conventional radical and socialist historiography 
1947 is the moment of conservative restoration, even if under 
the flag of Centrism. Conventionally dated from 1947,69 here 
Centrism is regarded as having entered its long crisis in 
1947. The CLN governments were centrist in the relational 
sense outlined in the introduction, but unlike in the classic 
consociational regime the party elites were not able to 
maintain their autonomy, but were forced to politically 
manifest the socio-cultural conflicts between their follow­
ings. Centrism originated in 1944, its crisis began in 1947, 
not 1953.
The crisis was severe. It threatened to reduce cen­
trism to an exclusionary rump which would end the transition 
to democracy. Unwilling to back either a new dictatorship or 
a clerical regime, the small centre parties hung back from 
joining De Gasperi*s monocolore. They expected to see the 
forcible reestablishment of synchronic centrism, or to be
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more ironic, 'coerced consociationalism1.
We shall look at this paradoxical idea, and at the 
significance of the minor parties in Chapter Three, which 
covers the transformation of Centrism in detail. What this 
section has stressed is the horizontal linkages between the 
parties and their autonomy as a political class. This we 
have seen, was limited by political mobilisation, the need to 
consolidate intra-party, vertical linkages. It is to this 
theme we now turn.
C. Organising a Party Democracy
De Gasperi and Togliatti used their understanding of 
the importance of mass parties and of political manoeuvre to 
establish the CLN as the supreme political organ in the land. 
Its authority rested on these two figures cooperating as the 
leaders of the two mass movements in Italian society, but 
this was something of a bluff. The political predominance of 
the PCI and DC was not obviously secure in the early post-war 
period, and both leaders faced internal challenges, not least 
on account of their alliance. Yet it was the collaboration 
of the two leaders which guaranteed the dominance of these 
two parties. It destroyed any possibility of the emergence 
of a Christian left, subordinated the PSI and smashed the 
Actionists. There was a huge tension here. The political 
force of the nascent political class derived from the control 
the party leaders were able to exercise over their cultural 
hinterlands, yet precisely this was electorally untested and 
unlikely to survive such a test if elite collaboration con­
tinued.
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1. The extension of party control into society
In 1944, Italy had existed as a state for only some 
seventy years, but it had failed to integrate state and 
society, or paese legale and paese reale. Thus, according to 
Martin Clark, Liberal Italy failed to create a nation­
state.70 This was the task that confronted the parties of 
the CLN.
The backing of the Church was decisive in mobilising 
the electorate behind the DC, but the Christian Democratic 
Party was not totally inexistent as an organisation. A 
meeting of Roman and Milanese catholic leaders in 1943 
agreed on a single political organisation, preventing a 
north-south and conservative-progressive split, and Giuseppe 
Spataro, an ex-Populist deeply involved in organisational 
matters was able to report that virtually every province in 
the country had a representative of the party in it. He 
arranged the circulation of letters on a national basis in 
the summer of 1943, and though this organisation was extreme­
ly skeletal it was critical in becoming the recipient of a 
grass-roots desire for collective action.71 This process 
marginalised weaker movements such as Gerardo Bruni's Chris­
tian Socialists, and the DC/PCI link in the CLN reinforced 
the tendency to duopolistic concentration.
A most important contribution to this duopolistic 
tendency was made by the DC*s appreciation of the importance 
of trade union organisation and cooperation with the Commu­
nists, Actionists and Socialists. In August 1943 the three 
major parties were already jointly agreed on the importance 
of anti-Fascist commissioners taking up appointments through
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the Badoglio government, even though political collaboration 
with the royalist government was otherwise shunned.72 The 
adoption of such responsibilities in public life meant the 
penetration of society and the opportunity to gain leadership 
over it. The assertion of DC domination over Christian trade 
unionism involved De Gasperi in a great deal of intrigue in 
the Vatican, the party and trade union circles, and again 
involved Togliatti.73
The grip of the mass parties was extended in June 1944 
through the pact establishing trade union unity, and this 
coincided with the seizure of the political initiative by the 
CLN in Rome. The political coup thus went hand-in- hand with 
the establishment of political control over industrial mobil­
isation. Here we have the tight hierarchical control of 
trade unions by a 'peak organisation* of the type discussed 
in the literature on neo-corporatism74 coinciding with the 
establishment of a grand coalition which has, similarly, been 
seen as a mechanism for stabilising the elite/mass relation­
ship. The attempt to unify state and society, to achieve a 
democratic inter-penetration of the two is clear. Trade 
union unity outlived CLN governmental cooperation by over a 
year and the continuing constitutional cooperation, which 
ended in December 1947 when its task was completed, by six 
months-.
The DC *s recognition of the need to penetrate and 
organise society in competition with other political forces, 
and its unwillingness to depend solely on the Church can be 
confirmed by the party's activity in the agricultural world. 
Here the DC stole a march on the PCI which, despite signifi­
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cant reform attempts by its Minister for Agriculture,75 
Fausto Gullo, was slow to realise the agricultural world's 
significance.76 The forerunner of Coldiretti. the associa­
tion of 'farmers' which was to play such a significant role 
in the DC was founded in October 1944.
By late 1944, then, the DC's penetration of society was 
well advanced. A skeletal party organisation existed and the 
tremendous commitment of Catholic Action worked almost exclu­
sively to its benefit. At the same time, industrial and 
agricultural union organisation was advancing. In the indus­
trial world this involved cooperation with the left, but De 
Gasperi was careful to ensure that the catholic contribution 
was not swamped. The 'cultural' catholic workers' associa­
tion ACLI was maintained independently, and if any party lost 
out in this period, it was the Socialists who completely lost 
the initiative in the face of the duopolistic relationship 
between the DC and PCI. The party organisation of society 
was intensely competitive. The critical determinant for 
crystallising the competitive penetration of society by the 
parties was the electoral process. This was why the timing 
of elections, and the sequence in which they took place was 
so important.
2. Elections: establishing party control
The radical left sought early elections, with the 
national election to precede local ones and to have the 
purpose of electing a sovereign power. This stance threat­
ened to break up the CLN from which both De Gasperi and 
Togliatti, and their respective organisations, they hoped, 
gained. Consequently, the national election was delayed
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until June 1946, and elected only a Constituent Assembly, not 
a parliament, allowing the CLN to continue governing.
The 1946 campaign was a heated affair and placed great 
strains on the CLN, but from without, rather than within. 
Togliatti was committed to avoiding insurrectionism and 
though the result was a great blow, revealing his failure to 
penetrate the middle classes in a catch-all strategy, he 
abandoned his government post in the subsequent reshuffle in 
order to reassert his strategy within his party. This was a 
necessary move, for by the autumn of 1946, elements of the 
party*s elite and especially the Emilia-Romagna region, the 
party*s stronghold, were in an insurrectionary mood.77
Nor was the right happy. The election placed the left 
within sight of a majority, and the Christian Democratic 
Party was seen as too weak to resist the pressure. At the 
very moment that the DC demonstrated its indispensability, 
opposition to the party's weakness reached a high point. In 
the autumn elections, which included those at Rome, the party 
lost heavily to anti-CLN forces, in particular to Uomo aua- 
lunaue. It was at this moment, as the pressures of the 
'Roman party' to create a second catholic party reached a 
climax, that Montini brought the tension between the Pope and 
De Gasperi to a head, establishing the latter's political 
supremacy.
The new weakness of the DC helped Togliatti contain his 
adventurist supporters, for it now seemed that the left would 
be able to dominate the weaker centre party. De Gasperi*s 
position was serious. Continuing collaboration with the left 
threatened to lose him the initiative to the right, but as he
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had made clear to the Pope, collaboration remained necessary. 
Over the winter of 1946-47, however, the party elites came to 
accept that social and political tensions now focused on the 
maintenance of the CLN, and that to ignore this reality 
indefinitely courted disaster. Electoral confrontation in 
the run up to the first parliamentary election, due at the 
end of 1947, would allow the party elites to reassert their 
leadership and make clear the national balance of power, 
providing a new political basis to work from. For this 
strategy to work, vigorous electoral campaigning was neces­
sary, incompatible with continued governmental cooperation.
The PCI, then, expected to go into the opposition 
before the election, but it did not anticipate the manner in 
which it occurred, and certainly did not expect the exclusion 
to be permanent. Togliatti was still orientated towards 
governing, not towards being a party of permanent opposition. 
Only the dramatic and unexpected initiation of the Marshall 
Plan on the basis of 'Cold War' confrontation, developments 
which events in Italy helped precipitate, thrust the PCI into 
a situation which the 1948 election confirmed to be one of 
all but guaranteed exclusion.78
Nevertheless, throughout 1947 the CLN parties continued 
to collaborate in the Constituent Assembly, establishing a 
precedent for the PCIfs elites to work with the government in 
the obscurity of state institutions whilst opposing it vigor­
ously in public debate. The summer and autumn of 1947, 
moreover, saw massive socioeconomic turmoil as the government 
at last undertook to govern, implementing tough economic 
policies, and this turmoil led to the postponement of the
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election until the summer of 1948. It is not surprising that 
electoral campaigning was incandescent. For the left it 
became the last opportunity to retain political influence 
following their political isolation in the autumn of 1947. 
At first, the minor parties had refused to back the conserva­
tive turn of the government, but in the late autumn, forced 
to choose between backing the government and bringing it 
down, Liberals, Republicans and the new Social Democrats 
(some half of the Socialist Party central committee having 
broken away in January 1947) had formally entered the cabi­
net.
Instead of a clash between parties, little more than a 
battle between alternative teams of leaders, the Republic's 
first election became part of a cosmic struggle between 
civilisations, the kingdom of God on one side and the Soviet 
Socialist utopia on the other. Italian society was corralled 
into massively confrontational politico-ideological blocks in 
an 'aligning election'. In the new political climate the 
leadership of the PCI found itself mobilising its electorate 
on the most extreme basis possible, yet wanting to moderate 
that force into a bargainable tool able to secure reentry to 
the cabinet, whilst the DC found itself pushed ever more 
deeply into being both a catholic and a conservative party, 
orientations which went deeply against the grain of many of 
its leading components. In effect, electoral mobilisation 
secured not simply the party control of society, but socie­
ty's perverse control of the state as the intense ideological 
patterning of the party system became a series of cages in 
which party elites were trapped.79
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Ill CONCLUSION
This Chapter has shown that between 1943 and 1947 a new 
type of polity was established in Italy in which political 
authority based itself on the leadership of political parties 
claiming to organise all of Italian society. It has argued 
that this type of sociopolitical organisation, common to 
modern states, was essentially new and untested in Italy, 
though limited previous experience had convinced the new 
political elites of its necessity. Much was made of the 
distinction between the party elites and the mass of society, 
to the point of establishing the existence of a ‘political 
class' distinct from ‘civil society1.
This distinction was stressed in looking at the Chris­
tian Democratic Party which was described as both of, and 
distinct from, the ‘catholic world'. The leadership function 
of political parties in post-war Italy was such that the DC 
has to be grasped as both a party of interests, in particular 
catholic and economic interests, and as a purposive organisa­
tion whose aims apparently often conflicted with the inter­
ests it represented. However, the heterogeneity of the 
catholic world, the matrix from which the party sprang, was 
emphasised in order to indicate the room for manoeuvre which 
the party elite could obtain by playing interests and fac­
tions off against each other. Above all else, the autonomy 
which the party elite acquired, it acquired through its 
special responsibility for political affairs, that is for 
handling relations with the other political forces.
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One of the prime objectives of this elite autonomy, it 
was argued, was to create a centrist political system, that 
is, a parliamentary and democratic system based simultaneous­
ly on party conflict and cooperation. In particular, it was 
argued that the political class constituted itself by estab­
lishing itself as the core of an electorally unproven party 
system, establishing a relational centre in the period 
1944-47 through the quasi-grand coalition of the CLN. The 
events of 1947-48 threw this centrism into a profound crisis, 
but it will be argued in Chapter Three that whilst the exist­
ence of a relational centre was challenged, the survival of a 
working party system means that centrism was transformed 
rather than destroyed.
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CHAPTER 3 THE CRISIS AND TRANSFORMATION
OF CENTRISM. 1947-53
Analysed in the terms of this thesis, the collapse of 
the grand coalition in 1947 was a particularly dramatic 
crisis because it was a collapse of synchronic centrism which 
threatened to lead to a collapse of centrism, of the exist­
ence of a relational centre, itself. The exclusion of the 
left was followed by the electoral fusion of the centre and 
right in 1948, and this appeared to make permanent the radi­
cal exclusion of some one third of the electorate, all on the 
left. Such exclusion violated the centrist principle of 
balanced all-party participation in the management of the 
polity. This Chapter considers the significance of the fact 
that this situation proved to be transient.
The governing coalition identified itself as centrist, 
and from 1950-51 its alienation of the right-wing electorate 
which it had briefly attracted in 1948 grew apace. A defi­
nite three-block tendency developed in which both the right 
and the left were excluded. The 1953 election was critical 
in fixing this sub-structural organisation of the party 
system. The period 1947-53 is thus seen as a period of the 
crisis of centrism. In it, the centrism established by the 
CLN was first overthrown and then recreated, in a transformed 
and ambiguous way, in order to avoid a two-block confronta­
tion which threatened to put an end to the very principle of 
centrism. The advantages and disadvantages of the three- 
block version of centrism are given particular attention.
One highly influential model of the nature and organi­
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sation of politics in this period, that is, the onset of the 
Cold War, high-lighted the necessity and benefits of the 
three-block structuring of the Italian party system. It 
identified ‘left* and 'right* globally as communist and 
fascist respectively, hence as destructive, anti-democratic 
forces bent on dictatorial rule, by contrast to the 'vital 
centre* of 'democracy* which had to exclude them from govern­
ment were it to survive.1 This model is echoed by Sartori in 
his model of polarised pluralism.
The purpose of this chapter is to examine the extent to 
which such a model was realised in Italy between 1947/8 and 
1953. In the first Section, the positive aspect of the 
three-block system are considered, but in a way which stress­
es continuing interaction, not radical separation. It does 
this by considering the PCI's understanding of the situation 
and the DC*s intentions. The second Section examines the 
significance of the government's reformist will and its 
actions in reestablishing the right block, creating the 
three-block structure of the party system, again questioning 
the rigidity of the analytical model of rigid vertical divi­
sion.
The Chapter concludes that the tendency towards the 
creation of a three-block system was positive in its confir­
mation of centrism as a principle of interaction within a 
unitary whole, but negative in decisively turning the centre 
into a location identified with a single party. In conse­
quence, it is argued that the failure of the election of 1953 
to give the centrist coalition the bonus of seats provided 
for in the 1952 electoral reform (the so-called 'swindle
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law1) was significant because it guaranteed the survival of 
centrism whilst exposing the danger that the new centrism 
would be a self-contradictory and self-destructive, exclu­
sionary1 one.
I CRISIS & TRANSFORMATION: EXCLUSIONARY CENTRISM
The exclusion of the Communists and Socialists from the 
cabinet in 1947 was not the result of American pressure. De 
Gasperi*s precipitation of the crisis provoked concern in the 
US administration for the Americans feared political confron­
tation. Their fears were fuelled by the dramatic economic 
action which De Gasperi promptly initiated.2 De Gasperi, by 
contrast, deliberately sought confrontation, deliberately 
tied political and economic crises together in a dramatic and 
decisive fashion, and deliberately provoked the Americans to 
respond to the political explosion of the Italian party 
system.
De Gasperi seized the political initiative in order to 
reap the maximum electoral benefit possible from a direct 
confrontation with 'Communism1. Such a confrontation enabled 
the DC to acquire the support of both conservatives and the 
bulk of practising Catholics, conservative or not, by con­
demning intransigent left Catholicism to apparent irrelevance 
now that it was part of the PCI rather than a separate party 
organisation.3
The Christian Democrat leader tied the anti-Communist 
electoral manoeuvre to the economic one in order to generate 
the maximum support for the Italian government from the 
'capitalist* world, meaning the business world in Italy, and
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the USA. De Gasperi wanted to force Italian business to give 
its wholehearted support to the new political system, and to 
provoke the USA in to giving Italy increased aid. Already 
Italian business had begun to implement its own foreign 
policy, outflanking governments distinguished by their policy 
immobilism, and US attitudes to Europe were unsure and con­
tradictory. De Gasperi achieved a success that probably went 
beyond his wildest dreams. Not only did the DC gain the 
support of the Italian business community through the so- 
called De Gasperi/Costa alliance, it also contributed to the 
launch of the Marshall Plan.4
The exclusion of the left meant that De Gasperi could 
implement policies to stabilise the economy which had hither­
to been delayed, and take responsibility for them. In this 
way, social antagonism was decisively focused on a political­
ly aggregating dialectic between a government and an opposi­
tion at the parliamentary level, and the PCI's insistence on 
focusing on the political struggle fitted in with this 
schema. 'Economic' confrontation within civil society was 
discouraged by the Communist elite itself, and business and 
state repression ensured that maximalist opposition to the 
'bourgeois regime' were marginalised through the loss of 
their jobs and so on. In this way, political and economic 
stabilisation and reconstruction were combined, and their 
conjunction helped the success of both. The question is, did 
the defeat of the left, in the work-place and in parliament, 
amount to an exclusion which signalled the end of the fragile 
centrist regime?
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A. The Exclusion of the Left?
The first elected parliament was the only one which 
gave the Christian Democrats a majority in the Chamber of 
Deputies, yet it presented a real blow to a part of De Gas­
per i*s strategy. The weakness of the Social Democrats in the 
face of PCI/PSI unity hardly made it a convincing partner 
with which to affirm the continuation of broad-based centrist 
government. The electoral campaign had been dominated by the 
confrontation between the Popular Front and the DC which 
marginalised the other parties, and a pretty clear division 
between a right government and an excluded left opposition 
seemed self-evident.
Such a division did not per se signal the end of cen­
trism since 'diachronic centrism1, ie centrism via governmen­
tal alternation, is based on the exclusion of the opposition, 
as was the case ab initio in post-war West Germany. However, 
the permanent exclusion of the opposition, as in Italy's 
'blocked' system, is another matter. The policy confronta­
tion in the Cold War atmosphere of the first legislature was, 
moreover, particularly intense, with an apparently unbridge­
able divide over the strategic issues such as economic and 
military integration in the West.
Nevertheless, as we have seen, pressures from the 
grass-roots had made it organisationally and electorally 
imperative that the PCI be outside the government in the 
run-up to the 1948 election, and although Togliatti had been 
sure of the party's return to power, the events of 1947-48 
rendered this all but impossible. Attitudes towards the 
Marshall Plan, and hence to the USA and the USSR, crystal­
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lised the difference between the Popular Front and the other 
parties making the resumption of governmental cooperation 
impossible. Because this strategic incompatibility mirrored 
a social confrontation between workers and entrepreneurs, a 
division of roles within the political class now took place. 
This saw the quality of government soar as the cabinet ended 
the previous policy immobilism and decisively took responsi­
bility for promoting economic and political reconstruction. 
The opposition, for its part, acted both as a lightning 
conductor for the intense stresses which this caused, and as 
a stimulus to the government to minimise these stresses.
The confrontational division between the government and 
the left was thus beneficial to the polity as a whole. At 
the same time, moreover, the division was not as rigid as it 
appeared. Not even the electoral reform, which would have 
made the government's parliamentary majority secure, was 
solely an anti-left measure. It was introduced only in 1952 
after it was clear that the centrist policies which the 
government pursued risked being destroyed by the collapse of 
the coalition's electoral support, principally to the right. 
The government was to the left of much of its 1948 elector­
ate, and the electoral reform sought to reconfirm the three- 
block pattern revealed in 1946, not merely to exclude and 
dominate the left.
As for strategic policy matters, seemingly black- and- 
white questions such as Italy's military posture and economic 
orientation were not issues for the left's elites in quite 
the way that a dichotomous left/centre/right model would 
suggest. Italy's geo-military and geopolitical location,
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and the consequences, were acknowledged. The true debate was 
not about whether integration with the West should take 
place, but about the detail of it, and whether the left 
should have a say in the decision.
The early 1950s was the period of Mccarthyism in the 
USA, and the transformation of the 'Cold War1 into a hot one 
in Korea, and in these circumstances the most important 
strategic decision made by the government was the decision 
not to outlaw the PCI. This would certainly have ended 
centrism, for the increase in police repression would have 
created a qualitatively new regime based on the repression, 
isolation and atomisation of entire strata of the industrial 
working class and peasantry. It would have been a repeat of 
the 1860s. Then, another new, and would-be constitutional 
and modernising, regime had implemented a policy of despotic 
repression throughout southern Italy, with major long-term 
historical consequences. As the CLN had indicated the new 
political class' intention not to repeat the mistakes of the 
post World War One period, so did the handling of the crisis 
of centrism reveal the intention of the new Republican polit­
ical class not to repeat the mistakes of the post-unification 
state. Thus, national integration by means of political 
party organisation and party competition survived, and the 
left remained politically potent, uniting north and south, 
industrial and agricultural demands for reform and modernisa­
tion. The PCI's survival and the electoral attraction of the 
Popular Front affected the behaviour of the DC, its coalition 
allies and parties on the right. In the long run, PCI legit­
imacy, however successfully contested in ideological and
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electoral rhetoric, was ultimately underpinned by that par­
t y ^  legal status.
But interaction between the left and the centre arose 
not only the basis of the electoral competition of the two 
blocks, but also from the overlap of policy positions between 
Left elites and subordinate (as it turned out) Centre elites. 
The policy defeats of the excluded left were matched by 
defeats for the powerful left opposition within the centrist 
coalition. As we shall see in the following sub-section and 
Section B, tensions within the DC and the other government 
parties were strong, and only surmounted by a call to disci­
pline in the face of the spectre of Communism and the threat 
of turmoil which the collapse of the government would bring. 
The internal difficulties De Gasperi faced allowed the Commu­
nists to continue to regard the DC as a centrist party, an 
amalgam of conservative and popular and democratic forces. 
This meant that the PCI could continue to pursue its strategy 
of seeking alliances with, or within, the parties of the 
centre, and unlike its French counterpart, the Communist 
Party in Italy never became estranged from 'bourgeois democ­
racy* and its theorists.5
The PCI had, nevertheless, a different view of the 
nature of government and of power, based on Gramsci. Togli- 
atti*s handling of the Gramscian inheritance was undoubtedly 
influenced by the organisational need to make a virtue out of 
necessity, but the emphasis on the importance of building a 
massively organised 'presence* in society as a strategy for 
eventually obtaining governmental power can be seen to have 
some correspondence with theories of government which began
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to dominate political science from the 1960s. These, too, 
played down the authoritative capabilities of government, 
unless backed by, and further enabling, deeper politico- 
cultural changes.6 As held by the PCI, this view allowed the 
Left to believe that though it was excluded from the cabinet, 
it was not excluded from governance, or the wider political 
process. Exclusion was thus reversible and relative, rather 
than permanent and total, and the validity of this approach 
was apparently confirmed by the failure of the Centre block 
to gain a secure parliamentary majority in the 1950s.
B. Exclusion and the DC
It was certainly not the desire of the whole of the DC 
permanently to exclude the Left from government. A majority 
may have expected the permanent exclusion of Marxists, but in 
1947 a large grouping within the party, known after its 
leader Giuseppe Dossetti as the Dossettiani, did not accept 
even this. They wanted tripartite cooperation to continue, 
and when it did not, expressed the hope that a single party 
government would be able more coherently to implement a 
social democratic programme similar to that of the British 
Labour Party.7
Even where the Left was rejected, a distinction has to 
be made between those who rejected both parties and elector­
ate, and those, such as Gronchi and Fanfani, who made a point 
of distinguishing between party and electorate with the 
intention of appealing to the left electorate whilst assert­
ing their anti-socialism. Large sections of the DC, ideolog­
ically and programmatically hostile to integration in, and
141
subordination to, the liberal and capitalist West, to liberal 
financial and employment policies, and to NATO, had reason to 
believe that little separated them from leftist voters in 
policy terms. Perhaps they were right. What hindered elec­
toral mobility was party identification based on supra-ra- 
tional, ideological motivation which the established party 
elites pursued so vigorously precisely in order to overcome 
such structurally destabilising alternatives as left Catholi­
cism.8
Both the left and the centre of the DC hoped that the 
success of the government's social and economic strategies 
would reinforce their own mass appeal and that of the newly 
founded Social Democrats, weakening the opposition whilst 
providing the DC with a safe centre-left ally. For the DC 
left this tended to mean that two centre-left parties, one 
catholic, one lay, would govern, flanked by left and right 
extremes. For De Gasperi, the DC could not be identified as 
a centre-left party, but had to remain a centrist one. Its 
conservative electorate and its anti-communism permitted only 
a defensive progressivism, and the radicalism of the DC left 
threatened to make even that unrealisable by pushing the 
party's electorate to the right.
The ambitions of the DC left were also destabilising 
because identifying the DC as centre-left, like the PSDI (and 
later the PSI), required some means of distinguishing them 
for electoral purposes, otherwise, again, electoral mobility 
would bring political turmoil. The obvious distinction lay 
in the DC's catholic identity, and this reinforced the 
grounds for the opposition and the lay centre parties alike
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to fear the DC's 'integralism1. Not that identifying the 
party with the centre-right was an alternative, for this 
confirmed the clerico-conservative nature of the party.
The perception of the DC as a catholic integralist 
party pursuing a 'third way', by its allies and foes alike, 
was hard to avoid. The roots of an important distinction can 
be seen here between what can be called on the one hand a 
centrist political strategy, and on the other a centrist 
party strategy. The former pursued a programmatic centrism 
seeking to distance the DC from the right (including the 
Vatican) and to encourage the growth of a moderate socialist 
coalition ally. In the long run, the electoral reinforcement 
of the centre would lead to its bifurcation and government 
alternation between a progressive centre-right and a centre- 
left. In the 1980s, Ciriaco De Mita was consciously to 
pursue this path, though by this time the core of the 
centre-left included the PCI. The problem with the strategy 
is that it implies the DC going into the opposition at some 
stage which would be both 'disloyal' and potentially disas­
trous for the party itself. The centrist party strategy, by 
contrast, aims to maintain the centrality of the DC, to 
prevent its identification with the right/centre-right and 
the development of a two-block system.
In Section II, we shall now see that the 1948-53 gov­
ernment was not that of a clerico-capitalist power block 
excluding the left. If anything, the genuinely centrist 
economic and lay policy orientations of the PSDI and PRI were 
those most nearly realised.9 Centrist government in this 
period vindicates the strategy of the PCI elite. The danger
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was that the transformation of centrism into an occupied 
location would see, if the 'swindle law' seats bonus was 
triggered in 1953, too complete a victory. That is, the 
expropriation of the centre by the DC, leading to the domina­
tion in that party of a centrist party strategy which would, 
out of catholic conviction and organisational self-interest, 
marginalise the opposition, contradicting the centrist polit­
ical strategy.
II CENTRIST GOVERNMENT
Despite the many challenges to De Gasperi, government 
policy in the period 1948-53 was largely shaped by him, or in 
accordance with his aims. These were not simply to occupy 
power, but to govern, and to govern according to a reformist 
programme stressing social justice based on growth and the 
development of a lay democracy. The difficulty was in rea­
lising this aim in the complex political circumstances of the 
time.10
A. Social Reform: The Limits of Voluntarism
After a year of government, the new parliament had 
implemented little more than a watered-down housing scheme 
from its ambitious programme of social reform. The ability 
of the conservative majority in the party to block reform had 
been revealed, and the upshot of this was a complex battle 
inside the party. The 3rd Congress of 1949 took the form of 
a confrontation between the Dossettiani and De Gasperi, with 
the latter seeking to defeat the left but to keep it in the
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party and use its mobilisation against the right. The left 
was internally divided over issues and strategies, as well as 
being divided by conflicting personal interests, and De 
Gasperi was able to convince Dossetti that it was adventurous 
and self-defeating to stride forward along the road of reform 
as the Left wished. De Gasperi offered a cautious 'two 
shuffles forward, one shuffle backwards1 approach which won 
because it bound the party together, uniting centrist politi­
cal and party strategies.
Events outside the party helped enforce upon the right 
of the party the need for accommodation with the left. By 
late 1949 social disturbances arising out of the land ques­
tion in southern Italy were a serious problem, and when land 
occupations led to confrontations with the police and a 
series of fatal shootings, the PSDI used the opportunity to 
withdraw from the government. The Social Democrats, like the 
DC left, were pushing for greater reform, and hoped to 
achieve it by attracting defectors from within the highly 
troubled PSI. The PRI too had difficulty in justifying its 
support of the government. Before joining the monocolore in 
late 1947 the PRI and PSDI had backed a parliamentary vote of 
no-confidence moved by the PCI and PSI against the DC. Now 
they were supporting that party, and their bases were not 
happy that the provision, with the PLI, of a lay counter­
weight to the DC was sufficient justification.11
Under the impact of external and internal pressure the 
DC right was forced make concessions, and the Dossettiani 
gained prominent positions in the party and in government. 
Thus, 1950 became a year of reform. Most significant were
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the series of agricultural reforms, the establishment of the 
Cassa per il Mezzoqiorno (Fund for the South), tax reform and 
the laying of the legislative bases for the foundation of 
ENI, the National Hydrocarbons Institute which later made a 
major contribution to the decisive defeat of conservative 
economic interests.12
The reforms of 1950 were radical enough to provoke a 
major electoral swing to the right in the local and regional 
elections of 1950-52, especially in the south. In Sicily and 
Sardinia the regional governments became dependent on the 
MSI, whilst the monarchist PNM became important on the main­
land. With the connivance of the 'Roman party1 both these 
parties sought to become respectable conservative parties in 
this period, able to increase their electoral pressure on the 
DC.13 The centrist government was then being heavily pressu­
rised from both left and right, and it was this that prompted 
De Gasperi to move towards the idea of a 'protected democra­
cy1 and electoral reform to reinforce a centre block which 
would establish the three-block structure adumbrated in 1946. 
The alternative, it was feared, was to accept division into 
two blocks, splitting the DC and creating a destabilising 
left/right confrontation which centrism was designed to 
avoid.
However, the requirements of the electoral reform were 
not reached in 1953, nor did a two-block system emerge. The 
reforms of 1950 were far from radical and the years 1951-52 
saw not only the electoral rise of the right but also massive 
discontent within the catholic world at De Gasperi*s modera­
tion.14 De Gasperi's manipulation of papal support15 never­
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theless ensured the marginalisation of this Dossetti-inspired 
discontent in the name of catholic unity. In consequence, 
renewed radical mobilisation ended up boosting support for De 
Gasperi's DC, often, paradoxically, interweaving itself with 
the attempt of the clerico-conservatives to force De Gasperi 
into alliance with the right ('operation Sturzo' see below). 
Where this mobilisation did turn against the party, it was 
brutally marginalised as a disloyal fringe of the catholic 
world which supported the fragments which split from the lay 
centre parties in 1952/33 to back the opposition against the 
new electoral law. The mobilisational vigour of Catholicism, 
left and right, thus contributed to the survival of centrism 
based on a three-block structure, though the centre block was 
far weaker than De Gasperi had intended.
To frustrated Christian leftists, the rise of Fanfani, 
following De Gasperi's death in 1954, seemed to offer the 
possibility of a more progressive Christian Democratic gov­
ernment. The view that the DC could, through regeneration, 
be its own alternative, was to become a consistently reap­
pearing party theme.16 The problem with the thesis was its 
excessive voluntarism. So long as the party's left was 
unable to effect an alliance with the forces of the left 
block, the right and centre was bound to continually frus­
trate them. Nevertheless, whilst the left attacked De Gas­
peri, it was actually De Gasperi's pursuit of political 
stabilisation and economic regeneration through maximum 
integration with the 'West', and his use of left-Catholicism, 
that lay the bases for Italy's subsequent economic 
successes.17
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B. The Threat of the Clerical Right
The expulsion of the left from the cabinet in the 
spring of 1947 removed the last elements of restraint on the 
situation of spiralling catholic/socialist confrontation. 
From the autumn, as the political, economic and international 
dimensions of crisis climaxed, De Gasperi availed himself of 
the intransigent confessionalist rhetoric whilst Togliatti 
moved to embrace the revolutionary equlvalent.18 In the wake 
of the DC's electoral victory in 1948, given the party*s 
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, the strength of the idea 
of an integralist catholic state grew.19 For the next decade 
the development of a confessional state under Vatican/DC 
direction was a major political issue, and by 1947 the radi­
cal democrat Gaetano Salvemini was decrying their joint 
transformation of Italy into a 'totalitarian state'.20
De Gasperi strove to counter this development by con­
tinuing the coalition with the minor centrist parties, now 
equally as valuable as anti-clerical parties as they were as 
anti-communist parties. This, of course, served only to 
infuriate the clerico-conservative reaction to the new phe­
nomenon of Christian Democracy, and in 1949 'closed Catholi­
cism', as John Whyte called it,21 achieved a major, but in 
retrospect, pyrrhic, victory: the papal declaration of the 
excommunication of practising Communists. This excommunica­
tion was subsequently clarified as covering Socialists and 
trade unionists in CGIL, as well as members of the PCI.
This action has since been judged an action of dubious 
merit, political or religious,22 and to have been a reflec­
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tion of the Church*s essentially defensive posture in the 
face of events in Eastern Europe,23 but it also reflected the 
power struggle going on in the catholic world and within the 
Vatican.24 Certainly, however, it was used by conservative 
politicians to push for catholic exclusiveness, just as Aldo 
Moro, a little over a decade later, used John XXIII*s new 
conciliatory message to justify the DC*s 'opening to the 
left*. At this stage, the clerico-conservatives hoped to 
force the DC to the right, both through internal manoeuvre 
and by external pressure.
De Gasperi was able to retain the upper hand. Though 
he needed the Pope's support in order to defeat the challenge 
presented by Dossetti without breaking catholic unity, his 
skill in achieving this made him indispensable to the right. 
Dossetti's challenge was a major one, enduring until 1951, 
and to attack De Gasperi would have been self-destructive at 
a moment when the right felt the catto-communist/progressive 
tendency to be ascendant in the catholic world.25 In fact, 
De Gasperi's political ascendancy within Catholicism was so 
prominent that, in championing Italy's integration in the 
West against the pacifist tendency in his party, he so in­
volved the Vatican as to force it to more or less it abandon 
its own supra-political posture of hostility to East and 
West.26
De Gasperi used the Pope and the right to defeat Dos­
setti, but then promptly turned around to dramatically assert 
his party's independence of the Vatican, and the Pope specif­
ically, above all when these were being used to promote the 
right. Between 1952-54, the right sought repeatedly to force
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the DC to form an alliance with the monarchists and/or MSI. 
The so-called 'operation Sturzo' was launched in 1952 in an 
attempt to get De Gasperi to accept the hitherto excluded 
parties of the right as coalition partners in the 1952 local 
elections in Rome and the south. With the national election 
in less than a year, and with the backing of the Pope for the 
prospective coalitions, the significance of operation Sturzo 
was not merely local, and De Gasperi refused the alliance. 
The centrist coalition won through in Rome, but on a minority 
of the vote, and it was De Gasperi's concern about the abili­
ty of centrism to survive at the national level that led him 
to favour electoral reform, and to speak seriously of the 
need for a 'protected democracy'.
In fact, centrism based on a three-block system sur­
vived without the new electoral provisions being triggered, 
indeed because the 'swindle law' was defeated, and the as­
cendancy of both the political and the economic worlds over 
the religious was reinforced between 1952-54. The ambitions 
of the monarchist party, the PNM, were blocked largely by the 
industrial elites of the north, who ensured that it did not 
expand there? whilst De Gasperi and his Interior Minister, 
Scelba, dispatched the MSI into a limbo of electoral illegit­
imacy by the lingering threat to ban it under the 1952 legis­
lation regarding parties hostile to the constitution.27
Massive defections from the governing coalition to the 
right in the 1953 election turned the centrist government 
into a centre block in a three-block party system. The 
defeat for the clerico-conservatives was a double one. Not 
only was the political right now excluded, but catholic
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coalition partners had been rejected in favour of lay ones. 
The Christian Democratic Party was leading Italian society 
towards a more tolerant and pluralist society.
This outcome was far from immediately apparent. The 
1950s witnessed a triumphalist mood in the Church in which 
Catholic evangelism militated against political pluralism. A 
series of,crusades, such as the declaration of 1950 a ‘Holy 
Year1 and the crusade to turn Rome back into a ‘ sacred city *, 
made Italian public life a continuous round of religious 
exhortation and celebration the organising of which freguent- 
ly involved the use and abuse of privileges against which the 
state and its representatives made no determined stand.28 
The 1950s were, as Martin Clark puts it, ‘the Marian years' 
when ‘the clergy were politically powerful, or thought to 
be',29
Pietro Scoppola goes beyond Martin Clark's emphasis on 
the semblance of clerical power to identify a continuous 
decline in the presence and power of the Church in Italian 
society from 1948. This he links to the development of a 
secular, consumer-orientated society championed by the DC as 
the basis for its power.30 The indifference of the DC to the 
Church's interests, and the negative effects of supporting 
that party were, moreover, recognised at the time. The 
Inter-Regional Bishops' Conference of January 1952, the first 
of its kind in Italy, identified support for the DC as one of 
the reasons for problems of clerical recruitment and morale, 
so that Church support for the DC was seen as a contingent 
necessity rather than a virtue in itself.
One strategy for coping with what was seen as the DC's
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fundamental unpopularity and disinterest in the aims of the 
Church was that of keeping the Church as distant from the 
party as possible. But this was a piece of wishful thinking 
which a more realistic second strategy contradicted: that of 
promoting the popularity and effectiveness of the DC by 
'renewing1 it internally.31 This is a theme we have just met 
in the response of the party left to De Gasperi's 'unholy' 
Realpolitik practices. These political and religious ideas 
were, of course, closely related.
The Church's hyper-activism of the 1950s, especially of 
the first years, was born of an at times hysterical spiritual 
desperation in the face of modernism and especially Commu­
nism. It was not matched by a real power which, if anywhere, 
now lay with the governing parties and with economic inter­
ests, and even, as we saw when considering the nature of left 
exclusion, with the opposition. The 1952 Bishop's Conference 
recognised this, and was in part a response to this fact. 
That it was the first conference of its kind in Italy re­
flected the fact that the Pope needed allies in his battle 
against the DC's autonomy.32
C. Reformist Government - a minimalist strategy
In matters both of socioeconomic and religious manage­
ment, the DC showed itself to be a reformist party. However, 
much of the party's electoral and interest group bases of 
support came from the same areas as the party's modernisers 
wished to reform, ie from the agricultural and entrepreneuri­
al worlds, and this situation placed a major constraint on 
the party's ability to enact its programme. Consistently,
152
the right of the party left the written word, the programme, 
to the party left, but blocked its realisation, something 
which was easy to do since the DC left could not force mat­
ters by seeking the support of the lay left.
The centre of the party, and in this period this large­
ly meant De Gasperi, tried to mediate this constructively. 
Often, it accepted the left's views on the need for reform 
and modernisation, but rejected the means. It also accepted 
that the right's conservatism prevented the party losing its 
electorate by presenting too radical an image. The centre 
also recognised the need to keep the left from abandoning the 
party, for this would end catholic unity and establish the DC 
as a straight-forward conservative party, leading either to 
political turmoil as the left threatened to come to power, or 
to a crushing political, social and economic conservatism 
which would hinder the country's modernisation.
The result was that the reformism of the party came to 
be realised through intrigue and through fear of the alterna­
tive. This was not *crisis-avoidance', that preempting of 
crisis through elite cooptation which Middlemass identified 
in post-World War One Britain,33 for crisis itself became the 
means both of enforcing change and of denying that it had 
happened. The normal mode of government and politics became 
management through crisis, for this arrangement allowed a 
series of small, or apparently small, changes to be made in 
the name of preventing a worse evil. Open and direct politi­
cal confrontation, clear victories and defeats, were avoided 
in favour of deals, achieved under pressure. Where the 
government had to confront and over-ride interests, as with
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agricultural reform, it ‘sweetened* its intervention by 
compromise and by pointing out its own reasonableness given 
the intensity of the tensions, and the alternative - the 
‘threat* of the left parties. The DC*s ability to act auton­
omously thus derived from its assertion of its centrist 
location in a three-block structure and from the alleged 
vulnerability of this structure. The paradox was that making 
the vulnerability of the system a major issue enlisted the 
support of right and left in maintaining it, both fearing a 
worse alternative.34
III THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRISM
Mammarella*s History of the Republic describes the 
quadripartite political formula of 1948-53 as a transitional 
one, unable to maintain itself.35 This is correct, for the 
centrism of the post-'exclusion crisis* coalition was vastly 
different from that established by the CLN and inherently 
self-contradictory. Yet Centrism was not finally superseded 
until 1963, and even the Centre-Left maintained the three- 
block structure of the party system.
A. Centrism: Ideal Types and Reality
Three ideal types of centrism can be identified. A 
democratically ambiguous type and two democratic types. All 
have played a role in post-war Italy.
1. Democratically ambiguous centrism
Whilst a ‘militant democracy* might be justified in 
excluding anti-democratic parties from the government arena,
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it is dangerous to make a principle of such necessity since 
if a democracy is effective there should be no anti-democrat- 
ic parties, whilst democracy at its most simple means the 
participation of all. The danger is that anti-democratic 
elements within the excluded parties will assert their domi­
nance over those elites more inclined to compromise, so that 
'exclusionary centrism1 becomes a self-fulfilling and self- 
defeating process.
Perhaps the major failing of Sartori's approach is that 
he fails to see this problem. From it, for example, stems 
his judgment that it is uniquely the parties of left and 
right which are de-legitimising, whereas the exclusion of 
those parties was equally delegitimising.
In so far as a tendency towards such an 'exclusionary 
centrism* was created in Italy between 1947-53, and continued 
thereafter, the crisis of centrism continued beyond 1953. 
Ultimately, centrist government could only survive only if 
the party system continued to function interactively, not 
through exclusion. The assertion of the three-block system 
both guaranteed the survival of centrism and threatened to 
end it by confirming its exclusionary nature.
2. Two democratic ideal types
'Centrism*, understood as the party political manage­
ment of the polity by a party system acting as a contradicto­
ry unity could, in principle, survive the introduction of a 
government/opposition dialectic such as in 1947-48. Unambig­
uously democratic centrism can exist in two ideal forms. 
That is, not merely synchronic, where all major parties are 
simultaneously in government, but also diachronic, where the
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major parties alternate in government. This is a major basis 
for the distinction between two types of democratic govern­
ment, 'majoritarian' and 'consensual', propounded by Arend 
Lijphart.36 For either to work in an ideal centrist fashion 
certain conditions would have to be met. As a first approxi­
mation, in the former the coalition would have to be all- 
embracing, and party organisation of the electorate equally 
efficient, in the latter there should be 'proportional ten­
ure' .37
Clearly, these conditions are not usually met, indeed 
it is the stuff of political competition to see that they are 
met only imperfectly. But there are limits to the degree of 
imperfection sustainable in democracy. In Italy, the exclu­
sion of the left in 1947-48 rapidly gave way to a three-block 
system which weakened this exclusion. This system developed 
because the government chose to respond in a primarily non­
military way to the social and political forces on its left, 
causing it to alienate its right electorate, but to maintain 
its own coalitional cohesion more or less intact. It also 
developed because of the fact that the exclusion of the Left 
alone, after 1948, appeared to be an unstated principle of 
the 'real' constitution, and this provoked opposition to 
electoral reform which it was feared would render this perma­
nent. Many who opposed the development of such a right- 
leaning centrism were, primarily, government party support­
ers. Some thought that they could ensure that such a devel­
opment did not take place by staying in the DC or by remain­
ing in coalition with it, others broke away to challenge the 
centre block electorally. The upshot of this was that whilst
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it was largely the defection of the right which created the 
three-block structure, prestigious centrist support was added 
to the left's mobilisation against the 'swindle law', rein­
forcing the left's belief that it was neither isolated nor 
politically irrelevant.
The failure of the block of centre parties to trigger 
the electoral bonus did not, however, lead to either of the 
ideal types of centrism outlined here, ie neither to a renew­
al of grand coalition nor to diachronic centrism. Rather, 
the gyrations of the party system over the next forty years 
reflected attempts to realise both. Indeed, until 1963, the 
party system was an evolving hybrid which contained elements 
not only of the two democratic models of centrism, but also 
of the third, democratically ambiguous type, that is exclu­
sionary centrism.
3. Resume
The effect of the tendency to 'exclusionary centrism' 
in the social and political context of the 1948-53 legisla­
ture was, paradoxically, to reconfirm centrism as a relation­
al construct by establishing a three-block structure. Where, 
as in the Netherlands, this structure also sees alternation, 
the participation of all parties in defining the centre is 
rather clear, but where this is not the case, it will still 
tend to be a balanced and embracing one, so long as a highly 
proportional system of representation makes it electorally 
sensitive. In fact the electoral reform of 1952 which would 
have countered this tendency was rapidly abandoned.
On the other hand, the identification of the centre as 
a block opposed to left and right extremes did make inter­
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block dialogue difficult, as emphasised by Sartori. Never­
theless, the significance of the maintenance of 'Centrism1 
throughout the 1950s was precisely that it prevented the 
exclusion that a two-block, Anglo-Saxon style 
government/opposition relationship would have signified. The 
three-block system could not be maintained on a basis of 
exclusion, even if the temptation, and its effects, were 
clearly present. Certainly, the maintenance of this struc­
ture at the electoral level required rigid distinctions to be 
drawn between the blocks, but at the elite level cross-block 
alliances, facilitated by the tradition of trasformismo, took 
on great significance. We shall look at this tendency more 
closely in Chapter Five.
B. 1947-53; Decisive Government. Weak Political Formula
In retrospect the 1948-53 legislature has come to be 
recognised as one of decisive governmental action, laying the 
basis for Italy*s 'economic miracle*. In this sense, the 
government of the period was clearly 'strong*, whereas the 
centrist government of the CLN had been notoriously weak. 
However, government coalition instability was marked and even 
the majority party revealed itself to be markedly disunited. 
De Gasperi was not even able to secure the nomination of the 
President of the Republic that he sought. The new centrism 
was also politically weak.
1. Centrist government and left political culture
On the basis of the centre block's internal non-cohe­
sion and the Gramscian theoretical inheritance, however 
manipulated, the PCI believed that it remained politically
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and even governmentally relevant, even if its outlook was 
fundamentally defensive. The 1953 election result and the 
subsequent abolition of the new electoral law confirmed this. 
In the 1950s, the PCI promoted itself, with the left-DC and 
PSI, as the defender of the constitution against DC clerico- 
authoritarianism whilst simultaneously defending the DC as an 
anti-Fascist party guiding a centrist coalition.
In effect, as Galli emphasised, it was to be to the 
left and with the left that the DC had to compete, for the 
three-block system was never symmetrical, and to make more 
than minimal moves to the right always risked creating a 
bipolar situation in which the DC would suffer. Zunino has 
written that Centrism was unable to establish its own politi­
cal culture, so unable to claim a hegemony, and was weak on 
this account.38 The reason for this is that the incipient 
two-block structure based on the DC and PCI established a 
political culture to the left of the governing block, a 
feature of post-war Italy which Sartori himself lamented. 
Extrapolating into the future, one can argue that the 
Centre-Left failed to overcome this disjuncture, resulting in 
the dramatic rise of support for the PCI in 1975-76, shortly 
after which the whole basis of party system organisation 
changed, as we shall see.
2. The strength of weakness
Centrism, as we have pointed out, did survive until 
1963 and beyond. Its weakness was its strength. The PCIfs 
elites sought not only to force themselves back into the 
cabinet, but also to compromise with it to avoid worsening 
the situation. The party right too could always be out­
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manoeuvred on the same basis, though it was more difficult to 
out-manoeuvre its special interests, when this was desired. 
It was, nevertheless, achieved, both in the first legisla­
ture, and subsequently, in response to the drift of the party 
system to the left.
The whole system has, thus, been highly interactive and 
even hyper-competitive, contrary to the view that the stabil­
ity of the system indicated electoral immobility and inflexi­
ble, non-responsive and non-innovative attitudes on the part 
of the political class. Rather than the stability of the 
system resulting from the immobility of the electorate, it 
has resulted from the responsiveness of the elites to elec­
toral change, a process which resulted not in stasis, but in 
gradual change indicated by the drift to the left as the DC 
developed alliances first with the PSDI, then the PSI, and 
finally the PCI. The latter alliance was the end of the road 
and proved abortive, but once the dramatic crisis of the late 
1970s had been overcome, no one could doubt the strength of 
the Italian party system or the attraction of the centre.
IV CONCLUSION
This Chapter has shown that centrism, understood as the 
existence of a relational centre constructed through multi­
party interaction, was thrown into a profound crisis in 
1947-48. It has also shown that centrism survived the crisis 
thanks to the rapid transformation of the exclusion of the 
left into a bipolar exclusion of left and right, thus estab­
lishing a new basis on which multi-party interaction could
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continue. The survival of centrism, however, also coincided 
with its transformation.
Whereas in the CLN centrism was imperfectly synchronic 
and openly relational, after 1947, and especially after 1953, 
the relational aspect of centrism was obscured. The centre 
came to be defined by a block, so that it appeared to be a 
location and the property of a party, rather than the outcome 
of either a synchronic or a diachronic relationship. The 
fact that the survival of the new three-block structure 
assumed the domination of the centre-block, together with the 
DC's ideological propensity to see itself as having a duty to 
govern, even threatened to deny the existence of a relational 
centre linking the three blocks. As we shall now see, this 
problem came to the fore with the rise of Amintore Fanfani to 
the leadership of the party after De Gasperi's death.
Building on the theory contained in Chapter One, this 
chapter has also specified three ideal types of centrism: 
exclusionary, synchronic and diachronic, only the latter two 
of which are unambiguously democratic. It has also further 
illustrated the argument that centrism, as a system of polity 
management, is constructive rather than merely a matter of 
compromise, inducing innovation among political elites and 
promoting stable change.
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CHAPTER 4 IMPERFECT CONSOLIDATION. 
CENTRISM. 1953-68
The ambiguities inherent in ‘centrism' were confirmed 
by the delicate position in which the so-called centre par­
ties found themselves in the second legislature. As a block 
coalition formula, Centrism emerged from the election of 1953 
as numerically valid, but as an exclusionary political formu­
la it was not viable. The PSDI's inclination to look left to 
the PSI was reinforced by its electoral losses and the left 
block's complementary and significant gains, whilst both the 
Republicans and Liberals found themselves facing out from, as 
well as into, the governmental coalition. The DC was thus 
compelled to follow the different propensities of its own 
components: to look left and right.
To seek support decisively in either direction was, 
however, impracticable if the DC was not to split. The right 
was implacably hostile to the Socialists for economic and/or 
religious reasons, whilst the left would not accept the 
backing of an anti-constitutional and reactionary right. In 
the aftermath of the 1953 election no political formula 
seemed tenable. Not even De Gasperi could find a satisfacto­
ry way of uniting the centrist party and centrist political 
strategies, and President Einaudi was forced to intervene, 
more or less imposing Giuseppe Pella, his successor at the 
Treasury, as a care-taker premier.1
In the long term, the desire within the centre to 
expand to left and right provided the grounds for the cen­
tre's expansion and the confirmation of its relational na­
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ture, but the established dominant images of the party system 
- of a group of democratic parties under totalitarian siege, 
and of a totalitarian clerico-capitalist reaction - made the 
continuation of cross-block political interaction other than 
through harsh electoral confrontation exceedingly difficult. 
Neither the government nor the opposition parties could allow 
themselves to be seen adopting similar policies, for that 
would undermine the cultural/institutional edifice on which 
the parties and the party system rested: the three-block 
party system. Open compromise would be destabilising both 
electorally, by encouraging electoral volatility, and within 
individual party organisations which had in any case been 
torn by an unusually high degree of internal trauma over the 
past decade. It would also provoke those alienated margins 
of the population least likely to accept the parliamentarisa- 
tion of politics. Already in the early 1950s the militant 
Fascist fringe had reemerged in the universities,A trade 
unions® and other activist organisations, leading to arrests 
and trials,2 whilst the PCI had had to suppress militants in 
Rome and the north during the CLN period and was losing 
electoral support from its militant northern working class 
base through the 1950s.3
In this Chapter we examine the survival of transformed 
centrism, ie the domination of the three-block structure, in 
the period 1953-68. Thus understood, centrism knew two 
phases, that of 'exclusionary centrism* in the 1953-63 peri-
A. FUAN: University Front of the National Advanced Guard.
B. CISNAL, the neo-Fascist trade union confederation was 
founded in 1950.
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od, and that of the Centre-Left from 1963-68. Whereas the 
period 1944-53 saw the creation of a political pact based on 
the survival of an interactive multi-party system, such that 
those years were the 'founding' phase of post-war Italian 
democracy, the subsequent fifteen years were those of its 
consolidation. The subsequent phase, that we look at in 
Chapter Six, was one of challenge to the form that the party 
system and democracy had taken. As we saw in Chapter Three, 
the establishment of the three-block structure of the party 
system both saved and transformed centrism, threatening to 
make it an exclusionary and self-contradictory phenomenon. 
In the first part of this Chapter we examine how this was 
avoided by considering: first, the development of the state 
and the confirmation of party rule, or partitocrazia as it 
came to be known at this time;4 second, the maintenance of 
centrism as a three-block structure through the realisation 
of the Centre-Left, an outcome seen as confirming the domina­
tion of politics by a political class ultimately wedded to 
the values of party competition and cross-block interaction, 
and shy of the destabilising effects of a two-block structu­
ration of the party system.
I THE MODERN STATE AND POLITICAL PARTIES IN ITALY
The 1950s was a decade of considerable political uncer­
tainty and ambiguity. A seemingly incompatible mix of prin­
ciples and institutions coexisted with considerable friction: 
a liberal/social constitutional state, powerful private 
business interests asserting the priority of capital over
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labour, a strong working class organised behind a powerful, 
if defensive, Communist Party, itself linked to a Socialist 
Party not without influence in government party circles, and 
finally a dominating 'catholic party* apparently tempted to 
institute a catholic state. In this section, the mutually 
hostile toleration of the political parties is shown to have 
allowed an ambitious political class to continue to assert 
the priority of its leadership as against the dominance of A) 
religion, B) class conflict and C) unmediated profit-making. 
It did this through the (unequal) hold exercised by the 
parties over both material and symbolic resources. Control 
of these promoted, respectively, the continuing mutual toler­
ation of the political class and its hold over the electorate 
through the redistribution of resources (so-called 'low 
politics*) and the maintenance of the established politico- 
electoral cleavages.
A. The Climax and Collapse of Clericalism
Establishing the dominance of the political over the 
religious was a long process. That it could be coupled with 
the survival of both Catholicism and of the DC only became 
generally evident with the launch of the alliance with the 
Socialists, and the new impetus given to Catholicism by John 
XXIII, in the early 1960s. As a specifically political 
phenomenon, the clerico-conservative tendency had already 
been hijacked by De Gasperi's centrist and lay political 
project in the 1940s, as confirmed by his rejection of opera­
tion Sturzo in 1952. The following sub-sections chronicle 
the virtual abandonment in 1954 of the attempt by a sectional
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interest - the Church - to reduce the political sphere to a 
mere instrument of its global project; the blows to the 
continuing presumption of Catholicism*s cultural predominance 
in 1957-58? and finally, the outflanking of the Vatican*s 
usurpative and anachronistic administrative core in the early 
1960s.
1. The Church abandons partisan politics
Operation Sturzo had been accompanied by turmoil in the 
catholic world, and youth revolts in ACLI and ACI in 1953-4 
focused on the desire of the ‘Roman party* to establish a 
right/centre-right government now that the centrist formula 
seemed dead. The resignations of Carlo Carretto in 1952 and 
Mario Rossi in 1954 from the presidency of the youth wings of 
ACI were symptomatic of this dissent.5
In January 1954, Amintore Fanfani, aware of the inter­
nal divisions within the catholic world, sought to form a new 
government gaining support from both the right and from the 
PSI.6 Fanfani's move was blocked by his rivals, not least by 
Pella, whose own premiership had won support for its compe­
tent ministerial team and decisive resistance to Tito*s 
attempt to regain Trieste. Cardinal Ronca, the political 
brain of the ‘Roman party', in the meanwhile promoted and 
then established an Italian National Union, favouring a 
right-wing government. A series of figures on the right of 
the DC, including Pella and Andreotti, supported this idea, 
and the weakness of the centrist formula clearly meant that 
1954 could have been a political turning point, seeing the 
establishment of a two-block party system. At the DC's Vth 
Congress in June, the centrist line, backed by Fanfani,
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prevailed. Now it was Fanfani*s turn to dominate the DC by 
uniting the centrist party and the centrist political strate­
gy-
The defeat of the rightist option signalled the deter­
mination of the party as a whole to maintain not only the 
distinction between the political and the religious, but also 
the supremacy of the former over the latter. The Vatican 
was powerful, but its political power was indirect and nega­
tive. It operated inside the DC primarily through the right, 
but even the latter sought to use Vatican support for its own 
ends. Otherwise, the Vatican could only prevent the DC-left 
from breaking away as an independent body. This it did by 
denying it vital clergy/parish support and by subordinating 
its most rebellious elements in ACI and ACLI by forced resig­
nations and the threat to withdraw episcopal support. The 
Vatican choked off catholic reformism, but the DC was no 
transmission belt for the Vatican. The Bishop*s Conference, 
as we have seen, had already indicated its awareness of the 
real situation in 1952 and now, in 1954, the two overtly 
partisan ecclesiastic figures, Ronca and Montini, were re­
moved from their positions of influence, Montini by promotion 
to the archbishopric of Milan, Ronca by an extraordinary 
forced resignation.7 The Church was now back on a course 
emphasising its leadership of the catholic world and its 
pastoral, as opposed to partisan role, hence, its moral and 
indirect domination of the DC and of government.8
2. Confirmation of the state*s secular culture
The blow to the cultural clericalism and residual 
triumphalism followed three to four years later. In 1957 the
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Bishop of Prato, a newly created appointment in the heart of 
the Red Belt, accused two of his parishioners of concubinage 
for, married in the eyes of the law, they were not married in 
the eyes of the Church, having foregone a religious ceremony. 
At this time, only two per cent of couples in all of Italy 
avoided Church blessing, but the couple sued the Bishop for 
defamation. The Florence Court found in favour of the cou­
ple, and the whole affair became a national cause celebre. 
featuring prominently in the 1958 election. At that election 
the DC*s vote rose, but this gain largely reflected the 
party's ousting of the monarchists and MSI in southern Italy 
through the clientelistic use of the state. In fact, con­
trary to the coding schema employed by Budge and Farlie 
(1983),9 the accentuation of the religious issue in the 1958 
election probably did not benefit a 'bourgeois' to the 
discomfort of a 'socialist' block, because concern at DC 
domination of the bourgeois/centre block was high (in 1956 
the PLI split over the issue of Vatican political interfer­
ence, giving birth to the Radicals) and because the catholic 
world itself was undergoing a profound crisis of secularisa­
tion which encouraged recognition of its affinities with the 
left. One can more or less reverse Budge and Farlie's gener­
alisation: the clergy had to avoid blunders like that of the 
Bishop of Prato in order not to see the DC punished and the 
growth of the left undermining the Church.
By 1959 the journal of the Milanese Jesuits, Aaiorna- 
menti sociali. was intervening within the Church in favour of 
the left DC's project of an 'opening to the left' ie to the 
PSI, and in the same year the newly operational Constitution­
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al Court found against the Church which had sought to get the 
election of an ex-priest (as a Socialist Deputy) declared 
unconstitutional. Elected offices, the court decided, were 
not public appointments.10
3. The end of %closed Catholicism1
The Milanese Jesuits were at the heart of the industri­
al north, where the opening to the left was first urged and 
experimented. The modernisation of Catholicism generally 
went faster in the north than the south, but slowest of all 
in understanding the post-war transformation of the Church 
into a pluralistically articulated and laicised movement was 
the administrative core of the Church, the Roman Curia. It 
was from this bastion of the Church that the last outpouring 
of opposition to the left came, parallel to the DC's move in 
this direction.
This opposition reached a climax in the last year of 
Pius's reign and first years of John's, as the Curia asserted 
its near autonomy from the Pope.11 Paradoxically, this 
hostility towards the PSI was not entirely unwelcome even to 
those like Fanfani whose allegedly Socialistic intriguing it 
opposed. For Fanfani, and for all those interested in main­
taining the strength of the DC, it was a guarantee that the 
left catholic electorate would not ‘jump ship' to a Socialist 
Party legitimated by its inclusion in the government.12 
Curial opposition was defeated by the victory of the centrist 
orientation within the DC which indicated the need for al­
liance with the PSI, and by internal reform within the Church 
brought about by the institutional revolution of Vatican II. 
Unable simply to replace major tranches of the administrative
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elite or to order a change of mentalities, John XXIII mobi­
lised the roots of the catholic world, its diverse national 
episcopates, to challenge outdated and Romano-centric dogmas.
The profound transformation brought about by the Second 
Vatican Council has already been referred to, with the claim 
that it achieved a 'paradigm shift1 in the catholic world.13 
In the Italian context of the early 1960s it helped bring the 
Church's base and its elite into line with one another, 
though in no easy or straight-forward fashion. The reason 
for this was that it encouraged a tremendous flowing together 
of the reformist catholic and socialist cultures, threatening 
for a long period to end catholic unity. In the event, the 
continued presence and 'threat' of the PCI, especially in the 
1970s, allowed this danger to be at least provisionally 
surmounted.
By the late 1960s, the catholic world and the DC had 
largely learnt to appreciate their different aims and means, 
so that although a privileged relationship continued to exist 
between them, they increasingly recognised their mutual 
autonomy in a pluralist and internally differentiated socie­
ty. This development was initially obscured when the rise to 
prominence of the divorce issue in the early 1970s, coupled 
with the challenge of the PCI to establish a two-block party 
system on its own terms (or at least a return to grand coali­
tion) , led Fanfani to attempt to rally the Church behind the 
DC, and the DC behind him, on a markedly conservative plat­
form. As it turned out, Fanfani united neither the catholic 
world nor the DC. By 1975 he was an anachronism.
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B. The Institutional Development of a Pluralist State
The relative autonomy of the party system from the 
catholic world was asserted in the foundation phase of build­
ing Italian democracy, but not widely recognised until the 
1960s. The autonomy of the state from class conflict and the 
party system remains incomplete, perhaps necessarily so. 
Modern democracies are party democracies, though the promi­
nence of party varies. In Switzerland, Britain and France the 
formal institutions of the liberal state (and the government 
executive in particular) such as parliament, government, 
cabinet, and the president, are prominent. Elsewhere the 
parties subordinate or even substitute the formal institu­
tional structure, giving rise to the West German Parteien- 
staat,14 Belgium*s particratie15 and the Italian partitocra- 
zia. In Italy, the chronic historical lack of popular iden­
tification with the state and the nature of post-Fascist 
political reconstruction saw the new political parties sub­
stituting themselves for allegiance to the state which came 
to be identified in large measure as anti-working class given 
the asymmetry of political exclusion. The domination of the 
cabinet/government and the state*s agencies by the DC rein­
forced the identification of capitalism, the state and the DC 
and became a major brake on the PCI*s ability to achieve 
'alternation*.
The necessity for the state*s institutions to acquire a 
greater degree of autonomy from the party system has been a 
prominent theme in post-war Italy, especially as a criticism 
of the DC and its alleged incomprehension of this need be­
cause of its integralism. During the 1950s the establishment
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of key state institutions provided for in the constitution as 
a way of enhancing institutional autonomy was a major politi­
cal issue. From 1955, President Gronchi championed his own 
institutional role as a guarantee against the partitocrazia. 
He backed this claim by seeking to effect the de facto estab­
lishment of other state institutions delayed by the DC out of 
fear of the PCI's manipulation of them, and he did so with 
Communist and Socialist backing.16 Gronchi had himself been 
elected by a cross-block parliamentary coalition which in­
cluded the Socialists and Communists, so the question of the 
institutional autonomy of the state was an important one in 
promoting cross-block intercourse.
Three main institutions were brought to life by Gronchi 
with cross-block support between 1955 and 1959: the Supreme 
Court, the Supreme Council of the Judiciary, and the Social 
and Economic Council. Gronchi's forceful championing of 
these institutions led the DC-right to try and hobble them, 
just as his attempts to move the country towards accepting 
the PSI in government resulted, as we shall see, in the 
appointment of prime ministers ever more to the right as he 
sought to placate resistance inside the party. Nevertheless, 
Gronchi's encouragement of constitutional development, backed 
by the Communist and Socialist Parties which presented them­
selves as champions of the constitution, contributed to the 
development of the modern principle of the impersonal state, 
and hence to the rejection of views which see the state as 
merely the emanation of a social class.
Gronchi's cooperation with the left allowed these 
parties to present themselves as guarantors of the constitu­
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tion combating Christian Democratic arrogance, and this 
promoted the centrist political strategy of the party. 
However, it contradicted Fanfani's more purely party centrist 
strategy which sought to move the DC left in order to capture 
the left electorate, without losing its right electorate, a 
strategy which required the left parties to remain essential­
ly illegitimate. It is to this we now turn. In the event, 
as we shall also see, both Fanfani and Gronchi became em­
broiled in a situation where the hegemonic party centrist 
strategy seemed to prevail at the expense of the centrist 
political strategy so that both lost the trust of the left 
which they sought to secure.
C. Fanfani's Ambivalent Christian State * Socialism1
Fanfani was elected political secretary at the party's 
Vth Congress in June 1954, and with De Gasperi's death in 
August became the party's leading figure. He remained a key 
figure in the party until 1975,A but he was never able to 
totally dominate the party. Through the 1950s he and Gronchi 
competed for power, and in 1959 he was dethroned in a move 
which definitively established the collective and oligarchic 
nature of the party's top elite.
Fanfani was associated with the Dossettiani, but unlike 
Dossetti, Fanfani was driven more by ambition than idealism. 
He had accepted De Gasperi's critique of the DC-left as 
over-zealous and, if not patient, self-defeating, and in 1954
A. He was still prominent in the 1980s when he was twice 
prime minister.
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he assumed De Gasperi's mantle, asserting that centrism 
remained a valid political formula, defeating the alternative 
line that pointed towards the creation of two-block confron­
tation. The defeat of the clerically supported conservative 
option implied the strengthening of links with the left, but 
this was clearly not going to be quickly achieved. Besides, 
a move to the left could be accomplished in two ways, either 
by shifting the party's image to the left to capture the left 
electorate, or part of it, preferably without losing any 
support on the right, or through coalition with the PSI 
leaving the party's centre/centre-right identification alone. 
Fanfani favoured the former strategy.
1. * Low politics' and the opposition
Whilst the party manoeuvred to achieve whichever of the 
two 'left' options proved feasible, itself a game of intrigue 
accentuating personal ambition and rivalry within the DC 
elite, the government, and the political class more general­
ly, bought time by promoting economic growth and expanding 
the sphere of state activities, the two being combined to a 
considerable degree. This involved a huge expansion of both 
the redistribution of 'treasures' and the allocation of 
'tokens of authority' (such as building permits, job recom­
mendations etc.).17 These are traditional governmental means 
of acquiring legitimacy, but they tended to be aimed at the 
individual and at special groups, rather than large collec­
tivities, leading to the alleged collapse of collective 
political organisation and mobilisation in Italy,18 whilst 
the domination of the state by the DC naturally meant that it 
gained most from these practices. With Fanfani increasingly
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identified as attempting to set up an exclusionary centrism, 
a catholic socialistic state in which 'integralism' was based 
on the DC rather than the Church, this use of the state was 
widely condemned as a new corporatism, as mass/bureaucratic 
clientelism.19
Nevertheless, the significance of the involvement of 
the excluded left parties in these practices should not be 
undervalued. Firstly, whilst it is true that the left's 
participation in the policy/legislative process has been 
restricted to matters of ‘low politics' it is not clear how 
the party could have contributed to strategic decisions given 
the aggressive ambition to autonomous rule of the major 
contending parties. Secondly, given that the basic interna­
tional and politico-economic parameters were more or less 
determined by the international situation and intense inter­
nal political pressures operating on the political class, the 
role of that class was to make the new system work. It is at 
this point that the distinction between high and low politics 
actually blurs. The strategy of competitive Western integra­
tion placed enormous strains on Italian society and the 
management of material and symbolic resources by the politi­
cal class allowed the potentially vicious circle of Italy's 
under-development to be broken by the early 1960sA, providing 
a new material basis on which politics could develop. Of 
course, there was a price to pay for the subordinate integra­
tion of the Left elites.
A. M.Salvati, Economia e politica in Italia dal dopoguerra a 
oggj. Milan: Garzanti, 1986. This is dealt with at more 
length in Chapter 6.
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We have already seen that the PCI lost votes amongst 
its militant northern working class core in the 1950s, but by 
the mid-to-late 1950s it was also being rejected by revolu­
tionary intellectuals. In the early 1960s these began to 
organise themselves, and by the 1970s they provided the 
inspiration and even the recruits for much of the left ter­
rorism of that decade. This terrorist movement developed 
Leninist and workerist revolutionism in response to the 
contradictory conservatism of the PCI which neither opted for 
'more democracy1 as the cure for the ills of socialism, as 
did Nenni and the PSI, nor took its own Marxism-Leninism as 
seriously as these dissidents thought proper.20 Their hos­
tility to the PCI was perhaps also related to a third reason 
for not underestimating the PCI * s involvement in the develop­
ment of Italian society.
The Communists dominated the red belt of central-north 
Italy, including major cities like Bologna. Their participa­
tion in the parliamentary game allowed them to consolidate 
their presence in this culturally and economically important 
area, an area which in the late 1970s was discovered as the 
core of a 'third Italy1 (neither the traditional industrial 
north nor the under-developed south) and championed as a key 
contributor to Italy's second economic miracle.21 Sidney 
Tarrow has even argued that localities dominated by the 
socialist sub-culture may even have received disproportion­
ately more of the state's resources than 'white' areas,22 
going on to stress the importance of the fact that the na­
tional political elites have strong local roots, and that at
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the local level an entrepreneurial ‘political class'A has 
formed which uses partisan loyalties in an instrumental, and 
non-ideological way as multiple routes of access to state 
resources.
The contribution of the PCI in Italian social and 
economic development has, then, been significant through its 
influence at the regional level and consequently in the 
important development of micro- and small industry, as well 
as in its national political role of aggregating opposition 
to the DC to gain compensation for the social costs involved 
in the chosen model of economic modernisation. The partici­
pation of the Left opposition in socioeconomic management, as 
in constitutional development, predated the major regional 
and parliamentary reforms of the 1970s and it, and even more 
so the extension of DC power, can be taken as a feature 
linked to the territorial extension/diffusion of the post-war 
interventionist state.23 The generosity of the Italian state 
consolidated the new centrism, underlining the role of the 
parties as promoters of economic growth and social welfare. 
Although in doing this the DC sought to advance its own party 
interests and catholic values, and to thwart those of the 
rival Left, the way that the party domination of society 
worked to ameliorate socioeconomic tensions worked against 
Fanfani's attempt to maintain the exclusion of the Left.
2. Fanfani's challenge to the left
The secession of Saragat in 1947 and the formation of 
the PSDI left many in the PSI concerned that the party had no
A. Tarrow's use of the term differs from mine in stressing 
its locally-operative nature.
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clear identity, being neither the reformist socialist nor the 
revolutionary socialist party. The weakness of the PSDI and 
its subordination to the DC robbed it, however, of much of 
its attraction. Nevertheless, the structural and ideological 
position of the PSI was awkward, and Fanfani believed he 
could rob it of its electorate. A number of developments 
inside the DC encouraged Fanfani to think in this fashion, 
and the fact that it might gain the support of left and right 
by simultaneously moving the party to the left and attacking 
the PSI made it an ideal leadership strategy.
In 1952 the trade unionists in the party had formed 
their own faction and through the 1950s this faction cam­
paigned to get Fanfani to withdraw the public sector compa­
nies of IRI from Confindustria control and to establish a 
progressive corporatist model of industrial relations which 
would exclude the increasingly marginalised CGIL. A natural 
link developed between the anti-Communist unionists and the 
public sector based interests and economic strategists all of 
whom sought to reduce the power of conservative private 
business interests. Given the ideologically polarised elec­
toral and intellectual atmosphere, it also seemed to indicate 
the desire to create a catholic inspired corporatist state in 
which worker and business interests would be mediated by the 
DC-dominated party state. The fact that Ezio Vanoni, the 
leading catholic advocate of planning, was able in 1954 to 
present a long-term economic programme to parliament dis­
tinctly promoted the DC's left image, though in fact the plan 
was emasculated in parliament and made irrelevant by the 
economic miracle.
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The appearance of the la baseA faction in 1953, and the 
rapid development of its emphasis on the need to bring the 
PSI into the government coalition, further promoted the DC's 
socialistic image, though la base's insistence on distin­
guishing the PSI from the PCI and drawing it into the centre 
was a different strategy to Fanfani's. By the latter half of 
the 1950s la base was actively promoting local centre-left 
experiments in northern Italy, to the alarm of conservative 
economic and Vatican circles. At the 1956 Congress, with the 
Left lacerated by events in Hungary and by Khrushchev's 
'secret' speech, the chances of stealing the left's elector­
ate seemed good. Moreover, Fanfani's organisational activ­
ism, aimed at reducing party dependence on the Church, was 
alleged to have brought membership gains in both the indus­
trial and agricultural working classes.
Whereas la Base's strategy was primarily a political- 
centrist strategy, Fanfani favoured the party centrist 
strategy, though he sought to maintain the unity of the two 
by pursuing a programme of centrist policies to be executed 
by the party. As far as Fanfani was concerned, other parties 
were welcome to support the government block's programme, but 
coalition was to be avoided. This position contrasted with 
that of Gronchi and la base.
Gronchi's position was heavily influenced by his 
'Gaullist'® tendencies and his hopes of gaining cross-
A. More or less meaning 'rank-and-file', and as such a re­
sponse to Vatican suppression of reformist Catholicism.
B. The Gaullist V*'*1 Republic was not set up until 1958 of 
course.
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spectrum support for a second seven year term in 1962, but 
his awareness of the voluntarist nature of the Dossettiani1s 
ambitions had been expressed early in the 1950s, and the 
strength of conservative opposition to his activities as 
president could only reinforce his appreciation of the need 
for the support of the PSI to realise a leftist programme. 
His first action as President was to dismiss the prime minis­
ter Mario Scelba who was sticking rigidly to the narrow and 
exclusionary formula of centrism - 'iron centrism1. However, 
his successor Segni proved unable to gain PSI support.
La base were insistent that it was the coalition part­
ner, not the programme, that should have priority. In ef­
fect, maintaining a centrist political strategy now meant 
abandoning the centrist party strategy, or at least expanding 
the centrist coalition so that the party no longer dominated 
the centre, but shared it. This position meant not only 
loosening the party's grip on society by sharing power with 
another mass party, dropping its dominant leadership role - 
and this was a period when the party's position seemed so 
powerful that it and the Vatican were being accused of seek­
ing to set up a catholic state - but also pointed towards the 
eventual passage of the party into the opposition! The 
expansion of the centre would create a legitimate social 
democratic/socialist pole of attraction within the centre 
block, leading to its bifurcation.
Whilst la Base's position was intrinsically unappealing 
to the right, both Fanfani's position and even Gronchi's had 
some appeal. As the maintenance of centrism got more and 
more difficult, and as the opposition of the Vatican flared,
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both Gronchi and Fanfani found themselves seeking to gain 
support from the right to cover their leftist moves. Both 
thus backed the nomination of Adone Zoli as prime minister in
1957, a monocolore government backed by monarchist and MSI 
votes. This ended the centrist political formula and was the 
government with which the DC appealed to the electorate in
1958. Yet the programme was a leftist christian-socialist 
one. The party was trying to have it both ways, offering 
social reform and an authoritarian guarantee of stability.
The DC fared well in the election, and Fanfani, after 
five years as an ultra-dynamic secretary, expected to take 
the credit. He now formed a government himself, defined, 
with just the PSDI for a coalition partner and a markedly 
Christian socialist programme,24 as centre-left. This was to 
be the new centrism - an aggressive attack on the PSI elec­
torate. But the Vatican and economic right were appalled, and 
this coupled with opposition to Fanfani's personal ambition - 
he was now party secretary, Prime Minister and Foreign Minis­
ter - led to his overthrow.
The party was now thrown back on to seeking support 
from the right, which much of the party would not, however, 
accept, and a series of unstable governments followed. As a 
coalition formula, centrism had now reached a point of no 
return. The party had to choose. Fanfani's use of state 
resources and Gronchi's encouragement of the left might have 
been elements in a good depolarising strategy, but it was not 
to be. Internal hostility to the Left had not diminished, 
whilst to the Left Fanfani's combination of DC party and 
political centrism looked like a strategy for consolidating
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an exclusionary centrism. The PCI's own polemical behaviour, 
spurred by genuine suspicion of the DC and an awareness of 
the need to maintain its radical image, ensured that politi­
cal tensions grew rather than declined, whilst the willing­
ness of even the PSI to actually take on the responsibility 
of governing in a crisis-ridden capitalist and bourgeois 
democracy was far from clear.
Such was the background to the Tambroni riots of 1960, 
provoked by fears of the DC moving towards the MSI. Both 
Gronchi and Fanfani were discredited by these developments, 
and neither was able to get the backing of the Left to be 
elected as president in 1962. Centrism had survived, and 
democracy been consolidated, through the confirmation of the 
parties' control in and over society, that is of partitocra- 
zia and the parties mutual responsiveness. A presidentialist 
development of Italian democracy threatened to reinforce the 
contradictions of exclusionary centrism, to undermine party 
interaction and to preempt the only political basis on which 
the three-block structure could be maintained - the inclusion 
of the PSI in government.
II THE OPENING TO THE LEFT
The opening to the left, like so much of Italian poli­
tics, was an ambiguous development. It did bring the Social­
ists into the cabinet, but it also squeezed the party elec-
torally and marginalised its traditional ally, the PCI. To 
that extent, it was an aggressive party strategy ideal for DC
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partisans. However, it did also shift the DC to the left, 
and the limits to this shift were uncertain. The inclusion 
of the Socialists in the government on a semi-permanent basis 
was a dramatic novelty in Italian, let alone Republican, 
history. The opening to the left thus bore all the ambigui­
ties typical of trasformismo.
In the post-war period, trasformismo was more easily 
practised in parliamentary commissions and in the administra­
tive channels of the expanding state machine, particularly, 
as we have seen, in centre-periphery relations, than at the 
cabinet level since, unlike in the Liberal period, parliament 
was now dominated by disciplined parties. Nevertheless, the 
centrist coalition formula itself was a form of trasformismo, 
based largely on the creation of the PSDI, and as we saw in 
Chapter Three, attitudes to trasformsimo had changed in the 
circumstances of its comparison with Fascism and Communism.25 
Now, however, in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the negative 
aspects of transformism were again stressed: its propping up 
the DC-regime, blocking of reform, and related effects. 
Vertical political cleavages had been deeply embedded as the 
basis of the three-block system, and the constraints on the 
PSI and DC party elites from their electorates, party mili­
tants, flanking interest groups and the excluded parties on 
the left and right were considerable. Nevertheless, precise­
ly the atmosphere of crisis was what guaranteed the estab­
lishment of the new political formula, the 'Centre-Left1.
A. Transformism under Duress: From Tambroni to De Lorenzo
The growing parliamentary crisis of centrism in the 
late 1950s, unable to secure a stable majority, led a succes­
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sion of DC prime ministers to gain a vote of confidence with 
votes from the right, whether sought or not. The DC left was 
no more willing to accept these governments than the DC right 
to accept the tentative moves made to the left, but the left 
itself became convinced that the DC was moving towards an 
authoritarian solution to the problem. The crisis came to a 
head in the summer of 1960 when it appeared that President 
Gronchi, and the prime minister, Ferdinando Tambroni, were 
promoting the legitimation of the MSI. It was not clear 
whether the aim was to promote its credibility as a potential 
government partner, or to encourage extremism of both the 
right and the left, permitting an authoritarian imposition of 
centrism.
Serious nation-wide public disorders did follow the 
attempt by the MSI to hold a triumphal party Congress in 
Genoa, a traditional strong-hold of the left, but the DC 
turned its back on authoritarian solutions, including that of 
a Centrist crack-down on both left and right. Tambroni was 
abandoned and another monocolore led by Fanfani was formed. 
This had the external backing of the three traditional cen­
trist allies, but it also had the abstention, in the vote of 
confidence, of the monarchists and PSI. The significance of 
this was clear. The exclusion of the PCI and of the newly 
boosted MSI allowed the claim to be made that the unaccept­
able extremes remained excluded, ie that a three-block system 
based on the defence of democracy continued to operate. At 
the same time, cross-block interaction was moving towards 
intra-block interaction as the principle of enlarging the 
centre was established.
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Aldo Moro, the creator of the arrangement, defined it 
as a 'parallel convergence* - both moderate left and moderate 
right were converging on the democratic centre. From this 
point on, Moro was established as the DC*s leading political 
thinker and manager. His authority rested largely on the 
ability to gain the confidence of his own party and mediate 
between it and the others, but the bulk of the DC never 
ceased to be suspicious of his ability to negotiate with the 
left.
The Tambroni crisis had demonstrated that some sort of 
acceptance of the PSI was indispensable, and it can be argued 
that this was the true aim of Gronchi and Tambroni.26 Such 
considerations may have been in their minds, but their per­
sonal motivations and intentions were probably multiple and 
volatile. The important point is that in this party-dominat­
ed polity the maintenance of the relational centre outweighed 
more narrowly defined party and individual interests. To 
this extent, the hunt for the 'true intentions* of leading 
figures is unimportant. The same, we shall see, is true of 
the debate over Moro's intentions in negotiating the govern­
ments of national solidarity with Enrico Berlinguer, the 
Communist leader, in the mid 1970s.
Fanfani's government of 'parallel convergence*, backed 
by Moro, paved the way for the Centre-Left, but not until 
December 1963 was it realised, and only with the De Lorenzo 
crypto-coup of 1964 was it solidly established. Its develop­
ment was aided by the arrival of the Kennedy administration 
in America and by the assertion of papal control over the 
Curia by John XXIII, via the Vatican Council, and by the
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interpretation given to John's works by the DC elite. Par­
ticularly significant was the 1961 encyclical Mater et Maais- 
tra which Moro emphasised as sanctioning the opening to the 
left. The VIIth Congress of the DC in January 1962 was a 
watershed, with Moro gaining official party sanction to 
conclude the opening to the left. Immediately thereafter, 
Fanfani formed a new government with the PRI and PSDI, ex­
cluding the PLI, and accepting the abstention of the PSI 
whilst ignoring the monarchists.
As ever there was a quid pro quo to be paid to the 
party's conservatives for their acceptance of these develop­
ments. In 1962 Antonio Segni was elected as President, and 
only on that basis was Moro able to seek to form a coalition 
with the PSI itself. Moreover, the party's fear of the PSI 
had only been calmed by Moro's argument that the DC's control 
of the para-state guaranteed the party's ability to withstand 
the challenge the PSI would mount. In fact, the party was 
now dominated by the Dorotei, the party oligarchs who had 
brought Fanfani down in 1959 and whose power lay in their 
domination of entire regions of Italy on the basis of 
clientelist networks which fused government, para-state 
agencies and electorate together.
Nevertheless, the PSI's entry into the cabinet was a 
major challenge to the DC and was only accepted when Nenni 
acquiesced to the extra-democratic pressure exerted on him in 
the summer of 1964 via the so-called De Lorenzo coup plot. 
Again, there is a wealth of controversy as to the degree of 
involvement of key actors in the plot, and their intentions, 
but there can be no doubt that the threat of rebellion by the
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commander of the carabinieri. General De Lorenzo, and the 
existence of plans for a coup d'etat cemented the Centre- 
Left. Pietro Nenni, the Socialist leader, accepted the need 
to continue the coalition on a minimalist basis of defending 
democracy, and took the bulk of the party with him. The 
alternative, it was feared, was a government based on 'ex­
perts' and perhaps a Gaullist reorientation of the presiden­
cy, the significance of which would have been precisely that 
it ended the dialogue between party elites and across the 
blocks. Nenni accepted the maintenance of centrism on the 
three-block basis, and there could be no going back.
In 1968 most of the PSI's electorate followed Nenni, 
but far from all, and the Centre-Left was far from a sweeping 
success for the left. Indeed, as we shall now see, the 
Centre-Left came to be widely judged a political failure, so 
that as a political formula it was only an interim solution 
to the problem of finding a stable arrangement of the basic 
centrist political agreement. Whilst the 1968 election 
confirmed the PSI's hold on most of its electorate, it also 
sustained the asymmetry of the three-block system and the 
continuing tendency of the government block to be forced to 
compete primarily on its left - now composed exclusively of 
the PCI.
B. The Centre-Left: An interim political solution
The Centre-Left brought policy innovation and, above 
all, cultural regeneration, through the flowing together of 
catholic, socialist and reformist liberal positions. For 
this reason, and for the fact that the elites' manoeuvring 
induced the bulk of the electorate to follow them, the Cen­
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tre-Left can be regarded a success for the centrist political 
strategy pursued by sections of the DC. The historic gulf 
between the Catholics and socialists had been soundly 
breached, and though the PCI was now isolated, its defeat was 
political, not 'anti-political*. Indeed, the PCI was far from 
excluded even in the new situation, and in so far as the PSI 
retained a natural affinity with that party, the PCI*s access 
to government increased,27 whilst electoral growth guaranteed 
its continuing relevance.
The centrist party strategy had also prospered. The DC 
maintained its domination of the centrist coalition block, 
now differently composed. It remained the country*s predomi­
nant political party without which no government could be 
formed. There was no question of the expanded centre split­
ting to produce a centre-based two-block system. The fusion 
of the PSI and PSDI in 1966 was a disaster and fell apart in 
1969 after the election showed the combined vote of the two 
parties to be one third less than the total of their separate 
votes in 1963.A
The short-lived Unified Socialist Party was unable to 
establish the predominance of a political cleavage running 
through the governing coalition. This would have required 
the subordination of the excluded left to the centre-left 
equal to the subordination of the right to the centre-right 
already achieved. This element of subordination and the 
focus on government control and alternation means that the 
model that failed to materialise is best described as a two-
A. From 19.9% (13.8% and 6.1%) down to 14.5%.
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block one, though Duverger refers to essentially the same 
situation as a four-party one.28
The failure of the PSU to provide the basis for a two- 
block system and government alternation does not, however, 
mean that the tendency to diachronic centrism between the DC 
and the left was extinguished. On the contrary, now even 
more clearly it came to be focused on the DC and the PCI. 
However, by 1968/69 far more than the structuring of the 
party system was open to question.
The Hot Autumn of 1969 and the tensions within the 
catholic and socialist sub-cultures indicated a fundamental 
challenge to party government itself. The lack of hold of 
the parties coincided with competing anti-party mobilisations 
which led briefly, in the period 1970-72, to a lurch of the 
political system to the right, reflecting the desire for more 
authoritative government rather than the left's proposal that 
pan-syndicalism should replace the moribund system of party 
non- or mis-government. Soon, however, the deeper, continu­
ing dynamism of party interaction and the attractive power of 
the left block displayed itself.
One of the consequences of the * failure1 of the Centre- 
Left was that the country's political culture continued to 
lie essentially to the left of the government coalition. 
Turmoil in the dominant political sub-cultures challenged 
both parties to a more active pursuit of major reform and led 
to the clear emergence in the mid 1970s of the PCI as the 
system's second hegemonic party, the core of an alternative 
government coalition, pulling the PSI and the left DC towards 
it. This firmly refocussed attention on the party system, as
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did the failure of the unions to realise their aims and the 
rise of terrorism.
With the Socialists in the government, an exclusionary 
centrism was no longer possible, though the generalised 
acceptance of state involvement in the old rightist 'strategy 
of tension1 indicates that non-democratic pressures remained 
highly relevant to political development, but what would 
replace the failed Centre-Left was unclear. Out of sheer 
necessity two unlikely alternatives presented themselves: 
either some sort of renewed grand coalition or the long- 
delayed establishment of a two-block system. This uncertain 
future came to be dubbed by Aldo Moro as the 'third phase•.
Ill THE THIRD PHASE
No one, not even Moro, was sure what the 'third phase1 
would bring, but the certainty that things could not continue 
as they were grew from the late 1960s, and was general by the 
early 1970s. Within the DC, Moro himself turned against the 
Dorotei in late 1968 after Donat-Cattin, historic leader of 
the trade union left, spoke of the need for a second catholic 
party, a 'credible' reformist party.29
It has been indicated that the Hot Autumn and related 
events raised the question of what would follow the Centre- 
Left in such a way that what was at issue was not merely the 
relationships between different party elites, ie coalition 
formulae, but the very role of political parties. Chapter 
Six deals with these developments in detail, analysing the 
Historic Compromise and the governments of national solidari­
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ty as well as the challenge of new parties, trade unions and 
terrorism to the established system of party government. 
Here I wish to reconsider the assumption that the ‘third 
phase1 was to see the assertion of one of the two ideal 
models of centrism - synchronic/grand coalition, or diachron­
ic/alternation .
Chapter Two demonstrated the importance of the self- 
assertion of a political class based on a ‘negative agree­
ment* (not to disagree militarily) and on the establishment 
of a functioning party system, at first operative only at the 
elite level. Centrism, it was argued, had its roots in the 
formation of this political class in the 1942-43 period and 
the consolidation of that class in the CLN and the elections 
which ended the CLN experience. The unity of that class was 
recognised to be highly competitive, antagonistic in its own 
right and, furthermore, goaded by social pressures which made 
it necessary to vent the conflictual aspect of the ‘contra­
dictory unity* which the party system comprised. Neverthe­
less, the argument went, the extremity of confrontation in 
1947-48 was functional to securing the political class's 
leading role in regulating the political pact whose existence 
the CLN and the foundation of the Republic both signalled and 
helped to create.
Chapter Three showed that the crisis of the CLN and the 
transformation of centrism threatened that pact but also 
allowed a relatively peaceful solution to the post-war socio­
political crisis. This solution was the establishment of the 
three-block structure, first hinted at in 1946, and made 
possible by the defeat of the ‘swindle law'. The 1950s saw
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the consolidation of this structure and indirectly the con­
solidation of party democracy, guaranteeing the survival of a 
relational centre and, with it, highly competitive party 
interaction. It was also shown, however, that the new 
'centrism* tended to be an exclusionary one, so that the 
1950s saw a mixture of dynamic tendencies: to reinstate 
synchronic centrism, to establish diachronic centrism, and to 
enforce exclusionary centrism. Thus, the democratic consoli­
dation of the 1950s was imperfect because the structure of 
the party system was one which rendered the existence, and 
significance, of the relational centre obscure.30
Since the establishment of the three-block system had 
evolved as a way of maintaining a democratically-based system 
when the one-block system proved untenable but a two-block 
confrontation appeared unwise, it is not surprising that the 
three-block structure lasted as well as it did, nor that it 
was extended by the birth of the Centre-Left. The Centre- 
Left maintained the three-block system and moved the centre 
block left, keeping it in step with the evolving relational 
centre, but the innovativeness of the move was smothered by 
the degree of continuity involved. Thus the Centre-Left was 
built on sand. The renewed three-block structure failed to 
generate a tendency towards a moderate two-block system and 
it certainly did not tend towards a new grand coalition. The 
asymmetry of the structure remained, and the political cul­
ture of the country quickly reestablished itself as lying to 
the left of the coalition formula. Within ten years, one of 
the excluded 'extremes* was itself a clear candidate for 
government.
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In fact, by the end of the 1960s the three-block struc­
ture was facing quite a different situation to that prevail­
ing ten or twenty years previously. On the right the monar­
chists had declined to irrelevance so that this excluded 
block now consisted of the PLI, a clearly constitutional 
party, and the MSI, now more of a protest party than a pro­
grammatic and governmentally orientated anti-system threat. 
The centre too was transformed. The welfarist and state/ 
national aspect of the ruling coalition, as against its class 
dictatorship nature, was more identifiable, and the fear of 
catholic totalitarianism was a thing of the past, even if the 
Vatican*s influence still outraged many. On the left, the 
PCI was increasingly integrated into the political and eco­
nomic system, even if this too was far from universally 
accepted.
The Centre-Left was an adjustment of, and advance on, 
the three-block centrism established in the early *50s. It 
both put off the moment of the party system's transformation 
into a moderate two-block system, or grand coalition, and 
eased the way towards these outcomes. The tendency towards 
what Farneti called *unipolarism*, and which in comparative 
West European terms had been identified as the 'waning of 
opposition' was having effect. But as well as making the 
demise of the three-block system possible, the tendency to 
unipolarism stimulated the rising generation's contemptuous 
rejection of the caution of the established political class.
In Chapter Six, then, the PCI-based challenge to the 
three-block structure and the DC's response will be examined 
in terms of the difficulties confronting a political class
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still concerned with the dangers of a two-block confronta­
tion, yet also relentlessly attacked for its increasingly 
open cooperation. Chapter Seven will show that the growth of 
the unipolar drive, encouraged by the national solidarity 
governments, took place in such a way that the 1980s was a 
decade in which neither grand coalition nor the formation of 
a two-block structure was realised.
By the 1980s, the collapse of ideologies, at least of 
Communism and exclusionary Catholicism were so advanced that 
the three-block organisation of the party system seemed 
anachronistic and even haphazard. Only the manipulation of 
residual ideological divides out of party self-interest 
prevented a two-block structure from being formed, even 
whilst parties declared themselves willing to 'play the 
field1, that is, not to restrict themselves to their accepted 
positions in the left/right spectrum.
Before turning to these developments, which clearly 
signal a radical transformation of the nature of the Italian 
party system, Chapter Five looks at the class/economic cleav­
age which Chapter One indicated to be the most important in 
twentieth century Western Europe, including Italy. In look­
ing at this cleavage we shall be stressing the vertical 
cleavage between left and right in contrast to the emphasis 
placed in Chapters Two to Four on the horizontal linkages 
within the political class and generalised through the com­
petitive interaction of the party system.
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CHAPTER 5 A CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC POLITICAL ECONOMY?
Programmatic economic policy differences are often 
taken as being the primary determinant of left and right in 
twentieth century Western Europe and, hence, of party system 
structuring. We have seen in Chapter One that Italy has an 
economically defined 'left/right* dimension predominant even 
in a multi-dimensional approach to political space based on 
saliency theory. In fact, that theory shows a bourgeois 
versus socialist/reformist divide is common to most party 
systems.1 It is the significance of this which we wish to 
address in this Chapter, in particular asking which is more 
important, the distinction or the agreement to manage it? 
This is another way of looking at the concept of contradicto­
ry unity. However, this time social forces and classes are 
more to the fore than they have been hitherto where the 
stress has been on the examination of party system manage­
ment.
The .significance of the division is significantly 
reduced by the other findings in Mastropaolo and Slaters' 
work. In particular, the DC is identified as a centre party 
on this key dimension, it is the PLI which is the clearly 
'bourgeois' party. Three other dimensions of competition are 
particularly salient. Two of which can be considered to be 
more or less inversely related, ie stress tends to be placed 
on 'technocracy' or 'social harmony'. The third is a common 
theme, ie 'modernisation and reform'.A This Chapter opens
A. See reproductions pp.58-60, Chapter 1.
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with a suggested interpretation of these findings, based on 
the prioritisation of polity management over the management 
of the economy which has been emphasised in Chapters Two to 
Four. It then looks in greater detail at the evolution of 
economic policy-making in order to confirm the validity of 
this approach. It looks first at the reconstruction, a 
critical period, and one surrounded by controversy? then at 
the period of Fanfani*s ascendancy and his attempt to domi­
nate the economy and,development? and finally at the rejec­
tion of Fanfani1s statism by the private sector and the 
unions alike.
CLEAVAGE AND UNITY: A PREVIEW 
(Mastropaolo & Slater)
This preliminary interpretation of the findings of 
Mastropaolo and Slater covers the period to the 197 0s, as 
does the material on which it is based, but it shows that the 
'70s are a natural break-off point for the subsequent de­
tailed analysis. By the 1970s, Italy's economic problems 
were typical of those of the Western European states. It had 
achieved industrial take-off. The immediately subsequent 
period, that of managing the crisis of the 1970s, was one 
which the subsequent chapters show also to be a watershed in 
polity management.
Whilst the central dimension emphasised by Mastropaolo 
and Slater is one of cleavage, of position-taking for and 
against two alternative ways of managing the economy, it is 
striking that the DC occupies a centre position on this 
dimension, particularly when this is related, as it must be,
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to the other two important dimensions. In this Chapter it 
will be argued that both the salience of the left/right 
dimension and the distance between the parties on it should 
be understood as belonging largely to the realm of symbolic 
politics. That is, this dimension is predominant because of 
its symbolic mobilisational force for the socialist left and, 
by reaction, for the anti-socialist forces. This dimension 
is largely used by the party elites, in particular the PCI, 
to corral the electorate in to standing behind it, accepting 
its leadership. Position-taking in terms of policy-making 
will be shown to be largely consequential to this motivation, 
so that the division into hostile blocks preceded policy 
intentions rather than vice versa.
An indication of the symbolic nature of this appeal, 
and the tendency for the parties in fact to interact posi­
tively, is the very weakness of the economic right. Certain­
ly, reconstruction was 'capitalist1, but only once was the 
DC's programme significantly on the right, and then, as we 
shall see, the programme was at odds with both the policies 
and with other key statements of the party's leadership. 
Conversely, there is the centripetal tendency of the PCI on 
the left/right economic dimension. This can be seen as not 
so much the result of the pariiamentarisation of communism 
through the cooptation of its elites, as the declining rele­
vance of this dimension in electoral mobilisation thanks to 
the way the political class, PCI elite included, handled 
political and economic confrontation. The early leftism 
identified by Mastropaolo & Slater was subsequent to a prior 
moderation, as was argued briefly in Chapters Two and Three,
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and will be examined more closely below, and was itself the 
response to the demands placed on it by electoral confronta­
tion in conditions of extreme economic hardship. Further 
evidence supportive of this argument can be found by inter­
preting the relationship between the various programmatic 
emphases highlighted by Mastropaolo and Slater.
That the 'technocratic* angle was pushed by the doctri­
naire Liberals in 1946/48, against the 'social harmony* 
emphasis of all three mass parties can be seen as confirming 
the view of this thesis of the importance of the construction 
of centrism by the mass parties, especially the DC and PCI, 
in this period. The prioritisation of politics by these 
parties, as led by De Gasperi and Togliatti, was stressed in 
Chapters Two and Three, and was particularly significant for 
its relegation of economic policy to second place.2 'Social 
harmony' was clearly prioritised by the elites of the mass 
parties as the essential precondition for establishing a way 
of constructively disagreeing and thus permitting successful 
economic management. This stands in stark contrast to the 
PLI's doctrinaire ignorance of the political bases of econom­
ic policy-making. In the DC's case, the party's popular 
catholic heritage was used by the leadership to ameliorate 
sociopolitical tensions throughout the 1950s. The PCI too 
continued to stress social harmony even whilst its economic 
leftism remained high, whereas, from 1953 the technocratic 
critique was taken up by the PSI. The PCI's behaviour re­
flects the fact that whilst it was striving to maintain its 
militant membership and electoral following, predicated on 
its identity as the principle socialist opposition and alter­
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native to the DC, it was simultaneously seeking to confirm 
that it remained loyal to the constitution by stressing that 
its politics remained orientated to broad alliances and 
cooperation. By contrast, the PSI’s technocratic critique 
was based on moderating its intransigent leftism to adopt a 
critical and alternative position to both the DC and the PCI. 
When the PCI's weakening leftism had reached a similar point 
in the 1960s and ’70s, it too took over the championing of 
the technocratic critique. The advantages of the critique 
for the socialist parties is that it conjoins a critique of 
government performance more appealing to a centrist elector­
ate with a partisan alternative which maintains the party's 
differentness. Of course, such reformism is open to criti­
cism, so tends to be unstable, and both parties can be seen 
trying to resolve this dilemma by tying the technocratic 
critique to a progressive perspective which simultaneously 
champions 'reform and modernisation’. For the PSI this 
becomes important in the late 1950s (1958-63), for the PCI 
from 1968.
The logic of this interpretation is that the excluded 
left elites, albeit in the face of strong internal opposi­
tion, accepted the general direction of economic development 
as pursued by the DC and its allies to the extent that they 
were content with forcing adjustments to it whilst awaiting 
electoral victory. This is not to argue that the left did 
not seek to modify the government's behaviour, it clearly 
did, and with intense vigour, nor is it to argue that there 
was no alternative, there was, but it is to argue that the 
alternative pursued was less total, less one of principle,
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than it often appeared.
Implicit in this sketch is the reason why this chapter 
does not look beyond the 1970s. By that time the PSI had 
been fully incorporated in the running of a capitalist democ­
racy, and the PCI was clearly ‘bailing the system out*, both 
politically and economically, just like other Social Demo­
cratic parties. By the mid-1980s it was clear not only that 
the Italian economy was like other West European economies, 
but also that the economic strategies of its parties operated 
within similarly tight parameters to those of other govern­
ment-orientated parties. It was no coincidence then that the 
party system underwent the profound change that it did in the 
late 1970s and early 1980s - the subject of the two following 
Chapters.
II RECONSTRUCTION
The reconstruction period was one of great political 
fluidity in which fundamental decisions about the future 
orientation of the economy had to be taken. Subsequently, 
stimulated by the dramatic exclusion of the left from the 
cabinet and the tremendous costs of the vast socioeconomic 
revolution which transformed Italy from an agricultural to an 
industrial and post-industrial nation in only thirty years, 
the nature of Italy's economic reconstruction became a sub­
ject of intense controversy. This Section starts by outlin­
ing the basic situation at the end of the war and then looks 
at the outlines of the debate before going on to look at the
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detail of policy-making in the 1945-53 period. It stresses 
the primacy of politics, in particular the importance of De 
Gasperi1s actions in the given international context in 
establishing a social and political coalition able to launch 
Italy on a modernising, industrialising path. It concludes 
by considering whether De Gasperi pursued a general interest 
or merely aggregated a winning coalition of individual inter­
ests.
A. The Inheritance
In 1945 the Italian economy suffered from both war 
damage and deeper historical problems. The immediate inheri­
tance was of immense losses of plant and machinery, shipping 
and livestock and of shattered roads, railways, bridges and 
ports. The flow of raw material supplies on which the econo­
my depended had been disrupted. Structurally, the economy 
was backward and under-developed. A more than semi-agricul- 
tural society, Italy risked being locked into a cycle of 
under-development.3
The effects of the Fascist regime on the country*s 
economic development, both industrially and agriculturally 
were ambiguous.4 The policy of autarchy, for example, had 
reinforced the strength of many large powerful sectors which 
the state had traditionally backed, and these provided a 
basis for expansion, but many were very wary of market compe­
tition. ^ Contrariwise, the liberal conviction that autarchy 
had hindered economic growth was also reinforced, and in the 
post-war, post-Fascist period came to the fore in the academ­
ic and political worlds.
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The industrial structure of the country was one of 
domination by industrial giants like FIAT (motor vehicles), 
Edison (electrical engineering) and Montecatini (chemicals) 
on the one hand, and a vast array of small, often family- 
based industries on the other. An intermediate level of 
middle-sized firms more attuned to wide-scale competition was 
largely absent. The tendency to oligopolistic and/or monopo­
listic concentration had been reinforced by the effects of 
the world recession of 1929-32, and this had also forced the 
state to step in and rescue the country's leading banks and, 
consequently, the industries dependent on them.
The state's rescue operation was nothing to do with the 
Fascist espousal of corporatism, indeed the operation was 
kept separate from Fascist ideologues by the creation of IRI, 
the Industrial Reconstruction Agency, in 1933. The state was 
forced to become a permanent actor by the absence of a strong 
bourgeoisie able and willing to buy back what the state had 
been left holding. By the late '30s RI's vast holdings were 
grouped sectorally: STET (telephones), Finmare (shipping), 
Finsider (iron and steel), AGIP (oil and gas) and so on, and 
by 1939 besides controlling virtually the entire banking 
sector IRI was responsible for 70% of ship-building, 45% of 
iron and steel production, 39% of electromechanical engineer­
ing and 23% of mechanical engineering.6 This was the largest 
degree of public intervention in the economy in the Western 
world. What happened to it in 1945 was of decisive impor­
tance. It could have provided the base for major ‘socialist' 
intervention, and indeed IRI became a major source of inspi­
ration for the British Labour party in the 1960s and '70s.
208
The Italian Communists, however, seeking not to emulate the 
soviet model but to develop a progressive alliance with 
business interests, were initially diffident towards what 
they regarded as a Fascist instrument.7 But let us enter 
directly into the realm of politics and ideological debate.
B. The Ideological Debate
Much of the historiography of post World War II Italian 
political economy has revolved around the assertion, and 
refutation, of a 'reconstruction' which saw the triumph of 
economic liberalism, and analyses have tended to assume, and 
assert the inevitability of a left/right split over this 
issue.8 Thus, in the early literature, a straight-forward 
victory of the right over the left, of liberalism over inter­
ventionism, was argued to have taken place. What made this 
plausible, indeed determined the contours of the analysis, 
was the coincidence of the expulsion of the left in 1947 and 
the drastic deflation which immediately followed.
Pursued by Luigi Einaudi as Treasury Minister, and then 
overseen by him as President, the financial stabilisation of 
1947-48 was not merely coincidental with the left's expulsion 
from the cabinet, but intimately bound up with it. Neverthe­
less, greater acknowledgement subsequently came to be given 
to the liberalisation of international trade from March 1946 
when the left was still in the cabinet, and to the great 
importance which the state and its special agencies played in 
the post-war boom. IRI in particular played a major role, 
and from this was backed by ENI the National Hydrocarbon 
Agency established to promote energy exploration and produc­
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tion. Thus an essentially diriaiste framework came to be 
stresses, within which there had been two liberal 'inter­
ludes', in early 1946 and again in 1947. The role of the 
state/DC was still seen largely as either deliberately pro­
moting the interests of monopoly capital, or as myopically 
mediating between different dominant interests. Interven­
tionism, like liberalism, was now identified as 'right-wing'.
Labelling the government's diriaiste/liberal mix as 
right-wing because of its domination by particular interests, 
and because of political Catholicism's alleged economic 
ignorance given its peasant roots and theoretical background 
rooted in medieval conceptions broke the simple reductionism 
of liberalism as right-wing and interventionism as left. The 
political nature of intervention now depended on who was 
implementing it and who for, ie on the balance of social and 
political forces. Nevertheless, 'liberalism' remained essen­
tially right-wing per se.
We shall pick this argument up when we look at the 
policies and politics of economic policy-making in detail. 
For the moment, to stick with the abstract level, it can be 
argued that for social democrats the political impact of 
liberal policies are also seen to depend on the balance of 
political forces. Thus whilst no policy is ever neutral, 
policies can be more (or less) democratically structured and 
implemented. In a democratic political system, some notion 
of the national interest will be relevant.9
In post-war Italy, the absence of a strong social 
democratic tradition, or more specifically of a strong, 
independent, avowedly reformist party allowed the DC to adopt
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a range of policies, some of which were reformist or 
'centre-left1, whilst remaining on the centre or centre-right 
of the party system. The left critique of the government was 
undermined by its confusion as to the nature of post-war 
capitalism, and given that the left position appeared to 
reject capitalism per se. a wide range of criticisms of 
government economic policy were nevertheless more assimilable 
to government positions than to those of the left. This 
applied whether the critique was essentially 'technical1 eg 
for a more reflationary/Keynesian approach, or 'moral' ie 
attacking the corruption and irrationality of the patronage 
and clientelism involved in the political direction of, and 
co-optation by, economic interests. The DC exploited this 
situation, as we shall now see, to establish an economic 
strategy which defined the national interest as requiring DC 
leadership and the subordinate participation of the left.
C. The Primacy of Politics. 1945-53
It has been argued that the primacy of politics was a 
fundamental consideration for both De Gasperi and Togliatti, 
and earlier in this chapter this was contrasted to the Liber­
als' insistence on putting the economy first during the CLN 
period. This will now be looked at in some detail. The 
first sub-section deals specifically with the CLN period, the 
second with the break up of the CLN and the significance of 
Einaudi's reforms. A third section then stresses the impor­
tance of the international context, considered not only as 
one of military confrontation between alternative economic 
systems, but also as one in which the reorganisation of
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economic development on a new, European and international, 
scale had its own independent dynamic. The final section 
moves from this context to consideration of De Gasperi's role 
as a statesman representing Italian national interests, not 
simply sectional interests.
1. Economic policy-making. 1945-47
The CLN had two fundamental tasks, one political, the 
other economic. On the one hand it sought to maintain polit­
ical stability, not in any static sense, but in the sense of 
preventing political degeneration so as to permit the evolu­
tion of a democratic and just new social order. On the other 
hand, it had to get the country working again. To a certain 
extent, business elites did this independently of government 
so that, for example, the strategy of promoting exports to 
overcome the yawning trade deficit was largely pre-given, 
already operational when the CLN came to power.10
The independent power of the business elites was a 
tacitly acknowledged fact which found reflection in the CLN's 
common stress on working class restraint and the united 
CGIL's repeated demonstration of its 'willingness to accommo­
date business interests1.11 The very independence of the 
business class, reinforced by their growing political and 
commercial links with the USA, allowed the political class to 
avoid taking fundamental decisions in the 1944-47 period and 
to concentrate on the battle for political power, for the 
parties' economic agnosticism allowed both the DC and the PCI 
to 'seek broad social and political alliances' in a catch-all 
strategy which sought to avoid alienating either the working 
or the middle classes to which both parties appealed.12
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Vague programmes and contradictory stances internal to the 
parties reflected their intensely competitive electoral 
strategies as they sought to maximise their appeal not only 
in their obvious catholic or industrial working class reser­
voirs, but amongst broad strata outside them. Electoral 
competitiveness thus blocked important initiatives identified 
with the left in the 1945-46 period. On the one hand Togli- 
atti refrained from supporting his more decisive Ministers 
lest their struggle to force measures through the CLN gave 
the impression of being aggressive Bolsheviks restrained only 
by the Allied military presence, a strategy which failed 
electorally, but was instrumental in forming the political 
class; on the other hand, the opposition parties opposed the 
left's initiatives for similarly indirect, electoral reasons. 
There was some self-interest, some rejection out of princi­
ple, but the real danger was that their implementation would 
be successful, boosting the left's image and leading to their 
political victory. Opposed in itself, such a development 
might also have decisively reinforced the right-wing reaction 
which was seeking to outflank the DC. Electoral considera­
tions thus drastically restricted policy options in two quite 
different ways.
The antagonistic cooperation of the political parties 
thus led to a public policy vacuum and increasing political 
uncertainty. From 1946 this was fuelled by the escalating 
international rhetoric which preceded the Cold War. In these 
circumstances, industrial stagnation increasingly came to be 
the effect of the absence of established political and eco­
nomic 'rules of the game'. Mariuccia Salvati, who sees the
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period as a lost opportunity for a more positive socialist 
state-led solution to the problems of industrialisation and 
accumulation, describes De Gasperi's tripartite administra­
tion as ‘preoccupied with the public interest and faced with 
the disinterest of the industrial classes', and she quotes 
President Truman's advisor on Italy on the ‘diffidence' of 
the industrial world ‘towards the general interest, towards 
the state, towards politics'.13 By early 1947, Confindustria 
was mounting a massive attack on the tripartite government, 
and as the pre-Fascist elites started to reassert themselves 
it became clear that the political class would have to con­
solidate its hold through electoral confrontation.
Workers too were putting pressure on the PCI to adopt a 
position more decisively in their favour, and we have seen 
that Togliatti withdrew from the government in the summer of 
1946 in order to concentrate on reasserting his authority in, 
and over, the PCI. Nevertheless, it would be a mistake to 
assume that working class living conditions declined, even as 
an immediate consequence of the 1947 exclusion crisis. 
Industrial wages rose from only 30% of the 1938 level in 1944 
to 100% in 1948, whereas industrial production picked up only 
to 80% for the same period.14 The key problem was unemploy­
ment.
As we have seen, the PCI expected to adopt an opposi­
tional position in 1947, but as a party of government, in 
principle.15 By withdrawing to a position of critical, but 
loyal, opposition, the party would, on the face of it, be 
doing no more than the PSI and PLI had already done. What 
changed things was De Gasperi's exploitation of the interna­
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tional environment to align the entrepreneurial classes 
decisively behind the DC in flagrant confrontation with its 
ex-partners.
The baseline of economic boom. 1947-48
De Gasperi signalled his concern that the new democracy 
had to gain the support of the business classes in a major 
speech at the start of the spring 1947 cabinet crisis. The 
three mass parties, he argued, were not enough to secure the 
democracy. It also had to be economically sound, and the 
'party* that could guarantee this, the 'fourth party’ of 
business interests, was absent. De Gasperi's speech has been 
vilified by the left, but it was an astute assessment of the 
situation. Rather than seeking to maintain some sort of 
broadly socialist coalition which would be able to garnish 
enough support to force the entrepreneurs into accepting a 
new political leadership, an exceptionally difficult and 
perhaps impossible undertaking16, De Gasperi persuaded Con- 
findustria to back the DC and to back a modernising strategy 
to which it was in large part opposed. He simultaneously 
persuaded a dithering and divided United States to supply 
massive funding to ensure that the 'anti-Communist' enter­
prise worked.17
Unable to bring about a reconciliation between an 
aggressively defensive business/industrial elite on the one 
hand, and a combative working class suffering 20% unemploy­
ment and convinced that socialism was around the corner, the 
division of the political class permitted it to confirm its 
overall societal leadership even as it became a prisoner of 
an electoral confrontation which fused the socioeconomic and
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political clash with a 'clash of civilisations'. The exclu­
sion of the left permitted the newly consolidating political 
class to confirm itself at the mass level, through elections, 
and enabled one of the new mass parties to at last give some 
decisive direction to economic policy-making. That a ration­
al, consensus basis for policy-making was rendered impossible 
was probably unavoidable, but the economic policies, foreign 
and domestic, which were the basis of Italy's future boom 
were made possible precisely by this politicisation.
As the resurgent economic liberalism of the post-Fas- 
cist period coincided with visceral anti-Communism, liberal­
ism inevitably became the butt of the excluded left's con­
frontation with the new government, which in turn became 
increasingly anti-Communist, but the DC neither ruptured the 
electoral and intra-elite dialectic by banning the PCI nor 
wholeheartedly adopted liberal positions. To the contrary, 
the DC's use of the state to promote economic development was 
marked. What it was not, and could not be, was open and 
solicitous of 'external' political support. It had to be 
more or less under-hand, pursued by agreements based on the 
party and the state, rather than parliament and the state. 
In this sense, economic policy remained 'centrist' rather 
than either laissez faire or 'socialist'.
A diriciste approach to economic management had brought 
increasing agreement between the DC-left (Dossetti, Fanfani 
and Taviani) and the PCI in the Constituent Assembly's Eco­
nomic Sub-Commission in the latter half of 1946, marginalis­
ing the PLI, and this had been a major reason behind that 
winter's attack by the business classes on the tripartite
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government.18 However, leading industrialists in both the 
private and the state sector had shown an interest in state 
intervention, so long as it took place within an overall 
capitalist framework. At the forefront of this interest were 
Vittorio Valletta of FIAT and Oscar Sinigaglia of Finsider, 
IRI's iron and steel sector. They shared ambitious plans for 
national economic modernisation and were convinced that the 
structural problems of the economy were such that successful 
industrialisation required the state's active, cooperative, 
participation.
The ousting of the doctrinaire Liberal, Epicarmo Corbi- 
no, from the cabinet in the autumn of 1946 was a victory for 
this approach, but the policy split within the business world 
was not between those favouring an interventionist approach 
and those opposing it. It was between those favouring an 
activist state aiming to modernise the economy to make it 
internationally competitive, and those seeking a regulated, 
still rather autarchic economy.19 The latter approach ap­
pealed to leading figures like Giorgio Falck (steel), actual­
ly an important founder of the DC, and Gaetano Marzotto 
(textiles), but would have condemned the country to relative 
stagnation. Crucial to defeating these interests was the 
alliance which De Gasperi reached with Angelo Costa, the 
President of Confindustria, which although hammered by the 
left as an anti-worker alliance, secured Confindustria's 
acceptance of a modernising strategy.20 In an interview 
given in 1988, Bruno Visentini an Action party supporter in 
the 1940s and subsequently vice-President of both IRI and 
Confindustria, described De Gasperi's role and the vision of
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Italian entrepreneurs in this period in the following terms:
'Confindustria was extraordinarily 
politically myopic. All the large industrial­
ists were extremely protectionist and opposed 
to the liberalisation of exchange. Inside the 
government they were supported by Pella who 
fought ferociously against La Malfa and Vanoni, 
accused of wanting to expose the Italian econo­
my to a massacre. THe latter won out because 
they had De Gasperi on their side ... a man 
already thinking of the construction of Europe 
and who had launched the European Coal and 
Steel Community with Schumann and Konrad Ade- 
naeur.121
The price to be paid for gaining the support of the business 
classes for a new style of polity management based on compe­
tition between mass-based parties, and for a modernising, 
internationally orientated economic policy programme, as well 
as for massive US support of the latter policy, was the 
exclusion of the left from the cabinet.
3. European integration
According to the historian James Joll, De Gasperi and 
Robert Schumann were 'the leading politicians who took deci­
sive steps towards the creation of a united Western 
Europe1.22 It was this which guaranteed the success of 
Italy*s economic modernisation and it was De Gasperi*s polit­
ical entrepreneurship which provided the strategic framework 
within which the schemes of the modernisers could be rea­
lised, and the conservative opposition induced to follow. It 
was an inextricably interpenetrating mix of economic and 
political management which truly deserves the label of 
'political economy' and the means which enabled De Gasperi 
to realise it was the DC and the party system created by the 
new political class.
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As we saw, the 1946 election disappointed Togliatti's 
hopes of creating a catch-all party, leaving De Gasperi to 
exploit the situation by maximising its appeal as an anti­
communist party. This stance secured not only the policy 
support of the USA and domestic business classes, but massive 
electoral support which De Gasperi used to realise his eco­
nomic strategy. Muriel Grindrod has described the 1948-53 
legislature as seeing the implementation of policies which 
determined the success of Italy's post-war economic policy.23 
The European Coal and Steel Community, inaugurated in 1952, 
proved to be such an outstanding success that the way for the 
European Economic Community was opened, and Italy continued 
to play a leading role, hosting the international conferences 
in Messina and Rome (in 1955 and '57) which paved the way to 
its creation.
For European integration to be of benefit to the Ital­
ian economy, both financial and industrial competitiveness 
were urgently required. To achieve these in all haste, an 
active mix of both liberalism and interventionism needed to 
be decisively pursued. The DC was an ideal party for this. 
Rather than being fettered by either ideological dogma, 
liberal or socialist, the party was predisposed to a pragma­
tism which was in tune with the realities of economic manage­
ment in a neo-capitalist mixed economy, yet predisposed to a 
rather voluntaristic activism thanks to its ‘Christian social 
solidarism'.24 This mixture joined a high regard for indi­
vidual private property ownership with an opposition to 
parasitic and monopolistic capitalism and a concern for the 
social welfare of the nation which counteracted the conserva­
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tism of many powerful Catholics and lay behind Fanfani's 
radical drive to make the DC independent of Church and busi­
ness interests later in the 1950s. Einaudian liberalism was 
thus one strand of De Gasperi1s commitment to economic moder­
nisation.
The reality of Christian Democrat domination in this 
period should be contrasted to the theory of the domination 
of 'liberalism', or of the unimportance of the DC compared to 
independents such as Einaudi and Carlo Sforza whom De Gasperi 
included in his cabinets. It was De Gasperi and the DC 
which held everything together. The liberal domination 
thesis has been argued at length by Vicarelli25 who estab­
lishes that Italian economists were overwhelmingly neoclassi­
cists in the tradition of Walras and Pareto, a judgment that 
has been echoed in a comparative study of the impact of 
Keynesianism.26 'traditional ideas', it seems, were much 
more traditional in Italy (and Germany) than elsewhere. 
Bleaney, nevertheless, notes that 'one gets the impression 
that Keynesian ideas were sufficiently influential to induce 
counter-cyclical action if a recession began to look seri­
ous', citing the reaction to the 1958 down-turn as evidence. 
Bleaney's example comes from a later date than is being dealt 
with here, but the point is that there was a crucial disjunc­
ture between theory and practice in economic management. In 
fact, as Vicarelli himself establishes, Einaudi made a cru­
cial distinction between 'competitive capitalism* which was 
an ideal to be sought after, and 'historical capitalism*, the 
imperfect beast present in Italy, and this distinction was 
well known to other key 'Einaudian liberals' such as D.Meni-
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chella and R.Mattioli who directed the Bank of Italy and 
Banca commerciale in the 1950s, and who consequently support­
ed IRI1s role in stimulating competition and industrial 
modernisation and even supported the commitment to full 
employment pursued by the catholic planner, Ezio Vanoni.
Bleaney*s specific thesis is that neither government 
stimulation of demandA nor economists* ideas were particular­
ly important to the post-war boom, compared to the 'invest­
ment euphoria' of the 1950s and'60s. The post-war political 
culture was one committed to growth, and governments and 
economists simply operated within it. Bleaney's picture is 
useful in pointing to the narrowness of Vicarelli's approach, 
but it invokes political culture at the expense of politics 
itself. As far as Italy, at least, is concerned, political 
elites, with De Gasperi in the van, created the post-war 
growth culture.
It has come to be increasingly recognised, moreover, 
that a less rigorous deflation, a more Keynesian approach, 
may have been inappropriate to Italy's requirements, as well 
as being administratively impracticable.27 The overwhelming 
need to internationalise Italy's economy and the inadequacy 
of capital to effect a sustained boom and absorb the labour 
surplus, not weak demand, were Italy's deeply historically 
rooted problems. What was necessary above all was to mobi­
lise capital, to force growth. This was a strategy that was 
harder on labour than it was on capital, for mobilising 
capital meant providing opportunity for profit (and stimulat-
A. Not relevant in Italy in any case.
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ing it through competition) , whereas labour mobilisation 
required a physical uprooting as the booming industries of 
the north were provided with a plentiful supply of low-cost 
labour. The immediate cost to labour in 1948 was unemploy­
ment and deprivation, and the monetary and material crises of 
1947-48 were real, in Italy at least.28 The response of the 
political class, including the intense pressure that Togliat- 
ti put on De Gasperi, in gaining emergency aid from the USA 
was the action of a national political class securing its 
survival by exploiting the concerns of another power.29
The monetary policy of the 1946-50 period has been 
judged to have restabilised Italy*s monetary base without 
impairing reconstruction.30 An alternative strategy based on 
idealistic social concern and muddled Keynesianism might have 
produced an alliance between the political left (catholic and 
lay) and the economic right which would have encouraged 
industrial growth based on securing employment rather than 
competitiveness and rendered Italy unable to benefit from 
European integration.
Running parallel with Einaudi*s deflation, the DC and 
technocrats who allied themselves with it such as Enrico 
Mattei (of AGIP and then ENI), made increasing use of the 
state and its directive capacities. Although not technically 
adequate to administer a planned or even Keynesian managed 
economy, largely because of its political hostility to such 
new ideas, the state machinery was by no means weak, as 
Mariuccia Salvati in particular has emphasised31. With 
rational planning impossible for reasons of political tension 
and bureaucratic deficiency the DC all but substituted it­
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self, and the new agencies which it set up and dominated, for 
the traditional state in order to carry out its voluntaristic 
and self-interested concern with social and economic engi­
neering. The exclusion of the left had avoided a tendential- 
ly negative-sum-game situation, but it also prevented the 
creation of a rational and visibly positive-sum-game. Rather 
a zero-sum game came to predominate in which the DC*s inter­
ventionist predilections were bent not only to economic 
growth but to self-preservation. However, the DC should not 
be entirely blamed for this situation which was virtually 
forced on it by a situation where the question was not wheth­
er the state had a role to play in industrialisation, but who 
the state was.
Catholic economists had been prominent in IRI and had 
acquired a vast amount of real-life experience in economic 
management during the previous decade. They were a major 
component of the technocratic and socially-minded elite which 
Roberto Moro described as becoming the post-war catholic 
ruling class. From 1943, these economists began elaborating 
a series of studies intended to lay the basis for determining 
the shape of the post-Fascist economy. De Gasperi himself 
had presented their work as an example to other catholic 
intellectuals. The requirement was to prepare to grapple 
with concrete economic and political problems.32 The groups 
conclusions were strikingly opposed to laissez faire liberal­
ism and were published as the Camaldoli Code in 1945. Al­
though this failed to have the intended practical impact over 
the course of the next two years, so that the role of its 
leading theoreticians in the sub-commissions of the Constitu­
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ent Assembly has been accused of being no more than a dis­
playing of catholic idealism, whilst the government got on 
with brutal reality, these same leading figures outlined the 
operational format which IRI eventually, and so successfully 
adopted, and implemented its role as an economic 'locomotive1 
from 1947.33 It has thus been argued, reversing the prevail­
ing anti-catholicism of the economic world, that these catho­
lic economists showed a far greater understanding than the 
left not only of IRI but of modern economics in general.34 
This accusation was asserted at the time by Franco Rodano, a 
leading catholic communist, excommunicated by the pope, who 
benefited personally from links with Pasquale Saraceno anoth­
er outstanding catholic economist who in the early 1960s, as 
the champion of the catholic planning movement, prepared the 
government's experiment in indicative planning.
European integration was thus an encompassing strategy 
within which financial rigour (and, increasingly, financial 
profligacy) were combined with the state promotion of indus­
trial entrepreneurship. The state acted as a supply-side 
catalyst to growth in a non-Keynesian but decidedly post- 
classical fashion.35
4. De Gasperi: the political economy of a statesman
De Gasperi's political-economic strategy made him the 
key figure able to bind together the disparate concerns of 
the business classes behind an effective governmental force 
and still maintain a degree of goodwill from the excluded 
left party elites. By firmly allying himself with Angelo 
Costa, the President of Confindustria, he united the business 
community, weaving it together to support an internationalist
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orientation of the economy based on US support for a relaunch 
of the European economy. At the same time, and even whilst 
the left was denouncing the De Gasper i/Costa alliance as the 
face of clerico-capitalist reaction, the PCI, via CGIL, was 
still seeking compromise in order to influence the govern­
ments economic policy-making. By now, CGIL was a Socio- 
Communist union, with the separate CISL and UIL unions just 
established, but its leader, Vittorio Valletti, was a cen­
trist-orientated and highly respected Communist.36
The PCI's fundamental acceptance of the government's 
economic leadership was part and parcel of its understanding 
that ‘centrism* had been maintained, if transformed, in 
1947-48, rather than being replaced by an anti-working class 
hegemony. As the Communist philosopher and party theoreti­
cian Giuseppe Vacca recently put it, the DC in this period 
synthesised a national interest' it did not realise a merely 
sectional interest, nor even a mere agglomeration of particu­
lar interests.37 The political economy of reconstruction 
sought political and economic development of the whole na­
tion-state in a progressive internationalist and democratic, 
albeit capitalist, framework. It was anti-Communist, but not 
anti-working class, and directed its anti-communism against 
radical individual militants, not the movement/party per se.
To argue this is to argue that De Gasperi was a states­
man in the sense that he developed a political economy for 
the state as a whole, but it is not to deny the existence of 
inter-block interaction and the importance of the PCI. This 
contrasts to the position of Antonio Lombardo, a political 
scientist close to the DC, who described the period 1947/48-
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63 as one of 'nation-building' in which the DC and its lay 
allies played the role of a modernising super-party, dominat­
ing the country politically and culturally.38 Lombardo's 
proposition overlooks the commonality of the desire for both 
oppositional and key governmental elites to promote, on the 
one hand, a lay orientation for political development, and on 
the other, a more socially just social order. Contrary to 
Lombardo's thesis of the creation of a new dominant culture 
which was 'national-religious' in the period 1948 to the 
early 1960s, the political culture of this period was one of 
radical modernisation which stood (as per Chapter Three) to 
the left of the governing coalition, which was predominantly 
a conservative moderniser. Lombardo's analysis is typically 
integral ist in its devaluation of the role of the left oppo­
sition in the process of nation-building, reflecting the way 
in which the country's modernising political economy came to 
be all but hegemonised by the DC as it substituted itself for 
the state.
The tendency to political domination by the DC in the
1950s and '60 was, as we have seen, a problem in itself, and
it was a problem for economic development too, as we shall
see in the next section. Nevertheless, under De Gasperi a
national interest was served by securing sectoral planning
and a modernising role for the state alongside Einaudi's
market orientated liberalism. A recent cross-national survey
of post-war development has written of Italy:
As in France, planning was characteristic of 
the post-war Italian economy. There were plans 
for regional and infrastructural improvement, 
special ten-year plans for the development of 
the railroads, schools and universities, plans
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for assistance to regions with special prob­
lems, plans for the construction of housing, 
and plans for the development of the iron and 
steel industry.*39
Of course, much of this 'planning* was often not rea­
lised, and the various plans were not coordinated. Less than 
'planning* what developed was politico-bureaucratic mediation 
of economic development. Already in the late 1940s the 
catholic planner Pasquale Saraceno was condemning the ab­
stract and extreme confrontation between planners and liber­
als which ignored the reality of de facto planning which was 
taking place under their noses. This reality was one which 
was parasitic and chaotic because the state was not being 
allowed to act rationally. The view was echoed by Meuccio 
Ruini and Ernesto Rossi in Cronache sociali. the organ of the 
Dossettiani, but the reality was that this was the only sort 
of state role that was realisable - a more or less covert one 
where an intensely political 'institutional politics* predom­
inated over the attempt to rationalise the process. Divi­
sions within the political class, in and out of government, 
encouraged the development of a state simultaneously powerful 
because manned by activist political and economic entrepre­
neurs yet weak because fragmented.
As the dirigiste role of the state under the DC grew 
more pronounced, so the attack on the partitocrazia. and on 
the DC, mounted. Under Fanfani, the DC*s statist activism 
provoked recurrent waves of alarm so that for some the 
'opening to the left* meant the ability to rationalise and 
correct the DC *s deformation (of itself and the state), 
whilst for others it meant that socialistic interference was
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bound to increase.
Despite the lack of overall coordination and the de­
scription of the political-economic process as 'politico- 
bureaucratic mediation1 which avoided parliament, it would be 
wrong to say the De Gasperi had no economic vision. A 'plan* 
was not politically viable where the politics of the economic 
policy-making process was so fraught with tension and con­
flict, but as we have argued, De Gasperi's strategic vision 
embraced the economic and the political simultaneously. At 
the 1949 Congress he outlined his economic policy as having 
had three phases: overcoming paralysis in 1946, price stabil­
isation in 1947, and galvanising a strong export-orientated 
economy from 1948. Thanks to his partnership with Einaudi 
and the imminent arrival of the ERP funds this was substan­
tially achieved in 1950, and De Gasperi felt able to give 
his whole-hearted support to the reforms of that year, the 
limitations to which he saw as political rather than econom­
ic. By the time of the 1954 Congress, a year after the DC's 
most right-wing campaign programme (Mastropaolo and Slater), 
De Gasperi defended his action since 1947 as part of an 
'organic programme' which included not only exchange liberal­
isation but also sectoral planning, as in the creation of 
Finmeccanica, an engineering sub-sector within IRI, in 1947, 
which became a 'locomotive' of the economy, and the develop­
ment of the iron and steel industry via Finsider. Other 
milestones were cited as Vanoni's fiscal reforms and the 
establishment of ENI, designed to make up for the inadequa­
cies and passivity of the private energy sector. The same 
Congress sanctioned Vanoni's plan for full-employment, cap­
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ping De Gasperi*s claim, made in the preceding year, that the 
DC was a 'party of the left* - a challenging counterpoint to 
the party programme as well as being an advance on the claim 
of 1946.
D. Reconstruction: A Conclusion
De Gasperi used the complex nature of his party and the 
structure of political conflicts to develop a progressive, if 
not radical, political economy. This political economy was 
one synthesis which promoted the 'national interest1, perhaps 
even the only one politically possible. The DC was admirably 
suited to be the central actor in achieving this. A centrist 
economic strategy which fused liberal and statist policies 
came to it easily, for it was not only not bound by liberal 
or socialist idees fixes, but in significant part, hostile to 
both.
The realisation of De Gasperi 1 s political economy was 
the realisation of a political and economic strategy, and in 
the hyper-competitive and volatile political situation pre­
vailing it was a strategy intimately bound up with the 
strategies of the other party elites, and superior to them. 
Bound up with, yet superior, because it offered a decisive 
way out of the political impasse of 1947. The right economic 
opposition was essentially contained within the DC, whilst 
the left never developed an alternative because it never 
clarified the nature of its acceptance/rejection of the DC. 
To do this it would have had to have asserted itself as an 
acceptable national alternative to the DC, as a reformist 
centre-left which was the other side of the coin to a reform­
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ist centre-right, not a different coin altogether. In fact 
both the DC and the PCI had electoral and ideological reasons 
for denying the idea that alternative, more or less progres­
sive, broadly centrist policies did, theoretically, exist, 
and that that was all that was available in a democratic 
state. The consolidation of the three-block system in 1953 
established the structural consolidation of this political 
economy. In its own particular way, the Italian political 
class had organised itself and its citizenry successfully in 
order to be able to benefit from immediate and decisive 
participation in the global economy.
MODERNISATION AND POLITICAL AMBIVALENCE:
FANFANI AND THE STRONG STATE
Fanfani, as we have seen, inherited De Gasperi's mantle 
in 1954, but he was never able to make permanent his authori­
ty, as was shown by his defeat in 1959, failure as a presi­
dential candidate in 1964 and 1971, and finally by his defeat 
in 1975. The reason for this was that he came to be dis­
trusted by the Communists and Socialists, on account of his 
aggressive politico-electoral ambitions, by the economic and 
clerical right in and outside his party, and by party col­
leagues who objected, whether as rivals or as critics of the 
consequences, of his urge to dominate. Increasingly, Fanfa­
ni 's ambitions, and the ambitions of his party, were seen to 
require the subordination of all alternative positions of 
leadership in Italian society.
Fanfani's urge to dominate made him left-wing to the
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right, right-wing to the left and, as we saw, encouraged the 
danger that 'centrism' would become an exclusivist, and 
therefore undemocratic formula. We have seen that despite 
Fanfani*s unseating by the cautious Dorotei in 1959 he re­
mained a major figure in it until 1975.A This Section of the 
Chapter considers the DC's political economy as epitomised by 
Fanfani, and considers the question of the 'weakness of the 
Italian state'. It looks first at the period of Fanfani's 
ascendance, and then at the challenges, from the PSI, the 
unions and the private sector, to Christian Democracy's urge 
to dominate the economy.
It is usual to argue that the decisional and directive 
capacity of the Italian state, or more narrowly (and perhaps 
more accurately) Italian government is, and has been, rather 
low. Here it is argued that the reverse case has much to be 
said for it. The argument for its weakness has been well 
rehearsed, with books suggesting the absence of government in 
Italy, or arguing that governments have survived only thanks 
to their do-nothing nature.40 Of course, the voluntarism and 
managerialism of all the DC's leading figures, pointed in the 
other direction, as did the attacks on clerical totalitarian­
ism, partitocrazia and the harsh anti-workerism in the 1950s 
and the domination of the DC-state over the PSI in the 1960s. 
It has been argued that De Gasperi's governments, those of 
the early Centre-Left, and those of the historic Compromise, 
were particularly constructive, the implication being that
A. He and Aldo Moro were considered the party's two cavalli 
di razza ([race horse] thoroughbreds) throughout the 1960s 
and into the '70s.
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something approaching government alternation produced the 
additional dynamic,41 but others have argued the more general 
case.42 The argument that Christian Democratic government 
was genuinely governmental can certainly be pursued in rela­
tion to the political economy conducted by Fanfani from the 
early 1950s. In Amintore Fanfani, Christian Democratic 
voluntarism found its greatest exponent.
A. The DC and the Economy under Fanfani
Fanfani entered De Gasperi's sixth government in 1950 
as part of the Dossettiani left opposition to De Gasperi's 
initially conservative socioeconomic policies. This govern­
ment was the ‘reform government' whose main opposition came 
from the right, including that internal to the DC. Its 
formation won the backing of Di Vittorio, the CGIL leader, 
and almost gained PCI abstention in consequence.
1. Territorial management
Fanfani was a known opponent of laissez faire against 
which he opposed a neo-voluntarist doctrine stressing the 
importance of political will, but he also had a great respect 
for the sound budgetary economics of Einaudi and Pella. For 
Fanfani these provided a basis for De Gasperi's industrial 
policy but needed to be supplemented by a regional strategy. 
Neither the DC nor its modernisation strategy would survive 
if the southern popular classes were not won over to the 
party. The year 1950 thus brought land redistribution and 
the formation of the Cassa per il Mezzoqiorno which, despite 
accusations of socio-cultural inadequacy and minimalism 
served to increase agricultural production in the interests
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of the nation as a whole whilst 'deproletarianising* the 
countryside, bringing an end to class war there, thus stabi­
lising southern Italy on a democratic basis.43 The impor­
tance of this can only be appreciated from a deeper histori­
cal perspective. The unification of Italy less than a hun­
dred years previously had, in the south, resulted in a 
quasi-civil war of repression so that far from drawing the 
popular masses into a mobilising and unifying nationalism the 
Risoraimento had led to the construction of a state which a 
vast part of its inhabitants regarded as just one more op­
pressor.44 The post-war period saw the process of nation- 
building completed, with the integration of the southern 
masses playing a major role in this, but this integration 
took place through a process of competitive mobilisation in 
which the PCI played a major role - which is one of the 
reasons Lombardo"s description of the post-war political 
culture as 'national religious" is inadequate.
The flow of funds to the south was enormous and in 1957 
the objectives of the Cassa was modified in order to promote 
the industrialisation of southern Italy. Its already enor­
mous budget of $1.6 milliard for the decade 1950-60 was 
doubled to $3.3 milliard for the period 1950-65 and the 
stipulation made that 60% of all new state investment would 
be located in the south so that eventually 40% of the total 
of state industry would be located there. Much of these huge 
sums of monies remained unspent, and much of what was spent 
was spent badly, as we shall see in the next section on 
governing the oligopoly economy. The use of these funds to 
promote party interests promoted corruption and maladminis­
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tration and encouraged the massive destruction of the envi­
ronment. By the 1980s it was routinely argued that Campania, 
Calabria and Sicily were beyond the rule of law, indicating 
the weakness of the state. Perhaps more accurately, reflect­
ing the fragmentation of the state, it indicated the weakness 
of the judiciary and the failure of interested reformers to 
create the sort of strong state which liberal democratic 
theory demands.
Nevertheless, by the 1980s Sardinia, Apulia and the 
Abruzzi regions had substantially developed economies. 
Industrial production had increased seven-fold in the south 
between 1951-75, compared to its doubling in the north, and 
in the crisis ridden seventies employment had grown three 
times faster in the south than in the north. More important­
ly, perhaps, as the south stagnated economically in the 
aftermath of the 1970s world slump, social indicators such as 
housing, diet and medical provision continued to rise,45 even 
though unemployment and other social inequalities remained 
concentrated there.
2. Governing the oligopoly economy
The 1950 reforms weakened hostility to state interven­
tion for they did not affect labour mobility, Confindustria*s 
key concern, whilst their success swelled the demand for 
industrial goods from the north. The Korean war also fur­
thered acceptance of state dirigisme. for it showed both the 
potential for growth in the economy and the fact that this 
did not have to be inflationary. Increasingly, in the early 
1950s, the DC's pragmatic mix of liberalism and intervention­
ism won grudging acceptance. But political sensitivities
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remained extraordinarily high. Inside the DC the successful 
promotion of the iron and steel industry by Finsider was 
particularly significant, stimulating an interest in plan­
ning. This interest became associated with the rise of 
Iniziativa democratica (Democratic initiative) the faction 
which backed Fanfani throughout the 1950s and whose name 
revealed the progressive intentions and voluntarism of its 
founders, Mariano Rumor and Paolo Emilio Taviani.
Iniziativa democratica was founded in 1951 and by 1954 
dominated the party, especially its important youth wing, 
which for the decade 1955-65 was enthused by the promise of 
state planning.46 In the years 1951-54 this faction formed a 
new political leadership in the DC. It was hostile to the 
Vatican (though this was hardly visible to the party*s oppo­
nents) , which was identified with MSI and monarchist sympa­
thies, but profoundly catholic, with a powerful vision of a 
strong state led by the DC in its role as a catholic 'modern 
prince1, a political party which would realise the anti- 
marxist and anti-liberal social values derived from catholic 
social doctrine.47
This profoundly political voluntarist reinforcement of 
the DC was typical of the initial mobilisational phase of 
modern party systems48 and coincided with, and promoted, the 
transformation of Italy into and industrial society. This 
new organisation of catholic voluntarism conjoined an empha­
sis on the public sector of the economy with the militant 
activism of the new catholic union, CISL, the twin enemies of 
which were the communist union CGIL and the unacceptable 
concentration of power in the hands of the monopolists of the
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private economy, essentially identified with Confindustria.
The declaration of CISL in 1953 that the IRI should be 
independent of Confindustria coincided with the creation of 
ENI. De Gasperi's backing for both the formation of ENI and 
CISL's claim came as a tremendous shock to the business 
classes, causing them to label his stance as 'revolutionary' 
and indicative of the party's leftward move - to Fanfani and 
his backers.49
There is little doubt that CISL and the new catholic 
public managers sought to remodel industrial relations, and 
the economy generally, in a socially progressive direction 
through its influence over the oligopoly sector of the econo­
my. The exemplar of this was where the activism of the DC's 
trade union left and interventionist voluntarism of its 
planners coincided in the use of ENI, via the CISL to 'set 
standards in working conditions, managerial attitudes to 
trade unions, plant modernisation, worker education and sales 
practices', with ENI enterprises being 'self-consciously 
modern, self-consciously socially aware, and manifestly 
intent on introducing the structures and practices of modern 
industrial society'.50
Nevertheless, the new leftism of Fanfani's DC and the 
interests associated with it posed more of a threat to the 
trade union and party left than to capitalism of even private 
monopoly interests. CISL's aggressive championing of plant- 
level bargaining purposively undermined the CGIL which still 
pursued a centralised, nationally-led system of industrial 
relations designed to promote class solidarity and to demon­
strate the power and influence of the PCI/CGIL. Moreover,
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the leftist element of the DC's union and public sector 
policy was always contained by the party's inability to act 
more decisively to reweight the scales against the business 
elites on the basis of a democratic mandate. Radical poli­
cies thus always ended compromised with the result that the 
socioeconomic politics of the middle to late 1950s were 
exceedingly ambiguous. The attempt by a technocratic genera­
tion to secure a socially progressive neo-capitalist develop­
ment foundered on the monopolistic political beliefs of its 
practitioners. Not only did the catholic (union) left pro­
foundly alienate the lay left, but relations between the DC 
and Confindustria also deteriorated dramatically, reinforcing 
the DC right as it strove to see this fundamental link 
strengthened.
The separation of the public sector from Confindustria 
by the creation of Intersind, together with the creation of 
the Ministry for State participation appeared to offer the 
planners the opportunity directing and rationalising produc­
tion, and these developments coincided with the transforma­
tion of the objectives of the Cassa to the industrialisation 
of the south. It thus appeared that the state was about to 
acquire the ability to determine the general flow of capital 
investment through IRI, ENI, the Cassa and the state dominat­
ed banking and credit institutions. The cautious move to­
wards the greater acceptance of state planning in the early 
1950s thus failed to initiate a climate of tolerance and 
rational debate and the whole issue remained highly conten­
tious throughout the decade. The looming rapprochement with 
the PSI naturally stimulated these tensions and consequently
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the attempt to rationalise the planning process in the 1960s 
was still-born.
The process of setting up the Ministry for State Par­
ticipation was a classic example of the inability of the DC 
left to achieve its modestly progressive aims. In practice 
the establishment of the Ministry established the clarifica­
tion and stabilisation of the boundaries between the private 
and the public spheres in different sectors of the economy, 
preventing creeping nationalisation and reasserting both the 
independence of the private sector and the subordination of 
state policy to the logic and demands of the markets and 
their private oligopolistic interests.51 The attempt to move 
the party to the left grossly underestimated the intractabil­
ity of sociopolitical divisions established by political 
culture and the structure of party competition. The Vanoni 
plan for full employment had fallen early into a political 
limbo, whilst the political wishful thinking of Fanfani's 
quasi-Centre-Left petered out in the face of the hostile 
atmosphere in which the 1959 wage rounds were carried out. 
These resubordinated the unions, leaving the political right 
ascendant. Soon, reinforced by the Tambroni affair, the 
catholic union would become convinced that the DC was a 
conservative political force and move towards solidarity with 
the other trade unions, though this was delayed by the victo­
ry of the non-union left (la base) in achieving coalition 
with the PSI.
3. Governing the micro-sector of the economy
Given the politically sensitive conditions in which 
Italy's political economy unfolded, the 'opening to the left*
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could not be hailed in terms of the participation of the 
working class in the investment process, so that it was the 
supposed outcome, in terms of growth, which was stressed by 
reformists. But in fact Italy's greatest economic boom 
preceded the PSI joining the government, so that Italy had 
already been hailed as a paradigm case of successful economic 
development.52 The stress on the small scale sector of the 
economy, extremely important to the DC of Fanfani, was a 
major factor in this. By contrast, the change to stressing 
planning, mergers and economies of scale in the 1960s pro­
duced some of Italy's greatest economic disasters in the 
1970s.
It was not only quantitative economic development which 
was already well advanced by 1960. The development of the 
modern interventionist 'social state' was remarkably preco­
cious in post-war Italy, with social transfer payments in the 
mid-1950s significantly higher than those of the Scandinavian 
social democracies and double those of Great Britain.53 Of 
course, both economic and welfare growth were determined by 
party self-interest as much as by welfare ideology, and the 
cut-throat political environment, combining with the inheri­
tance of particularly brutalised peasant mentalities deriving 
from the most desperate social and economic conditions,54 
also meant that a public service ethos never came to be 
associated with the state's growing powers. Critics of DC 
intervention came to describe its social concern as essen­
tially artificially induced - behind the genuine veneer 
provided by the DC-left there was merely a 'vicarious dyna­
mism' founded on a permanent strategy of preempting the
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appeal of the PSI and PCI.55 However, the 'welfare1 profli­
gacy of the new state was also a supply-side economic measure 
which was peculiarly Christian Democratic.
Italy's new political class was well aware that twice 
in its brief existence, under Giolitti and under Mussolini, 
the Italian state had gropingly reached for mass legitimacy, 
each time seeing it undone in war and civil war. It was 
evident to the populist leaders of the mass parties that such 
legitimacy as the new Republican regime possessed was inti­
mately connected with its ability to provide a combination of 
economic growth and/or at least minimum welfare conditions. 
The interventionist redistribution of economic wealth, ie the 
salience of so-called 'low politics1, was important as a 
supply side economic measure in two ways, one negative, one 
positive. Negatively, it obtained the quiescence of what 
was, in economic terms, surplus labour, but it did so without 
interdicting the supply of cheap labour to the booming indus­
tries of northern Italy. The intertwining of social policy 
and industrial policy in Italy has always been apparent to 
its mass-based political leaders and the fact that this was 
brought rewards for party organisations, rather than the 
state, should probably be regarded as a matter of historical 
necessity as much as the outcome of deliberate manipulation 
by the DC.
On the positive side, the state used its resources to 
encourage the founding of new small firms and the expansion 
of old ones in order to speed reconstruction. The concern of 
Christian Democracy with small-scale property ownership 
meshed here with Einaudi's recognition of the inherited
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structural weakness of the Italian economy, particularly the 
lack of a developed consumer goods industry. The Italian 
state did well not to neglect its small family firms. They 
were an important resource. Whilst their growth and survival 
undoubtedly helped fend of the Communist threat in southern 
Italy, their overall political effect was much more ambigu­
ous, whereas economically their encouragement was a tailor- 
made strategy for maximal utilisation of Italy*s resources, 
polarised as they were between the oligopoly sector and the 
small and micro-industrial sector. The electoral aspect may 
thus have been of lesser import than critics considered. 
Indeed, we have already seen that Sidney Tarrow suggested 
that the Red Belt may have received more resources than the 
White.
The economic miracle of 1953-63 was the result not only 
of monetary policy and activities of Finsider and Fiat, but 
also of the rapid growth of myriads of small firms56. There 
is little doubt that the major impetus for the implementation 
of a strategy favouring the small scale sector was the DC. 
Even critics concede that its view of its social mission, its 
politico-economic voluntarism and the governmental position 
in which it found itself made it the motor force driving this 
sector of the economy.57 The economic rationality of this 
strategy is often argued to have been fortuitous, proven only 
in retrospect, to be explained by the economy's semi-periph­
eral development, and this luck is contrasted to the DC's 
distortion and abuse of the oligopoly sector. Yet, as we 
have seen, the DC's diriaiste capacities and grasp of modern 
macro-economic management were at least the equal of any
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alternative. The problems came later, and were induced by 
party competition in the first place, rather than cognitive 
or managerial inadequacy.
The DC's strategy of encouraging entrepreneurialism at 
the micro-level was a constant feature of its programmatic 
statements from the early 1940s. It sought a 'new social 
economy' and used its control of state resources in the 1950s 
not merely to prop up declining sectors where it was politi­
cally vulnerable, but to encourage artisan and small-scale 
businessmen for its own sake. A number of crucial interven­
tions were championed by Fanfani's party in the 1950s. A 
whole series of tax concessions, loan schemes and so on, 
leading to the Artisan Statute of 1956, tremendously promoted 
this sector of the economy, encouraging its vital contribu­
tion to the first economic miracle and laying the basis for 
the second.58
In fact, a probable major reason for the phenomenon 
noted by Tarrow, whereby the Red Belt did so well out of the 
redistribution of state resources, was that the DC's promo­
tion of the small-scale industry sector provided resources 
less to prop up the backward economy of the south, where the 
bulk of the 'clientelist vote' for the DC is located, than 
for what cam to be known as the 'Third Italy'. This is the 
central and north-eastern belt of Italy, neither northern 
industrial nor backward southern Italy, where both the Red 
and the White sub-cultures are rooted. The DC's economic 
voluntarism, so highly prized by Fanfani, correctly chal­
lenged the prevailing economic orthodoxies which assumed the 
decline of the small-scale sector as 'economies of scale' and
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rationalisation (or 'Fordism') resulted in the domination of 
larger and larger industrial units. In the process, this 
strategy benefited not only the national economy but directly 
advantaged both major parties, promoting the legitimation of 
the new state and its political class - at least until the 
late 1960s and early 1970s.
B. The Assault on the PC's Policy-Making Primacy
Fanfani sought to transform his party into a mass-based 
vanguard party able to direct the country's economic and 
political development. Although he always sought broad 
alliances in order to achieve his ambitions, the DC's domi­
nant position and the power of Fanfani himself, even when 
toppled from the leadership of the party, led him to be seen 
as something of a catholic Lenin. Checked by his own party 
in 1959, the possibility of his realising the dominant posi­
tion which he sought passed away definitively in the 1960s 
and '70s as his party's leading role was challenged by com­
peting parties, by unions and by business interests.
1. The Centre-Left
Fanfani's July 1960 government was confirmed the gov­
ernment of parallel convergence by Aldo Moro to stress its 
centrist continuity with the past, but the novelty of Social­
ist support triggered an avalanche of public debate on eco­
nomic planning. In September 1961 an 'ideological conven­
tion' held by the DC at San Pellegrino outlined a new politi­
cal and economic strategy for the party based on 'program­
ming'. The word 'planning' was too sensitive to use, but 
mere word-play was not enough to dispel the totally unfavour­
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able circumstances for a change which required innovative 
institutional reform and a dramatic change in political and 
institutional behaviour. Although Fiat was in favour of a 
more rationalised state role for economic and urban develop­
ment, the bulk of Confindustria was horrified. Far from 
seeing the PSI being drawn into the management of a capital­
ist economy the DC's VI1 ^  Congress, held in Naples in 1962, 
seemed to indicate the transformation of the DC into a party 
of the Centre-Left.59
Immediately after the Congress, Fanfani formed a new 
government from which the PLI was excluded. Its programme 
foresaw the establishment of the regions, educational reform, 
the nationalisation of the electricity industry and the 
institutionalisation of economic programming. The basic 
ideas of the latter were outlined by Ugo La Malfa, now Minis­
ter of the Budget and Economic Programming, in an Additional 
Note which he attached to the annual budget report to parlia­
ment. In August, the National Committee for Economic Pro­
gramming (CNPE) was established, with Pasquale Saraceno, the 
leading catholic advocate of planning as its acknowledged 
guiding force.
These plans would have established a new political 
economy, led by the DC and PSI, defining a new national 
interest. But it was not to be. It coincided with the first 
significant strike-wave since the aftermath of the war and 
the reaction of the business classes, appalled by political 
and industrial developments, was a massive capital strike.60 
The task of reassuring the business world clearly belonged to 
the DC, but this left the PSI free to reap the benefits from
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the government's move to the left. The DC could expect only 
to lose - all across the board. In 1963 it lost to the PLI, 
but if the PSI was not clearly subordinated the DC could 
expect to lose to all the parties with which it stood in 
coalition, for the PCI was no threat to a strong coalition. 
The DC had to subordinate the PSI and to acquiesce in the 
forceful reassertion of management power. A new political 
economy based on a new relationship between business, unions 
and government could not be achieved which was not potential- 
ly ruinous for the DC.
The initiative passed back to the DC right and to a 
private business sector clearly bent on reasserting tradi­
tional, conservative industrial relations. The tendentially 
united trade unions and the increasingly militant working 
class now moved strongly towards identifying the DC as a 
conservative party, the PSI as weak and treacherous, and the 
PCI as irrelevant, contributing to the syndicalist explosion 
of 1969.61 The failure to establish a new basis for indus­
trial relations and the failure to consolidate the coalition 
on a progressive basis meant that a new political economy was 
not effected. But neither was the old political economy 
reestablished.62 The business elites failed to regain their 
confidence and the growth of capital fixed investment slumped 
from 9.1% per annum, 1952-63, to 1% per annum, 1964-72.63 
The technocratic-managerial aspect of the DC, which in the 
1950s and early '60s had sought, via the public sector in 
particular, to promote rational sectoral planning and 
union/business elite cooperation in a progressive neo-capi- 
talist programme now became subordinated to a conservative
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regime in which Emilio Colombo attempted to promote the 
national economic interest without the active consent of 
either the unions or much of the business world.64
In the short term the DC had managed to defeat the 
challenge of the Centre-Left, but the PSI's strategic foot­
hold in the cabinet remained. Worse, the government had 
failed to win the backing of the unions and could no longer 
rely on the consent of private enterprise. Only the state 
sector was reliable, and it was here that the party attempted 
to reassert itself.
2. The assertion of private sector independence
The DC's relationship with the private sector was close 
from the time of the De Gasperi/Costa alliance. However, the 
union left and those inspired by catholic social doctrine 
were hostile in principle to its vast concentration of power, 
whilst all those concerned to assert the party's own power 
were keen to see an end to its dependence on Confindustria. 
The challenge of the PSI and the difficulties the DC faced in 
running a genuinely national political economy in the 1960s 
reinforced the DC's relationship with the public sector and 
in the end provoked a major back-lash on the part of the 
private sector.
The expansion of the public sector in the 1960s thus 
continued apace, and according to one comparative survey of 
economic power in capitalist systems: "most long-term indus­
trial finance by the 1970s was provided by state banks and 
credit agencies", which, together with the activities of the 
public sector bodies like IRI and ENI, meant that "state 
intervention .... [had] transformed a chronically disabled
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system of bank hegemony into a state controlled holding 
system” where the state*s activist role was comparable to 
Austria*s in that both countries saw the public sector enter­
prises play a "strategic role" whereby "public corporations 
and state share-holdings reach into the banking systems and 
key industries, and so give public authorities power and 
influence over the commanding heights of the economy.”65 
This degree of power and influence presented a growing threat 
to the private sector as can be confirmed by another compara­
tive analysis of capitalist organisation in the liberal 
democracies. According to this analysis66 Italy, uniquely, 
saw the control of its financial/industrial core divided 
between two sets of 'interlocks*, one private, the other 
public, and the public, or state core, as we know, was large­
ly controlled by the DC. It was precisely to assert the 
independent authority of the state from parties, as well as 
interests, that had led many to support the attempt to rea­
lise a rational programming of the economy via the government 
and parliament in the early '60s.67
The DC's domination of the public sector was far from 
all negative, even in the '60s. Thus, 'state-owned enter­
prises in general were more advanced than private enterprises 
in work organisation and industrial relations. Coexisting 
with labour unions, particularly the catholic union (CISL), 
was important to the modernising strategy of the public 
sector. Job evaluations were introduced in Italsider, the 
steel firm, in the mid-60s ...'68. These developments also 
helped bring management and workers together and reinforced 
the high level rapprochement which was required associated
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with the planning experience through the coordination of 
Intersind, CISL and the Ministries of Labour and of State 
Participation. Other analysts have thus concluded that the 
state's economic role in the 1960s contributed to the insti­
tutional recognition of the trade unions and the long-run 
development of neo-corporatist and tripartite tendencies,69 
and just such long-term effects, as well as more direct 
challenges such as the control over access to investment 
funds and the determination of the general direction of 
investment, were surely what disturbed the private sector 
about the state's role.
It was at the end of the 1960s and in the early 1970s 
that the private sector decisively showed itself unwilling to 
accept the DC's pretensions to political domination, thus 
coinciding in a complex fashion with the upsurge of union 
unrest which itself challenged both the business classes and 
the DC-state. The crucial spark which set ablaze the busi­
ness counter-offensive was the crypto-nationalisation of 
Montedison, the chemical giant, by IRI in 1968.70 Although 
arguably 'functional' to the interests of the progressive 
business sector the manner of its realisation, without par­
liament's knowledge, and the general circumstances of rampant 
attacks on private sector companies by public ones in the 
stock exchange, rang massive alarm bells. The appointment of 
Eugenio Cefis, a leading Fanfani protege, to head Montedison 
in 1971 was widely understood as confirming the political 
significance of the Montedison affair.
At the most simple level Cefis' appointment increased 
Fanfani's political and economic influence, but for many it
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was a key step in a strategy of providing a statist solution 
to the country's (and the DC's) politico-economic dilemma. 
By making the chemical industry the core of the Italian 
economy, both the organised working class and the private 
business sector would be weakened, for ousting Fiat from its 
preeminent position would deal a mighty blow to the entrepre­
neurs and promote national economic growth based on capital- 
intensive industry. Labour would be absorbed through the 
usual mechanisms of political and economic concessions and 
through the growth of the tertiary sector and of the small- 
scale industry sector where union power was negligible.
The private sector's self-assertion against Fanfani was 
overwhelmed by the Hot Autumn of 1969 and the domination of a 
weak government in the following years by the unions. Never­
theless, a massive counter-attack developed through the 
1970s, and took four main approaches.71 Firstly, a massive 
ideological offensive against the state and its role in the 
economy was mounted, reawakening the somnambulant liberal 
discourse before Thatcherism was heard of. Secondly, the 
'judicial destruction' of the so-called 'assisted capital­
ist', ie of those over-dependent on political support, was 
pursued, both at the personal and at the institutional level. 
Thirdly, the crisis of the 1970s was not allowed to lead to 
an extension of the public sector's grip. IRI collaborated 
in this process, for it did not want to be saddled with 'lame 
ducks', and the common interests of public and private busi­
ness managers resulted in innovative policies such as the 
institution of GEPI a specialist industrial salvage body, 
distinct from the state-holding sector of the economy.
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Finally, the business sector moved to outflank the DC, moving 
towards negotiation and accommodation with the other parties, 
including the PCI. THis was backed by arrangements made with 
the trade unions for a 'productivist alliance1 against the 
parasitic 'assisted* sector close to Fanfani. By the mid- 
70s, the DC was being widely condemned as an anti-capitalist 
force hindering Italy*s modernisation.72
The eruption, in 1974, of an enormous scandal alleging 
the DC's receipt of massive funds from the public sector 
industries, which it controlled, forced the DC to reconsider 
its role in economic management. It also helped seal Fanfa­
ni 's fate. Already he had pushed the party's confrontation 
with Confindustria to the limit by trying to force the elec­
tion of his nominee as president of that organisation. 
Agnelli, the head of Fiat himself, had had to intervene to 
prevent this, his own nomination being ungainsayable. Never­
theless, Fanfani's power in the party was still such that 
only his defeat in the divorce referendum and in the 1975 
elections enabled the party to radically renew itself from 
1975/76.
In 1975, parliament established the Chiarelli commis­
sion with the aim of restructuring Italy's system of state 
participations73 and the DC moved increasingly towards accom­
modating business interests, covered both by trade union 
involvement in an economic environment increasingly marked by 
neo-corporatist tendencies, and the steady abandonment of 
anti-business attitudes by the PSI and PCI in the name of the 
'national interest'. By this time Italy was confronting both 
a major economic and a major political crisis and the DC
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shifted to asserting its authority through electoral confron­
tation and coalition bargaining, rather than the attempt to 
dominate the economy. Moro regained the upper hand in the 
party and Fanfani went into decline.
3. The unions throw off their subordination
The upsurge of labour unrest in 1969 was quite massive 
and had an impact far beyond the confines of the economic 
world. It was too powerful to be defeated by the business 
world or even by the government. Only time and the unions' 
inability to force governments to implement their programmes 
allowed government and business gradually to regain their 
initiative. The business class was itself divided, with 
those sectors which had supported the opening to the left 
blaming its opponents for what it saw as the consequences of 
the failure of the Centre-Left. The DC was divided, as we 
have seen, with the left fearing that it would lose its 
support in the union and catholic working world. The move of 
CISL and ACLI away from the DC, particularly the loss of the 
latter, was a personal blow to Fanfani, as was the youth 
movement's rejection of him,74 and this encouraged his rejec­
tion of his leftist past for more straight-forward authori­
tarian positions.
Since a Gaullist solution meant abandoning the party's 
centrist tradition, Fanfani's alternative found little back­
ing. The unions could hardly have chosen a better moment to 
strike. For almost four years the party vacillated, provok­
ing left and right as it sought to maintain its centrist 
position. On the one hand Donat Cattin, left-DC scourge of 
the party's conservatism in the 1960s, was made Labour Minis­
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ter and backed worker demands for wage increases, whilst 
supporting the passage of the Workers* Statute in 1970. On 
the other, the emergence of right-wing terrorism associated 
with the state, Fanfani*s authoritarian posturing and the 
return to coalition with the PLI instead of the PSI all 
outraged the left.
Unlike the economic down-swing of 1964, that of 1970 
could not be continued to the point of breaking the unions' 
resolve, for it would have destroyed the economy in the 
process. Rather, from 1969-73 a counter-cyclical easy credit 
policy was pursued, backed by the public and private oligopo­
lies, which promoted investment in southern Italy, away from 
the union hot-spots, and a massive new industrialisation of 
the southern economy took place - virtually the only union 
demand that was realised, and even then in capital intensive 
forms which they had not sought.
As the unions became more involved in processes of 
political bargaining, trends towards neo-corporatist interest 
mediation developed, though these were rendered all but 
impossible by the high stakes for the DC and the PCI and 
by the opposition of the grass-roots to the accommodations of 
the elites. It was not until the later '70s that the argu­
ment of the unions' and left party elites about the need for 
collaboration in the national interest began to be appreciat­
ed. By then, the unions were already losing their initia­
tive, and from 1980 the resurgence of business confidence was 
such that the unions were left seeking neo-corporatist 
‘political exchange' from a position of relative weakness.75 
Nevertheless, the unions were in no way as weak as they had
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been in the 1950s, and in the 1980s the recognition of the 
interdependence of labour, business and government became 
widespread. Fanfani*s attempt to achieve a 'corporatism 
within one party* were finally realised to be self-defeating, 
and as the 1990s opened the possibility of a grand coalition 
able to establish a new, genuinely national, political econo­
my was being canvassed.
IV CENTRISM AND CHRISTIAN DEMOCRAT POLITICAL ECONOMY
From the late 1940s through the 1950s the Christian 
Democratic Party, with its coalition allies, combined a 
policy of innovative economic management with an astute 
handling of party political interaction to generate a politi­
cal economy which was in the national interest. The policies 
of the centre block were a positive synthesis of contradic­
tory political forces. By the late 1960s and 1970s, the 
economic policies of the centre-block were less a positive 
synthesis and more of a negative one: an immobilist attempt 
to preserve the structure of the party system and to block 
alternatives which sought to establish either a centre-left 
or a centre-right economic policy, with the politics to 
match.
The shift that took place was one between genuinely 
centrist government, and 'non-government* by the centrist 
block. The centre block was no longer able to synthesise a 
national political economy. But this this non-government 
coincided with a state in many respects strong. It was 
strong economically, able to influence and directly control
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massive industrial and infrastructural investment? it was 
strong politically, able to survive both terrorist challenge 
and profound economic crisis? and it was strong socio-cultur- 
ally to the extent that consumer capitalism and welfare 
interventionism were dominant values, despite significant 
challenges.
At a high level of generalisation, the post-war 'social 
democratic1 consensus common to Western Europe76 can be seen 
as having prevailed in Italy too, thanks to the developments 
of the 1950s. Thus, a multi-party centrist regime based on a 
neo-social capitalism was built in Italy. But there are 
differences between national social democracies. By compari­
son to many West European countries the industrial working 
class in Italy was largely excluded from direct participation 
in policy-making, leading Miriam Golden to talk of Italy as 
having a regime of 'labour exclusion1.77 Moreover, the 
importance of both the small-scale industrial sector and the 
state oligopoly sectors was unusual, so that given the promi­
nence of the DC in all these areas Italy's post-war 'social 
democratic1 regime should be considered as having clear 
distinguishing features.
Golden uses the expression 'labour exclusion’ within a 
context of comparing policy-making in liberal democracies, 
and it is clear that the term 'exclusion' is relative. One 
leading Italian Socialist, Gino Giugni, the principle author 
of the 1970 Workers' Statute, has gone so far as to argue 
that the Republic has never had an anti-working class govern­
ment.78 This is surely somewhat of an exaggeration, though 
it meshes with David Hine's observation that a straight­
254
forward centre-right political formula has never been other 
than marginally operant in Italy.
Given differences in national approaches and the fact 
that centre-left and centre-right governments may be consid­
ered as providing slightly different political economic 
packages it is worth considering that several different, 
broadly centrist, political economies can and have existed in 
Western Europe. Italy has avoided political alternation and 
sharp changes in policy packages, often simultaneously run­
ning policies which might be considered contradictory,79 but 
overall it has had a governing elite based on a regime of 
'subordinate labour inclusion1. Logically, it should there­
fore be considered as having been 'centre-right1. However, 
under De Gasperi, and under Fanfani in the 1950s, this regime 
was politically and economically progressive. There is no 
reason why centre-right governments should not be progres­
sive. From the 1960s, however, the centre-right political 
economy was increasingly conservative, for it blocked more 
progressive alternatives which had they developed might have 
been labelled centre-left or centre-right.
Of course, from the early 1970s, Italy was facing the 
same crisis of readjustment to new world economic conditions 
as everyone else, so that the peculiarities of the Italian 
economy, by comparison with other large advanced industrial 
economies seemed less marked. Moreover, by the end of the 
decade these conditions, combining with developments in the 
party system, brought about a mass recognition that Italian 
political parties, of whatever political 'block', had a 
common interest in working to secure the economic well-being
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of the country. This did not mean they had to stop compet­
ing, far from it. By the 1970s it was clear that the 
negative aspects of the distinctive and constructive politi­
cal economy of the late 1940s to early '60s were growing in 
their significance. The irrationality of the policy-making 
system and the difficulty of implementing any policy deci­
sively no longer had any political justification. The fail­
ures were politico-cultural and politico-institutional, 
rather than economic. Rationalisation and reform of the 
economic policy-making system needed reform and rationalisa­
tion of the political system. The challenge of the PCI in 
the 1970s and of the PSI in the 1980s was a challenge to the 
DC to reform not only itself, but the political system and 
the policy-making apparatus of the state.
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PTER 6 THE DC REJECTION OF BIPOLARITY:
THE DEFEAT OF THE * HISTORIC COMPROMISE1
It was shown in Chapters Two to Four that the DC was 
able to identify itself as a centre party and to reinforce 
that identity by establishing itself as the key party of a 
centre block in a three-block system. Established in the 
period 1946-53, this system was consolidated in 1963 by the 
creation of the Centre-Left. We also saw, however, that the 
bulk of the opposition to the DC lay to the left, and that 
the political culture of the country tended to be left of the 
coalition formula. The asymmetric nature of the three-block 
system mattered.
In concluding Chapter Four an outline of development 
in the 1970s and '80s was presented which suggested that the 
1970s saw this asymmetry increase in such a way that a steady 
trend towards a two-block system was visible, a trend which 
inspired visions of a return to grand coalition. It is the 
intertwining of these tendencies which we examine in this 
chapter, and in particular the significance of the govern­
ments of national or democratic solidarity, which it is 
argued constituted a watershed in the development of the 
system and Italian political culture.
The present Chapter begins by looking briefly at the 
response of Enrico Berlinguer, the PCI leader, to the devel­
opment of a two-block, or bipolar, dynamic focusing on the 
PCI as the core of an alternative governing coalition. It 
then concentrates on the Christian Democratic Party and its 
attempts to grapple with changes in the catholic world and in
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society at large. It looks particularly at the strategies of 
Aldo Moro and Giulio Andreotti, both aimed at maintaining the 
centrist orientation of the party, and of Amintore Fanfani, 
now oriented towards establishing a two-block system and 
prepared to abandon the centrist strategy. It then considers 
the problem of party 'legitimacy1 and the problems experi­
enced by the DC, before examining the confrontation between 
the PCI and DC and its contribution, in a context of econom­
ic crisis and a terrorist challenge to the state, to relegi- 
timising party competition and individual parties.
I THE REVITALISATION OF THE BIPOLAR DYNAMIC
AND THE COMMUNIST PARTY'S RESPONSE
The strategy of the Historic Compromise was presented in 
1973, in the aftermath of the anti-Allende coup in Chile, but 
it had deep, and Italian, roots. Most immediately, it was a 
response to the failure of the PSU to substitute itself as 
the left pole of attraction in the party system, demonstrated 
by the election results of 1968 election and the collapse of 
the party in to its original components in 1969. This fail­
ure coincided with an uprising of political and cultural 
ferment in society which challenged the ability of even the 
major parties to carry on dictating the terms of political 
development,1 and which seemed to be pushing both parties to 
the left. This was not an easy situation for the DC which 
had to cope with the rightist back-lash to these develop­
ments, and increasingly it looked as though the PCI would be 
propelled into government willy nilly.
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There were deeper, more historic roots to Berlinguer's 
speech too. Although its message of the need to work with 
the DC and to realise its aims on a consensual basis was 
dramatic and shocking - one only has to think how Labour 
supporters reacted to suggestions that they needed to form a 
coalition with David Owen in order to gain acceptability in 
the 1980s - it was not entirely novel either. Berlinguer 
placed his message in the context of Gramsci's and Togliat- 
ti's stress on alliances and winning moral leadership, and 
the whole idea had the important precedent of the CLN experi­
ence.
A. Italy was not Germany
The PCI elite was acutely aware of the difficulties 
that were involved in their coming to power. The smoothness 
of the transition to government by the SPD in Germany via the 
brief Grosse Koalition could not be repeated in Italy.A The 
expectations of the Italian left, and of its opponents, were 
much higher. Unlike the SPD, the PCI had had no Bad Godes- 
berg, ie no refounding Congress where Marxism had formally 
been abandoned. So Berlinguer spoke of Chile, and warned 
that the DC could not be suddenly ejected from power by a 
left obtaining marginally over 50 per cent of the seats in 
parliament. The shock of such a sudden transition would be
A. The CDU-CSU dominated West German government for the 
entire post-war period until 1966, without any sort of grand 
coalition such as occurred in Italy and elsewhere. In 1966 
it entered a grand coalition with the opposition Social 
Democrats, and in 1969 itself went into the opposition, 
leaving the Social Democrats the dominant force in govern­
ment.
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too great for the right and centre to bear. After all, 
previous ‘alternations' in power in Italy had been semi­
permanent in nature.
The dilemma for the PCI elite was that it could not 
gain the consent of key veto groups on its coming to power if 
it maintained its radical image, yet it could not simply 
abandon that image and disillusion its followers, especially 
given the disillusion with the Centre-Left and the expecta­
tions that precisely the PCI would deliver where the PSI had 
failed to. Somehow, the PCI had to live up to its promise of 
radical reform without itself being the detonator of a desta­
bilising counter-mobilisation. Evidence that an anti­
democratic back-lash was possible was horribly visible. In 
December 1969 a bomb attributed to the neo-fascist Right had 
exploded in a crowded bank in Milan, and this was widely seen 
as an attempt to promote popular anxieties, even fear, and to 
force the state into a more authoritarian style of govern­
ment, and between 1970 and 1972 increasingly numerous and 
violent clashes in the streets were accompanied by a resur­
gence of support for the MSI.
B. The PCI and ‘Centrifugation'
The difficulty of the position the PCI found itself in 
can be seen if we examine what happened to the PSI when it 
abandoned its oppositional role. On the face of it, the 
PSI's entry in to government had resulted in its being se­
verely punished. Half of the party's Deputies had broken 
away within a year to form a separate party (the PSIUP), and 
that party had been electorally confirmed in 1968 at the same
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time that the PCI's vote had continued to rise. The 'unam­
biguously' left vote had thus risen from 25.3% (PCI) in 1963 
to 31.3% (PCI and PSIUP) in 1968. By contrast, the vote for 
the centrist socialist parties had declined from 19.9% to 
14.5% in the same period. From a Sartorian perspective this 
was a situation of electoral (and parliamentary) centrifuga­
tion on the left.
But things were not so straight-forward. Perhaps half 
of the PSI's vote in 1963 was implicitly the PSIUP's, given 
the exit of those Deputies in 1964, so that the PSI's losses 
in 1968 were less than might have been expected. Perhaps it 
was the PSIUP Deputies who erred. Certainly they did not 
survive the 1972 election. Moreover, to go back in time, if 
the PSI's success in 1958, like the DC's, can be interpreted 
as an attempt by partisan electorates to prevent the looming 
DC/PSI coalition,2 the success of the PSI vote in 1963, by 
which time the decision to form the Centre-Left had been 
taken, indicates that by then the electorate had accepted the 
leadership that was being given them. The left electorate 
was to some extent centripetal too. After all, in 1968 
three-quarters of the PSI/PSDI electorate remained loyal to 
the PSU.
This counters the centrifugation thesis, but it still 
fails to grasp the entire complexity of the situation. The 
backing of the Centre-Left was not support for centrifuga­
tion, but it was support for the evolution of the centre to 
the left, and the reinforcing of the PCI (and continued 
support for the PSIUP in 1968) could indicate no more than 
the desire to continue reinforcing the gradual evolution of
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the centre to the left. In other words, an electoral en­
dorsement of a cautiously progressive trasformismo. The 
problem was that despite the tendency of the Socialist tradi­
tion to fragment, the post-war party system was based on 
disciplined parties, not individual notables, and eventually 
this pattern of moving to the left hit up against the PCI. 
It could not be consumed piece-meal, as the PSI was. This 
was the problem.
This argument of a preference amongst voters for a 
gradual, evolutionary shift to the left could be confirmed by 
looking at the PCI itself. In a sense, the PSIUP's rejection 
of the DC was a more extreme position than that of the PCI 
itself, and the PCI allowed that element within it that was 
equally intransigent towards the DC first to organise itself 
as a distinct sub-group, and then expelled it from the party. 
In the 1972 the groups to the left of the PCI fared as miser­
ably as the PSIUP, failing to gain parliamentary representa­
tion. A
It has too, to be said, that the PCI's inexorably 
rising vote over twenty years could not be assumed to derive 
from an ideologically intransigent position. On the con­
trary, the party had fought consistently to extricate itself 
from the ideological cul de sac in which it found itself 
after 1947-48, even if the road to be travelled was apparent­
ly never ending, given the impossibility of simply renouncing 
the Soviet link and the succession of events in the Communist
A. The PSIUP gained 1.9%, the Party of Proletarian Unity 
(PdUP) gained 0.7%, the Revolutionary Communist Party 0.3%.
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world. Thus Togliatti's break with the Soviet model in 1956 
was countered by the condemnation of the Hungarian uprising 
as counter-revolutionary, and neither the Yalta memorandum of 
1964 nor the condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia 
in 1968 ended the ambiguity of the PCI's status as a 'reform­
ist Communist' party. Still, even that ambiguity implied an 
openness to the centre that was absent in the French Commu­
nist Party, and this distinction was confirmed in the socio­
logical differences between the parties. The PCI was less a 
workers' party than the PCF, and more a party of workers and 
their families, and of the petty bourgeoisie,3 the votes of 
the latter being sought to consolidate the party's domination 
of important areas of local government, a domination trans­
lated into regional government responsibilities in 1970.
There was little reason, then, for the PCI to think 
that extremist positions vis a vis the DC would be rewarded, 
even if it was equally clear that conceding too much would 
also be deeply unpopular. Berlinguer's elaboration of the 
'Historic Compromise' was designed to update the strategy of 
seeking power on a realistic basis, avoiding destabilisation 
by combining electoral success with coalition strategy. In 
the wake of the 1975-76 'electoral earthquake', Berlinguer's 
reformulation of the party's understanding of its political 
strategy was concretised in the governments of 'national 
solidarity1. These were Christian Democratic monocolore 
governments operating in an environment of high crisis.
They were a disaster for the PCI, and ended the possi­
bility of the formation of a two-block system led by the 
Communists. The DC rejected the temptation to submit to a
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strategy of two-block confrontation, insisting on its cen­
trist orientation in order both to gain PCI support and, 
ultimately, to ensure that that party remained labelled a 
party of the extreme left, ineligible to govern.
II THE DC AT THE CENTRE OF THE STORM
In this Part of the chapter and the next we look at the DC, 
stressing the enormous pressures which were put on the party 
by the welling up of social and political frustrations. 
These pressures reflected different perceptions of the DC: as 
a 'regime party' bordering on illegitimacy, opposed by the 
left-DC and other governmental parties; as the core of a 
clerico-capitalist state, by traditional socialist maximal­
ists? as the core of 'party government', challenged by pan­
syndicalism and direct forms of democracy? and as a corrupt 
expression of catholic culture.
Moro's insistence on maintaining the link with the 
catholic world and using it to retain a centrist/reformist 
image for the party was particularly important in the face of 
these multiple attacks. It enabled the DC to avoid becoming 
a party of the right/centre-right and provided a reason for 
rejecting the alternative left - its Marxism. At all times, 
the centrality of the DC put it under great pressure. Far 
from being non-responsive to social change and upheaval the 
factional turmoil of these years, largely centring on cross­
party arrangements, indicates the intensity of the battle to 
retain the party's social and political predominance.
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A. Ferment in the Catholic World
The establishment of the Centre-Left had added a spe­
cifically politico-cultural contribution to already rising 
socioeconomic expectations fed by the economic miracle of the 
late 1950s, early 1960s. The effects of social change and 
the impact of Vatican II combined with the widening convic­
tion in the catholic world that the DC was a conservative 
hindrance to progress meant that the principle of catholic 
unity was fundamentally challenged in the late 1960s.
At the Xth Party Congress in 19 67, Donat Cattin, the 
leader of the trade union left had been forced by the pres­
sure from ACLI and CISL to speak of the need for a credible 
reformist catholic party to compete with the lay left, and in 
1968 Donat Cattin called for a second catholic party to be 
formed before the prospective 1973 election. The remorseless 
decline of the Dutch Catholic People*s Party from a steady 
post-war 31% (average 1946-63) to 27% in 1967, 23.3% in 1971 
and 18.0% in 1972 provided a remarkable contemporary spur to 
action.4 Somehow the DC had to retain its interclassist and 
catholic base, to reconcile its conservative interests with 
the desire for change and the urgent need for collective 
social, especially urban, reform.
The 1968 election had seen the immediate threat of the 
PSU beaten off, but it had also revealed the fact that the DC 
could not advance to the left at those parties* expense. Its 
location on the centre-right was clear. As we shall see 
below, the continuing temptation to try and turn the party 
into a centre-left one was weak. The only real options were 
between accepting the two-block logic in which the DC was the
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party of the centre-right, and continuing to assert the 
three-block logic.
In late 1968 the DC was confronted by the threat of 
internal schism and secession, the unreliability of its major 
coalition ally, the PSU which was clearly drawn towards the 
left, and by a tendency to confrontation with the PCI. In 
the period 1969-75 a number of attempts were made, led prin­
cipally by Fanfani, to confront the PCI head-on in a way 
which would probably have confirmed the two-block structuring 
of the party system. For a variety of reasons these attempts 
were defeated, and Moro maintained the party*s centrist 
character and outfaced the PCI.
B. Moro * s * Left Switch'
The first effect of the 1968 election, however, was to 
undermine Moro1s position. The PSU leaders vetoed further 
participation in his government and the DC's oligarchic 
leadership took the opportunity to reassert itself. Although 
preferences for arrangements with the Communists or with the 
right existed, the only realistic coalition was with the PSU 
and competition within the DC was largely about who could and 
would arrange this, and with what aims.
After twenty years of political and economic management 
many Christian Democrats now had a technocratic vision of 
government and an assumption that further economic success 
was the key to regaining popular consent. In this they were 
not unlike politicians in many West European countries, not 
least Britain, where 'politics' as a national and cultural 
phenomenon was largely avoided in the 1950s and '60s5 as a
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constituent part, and reflection, of the assumed 'end of 
ideology*. The Dorotei with their clientelist and manageri­
al-manipulative roots were particularly vulnerable to the 
danger of underestimating the significance of cultural change 
and it was Moro*s long-felt concern for these matters which 
distinguished him from the other notables.
Moro resigned the premiership and moved rather sharply 
to the left, voicing his appreciation for the idealism of 
modern youth and criticising his party*s loss of contact with 
the changing reality of society and its demands. Moro feared 
the myopic and self-interested manoeuvrings of his colleagues 
both for the effects it could have on the party, and for the 
effect the collapse of the DC would have on Italian democra­
cy.6 Whilst Moro manoeuvred to gain the backing of the left, 
attempts to rebuild the Centre-Left struggled on.
A series of weak governments faced the storm of protest 
which swept Italy between 1968-70, making major concessions 
to trade-union demands. The first post-election government 
was a care-taker government, led by Giovanni Leone. Already 
in 1963 he had presided over such a government, waiting for 
the Centre-Left to be formalised. It was a government with­
out authority. The government that followed was little 
better. The Leone government had been tolerated as a result 
of an agreement between Mariano Rumor, the head of the Doro­
tei and De Martino, the Socialist who was expected to gain 
the leadership of the PSU at its Congress. In fact De Marti­
no was not recognised as leader and Rumor*s post-Leone gov­
ernment had to include all the PSU faction leaders. These 
were deeply divided amongst themselves, both by considera­
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tions of ideology and long-term strategy, and also by immedi­
ate personal and organisational considerations - the PSDI 
leaders, traditionally pro-DC had more or less swept the 
board once the return to government with the DC was agreed 
upon, and the PSI leaders were not at all happy.
Dissatisfaction within the DC was also manifest. When 
Rumor resigned as secretary to take up the premiership, in 
accordance with the DC*s practice of avoiding the concentra­
tion of leadership power, the Dorotei's number two, Flaminio 
Piccoli, was elected secretary. However, Piccoli gained only 
85 votes compared to 87 blank votes from a divided opposi­
tion. Dissidents on the centre and right were not willing to 
work with the ‘left*, and the left, at the X^*1 Congress 
(1967), had mustered only 24 per cent of the vote. Even with 
the support of Paolo Emilio Taviani's mediating group they 
could only muster 36 per cent.
In February 1969, Moro made a key speech launching a 
'strategy of attention* towards the PCI, a move which allowed 
him to present himself as a leader for the left even whilst 
remaining essentially tolerable to the Dorotei, which the 
left*s own leaders were not. Neither the la base component 
of the left, which sought to involve the PCI in institutional 
reform nor the trade union Forze sociali wanted to move the 
DC into a governing relationship with the PCI. The trade 
unionists, as we have seen, were extremely hostile to the 
PCI. Their position was one of recognising the validity of 
the workers struggle, of promoting trade union rights. 
Neither was Moro, as yet, contemplating a closer relationship 
with the PCI,7 and Andreotti belittled Moro*s 'shift to the
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left1 as indicating neither a personal change of temperament 
nor anything new as far as the DC was concerned.8
Nevertheless, the move was significant, for Moro's 
intellectual authority, his status as a notable in his own 
right, and his profound religiosity, allowed him to unite the 
left of the party and the Dorotei. He provided a very effec­
tive basis for recuperating catholic dissent9 and for main­
taining the party's solid material links with society: the
left had gained a champion, whilst the notables were happy 
that the left would be subordinated to one of their kind. 
Thus, for example, the proposal by Ciriaco De Mita, a la base 
leader, that the constitutional pact with the PCI of 1946-47 
ought to be reestablished was contained within Moro's push to 
regain the party leadership.
At the XI^*1 Congress in June/July 1969 Moro's position 
remained minoritarian, but he now had the backing of 43% of 
the party. According to Provasi, this Congress saw the party 
divided between a labourite/reformist wing and a technocrat­
ic, managerial conservative party.10 Although the presence 
of the trade unions and the lingering influence of Dossetti 
provided an entree into the party for the workerist ideas of 
the late '60s, it was now clear to the bulk of the party that 
the hope, championed by Fanfani in the 1950s, of displacing 
the PSI & occupying more firmly a centre/centre-left position 
was vain. The choice was between centrism and conservatism, 
and Fanfani now tended to the latter.
C. Fanfani's Ambitions
The Dorotei's continuing domination of the party was
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now dependent on Fanfani for its majority, and Fanfani used 
this leverage to try and gain his party's backing as the 
official presidential candidate, Saragat's presidency being 
due to end in 1971. He sought to augment the presidential 
aspect of Italian democracy as a way out of the crisis which 
focused on the fragmentation of the party system, and to this 
end could expect the support of conservatives. Perhaps he 
also hoped for the backing of the PCI, as he had done in 
1962, encouraged by Gronchi's election in 1955. Fanfani's 
supposed appeal to the PCI was that Moro looked a likely 
figure to unite the DC vote, and a strong relaunch of the 
Centre-Left encouraged by him was likely to benefit the PSI, 
confirming the PCI's marginalisation. In the event, his 
moves to gain conservative support lost him any chance of 
Communist sympathy.
In September 1969 Fanfani saw his protege, Armando 
Forlani acquire the party secretaryship in a generational 
coup which overthrew Piccoli. Meanwhile, Mariano Rumor had 
found himself deprived of the PSU's support by its re-divi- 
sion, and the DC had to choose between the PSI and the PSDI. 
The new DC leadership arrangement backed the PSI, but now the 
attempt to make this a permanent arrangement, excluding the 
PCI and able to provide solid and enduring government was 
made clear. The so-called preambolo Forlani sought to tie 
the Socialists to the Christian Democrats by vetoing continu­
ing PCI/PSI arrangements at the local level, particularly in 
view of the forthcoming first round of regional elections.11
At the same time that the party was seeking to tie the 
PSI to it, Fanfani was trying to reinforce his position on a
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mixture of institutional and charismatic bases. The year 
1970 saw three governments, and in the spring crisis Fanfani 
attempted to establish a 'directory1 of the four centrist 
party secretaries as the core of a new government. This idea 
was not accepted for not only did it exclude the PSI but it 
followed talk, in the winter of 1969-70, of early elections 
and a return to law and order government based on the return 
of the Liberals. These ideas were associated with the gath­
ering right-wing backlash to the Hot Autumn and were addi­
tionally coloured by the dramatic new appearance of right- 
wing terrorism signalled by the Piazza Fontana bombing. 
Although it was Mauro Ferro, a Socialist who now shifted to 
the newly independent PSDI who had proposed the return of the 
Liberals and a law and order government,12 Fanfani was seen 
as moving in the same direction, and with the PSDI at this 
time emphatically more right-wing than the DC itself13 any 
hypothesised exclusion of the PSI was a serious matter.14
This was a difficult period. Not only was the DC under 
pressure from the Vatican not to favour the PSI because of 
its proposals for divorce legislation, but the Socialists 
themselves were as determined not to be resubordinated to the 
DC as the DC was to secure a stable relationship with the 
PSI. To this end they posed as both a serious government 
party and an oppositional party seeking a 'more advanced 
equilibrium1, ie one which advanced the position of the PCI. 
It was this the anti-Socialists opposed so strongly.15
The Centre-Left was clearly a difficult alliance to 
maintain, but Fanfani's abandonment of centrism as a party 
strategy seemed to point to an abandonment of centrism as a
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political strategy too. The party was not ready to follow 
Fanfani on either account. Andreotti now stepped forward to 
offer the possibility of maintaining the party's centrist 
strategy, but without the PSI.
D. Andreotti: Conservative Centrism
In the summer of 1970, when Rumor's third government 
fell, Andreotti attempted to form a government which would 
survive by the good-will of the PCI. Andreotti was not 
identified with the Left at all, but with the Vatican right 
and various forms of often unsavoury business interests, but 
as leader of the DC in the Chamber of Deputies his contacts 
with PCI parliamentarians was close. Fanfani rallied the 
DC's centre and right to block Andreotti, but it was his 
close ally, Emilio Colombo who formed the next government. 
Colombo attempted to mediate with the unions, and via them, 
the PCI,16 but he could not adopt neo-corporatist positions, 
even if the opportunity was supposedly there,17 both because 
he himself was backed by business interests seeking protec­
tion from labour militancy, not more concessions to it, and 
because his party was not willing to play second fiddle to 
the CGIL and PCI. Meanwhile, however, Andreotti was over­
seeing a series of major reforms of parliamentary procedure 
which confirmed the importance of the PCI and that institu­
tions growing political centrality.18
At the same time, the party elected Giovanni Leone as 
president, rejecting Fanfani and Moro alike, both of whom 
seemed in odour of PCI support,19 if for different reasons, a 
move which 'balanced' Andreotti and Colombo's cautiously
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institutional and technocratic approaches towards the PCI. 
This balanced approach was reflected in Forlani*s watchword 
for the electoral campaign - 'centrality*. The election had 
been brought forward a year to 1972 by the need to preempt 
the divorce election in order to maintain PSI support, and 
circumstances made Forlani*s approach a judicious choice. It 
was fully in keeping with the DC*s traditional image as a 
centre party, but more specifically relevant was the fact 
that the right block had been reorganised under the leader­
ship of Giorgio Almirante so that once again, and in fact for 
the last time, something like a three-block system really did 
exist.
In the local and regional elections of 1970-71 the MSI 
vote rose to 16.2% in Rome, where of course its visibility 
was at a maximum, and in Sicily it gained 16.3% of the vote. 
The party did well in small communes in particular, and there 
was talk of the party gaining 12% of the vote in the national 
election. As it turned out, Almirante*s newly inspired 
party gained almost nine per cent of the vote.A The DC's 
vote stayed rock-steady, at least in aggregate, contrary to 
the predictions of opinion polls and commentators who saw the 
DC as awfully exposed on two flanks.20 The revitalised 
'tripolar' situation in which "The DC, the PCI and DN [MSI] 
were the major protagonists"21 had, as per Sartori's model, 
done wonders for the party.
In order to bring about the early election Emilio 
Colombo had resigned, and Giulio Andreotti had formed the
A. Actually 8.7%, whilst the PLI, still excluded from gov­
ernment, as it had been since 1957, gained 3.9%.
279
care-taker government which administered the country during 
the ensuing election. This government, like two others 
before it, never gained a vote of confidence,A but in the 
aftermath of the election Andreotti formed a government with 
the PLI and PSDI which did gain a vote of confidence. Andre­
otti *s aim was to confirm the DC as the centre linch-pin of 
the party system, able to form coalitions to left or right as 
the occasion required. Whereas Forlani had abandoned the 
party centrist strategy, Andreotti sought to confirm it, but 
he risked pushing the PSI back into the arms of the PCI and 
so creating a two-block system. Moreover, the importance of 
the PCI was now such that a centrist political strategy 
increasingly seemed to indicate the need not to exclude the 
PCI whereas Andreotti's formula, which would embrace alter­
nately the PLI or the PSI, excluded, as though equal, the MSI 
and PCI.
By 1973 both the DC and US political intelligence were 
convinced that Moro's strategy of attention towards the PCI 
was more realistic than Fanfani's confrontational approach.22 
In any case, the DC was not a party which could be trans­
formed into an authoritarian centre-right party, whilst the 
PSI was now willing to resume its coalition relationship with 
the DC. Both Moro and Fanfani opposed the right-leaning 
approach of Andreotti and they now jointly engineered a coup 
against him, however different their understandings of their
A. The others were De Gasperi-8, July 1953, which was re­
placed by Einaudi's nominee Giuseppe Pella, and Fanfani-1 
which followed Pella's. Similar governments were formed by 
Andreotti (again) in 1979, to precede that year's election, 
and by Fanfani in 1987 for similar reasons.
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own party*s relationship with the PSI remained. Whilst 
Fanfani emphasised the party aspect of the centrist strategy, 
so that the PSI* s position had once again been successfully 
undermined by extra-democratic political forces, as in 1964, 
Moro was more concerned that the coalition with the PSI was 
an essential part of a centrist political strategy enlarging 
the area of democracy. The two strategies, or emphases, were 
not necessarily contradictory, though the tension between the 
them was intense. In June 1973 Andreotti's experiment of 
governing with Malagodi was liquidated by the XIII^*1 Party 
Congress and Mariano Rumor once more came to head a Centre- 
Left government.
E. Fanfani1s Last Chance
The relaunch of the Centre-Left was ignominious and 
provided Fanfani with a final opportunity to establish a more 
authoritative role for himself and his party. Weak in its 
handling of civil order and of the economy, Rumor's name and 
the political formula associated with it were once again 
associated with vaccilation and indecisiveness. The key 
moment in deciding Fanfani to relaunch his campaign against 
the PCI probably came when Berlinguer made his Historic 
Compromise speech, with Fanfani interpreting it as a sign of 
weakness to be taken advantage of.23 The caution of the PCI 
and of the government allowed Fanfani's ambition to regain 
the upper hand over Moro's strategic vision, and he re­
launched his confrontational approach, now a full-fledged 
strategy of bipolarisation, DC versus PCI. His tool was the 
divorce referendum campaign.
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The referendum idea originated with Fanfani in 197 0 
when he was trying to form a government. A key issue sepa­
rating the DC from the PSI and the lay parties had been the 
proposed divorce legislation, and Fanfani persuaded the 
Vatican to accept the legislation in return for a promise to 
effect legislation creating the possibility of an abrogative 
referendum. The referendum, like the 'ordinary' regions, 
was one of the institutions foreseen in the constitution but 
only now realised. A lay movement championing the repeal of 
the divorce legislation had sprung up, and a referendum had 
been due in 1972, but that had been avoided by calling an 
early election - the first one in the history of the Repub­
lic. Now Fanfani put himself at the head of the continuing 
campaign, revitalising it.
There is no doubt that neither the PCI nor the Catholic 
Church were united in their attitudes to this referendum, and 
there is evidence to suggest that both wanted to avoid a 
bruising confrontation which both feared they might lose.24 
The Church campaign had, therefore, lacked decisive support 
until Fanfani saw that it presented him with an opportunity, 
and on the opposite side it was the Radical Party which made 
the running, forcing the PCI to mobilise. The cautious moves 
of Moro and the left, and of Berlinguer, towards some sort of 
accommodation were thus pushed to one side.
Fanfani's reelection as secretary had amounted to an 
acceptance of the need for an authoritative figure to lead 
the party in a difficult period and this, together with his 
characteristic dynamism and historic political standing was 
sufficient to overcame doubts in the Vatican and the party as
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to the wisdom of his strategy. At least, no one tried to 
stop him. But in practice, Vatican support was not forthcom­
ing, the Vatican leaving the matter to the Italian episco­
pate, which itself proved to be divided and uninspiring. 
Party support was equally lacklustre. In the aftermath of 
the defeat, Fanfani was not slow to attack the Church for 
having failed to adequately support him, but it was evident 
that neither the DC as a whole nor the Church were inspired 
by Fanfani*s resumption of integralist ways of thinking.
For the DC, Fanfani*s last attempt to create a catholic 
front and reconquer Italian society led it to be identified 
with the MSI, the only other party to back the yes vote in 
the referendum. This was worse than the ambiguities of 
Andreotti's right-leaning centrism. Nevertheless, Fanfani 
was not immediately removed from his position, for the obvi­
ous alternative was Moro, which seemed, perhaps unreasonably, 
to be leaping from one extreme to the other. Fanfani was 
thus able to keep the initiative, and in the Winter of 1974- 
75 the confrontationist front between Fanfani and the PSDI, 
first seen in 1969-70, reappeared. The PSDI forced Rumor to 
resign, denouncing the PSI as unfit to govern. Again, a 
crude attempt to subordinate the Socialists was visible, and 
perhaps another attempt to force early elections, but again 
this manoeuvre failed, and Moro established a government with 
the Republicans.
What finally brought Fanfani down was his running of 
the 1975 regional elections campaign. At the meeting of the 
party*s National Council in January 1975 he gained a ban on 
any form of negotiation between the DC and the PCI, promoting
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a head-on confrontation. In the same period the leqqe Reale 
anti-terrorist law was passed, the terrorist threat having 
reached new heights, a fact not unconnected with Fanfani's 
plans for many commentators; and in February the DC's youth 
wing was disbanded for its positive attitude to the left.
The regional elections took place in a tense atmos­
phere of left and right terrorism and with Fanfani using the 
example of the Portuguese revolution to attack the Italian 
Communist Party. Fanfani*s confrontational strategy was at 
full tilt. The massive advance of the PCI assured Fanfani's 
rapid removal from the party secretaryship. It was as much 
the DC of Fanfani, as the PCI of Berlinguer, which was seen 
as a danger to democracy (see next section).
Fanfani was forced out at a meeting of the National 
Council, but the choice of substitute was not easy. The 
Dorotei were still not willing to accept Moro's alternative 
approach. They knew that their political and electoral base 
was deeply hostile to the idea of coming to terms with the 
PCI; the developing openness towards the PCI was essentially 
an elite matter.25 The Dorotei thus sought to get Flaminio 
Piccoli reelected as political secretary, preferring to 
concentrate narrowly on their own party's management of the 
state and the electorate. Maintaining the intra-party, 
intra-block game, as Moro was seeking to do, was becoming too 
difficult.
This insularism of the Dorotei was perhaps their most 
damaging contribution to the party, and it naturally tended 
to support the strategy of two-block confrontation if it was 
felt that there was a choice. It was the ability and will­
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ingness to play the inter-block game which distinguished 
leaders like Fanfani, Forlani, Andreotti and Moro. Now, in 
1975, the party had to choose again. The Dorotei remained 
cautious, the left strong enough to block Piccoli, but not to 
impose their own candidate. The compromise effected was the 
election of Benigno Zaccagnini, an 'institutional* solution 
in that 'Zac* was the President of the National Council.
F. The Problem of DC Legitimacy
A major problem of Fanfani*s political style, and of 
the Dorotei*s mode of governing, was that they heightened the 
problem of the DC*s 'illegitimacy*. It is perhaps wrong to 
talk of the legitimacy of individual parties in a multi-party 
democracy, since it is the functioning of the whole which is 
the important point. One of the major criticism*s of Sarto- 
ri*s model is its insistence on the illegitimacy of the PCI 
and MSI (and PSI for a considerable period). A key feature 
of Moro's strategy was that part of the point of the 'strate­
gy of attention' vis a vis the PCI was to force the DC to 
compete on an electorally competitive programmatic and 
ethical level, rather than rely on state resources.
That the DC too had a legitimacy problem was recognised 
by the left DC early on. As early as 1965 Leopoldo Elia de 
scribed the political situation in Italy as one where the DC 
had acquired state power as an "occupying, but not legiti­
mate" force. Elia was a constitutional lawyer who later 
became President of the Supreme Court (1981-85) and whose 
political associations were securely with the DC left, first 
with the Dossettiani, as an advisor to Moro after 1969, and
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to De Mita in the 1980's. According to Ruggiero Orfei, a 
historian of the DC, De Gasperi himself had recognised the 
fact that the DC's occupation of power was based on its 
anti-communism and the guarantees it provided the Church, but 
that in times of social tension neither the government nor 
the catholic world were adequate to maintain social order. 
That needed the backing of the PCI.26
The problem of party legitimacy was confirmed by Giu­
seppe Di Palma. He argued that the problem of the DC was 
less an inheritance of illegitimacy deriving from having 
substituted itself for Fascism than the 'inheritance of the 
inheritance' ie the delegitimation that occurred in the 
aligning election of 1948. This problem affected both major 
parties: they had mutually delegitimised each other.27
On the bases of these analyses, government in Italy can 
be described as an asymmetrical dyarchy, with the DC dominat­
ing the cabinet and para-state and the PCI involved in the 
country's governance at the local level and at the 'invisi­
ble' national level, and ensuring the opposition's substan­
tive loyalty. It was precisely the growing illegitimacy of 
the DC in the 1960s, deriving from its increasingly corrupt 
and questionable occupation of power, that provoked Elia's 
analysis.28 The failure of the Centre-Left to challenge this 
then provoked the tendency to look to the PCI for a solution. 
Since it too had a legitimacy problem, the crisis of the 
Centre-Left presented a massive problem, and it was above all 
Enrico Berlinguer and Aldo Moro who recognised this difficul­
ty. The Historic Compromise and the governments of national 
solidarity saw the crisis of the system of polity management
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based on the visible mutual hostility and covert accommoda­
tion of the two principal parties in the party system.
Ill POLITICAL CONFRONTATION AND POLITICAL LEGITIMACY
The electoral advance of the PCI in 1975 and 1976 
created a situation where the DC had to make an open politi­
cal arrangement with that party. This was the climax of a 
long-term, if not uninterrupted, trend towards a confronta­
tion between the two parties. The surprising result, in 
which both the unconventional politics of the Radicals and 
the appalling violence of the left played major roles in 
addition to those played by Moro and Berlinguer, was the 
considerable relegitimation of party government.
The DC also found a new legitimation, not least from 
the PCI? whilst the PCI's defence of the Republic, capitalist 
and bourgeois though it was, triggered a profound internal 
crisis in the Red sub-culture level which eventually brought 
its elites and masses together on a new, 'post-communist' 
basis, signalling the new legitimation of that party too. 
The crisis of the PCI lasted the entire decade of the 1980s, 
and saw the challenge to the DC shift radically to the PSI. 
But that is the subject of Chapter Seven. This Chapter 
considers the conflicting party and political centrist 
strategies behind the work of Aldo Moro? the 'Refoundation1 
of the DC and the confrontation with the PCI? and, finally, 
the relegitimation of party government and the collapse of 
the bipolar process that made the PCI the vehicle for estab­
lishing a two-block system able to put the DC into the oppo­
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sition.
A. Morels Strategic Aims
Following the shock advance of the PCI in the 1975 
regional elections,^ Moro made a major speech at the party's 
National Council meeting. He warned that 'the future is no 
longer in our hands', arguing that a 'third phase' had begun, 
subsequent to Centrism and the Centre-Left. Undoubtedly Moro 
was seeking to sensitise the party to the need to reform 
itself and to accept the challenge presented by the PCI. 
Large sections of the party, notably la base, had never 
thought that the future lay solely in the DC's hands and had 
consistently sought to enlarge the area of democracy. This 
had been a difficult task when it had referred to the PSI, 
now that it apparently meant embracing the PCI too the prob­
lem was infinitely greater.
The assassination of Moro in 1978 by the Red Brigades 
and the subsequent demise of the national solidarity formula, 
of which Moro had been the linchpin, has given rise to much 
debate about Moro's intentions. As with the debates about 
the intentions of Gronchi and Tambroni, Segni and De Lorenzo, 
the enterprise easily leads in the wrong direction. The 
situation was one that demanded flexibility, and Moro himself 
probably saw the precise outcome of the game as essentially 
undetermined. A key reason for such openness on Moro's part
A. The PCI moved into the governing counicil's of Piedmont, 
Liguria and the Marches, as well as confirming its hold of 
Tuscany, Umbria and Emilia-Romagna acquired in the first 
regional elections of 1970. It also captured most of Italy's 
city (communal) administrations.
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is the ambiguity of the relationship between the centrist 
party strategy, focusing on maintaining the DC's domination 
of a centre block, and the centrist political strategy, 
focusing on the encouragement of a fully relational centrism 
where no party appropriated the centre. The major interpre­
tations of Moro's intentions can be reviewed in terms of the 
emphasis placed on each during the Historic Compromise.
For Baget Bozzo, Moro's aim was to defeat the PCI by 
rebuilding and strengthening the DC on the basis of the 
confrontation with the Communists. This confrontation would 
force the DC to compete on a new moral and programmatic 
basis, and the cultural and popular grounds for this lay in 
the post-Conciliar (Vatican II) catholic world. This would 
allow the DC to continue to dominate - the PCI, like the PSI, 
would be subordinated to the DC - but in everyone's inter­
ests, or in the general interest a least.29
In this interpretation, Moro is seen as intending to 
maintain the unity of the centrist party strategy and the 
centrist political strategy, believing that the new DC's 
party centrism, being based in competitive and collaborative 
intercourse with the PCI, would be accepted as constructive 
and progressive, ie politically centrist. The problem arose 
in that Moro, as both a loyal Christian Democrat and a man 
committed to high ideals could not see that progress, for the 
political class as a whole, might be greater if the DC were 
defeated and went on to successfully aggregate a loyal oppo­
sition. 'Ultimately' then, Moro was a conservative, and in 
fact Baget Bozzo moved to support the Socialists from 1980.
For Geoffrey Pridham, too, Moro's strategy in the 1960s
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and f70s ‘revolved around the retention of the DC's power 
position', but he would hardly have been as successful a 
party politician as he undoubtedly was had this not been to 
the fore. The question is, how much did the fact that Moro 
was also finely attuned to the problem of ‘system mainte­
nance' lead him to an openness regarding the significance of 
the relationship with the PCI, despite the fact that the 
‘evidence suggests that at heart he maintained strong reser­
vations about a formal coalition with the PCI.', particularly 
given that ‘Of DC leaders Moro was, perhaps, the most strate­
gically aware of social consensus and stability' as political 
aims and requirements?30
For many, Moro's awareness of the needs of the demo­
cratic system, and his vision of a ‘completed democracy', 
meant precisely the full legitimation of the PCI through full 
cabinet coalition, leading to alternation.31 In such a case, 
Moro would clearly have been prioritising the centrist polit­
ical strategy and initiating a sharp break in party strategy, 
for the latter would now have become that of preparing to 
aggregate a right/centre-right loyal opposition - a far cry 
from governing the country from a progressive, centre- 
moving-left position. As a democrat, Moro could accept such 
an outcome if it happened, but not a priori. His position 
was flexible, but not self-negating. ‘Constructive opposi­
tion', whether openly or merely tacitly given, was a good 
enough role for the PCI but not for the DC. Indeed, for a 
convinced left catholic, the PCI's willingness to fulfil this 
role was probably both its ‘saving grace' and all that was 
conceivably permissible, and Moro expected the PCI to share
290
this interpretation of its role. It was a view which assert­
ed the importance of the PCI as a political force which gave 
the country leadership, participated in determining its 
future, but which also stressed the difficulty of the PCI 
becoming the predominant political force: Italy was a ‘diffi­
cult democracy* where alternation was more or less impossi­
ble.32
Moro updated Elia*s thesis according to which the 
problem was the illegitimacy of both the opposition and the 
governing party. Moro sought to raise the standing of both, 
but primarily the former, in a strategy which fused political 
and party centrism by seeking to consolidate the Christian 
Democratic and Communist Party ‘asymmetric dyarchy*. Devel­
opment of the Historic Compromise in the direction sought by 
the PCI, however, was to be avoided, for it was both objec­
tively difficult and involved inflicting a defeat on the DC, 
reversing the asymmetry.
B. Refoundation and Confrontation
For Moro it was possible to work towards defeating the 
PCI, whilst using its creative force, through two processes. 
On the one hand, the antagonistic-competitive aspect of the 
relationship between the two parties could be used to force 
an internal renewal of the DC? on the other, moving the PCI 
into giving the DC openly acknowledged support would enable 
the DC to govern. This took the PCI a step further than the 
‘constructive opposition* which Togliatti had offered the 
opening to the left, but nevertheless left it in the opposi­
tion. This confirmed the PCI*s legitimacy for some, perhaps
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even extended it, but was far from guaranteeing it.
The first, the internal transformation of the DC, was 
initiated by the election of Zaccagnini as party political 
secretary in 1975. This choice was popular in the catholic 
world where Zaccagnini was known as ‘honest Zac1, and did 
much to fire enthusiasm in support of an internal renewal of 
the party. Moro's message, that the DC had to be its own 
alternative, was one that the DC left had nurtured for over 
twenty years, and the conservatives in the party found it 
infinitely preferable to the possibility of defeat by the 
PCI. Moreover, although they were the intended target, they 
were also able to play a major role in the reshaping of the 
party. Thus, the reelection of Zaccagnini at the 1976 
Congress saw him backed by key Dorotei like Rumor and Colom­
bo.
The success of the DC in the subsequent election was 
undoubtedly due to the power of its anti-communist appeal in 
the face of an expected massive advance by the PCI, a situa­
tion pungently captured by Indro Montanelli's editorial 
injunction, ‘To hold one's nose, but to vote DC'? neverthe­
less, the defeat of the Dorotei by Moro and Zaccagnini, and 
their identification with the new Catholicism of Vatican II 
undoubtedly increased the extent to which catholic activists 
gave positive support to the party. The 1976 election also 
saw the most thorough-going rejuvenation of its parliamentary 
personnel since the founding of the Republic33, and although 
Zaccagnini was held firmly in check by the party's still 
powerful traditional oligarchs, a series of initiatives were 
undertaken in the five years of his secretaryship which did
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boost the party*s links with progressive forces in the catho­
lic world.
The running of the tide in favour of the PCI was re­
vealed in all its strength in the 1975 regional and local 
elections, and the likelihood of this being repeated at the 
national level led the PSI to withdraw its external support 
to the DC in January 1976. The PSI*s affinities with the PCI 
had always been great, and now opposing it seemed electorally 
foolhardy. Even the Liberals abandoned their right-leaning 
leader, Malagodi, when the collapse of Andreotti*s coalition 
signalled that in a party system whose centre of gravity was 
ever moving to the left they were no more coalitionable than 
the MSI had been in 1960. Similarly the national elite of 
the PSDI was forced to change tack, in its case by increasing 
defections in favour of local governments of the left. The 
Republicans faced a similar if lesser challenge, but their 
leader, Ugo La Malfa, was in any case establishing himself as 
a mediator between the DC and the PCI now that the PSI*s 
shift left had reduced its capacity to play this role.34
By the winter of 1975 all the parties were anticipating 
an early election, and this duly took place in the summer of 
1976. The result was dramatic, but indecisive: the Centre- 
Left was definitively killed off by the size of the Communist 
advance, but alternation was still not born. The PSI under­
went a massive generational leadership change immediately 
before the election which left its new elite seeking legiti­
mation at a time when the party base was profoundly hostile 
to the DC, whilst the traditionally staunchly anti-communist 
PLI and PSDI lost half to two-thirds of their small elector­
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ates. Not even Zaccagnini's offer of a government of 'equal 
parity1 in which the Socialists would have gained half of the 
cabinet posts could induce the PSI to back a Centre-Left 
formula.
For its part, the PCI faced a veto from the USA and 
domestic interests. As its leadership had foreseen, only 
through the DC could it gain enough support to come to power. 
Like it or not, the DC and the PCI were forced to cooperate 
in some way. The Historic Compromise had to be given con­
crete meaning.
In August 1976 the government of 'non-no-confidence' 
was born. This was a monocolore led by Giulio Andreotti, a 
great believer in the DC's centrist party project, and nego­
tiated largely by Aldo Moro. Andreotti gained an inaugural 
vote of confidence thanks to the abstention of the parties of 
the 'constitutional arc', a formula which excluded the ex­
treme right MSI, and the extreme left Democrazia proletaria 
which had just gained entry to parliament, as well as the 
anti-system, but essentially unlocatable, Radicals. The 
formula included the Communists and as an echo of Fanfani's 
1960 government of 'parallel convergence* was a step towards 
the further expansion of the centre.
The PCI behaved very much as it had in the CLN, demon­
strating a willingness to compromise and to avoid government 
collapse in the face of the threat of radical destabilisa­
tion. This threat was both economic and terrorist, with the 
terrorism of the left moving towards a grisly climax precise­
ly in the years in which the PCI found itself once more with 
governing responsibilities at a national level, even if
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without ministerial portfolios. The Communist defence of 
capitalist economic rationality against union militancy and 
of the bourgeois Republic against terrorism amounted, for 
many on the left, to that party's final convergence on the 
political centre.
The PSI was not slow to attempt to profit from this 
situation, again repeating a story similar to the CLN. As 
the PCI/DC relationship had squeezed the PSI in the 1940s, 
now it threatened to make that party finally irrelevant, and 
in response the party sought to gain the leadership of the 
new social movements, outflanking the PCI on the left. In 
March 1977 it sought to provoke a government crisis, but was 
blocked by the PCI. This, and the PCI's defence of the 
capitalist state, pitched in terms of a defence of the Repub­
lic which the party had helped to build, and to defend, led 
to the attack on the DC-state, which figured prominently from 
the early 1960s, becoming an attack on the partitocrazia ie 
on parties and multi-party government, including the PCI.
An anti-party emphasis to the protest politics of the 
1970s was common in Western Europe, but in Italy the formida­
ble strength of the trade union revival in 1969 had contrast­
ed with the weakness of the party left, reinforcing anti­
party feeling. Thus, pan-syndicalism gained great signifi­
cance in Italy, whilst the interest in both the catholic and 
the Marxist sub-cultures for council or base democracy also 
made the idea of direct democracy particularly appealing. 
The passage of legislation enabling the use of the referendum 
instrument at the start of the decade fuelled this movement, 
with the Radicals spear-heading the drive to overcome the
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inertia of the party system through the use of referenda. 
The Radicals hostility to the PCI was particularly marked, 
and its argument that the party*s elite preferred a comfort­
able position of permanent opposition to the risks of chal­
lenging the DC was damaging because it rang true. But what 
could the PCI do? Moro*s analysis that Italy was a 'diffi­
cult democracy* reflected Berlinguer*s belief that a Historic 
Compromise was needed given the impossibility of alternation 
and, now, the impossibility of standing on the side-lines, 
fiddling while the Republic burned. At the very moment that 
the PCI was being thrust on to the governmental stage, funda­
mentally challenging the DC*s quasi-monopoly of state power, 
the party was being attacked for failing to challenge the DC.
The failure of the PCI to back the PSI*s attempt to 
bring down the government in the spring of 1977 coincided 
with a major speech by Moro in defence of his party and its 
history. With the party deeply involved in corruption scan­
dals that eventually led to the early resignation of the 
Italian President, Leone, in 1978, Moro aggressively echoed 
the PCI*s defence of the Republic, championing the DC*s role 
in the Republic*s construction and survival. In retrospect, 
the survival of the DC monocolore government in the spring of 
1977 has been seen as the crucial turning point when the DC 
won the battle with the PCI.35 Neither now, nor until after 
the failure of the Historic Compromise, did any party share 
the DC's governmental power. The DC was the party of govern­
ment which faced the terrorist onslaught and which had gua­
ranteed provided liberal democracy and the conditions for 
economic growth. The party had to be accepted warts and all
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- the corruptions of individual ministers and so on was 
trivial by comparison to the benefits Italy had gained from 
Christian Democratic government.
The confrontation between the DC and the PCI was being 
won by the DC. In the summer of 1977 its Festivals of 
Friendship were judged to be rather successful, and that 
summer's transformation of the non-no-confidence government 
into a legislative coalition did not alter the fundamental 
fact of the continuing exclusion of the Communists from 
government. Indeed, when La Malfa made steps towards recog­
nising PCI ministerial eligibility in October weeks of polem­
ic ensued. Berlinguer's insistence on access in December, 
provoked by union and membership pressure, provoked Andreot- 
ti's resignation in January 1978. By now, governmental 
support short of inclusion in the cabinet had seen abstention 
and legislative coalition and little else remained. It was 
in this situation that Moro was kidnapped.
Whilst the kidnapping of Moro gradually turned in to a 
martyrdom, Andreotti formed a new government from which the 
PCI was again excluded, the new government being formally 
based on a political and programmatic accord which permitted 
the PCI to give a positive vote of confidence. This in 
itself provoked the PLI into opposition, but the PCI gained 
all but nothing with which to convince its supporters of the 
correctness of its strategy and by the end of 1978 the PCI 
elite was desperate.36 A final attempt was made to force 
entry into the cabinet, but this served only to bring the 
government down and initiate a process leading to the early 
election of 1979. The legislature had lasted only three
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years, compared to the four of the previous two, and, given 
the circumstances of socioeconomic and political turmoil, 
many identified a trend to parliamentary collapse.
In the 1979 election the PCI's vote fell for the first 
time in the history of the Republican parliament, and it 
continued to decline throughout the 1980s. At the same time 
the electoral turnout fell. The party had failed to convince 
the doubters that it was a respectable party of government, 
and it convinced many of its supporters that it was no longer 
a party of opposition. The competitive edge had gone out of 
the party system. The vote for the DC, by contrast, was 
almost exactly the same as it had been in 1963, and it had 
been little different in the intervening elections. The 
combination of refoundation and confrontation had brought it 
a great victory.
C. The Releaitimation of Party Government
For eight weeks between March and May 197 8 the very 
fundamentals of democracy and of party government were chal­
lenged when Aldo Moro, the acknowledged leader of the DC was 
held in captivity by Red Brigade terrorists. The PCI backed 
the DC steadfastly in its refusal to bargain with terrorists, 
and following Moro's assassination in May he immediately 
achieved the status of a lay saint. In the meantime, Andre­
otti 1s monocolore continued to exclude the Communists so that 
the DC remained the party of government par excellence. In 
the long run, the terrorist compounding of socioeconomic 
crisis dramatically relegitimated the Christian Democratic 
Party and party government in Italy.37 In the political
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sphere, the clear and clearly valuable distinction between 
the ‘armed parties* and the competitive electoral parties, 
revalidated the electoral arena and the parties that fought 
in it; whilst the principle of party government bearing 
ultimate responsibility for the economy was established 
through the PCI's rejection of trade union intransigence and 
the recognition that the 1975 bilateral agreement between 
labour and private business had damaged the national interest 
by boosting inflation.
This relegitimation of party government was not immedi­
ately evident at the time. Just a month after the election, 
two referenda, promoted by the Radicals, showed that anti­
party feeling continued to run high. Though neither referen­
dum succeeded in repealing the legislation it attacked, the 
very fact that the proposed repeal of the 1975 anti-terrorist 
legislation could gain any credibility in the wake of Moro's 
murder was astonishing, whilst the near victory (44% in 
favour) of the repeal of new legislation permitting the state 
funding of parties was taken by the Radicals as a moral 
victory in their attack on the partitocrazia.
In the same month as the referenda were held, President 
Leone was forced to resign over allegations of involvement in 
the Lockheed bribe scandals, and the election of Alessandro 
Pertini in his stead was a significantly anti-party affair.38 
Pertini was elected for his personal, not party capacity, and 
his popularity so restored the dignity of the institution, 
that the parties chose to select his successor on a single 
ballot, thus avoiding the undignified spectacle where the
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President required several ballots to be elected.A
The considerable relegitimation of the DC and of party 
government did not end criticism of the DC and of the blocked 
party system. Indeed, criticism of both remained significant 
through the 1980s, but 'legitimation1 is a process, 'legiti­
macy* something that has to be constantly reacquired, and in 
the crisis years 1977-78 it became clear that there was 
really little alternative to party government, that if im­
provement was sought - which it clearly was - it had to be 
done through the party system or otherwise via democratic 
means which did not challenge party government, except per­
haps in the very longest of long runs. The continuing vital­
ity of social movements in the Italy of the 1980s was no 
longer linked to ideas of pan-syndicalism or conciliar democ­
racy as laternatives to party government. The rise of the 
Greens and the speed of their gaining parliamentary represen­
tation in 1987, the challenge of the PSI to the dominant 
parties - the 'asymmetric dyarchy* - from the beginning of 
the decade, and the response of both major parties to these 
challenges bear witness to the renewed emphasis on the impor­
tance of party government and party competition. So, above 
all, does the dramatic decline of terrorism. More violent 
and of longer duration than in West Germany, violence peaked 
in 1978-79 and by 1982 was a marginal political phenomenon.
A. A unique event. Compare: Einaudi and Gronchi, 4; Segni, 9; 
Saragat 21 and Leone, 23. Pertini required 16.
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IV A WATERSHED: THE HISTORIC COMPROMISE IN RETROSPECT
The confrontation between the DC and the PCI was an 
outcome built into the long-term structural dynamic of the 
party system. It was fore-shadowed in the 1948 election, 
which saw a strong tendency to left/right confrontation and 
the creation of a two-block system, but its realisation was 
delayed by the creation of the three-block party system. 
Because the three-block system was asymmetric, a tendency to 
reinstate a two-block confrontation was built into the struc­
ture of the party system, and though the PCIfs leadership of 
the second block was not unchallenged, by the 1970s there was 
no alternative left. The confrontation between the DC and 
the PCI was one that had been put off for thirty years. It 
was both the end of a cycle and a watershed.
A. A Culmination
The creation of the three-block structure between 1946 
and 1953 was the result of decisions taken by the political 
class. It was a deliberate avoidance of two-block confronta­
tion. Its creation depended on the January 1947 split in the 
Socialist Party, giving rise to the PSDI and their seven per 
cent of the vote in 1948, and its survival depended on the 
maintenance of relations with the Left as well as the Right. 
This was guaranteed by the actions of the 1948-53 government 
and by the defeat of the so-called swindle law fleqqe truffa) 
in 1953.
The breakaway of the PSDI in January 1947 had certainly 
not created a strong centre-left alternative to the DC since
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Saragat had been unable to pull the bulk of the party behind 
him. The failure of the PSI to follow Saragat led to its 
subordination to the PCI in the 1940s and '50s and this meant 
that the two-block tendency focused firmly on the PCI. Thus 
it was that in the early 1960s, Pietro Nenni, who more than 
anyone could have led the PSI into backing Saragat, himself 
sided with the DC, confirming the danger of a two-block 
confrontation which focused on the PCI. It is not surprising 
that judgments of Nenni*s tactical and leadership abilities 
have been harsh.39
The alliance of the DC with the PSI in the early 1960s 
did not end the PCI * s domination of the bipolar tendency any 
more than the alliance with the PSDI in 1947-48. The possi­
bility that the two-block dynamic would refocus on the DC and 
the PSI/PSDI was slim given the PCI *s domination of the 
socialist sub-culture in the 1950s, and the conservatism of 
the Centre-Left guaranteed that this possibility did not 
emerge. By 1968 the two-block dynamic was focused squarely 
on the PCI and the DC. The Centre-Left, then, was a continu­
ation of centrism both in the sense that it was another 
attempt to preempt two-block confrontation, and in the sense 
that it failed to replace the PCI as the champion of the 
alternative to DC domination. A third attempt to head-off 
the confrontation could not be made - the clash between the 
two dominant parties in the late 1970s was the end of a 
cycle. Explicable in terms of the structural dynamic of the 
system created in the 1946-53 period, it brought that dynamic 
to a conclusion, making it a watershed in the development of 
the party system.
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B. A Watershed
Being the end of a cycle, it was natural that there 
were substantial continuities in the behaviour of Moro and 
Berlinguer in the 1970s and that of earlier key political 
figures in similar circumstances. Just as De Gasperi, Togli- 
atti and Saragat in the '40s, and Nenni and Moro in the 60s, 
had sought to avoid a confrontation which would lead to 
extreme political strategies gaining the upper hand, so did 
Moro and Berlinguer in the 1970s. But as we have seen, by 
the 1970s the three-block ‘buffer* had gone, and the circum­
stances of both revolutionary left-wing violence and wide­
spread fears about the involvement of the security and intel­
ligence apparatuses in violent right-wing destabilisation 
were rich evidence of the continuing presence of extremists 
hoping to gain from the political class' loss of control. 
Precisely the lack of a buffer, and Moro and Berlinguer's 
ability to lead the unwilling parties to work together, made 
it clear that the dominant political parties, however hostile 
to each other in many respects, had enough in common to bring 
them to cooperate when it was necessary. Essentially this 
meant in defence of the Republic, good and bad, as a creation 
of the CLN and the democratic multi-party system. Neither 
party was an anti-system party, neither was entirely illegit­
imate .
Whilst it no longer made much sense to see the PCI as 
an anti-system party when it so vigorously defended the 
Republic and its thirty year history against destabilisation 
coming from the left in both the industrial and political
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spheres, it was also clear that the Communist Party had been 
the bearer of a mission - to defeat the DC. Not everyone 
wanted this outcome of course, but it was clear that antipa­
thy towards the DC not only embraced the PCI and the new 
radical parties but was shared to a considerable degree by 
its coalition partners and even went deeply into its own 
electorate. The DC was supported for being anti-Communist, 
not for being the DC. The PCI was, to a large extent, sup­
ported for being anti-DC. In failing to defeat the DC it had 
failed in its mission, and the PCI was not the only loser. 
The unsuitability of the PCI was, in a sense, everybody*s 
loss, and even within the DC voices appeared saying that a 
spell in opposition would do the party good, as it had done 
the West German CDU-CSU.40 Needless to say, for the bulk of 
the DC this took too far the argument that the regeneration 
of the DC was what the country needed. Nevertheless, the 
secretary of the party for fully seven years from 1983-90, 
Ciriaco De Mita, was feared by some (and admired by some 
others) as harbouring similar views.
Moro had defeated the PCI by maintaining the centrist 
party strategy against the temptation of Fanfani and others 
to abandon it for a straight-forward two-block confrontation. 
He united the party because he maintained, in extremis, the 
traditional unity of the political and party centrist strate­
gies. However, since the Historic Compromise demonstrated 
the reasonableness and responsibility of the PCI, the contin­
uation of the centrist party strategy in the 1980s was more 
and more revealed as merely a means for maintaining the power 
of the party. Less and less was it a means for realising a
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progressive political strategy or even for avoiding a radi­
cally conservative degeneration of the political system.
In looking at Moro's continuing fusion of centrist 
party and political strategies we saw that the success of the 
former was tending to contradict the latter; by the time the 
party system settled down after the shocks of the collapse of 
the Historic Compromise it was obvious. Increasingly, the 
maintenance of the centrist party strategy was seen as con­
servative in itself, conflicting with a centrist political 
strategy which had to be based on alternation. Not even a 
grand coalition would do, for the domination of the DC and 
the PCI in the 1976-78 period had seen a weakening of the 
relevance of parliamentary and electoral opposition, ie of 
the conflictual element in the political class's contradicto­
ry unity, which had brought tremendous disquiet. This unease 
had been voiced by all the minor parties, for they tended to 
be squeezed out of the political picture, but it was the PSI 
which played the crucial role, establishing itself as the 
basis for an alternation which would challenge the stifling 
domination of the two major parties.
When the governments of national solidarity finally 
gave way in 1979 the atmosphere was one of deep crisis. It 
was far from clear at the time that the terrorist onslaught 
was peaking and about to collapse. It was far from clear 
that the troubled economy, just hit by the 'second oil shock' 
was going to make a major recovery. And it was also far from 
clear that a new coalition formula was available, able to 
provide the necessary parliamentary backing to maintain 
government. In fact, the 1980s turned out to be a decade of
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economic and political transformation. The economy boomed, 
the DC lost its control of the premiership for the first time 
since it had acquired it in 1945, and the PCI lost its domi­
nation over the PSI for the first time in the history of the 
Republic. The Historic Compromise had been a watershed.
(1) P.Farneti, II si sterna politica italiano. 1973, p.26.
(2) P.Farneti, The Italian Party System. London: Frances Pinter, 1985,
p .188.
(3) K.von Beyme, Political parties in Western Democracies. Aldershot: 
Gower, 1985, pp.104-11, 220, 262.
(4) H.Daalder, ‘The Netherlands’, in H.Daalder (ed), Party Systems in 
Denmark. Austria. Switzerland, the Nethrelands and B e l g i u m . London: 
Frances Pinter, 1987, pp.196-7.
(5) See eg T.Smith, ‘The British Constitution: Unwritten and Unravelled’ 
in J.Hayward and P.Norton, The Political Science of British politics. 
Brighton: Wheatsheaf, 1986, pp.65-84.
(6) G.Tamburrano, PCI e PSI nel si sterna democristiano. Bari: Laterza, 
1978, pp.51-54.
(7) R.Ruffilli, ‘L’ultimo Moro: dalla crisi del centro-sinistra all'avvio 
della Terza fase*, in F.Malgeri (ed), Storia della Democrazia cristiana. 
Vol.4, 1989, pp.317-334, pp.327-8.
(8) R.Orfei, L ’occupazione del potere. I democristiani. 1945-75. Milan: 
Longanesi, 1976, p.246.
(9) S.Magister, La politica Vaticana e 1*Italia. 1943-78. Rome; Riuniti,
306
1979.
(10) G.Provasi, Borghesia industriale e DC: Sviluppo economico e media- 
zione politica dall Ricostruzione agli anni *70. Bari: De Donato, 1977, 
chapter 5.
(11) Pierluigi Castellani, *La Democrazia cristiana dal centro-sinistra 
al delitto Moro (1962-78)', in F.Malgeri, op.cit. Vol.4, 1989, pp.3-116, 
p. 58.
(12) G.Galli, Storia della DC. Bari: Laterza, 1978, p.331.
(13) A.Marradi, ‘Italy: From "Centrism" to the Crisis of the Centre-Left 
Coalitions', in E.Browne and J.Dreijmanis (eds), Government Coalitions in 
Western Democracies. London: Longman, 1982, pp33-70.
(14) L.Gualtieri, the Liberal president of the the parliamentary commis­
sion investigating unsolved terrorist atrocities is but the latest to 
have hypothesised the existnce of a ‘politico-military complex' operating 
during the period of the strategy of tension in support of conservative 
aims. The political direction of the key ministries in this period was 
limited to a very small elite, mostly from the DC and PSDI. See the 
report in La Repubblica, 30 November, 1988.
(15) O.M.Petracca, ‘L'opposizione liberale al centro-sinistra', in 
Biblioteca della Liberta. 1971.
(16) P.Castellani, op.cit. 1989, p.60.
(17) M.Regiini, ‘Social Pacts in Italy' in I.Scholten (ed), Political 
Stability and Neo-corporatism. London: Sage, 1987, pp.195-215.
(18) See eg D.Hine, ‘Thirty Years of the Italian Republib: Governability 
and Constituional Reform', Government and Opposi t i o n . Winter, 1981, 
pp.63-80.
(19) G.Morosa and G.Moncalvo, De Mita il nuovo potere. Milan: Sperling 
and Kupfer, 1982, p.170.
(20) A.Spreafico, ‘Risultati elettorali ed evoluzione del sistema partit- 
ico', in M.Caciagli and A.Spreafico (eds), Un sistema alia prova. Bolo­
gna: II Mulino, 1975, pp.25-83.
307
(21) G.Mammarella, op.cit. p.398. The fusion of the remaining monar­
chists in the MSI led it to be known officially as the Destra Nazionale 
(National Right).
(22) G.Galli, op.cit. 1978, pp.336-8.
(23) G.Galli, op.cit. 1978, pp.379-380.
(24) G.Galli, op.cit. 1978, p.381.
(25) R.Putnam et al., ‘Polarizazzione e depolarizazzione in Italia, 1968-
81*, in II Mulino. 1983.
(26) R.Orfei, op.cit. 1976, p.24.
(27) G.Di Palma, ‘Italy: Is there a Legacy and is it Fascist?* in 
J.H.Herz (ed), From Dictatorship to Democracy: Coping with the Legacies 
of Authoritarianism and Totalitarianism. London, 1982, pp.107-134.
(28) R.Orfei, op.cit. p.37.
(29) G.Baget Bozzo, ‘La crisi della DC in Mondoperaio. March, 1988, p.5.
(30) G.Pridham, Political Parties and Coalitional Behaviour in Italy. 
London: Routledge, 1988. Quotes in this paragraphs are found on pp.153, 
112, 168 and 317 respectively.
(31) C.De Stefanis, La guerra dei sette anni. Milan, 1973.
(32) A.Moro’s speech at the XII**1 Congress, June, 1973.
(33) M.Cotta, ‘II rinnovamento del personale parlamentare democristiano*, 
II Mulino. Sept-Oct. 1978.
(34) G.Mammarella, op.cit. p.469.
(35) G.Baget Bozzo, in A.Moro, L*intelliqenza e gli avvenimenti. Testi. 
1959-78. Garzanti, 1979, pp.349-355, cited in A.Gismondi, Al 1e Soglie del 
Potere. Storia e cronaca della solidarieta nazionale. 1976-79. Milan: 
SugarCo. 1986, p.152.
308
(36) S.Tarrow, ‘Historic Compromise or Bourgeois hegemony?* in H.Machin 
(ed), National Communism in Western Europe: A third wav to socialism?. 
London: Methuen, 1983, pp.124-153.
(37) P.Farneti, ‘Italy: the Response to Overload*, in R.Rose (ed), Chal­
lenge to Governance. 1980, pp.199-214.
(38) G.Pasquino, Istituzioni. partiti. lobbies. Rome: Laterza, 1988, 
pp.44-8.
(39) S.M.Di Scala, Renewing Italian Socialism. From Nenni to C r a x i . 
Oxford University Press, 1988.
(40) Documents from AREL, the think-tank associated with the catholic and 
DC intellectuals.
309
CHAPTER 7 % BIPOLAR GOVERNMENT' AND ITS LIMITS:
THE TRANSFORMATION OF CENTRE DOMINATION IN THE 1980s
In Chapter Six it was shown that both Moro and Berlin­
guer were severely constrained by the inherited structure of 
the party system. Both were concerned by the destabilising 
effects which the tendency for a two block confrontation to 
become dominant would provoke, but neither could avoid it. 
They had to manage it, attempting to benefit from it. They 
did this, it was argued, by attempting to smother the con­
frontational aspect, Berlinguer stressing the need to cooper­
ate with the DC in a Historic Compromise, Moro keeping the 
centrist tradition of his party alive, in opposition to 
Fanfani's confrontational strategy.
It was also argued that the final working-out of the 
complex structural dynamic within the context of which Moro, 
Berlinguer and other established party leaders found them­
selves acting was accompanied by a rejection of the party 
system and of the parties. Despite the perpetual drama of 
Italian politics, in which crisi follows crisi with monoto­
nous (approximately annual) regularity, the evolution of 
centrism, without alternation, encouraged the view that there 
was no change, that trasformismo smothered everything of 
worth in its grey embrace. This stimulus to radicalism has 
been a constant of post-unification Italian history.
The consequences, in Republican Italy, were the rise of 
opposition within both sub-cultures to the party elites which 
represented them politically, and the exacerbation of anti­
party attitudes. Thus, opposition in the catholic world to
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the cautiously progressive De Gasperi and the ambiguously 
progressive Fanfani finally erupted into open 'contestation* 
in the 1960s, whilst discontent with the conservative opposi­
tional ism of the PCI led to the emergence of an extra-party 
fringe in the early 1960s. The eve of the 1976 election saw 
the birth of extreme left terrorist activity which was 
whipped into a frenzy of activity by the concretisation of 
the Historic Compromise immediately thereafter. The 
lay/liberal world too made a precise contribution, with the 
Radicals spearheading the anti-party attack on the catto- 
communist, 'neo-totalitarian' , partitocrazia. The chief 
victims of the assault on the party system were, then the two 
main parties.
This was important, for the relegitimation of the party 
system went hand in hand with the emergence of a major 'new' 
political protagonist: the PSI. This party underwent a 
dramatic transformation in the late 1970s, emerging as the 
centre of a national political debate for the first time in a 
generation,1 and it benefited from and pioneered the revali­
dation of multi-party competition.
One of the consequences of the national solidarity 
governments was the generalised realisation that the DC and 
the PCI really were not engaged in a fight to the death. The 
politics of the party system was not a zero-sum game in 
which one side had to try to maintain the exclusion of the 
other at all costs, whilst the other sought to deny the 
formally governing party either legitimacy or effective state 
power. Both parties did seek to prevent the other exercising 
power, but the aim was not the destruction of the opponent,
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in order oneself to prosper, but the provision of government. 
Good government, or better government. Or bad government, as 
things stood. And the blame for forty years of inadequate 
government was pinned on the parties of the 'asymmetric 
dyarchy1 - the PCI and the DC.
The PSI, led by Bettino Craxi, a formidable politician 
who benefited enormously from being the right man in the 
right place at the right time, declared that it could provide 
better government and political stability. That it could 
provide a socialist alternative to the DC which was safe. 
This it would do from within the government area, effecting a 
division of the party system into two blocks by establishing 
that the key political cleavage ran through the governing 
area. Exactly what the PSI (and PSDI) had been unwilling to 
do in the 1940s and unable to do in the 1960s. It is this 
strategy, and the limits to it, presented principally by the 
reactive strategies of the Christian Democratic Party and of 
the PCI, which we look at in this chapter.
I 'BIPOLAR GOVERNMENT: THE PSI CHALLENGE TO THE DC
The PSI was in a difficult situation in the 1970s, torn 
between the need to support the DC in order to provide gov­
ernment stability and the clear signs of the increasing 
attractiveness of the left with which it was historically 
linked. Whatever the party did it was widely damned. Both 
the move towards a rapprochement between the PCI and DC and 
the conflict between them which concentrated the vote made 
the PSI, like the other small parties, irrelevant. In a
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desperate attempt to regenerate the party a wide-ranging 
generational coup took place in the party in 1976 in which 
Bettino Craxi was elected party secretary.
A. Craxi and Structural Opportunity
Craxi was the leader of the 'autonomy' faction which 
vaunted the party's independence from the PCI, symbolising 
the desire of the party not to swap subordination to the DC 
with resubordination to the Communist Party, but Craxi was 
also elected because this faction was weak. Craxi was 
thought unlikely to be able to challenge the oligarchic 
factional rule which made the PSI's internal organisation 
resemble that of the DC. In fact, Craxi's combative person­
ality, tactical skill and patience, and his sheer ambition to 
succeed at the party government game ensured that he maxi­
mised the structural opportunity which the Andreotti govern­
ments presented.
This structural opportunity was a consequence of the 
1976 election. Far from being the final nail in the coffin 
of the small parties, the governments of national solidarity 
gave them new significance, for the locking together of two 
'illegitimate' parties heightened discord within both their 
electorates whilst the liberal/lay culture attacked the 
quasi-coalition as heralding a bureaucratic nightmare as 
catholic and socialist statisms reinforced each other. The 
PSI could hope to attract the discontented from all three 
traditional cultural areas and overturn the centrality of the 
DC. In fact, within three years Craxi established himself as 
the arbiter as to which Christian Democratic leader could
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form a government, and within seven he was himself Prime 
Minister. Italy's first Socialist Premier.
Craxi's offensive matured rapidly. In September 1976 
he outlined ambitious plans for organisational, ideological 
and strategic change to the party's Central Committee, and by 
1977 the strategy of establishing the PSI as an avowedly 
reformist socialist party had been launched. The aim was to 
create a ‘socialist pole' of electoral attraction in which 
the PSI would gain the leadership of the small lay parties 
and offer an alternative to each of the major parties and to 
the near paralysis of the party system which their joint, but 
antagonistic, domination ensured.
As we have argued in Chapter Six, the Historic Compro­
mise marked a culmination and watershed in the development of 
the structural dynamic of the party system, so Craxi's ambi­
tion meshed with propitious circumstances, and his newly won 
leadership of the PSI made him the right man in the right 
place at the right time. Craxi's PSI made a key contribution 
to ending the governments of national solidarity, encouraging 
internal opposition to it within the DC and the PCI through 
his condemnation of it, and by acting as a potential focus 
for electoral discontent. The local government elections of 
1978, which saw the PCI losing ground to the PSI offensive, 
reinforced the Communist's conviction that backing Andreotti 
was risking much for little gain.
B. Challenging DC/PCI Bipolarity
The withdrawal of Communist support for Andreotti's 
monocolore governments in early 1979 made the PSI the arbiter
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of coalition formation. Despite President Pertini*s concern 
not to have to call an election after only three years, Craxi 
refused to back a DC minority government and an early elec­
tion became inevitable. The alternative to growing 'ungov­
ernability1, Craxi argued, was to avoid both a suicidal 
resubordination of the PSI to the DC and a risky reedition of 
the Popular Front. A Socialist led coalition with the DC 
would establish a 'socialist alternative1 which would guaran­
tee 'five years of stability and governability1. The widen­
ing recognition that the coalition game was about providing 
government, rather than an anti-Communist/anti-capitalist 
power struggle was thus given concrete form and projected 
onto the PSI. Craxi would synthesise stability and change to 
bring the reform that the Italian electorate had been seeking 
for nearly forty years.
Craxi*s audacious proposal of a Socialist premiership 
was based on the fact that without the PSI1s at least tacit 
consent, a government could not be formed, and in the wake of 
the 1979 election Pertini offered a mandate to Craxi after 
the Christian Democrats had proven unable to put together the 
backing for a vote of confidence. Of course, Craxi failed 
too, but the government which was formed, thanks to PSI 
abstention in the vote of confidence, was clearly operating 
under the threat of a Socialist veto. The DC's strangle-hold 
over government formation had been severely weakened.
Craxi worked to weaken it further. The call for a 
Socialist Premier was based both on the specific inability of 
the DC to claim to represent and lead the nation, and on the 
generic need for rotation in a dynamic democracy. Such
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rotation could be provided by the parties internal of the 
government coalition. This theory, of * alternanza'. was 
posed as a safe but innovative alternative to the full-blown 
*alternativa1 which put the DC in the opposition and the PCI 
in the driving seat. It was a theory which could not but 
appeal to the DC's traditional allies.
In February 1980 the XIVth Congress of the Christian 
Democratic Party ended Zaccagnini's leadership and with it 
the preference for an arrangement with the PCI. In a matter 
of weeks Francesco Cossiga resigned and formed a new govern­
ment, this time numerically strengthened by Socialist partic­
ipation. After a six-year absence from government Socialist 
Ministers reappeared, and with substantial portfolios - 
Health, Defence, Transport and State Industry among others. 
Government stability was, however, far from assured, because 
the PSI had to prove its substantial autonomy in matters of 
policy. Intense conflict was built into the coalition as 
the DC tried to subordinate the PSI and the latter sought to 
deny that subordination. However, unlike in the 1950s and 
'60s when governments fell as the result of struggles inter­
nal to a DC whose domination of government was electorally 
invulnerable,2 the electorate could now be expected to punish 
a party which provoked government collapse out of mere self- 
interest. This new situation did not entirely bring an end 
to the pattern of high governmental turn-over, but it was a 
new factor which bolstered the view that party competition 
was about providing good government, not about self-interest.
The period of government with Cossiga was a difficult 
one for Craxi, but he maintained control of his party and
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increased his appeal to the lay parties. Already attracted 
by the idea of alternanza they were further flattered by the 
revision of the theory of the new third pole which now became 
the 'lay pole1, rather than a socialist one. In 1981 the 
minor parties of the coalition exploited the scandals over 
the mysterious Masonic lodge Propaganda-2 to bring Cossiga's 
government down, and the upshot of this confrontation was the 
appointment of Giovanni Spadolini, the leader of the Republi­
can Party, as Prime Minister. Now the DC's strangle-hold 
over the premiership had been broken.
Spadolini presided over Italian government from June 
1981 to the end of 1982 when the DC exploited new tensions to 
reassert its right, as the majority party, to lead the gov­
ernment. The DC was now lead by Ciriaco De Mita, a new 
Secretary associated with the party's left. De Mita's elec­
tion was a response to Craxi's challenge. He appeared to 
continue Zaccagnini's drive to renew the party, and his 
favouring of the PCI was matched by a high degree of antipa­
thy towards the PSI and Craxi personally. The DC's aim in 
electing him was to force the PSI to accept subordination to 
this vigorous new leader and his radical programme to cope 
with the country's massive economic problems, or to reject 
him and accept responsibility for the country's economic 
problems and renewed government instability. The PSI had to 
accept domination by the DC or switch to the PCI. Craxi 
refused the terms of the dilemma and attacked De Mita as the 
face of the 1980s neo-liberal new conservatism in Italy 
whilst steadfastly and adamantly refusing identification with 
the PCI which he castigated for its inadequacy and cowardice
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in failing to destalinize. The intense conflict between the 
DC and PSI, focusing on De Mita and Craxi personally, led 
into another early election in 1983.
The result led directly to Craxi being installed as 
premier, less because the PSI did well, than because the DC 
did badly. The PSI's modest gains were actually a great 
disappointment to the party. Much of the electorate remained 
tied to traditional habits and the transformation of the 
bipolar challenge so that it now rotated around a DC/PSI core 
was far from clear. In effect, the electoral confrontation 
was useful to Craxi in highlighting that perspective, but the 
campaign was not enough to convince. The acquisition of the 
premiership did give Craxi the opportunity to distinguish his 
party*s government from that of the DC*s, and reinforced the 
marginalisation of the PCI which was crucial to PSI success.
As befitted the leader of a modern party, Craxi had his 
staff and his programme for the new government ready and 
waiting, and although the editor of the left independent 
Repubblica mocked it as incompetent the Milan stock exchange 
rose.3 The reaction of the PCI was confused, as it was 
throughout the early 1980s. Vividly marginalised, the party 
was aware that the DC and PSI had a common interest in its 
electoral decline and attacked the government as the true 
face of the new conservatism. Yet without the PSI as a 
potential ally the isolation of the PCI was increased, and 
its official new strategy, the 'democratic alternative1 was 
unrealisable. Not surprisingly, given such confusion, the 
'consociational temptation1 remained alive, further revealing 
the party's own doubts as to its legitimacy whilst enhancing
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the legitimacy of the DC. Craxi*s hostility to the PCI 
continually twisted the knife in the wound, and the 1987 
election and even more the 1988 administrative elections 
seemed to be turning the irrelevance of the PCI into a self- 
perpetuating process. By 1988 the sorpasso which dominated 
political gossip was no longer that of the PCI over the DC, 
as it had been a decade earlier, but of the PSI over the 
PCI.4 From mid-1988 a PSI-led two-block challenge was being 
canvassed,5 the leadership of the bipolar dynamic had shift­
ed.
C. Challenging DC Centrality
Having wrested the premiership from the DC, Craxi 
strove to promote the image of his party and the lay-social­
ist area at the expense of the coalition's major party - the 
DC. Craxi's aim was to show, from the position of Premier, 
that the primary political fault-line ran through the govern­
ing coalition rather than between the coalition and the PCI, 
ie he sought to demonstrate the existence of ‘bipolar govern­
ment ' . If successful, he would show that the political 
alternative to the DC was not doomed to permanent opposition, 
nor did a virtue have to be made of such a situation. In- 
system reform was possible. Craxi directed his attention to 
four main areas in all of which the DC was vulnerable. The 
most significant for the DC as an organisation historically 
rooted in the catholic world was Craxi's assault on the 
special relationship between Catholicism and the DC.
1. The Catholic World
Craxi's attack on catholic unity was two-pronged,
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directed at the Vatican, at Church-state relations, and at 
the catholic sub-culture, especially its organisational and 
electoral links with the DC. Craxi had worked at developing 
a constructive and positive relationship with the Vatican 
since his election as party secretary. In 1978, during the 
Moro abduction crisis, he had differentiated his party from 
the others by supporting negotiations with the Red Brigade 
kidnappers. Invoking the Italian humanitarian tradition he 
had worked together with the Vatican to save the statesman*s 
life. Subsequently, when his mandate to form a government in 
the 1979 crisis had proved fruitless, he made it clear that 
his failure was the result of the other parties blocking him, 
not a veto from the Vatican, as in the late 1950s and early 
'60s.6 The PSI's acceptability to the Vatican was based on 
the former's uncompromising attacks on Marxism and Craxi's 
willingness to put pragmatism before anti-clerical dogma, 
thus enabling collaboration with the Vatican, as well as by 
the close personal relationship between John Paul II and 
president Pertini, himself a life-long Socialist.
Craxi entered office determined to demonstrate to the 
Vatican that it did not need to rely on a special relation­
ship with one party to secure its legitimate interests. It 
could rely on formal inter-state Vatican/Italian diplomacy. 
The result of Craxi's long-developed association with the 
Vatican bore rapid fruit. In February 1984 the Villa Madama 
Accords were signed, replacing the 192 9 Lateran Pact, and 
their implementation was celebrated in June 1985. This 
updating of Church-state relations had been on the political 
agenda for a long time, but the DC had been unable to tackle
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such a contentious topic without inflaming the lay/clerical 
cleavage. The concern to downplay this cleavage has already 
been commented on in explaining Fanfani*s defeat over the 
divorce referendum, but the tendency grew, so that even the 
(anti-)abortion referendum had received scant Church backing, 
whilst the legislation itself had won papal approval.7 When, 
in December 1985, work on the details of the agreement be­
tween the Education minister, Franca Falcucci (DC), and 
Cardinal Poletti on the teaching of religion in the state 
schools provoked an outcry from the Independent Left,A the 
leading parties rushed to stifle it.8 In the public at large 
the Accords were generally well-received, and the PCI backed 
them in parliament. The PSI’s ability to break the log-jam in 
this area of fundamental policy importance gave the party’s 
image as a capable and reformist moderniser a great boost.
Craxi did not allow the close links with the Vatican to 
wither when the premiership passed back to the DC. In Sep­
tember 1987 the Commission on Culture and Education of the 
Chamber of Deputies determined the details for implementing 
religious education in the state schools only to have the 
Italian episcopate reject them as inadmissible. Vatican 
pressure was applied to force the government to reopen the 
issue, and within days the PSI was seen to leap-frog the DC 
in order to reach the basis for an understanding with the 
Vatican.9 The PSI was determined to ensure that it retained 
the political initiative and that the Church-state relation-
A. The Independent Left comprised those who had entered parliament in 
1976 and 1979 elections via PCI lists, but who were not members of the 
PCI. They were a part of the transition of the Italian left/PCI to 
'post-communism*.
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ship remained a corporatist one, not one based on parentela, 
or party access. It also signalled the PSI's readiness to 
accommodate Vatican interests to the catholic electorate, 
something which contrasted with the DC's reluctance to cham­
pion Church conservatism in the divorce and abortion issues.
In fact, the DC could not champion Catholic interests 
on such issues because the Catholic world was no longer 
compact. The 'contestation' of the 1960s had threatened to 
split the catholic world and, by the end of the decade, the 
DC too. Only Moro's careful leadership and confrontation 
with the PCI, and the much criticised, but ultimately con­
structively ambiguous, leadership of Paul VI, had allowed 
unity to be rebuilt.10 Nevertheless, the push towards an 
open plurality of the catholic vote remained a fundamental 
threat hanging over the catholic world through the 1980s, 
with a split (facilitated by Vatican II) developing between 
Pope John XXIII's unequivocal support for continuing unity in 
support of the DC and the Italian Church's greater openness 
to other political forces.11 Particularly significant was a 
debate that opened up within the catholic world itself about 
the relationship between the PSI and Communione a Libera- 
zione, and in particular its political offshoot, the Movimen- 
to popolare.
Communione e Liberazione is often taken to be a funda­
mentally right-wing movement because of its commitment to 
Catholicism, its hostility to communism and its allegedly 
neo-integralist and fundamentalist ideology.12 Nevertheless, 
its active commitment to catholic social doctrine gives it 
appeal to Italy's idealistic and post-marxist youth, whilst
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its urgent championing of social reform and attacks on the 
lay neo-conservatism of the DC as led by De Mita could not 
but make it attractive to the PSI. That interest has been 
reciprocated. G.Cesana, the leader of Movimento popolare, 
defended his movement's interest in the PSI. Support for the 
DC, he argued, was contingent on the DC's behaviour, not 
mechanical, and other parties, 'particularly those which 
count most' deserved attention, especially as the spread of 
catholic values ended the necessity for narrow catholic 
unity.13 Not even the issue of abortion, an obvious stum­
bling-block for continuing and deepening relations between 
the two organisations is necessarily an insurmountable hur­
dle. In January 1989, the developing counter-attack on the 
practice of Italy's abortion law was dramatised by a police 
raid, instigated by the aging Christian Democratic Health 
Minister, on a prestigious Milan institute with the aim of 
securing evidence about its working practices. Political 
debate reached fever-pitch, yet in February Claudio Martelli, 
a senior figure in the PSI, and Roberto Formigoni, Euro-MP 
and leader of Movimento popolare from 1975-87, flaunted their 
mutual regard even over this deeply divisive issue.14
The PSI' s outflanking of the DC is clearly being coun­
tered by expansive ambitions within the catholic world, but 
both movements, for all their ideological ambiguity, repre­
sent a clear threat to the DC and the principle of catholic 
unity. At the same time, the DC is no longer a necessary and 
privileged interlocutor for the Vatican.
2. Economic management
On the economic front Craxi won two major political
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victories, the first a set-piece confrontation with the PCI, 
the second through the repeated annual struggle to get the 
budget pushed through parliament on schedule, something that 
Christian Democratic government had proved notoriously unable 
to do.
The victory over the PCI was achieved via the 1985 
referendum on wage-indexing. It was decisive in that it 
redefined who it was who determined where the interests of 
the industrial working class lay. Craxi denied the PCI*s 
exclusive right to define that interest, and to define it in 
such a way that it clashed with the government defined gener­
al interest. The possibility that the unions could damage 
working class interests by pursuing their own narrow, sec­
tional interest had been recognised by the PCI, and in par­
ticular Lucio Lama the head of the CGIL, during the national 
solidarity governments. Then, of course, it had been part of 
a much larger strategy aiming to bring about both neo-corpor- 
atist and consociational arrangements. Now, Craxi was as­
serting the governments ability to define what was in the 
general interest in opposition to the PCI. His success 
confirmed the authority of government in socioeconomic mat­
ters and established the principle that deflationary measures 
could be in the interests of the workers. By 1989, Craxi was 
able to exploit De Mitafs budget difficulties to predict a 
future government of left unity which would seek to rationa­
lise public spending in the national-popular interest.15
The ground for this sophisticated political message was 
prepared through the annual battles to secure the passage of 
the budget, and by the battle to plug a tax-loophole favour­
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ing commercial traders in 1984-85. In this latter battle, 
the PSI backed the Republican Finance Minister, Bruno Visen- 
tini, to the extent not only of risking the government's 
survival, but also of arranging a political front spanning 
the PRI, the Socialists and the PCI. The target, of course, 
was the DC. The ghost of this front was raised in early 1989 
when the PSI and the Republicans, together with international 
financial circles,16 criticised the new DC-led government for 
courting popularity at the expense of budgetary rectitude and 
the genuine national interest.
Craxi fought hard to get his budgets accepted by the 
end of the parliamentary year since the failure to do this 
inevitably indicated the addition of inflationary amendments. 
Craxi's wish was to saddle the DC with the blame for these, 
thus labelling the party as structurally incapable of leading 
a constructive financial policy because of its clientelistic 
roots and the domination of the national party organisation 
over the parliamentary party. In fact, whereas the DC was 
able to get the budget accepted on time only three times in 
the history of the Republic (in 1969, 1974 and 1976), Craxi 
got his budget ratified on three occasions out of four - 
1983, 1984 and 1986.17 As early as October 1983 the Espres­
so magazine had hailed Craxi as at last providing a govern­
ment with the courage to govern,18 and in fact though his 
first government was put in a minority position on 163 occa­
sions, mostly over financial details, his vigorous use of the 
vote of confidence and of decrees forced many of his measures 
through.
Craxi was fortunate to govern in a period when expan­
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sionary US budgeting was benefiting the West European econo­
mies in general, but his force and determination contributed 
to creating Italy's 'second economic miracle'. Against 
predictions, 1984, the first full year of Craxi's premier­
ship, was a good year for the Italian economy, and further 
good years followed. By October 1986 L'Espresso was report­
ing Italy to be living through a neo-capitalist revolution 
following the dramatic transformation of the Italian stock 
market and the taming of inflation.19
3. Foreign policy
Craxi's economic success was in itself a major source 
of international recognition, with Italy being 'discovered' 
as a good investment,20 but Craxi became the first Italian 
statesman since De Gasperi to win an international reputation 
for his foreign policy initiatives. Under the DC, Italian 
foreign policy had been virtually non-existent,21 but already 
this had changed under Spadolini with, for example, the 
despatch of a peace-keeping force to the Lebanon. During 
Craxi's government, this force was expanded and gained great 
prestige by contrast to the French and US contingents which 
suffered murderous losses thanks to their governments' less 
even-handed, pro-Israeli, positions. Craxi, in fact, promot­
ed relations with Yasser Arafat, encouraging the development 
towards his formal international recognition in 1988.
While Craxi promoted Italy's role as Western Europe's 
special link with the Mediterranean, he did not neglect the 
super-power relationship. In particular, he took an active 
part in arranging the western response to the USSR's deploy­
ment of the SS-2Os, an involvement which ended with the
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siting of Cruise missiles in Comiso, Sicily. Finally, Craxi 
also won his case, made at the Tokyo economic summit of May 
1986, for Italy's entry to the 'Club of Five', leading to 
Italy hosting the 1987 Venice Summit.22 The fact that in the 
event the aged Fanfani, rather than the youthful Craxi, 
represented Italy confirmed the DC's aged image.
4. Law and Order
On coming to office, Craxi promoted a decisive campaign 
against the mafia,23 not least because this was an area where 
the DC's reputation suffered. This involvement was high­
lighted by the contemporary prominence of the 'Cirillo 
affair' in which a Neapolitan Christian Democrat, Ciro Ciril­
lo, appeared to have secured his release from his kidnappers 
thanks to the party's intimacy with both the Camorra and the 
secret services. Sweeping operations against the mafia and 
the camorra in 1985 and '86, leading to mass trials, gave the 
impression that at last the state was tackling this running 
sore in Italy's side. It contrasted sharply with the 
widely-held belief that the DC was deeply involved with 
organised crime.
Craxi also benefited from the continuing success of the 
battle against terrorism. A historical low-point was regis­
tered in Italy's terrorist problem in 1986 with only one dead 
and two injured in a mere thirty recorded incidents.24 
'Governability' appeared to be working not only for the 
economy, but for law and order too.
In four key areas then, relations with the catholic 
world, the economy, foreign affairs and ‘law and order', the 
PSI presented a major challenge to the DC's record as the
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party of government, and it did so whilst proclaiming its 
centrality in a party system dominated by the Christian 
Democrats on its right and the Communists on its left. The 
centrality of the DC was challenged in terms both of its 
natural domination of government and its indispensability.
II THE CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE
The Christian Democratic Party had beaten off the 
challenge of PCI-led bipolarity in the 1970s with a strategy 
which combined confrontation and cooperation with the Commu­
nists. This had maintained both the DC's identification as a 
centre party and the three-block structure of the party 
system, yet the significance of the blocks had been substan­
tially revised. Now they were much more widely seen as the 
result of party strategies and coalition arrangements and 
possibilities, hardly at all as the warring cores of alterna­
tive political systems.
In the 1980s a similar pattern of confrontation and 
cooperation came to characterise the DC's relationship with 
the PSI, but as we have seen, it was the PSI which was able 
to claim to be the centre of the party system, the only party 
able to provide stability of government, indeed to guarantee 
'governability'. The fundamental division within the DC 
between the 'centre' factions favouring close links with the 
PSI and the left favouring closer links with the PCI contin­
ued to exist, but the strategies remained complementary, 
united by the perception that the PSI was the principal
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competitive threat. The clarity of factional organisation 
thus weakened.25 Nevertheless, tension between the two 
blocks within the DC was inevitably high since the two 
strategies were not easily combined. Indeed, the possibility 
existed that the long-run aims of the two strategies were 
fundamentally divergent. Stressing the link with the PSI 
tended to emphasise the continuing unity of the political and 
party centrist strategy where the DC would never let go of 
power. By contrast, stressing the link with the PCI hinted 
at an acceptance of a two-block party system in which the DC 
would be fundamentally reorganised, losing its clientelist 
and power-for-power's-sake image finally and fully to be 
relegitimated as a modern, programmatic party of the centre- 
right, like the West German CDU. Here the centrist political 
strategy required a decisive break with the centrist party 
strategy.
A. Reasserting * Centre-Left Centrism1
President Pertini's nomination of Craxi as a Prime 
minister designate in the wake of the 1979 election was not a 
move that found no favour in the DC. That it should succeed 
was unthinkable, but since Craxi was not attempting to form a 
left coalition the reappearance of the PSI as a central actor 
implied the end of both the crypto-Grand coalition and any 
tendency towards a two-block system based on the exclusion of 
the PCI and the PSI. It pointed to a reassertion of 
'Centre-Left Centrism'.
1. The 'Preambolo1
The formal leadership of the party, principally Zaccag-
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nini, remained keen to maintain the link with the PCI, so it 
blocked Craxi*s attempts to form a government. Nevertheless, 
a certain complementarity of the two factional blocks within 
the DC was evident. The centre preferred a link with the 
PSI, but not with the PSI dominant, so Zaccagnini*s veto was 
not entirely unwelcome. Similarly, the DC-left was, in the 
main, seeking not to bring the PCI into the cabinet but to 
effect institutional reforms which would strengthen the two 
dominant parties, preferably to the benefit of the DC and 
particularly the left-DC with its desire to match institu­
tional reform with the reform of their own party.
Since the PCI was not willing to back Zaccagnini with­
out gaining access to the cabinet for at least the Independ­
ent Left, the only way of securing a reasonably stable gov­
ernment was for Zaccagnini to be replaced by someone with 
whom Craxi could do business. In the meantime, Cossiga's 
government survived by the abstention in the vote of confi­
dence of the PSI and PRI.
In February 1980 the DC held its XIVth Party Congress 
and duly put Zaccagnini in the minority on the basis of the 
Preambolo, or preamble, put forward by Armando Forlani which 
vetoed continuing links with the PCI. Shortly thereafter 
Cossiga formed his second government with the PSI, as we have 
seen, gaining major portfolios. The DC was rather satisfied 
at having drawn the PSI into taking responsibility for gov­
erning the country, for 1980-81 were crisis years for the 
Italian economy and the terrorist attack was still in full 
swing. The Cossiga governments were widely seen as a swing 
to the right, mirroring developments in the USA and Great
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Britain. Outside parliament, 1980 came to be seen as a 
turning point in the relationship between the unions and big 
business thanks to the ‘March of the 40,000* in Turin, a 
protest against strike action opposing Fiat's projected lay­
offs. In parliament, the decisive attack launched by the 
state on terrorism caused concern about civil liberties, 
leading the Radicals to put the government under pressure by 
initiating the process for a referendum, held in 1981, again 
to overturn anti-terrorist legislation, whilst tough economic 
measures and the increasing use of decrees to force executive 
measures through parliament brought accusations that parlia­
mentary democracy was being subverted.
What brought Cossiga's second government down at the 
end of 1980 was hostility to the new political formula and 
its leadership - the hostility of the PSI-left to Craxi, and 
of the DC-left to the inglorious leadership being given their 
party.26 For the latter, their defeat in the preambolo 
appeared to be a defeat for the party's 'renovation', and the 
1980 administrative elections had seen the DC's vote crumble, 
whereas the main benefactors had been the PSI and PSDI. The 
DC-left wanted to reassert itself to improve the party's 
image and to try, once more, to squeeze the PSI/PSDI in a 
situation of confrontation/ cooperation between the DC and 
PCI.
2. The New Right in Italy?
In fact, the accusations of neo-conservatism and worse 
(Cossiga was widely denounced as a hangman in the streets) 
thrown at the Cossiga governments reflected the tremendous 
sense of anti-climax and frustration following the failure of
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the Historic Compromise. It is much more doubtful that party 
leaders, of whatever persuasion, saw much alternative to 
decisive anti-terrorist action nor, indeed, to the necessity 
to try and bring state spending under control. In fact, 
Italy*s inability to control public spending was to a large 
extent associated with the DC regime*s welfare generosity, so 
‘uncharacteristic of parties of the right*.27 Of course, the 
nature of this generosity was a favourite target of the PCI, 
the liberal parties and the left-DC, but a left/right line-up 
in party system terms did not exist on this question as it 
did (perhaps uncharacteristically in a comparative perspec­
tive) in Great Britain and the USA.
Inside the DC a harsh neo-liberal, monetarist position 
existed, but it was championed by Nino Andreatta, from the 
left of the party, in terms of the requirement for interna­
tional social democracy to adjust to the new economic cli­
mate.28 Andreatta's position nevertheless isolated him 
within the party which, working from its organisational roots 
rather than an intellectual base, preferred to maintain state 
spending. Rather than stressing ‘cuts' and the need to 
control demand, the party stressed the need to modernise the 
economy and promote post-Fordist flexibility, so that it 
allegedly ‘rediscovered the market from the left'.29
The DC's traditional promotion of the small scale 
sector, ‘discovered' in the latter 1970s, strengthened this 
position, but the big business giants and the public sector 
were not neglected. Their contribution to the country's 
post-war boom was evident. Thus the DC took the opposite 
policy course to Thatcherite Britain, allowing inflation to
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roar whilst overseeing, and supporting, a major programme of 
industrial investment and restructuring which prevented the 
destruction of large swathes of industry seen in Britain and 
yet succeeded in bringing inflation down.30 Moreover, the 
defence of workers* rights and social conditions continued to 
play a significant role, and this was accepted by the busi­
ness classes as a necessary condition for their own 
success.31
The 'rediscovery of the market* by the DC was similar 
to that made by the French Socialists under Mitterrand when 
they discovered the constraints of international 
competition,32 but the DC rediscovered it with thirty years 
experience of governing Italy's economy and society, so that 
whilst it rejected Fanfani's extreme statism it did not turn 
full circle to a Thatcherite commitment to 'rolling back the 
state'. Nor could such an idea appeal to a party whose power 
remained critically linked to the state's penetration of 
society, including its economy. The same was true of the 
PSI, and in the 1980s it was often to be found on the same 
side as the DC in battles which saw a confrontation between 
'Rome and Turin', or the power of the parties and the power 
of FIAT33 and other oligopolies. By the late 1980s the 
similarity between the positions of the parties in matters of 
principle was even clearer, as the PCI under Occhetto made 
clear its own 'rediscovery of the firm', explicitly echoing 
the French Socialists.34 This is not to say that the DC/PSI 
coalition was not conservative, but it was conservative by 
virtue of its exclusion of the PCI and the greater weight it 
would be able to bring to bear in defence of union and worker
333
interests, not by virtue of being a capitalist reaction to 
which there was a socialist alternative.
3. The resurgence of the DC-left
The DC's loss of the premiership in the spring of 1981 
under the pressure of its own coalition allies" use of the 
P-2 scandal was a major blow to the party. Nevertheless, the 
party was able to exploit even this situation by contrasting 
Spadolini's introduction of wage and price controls in the 
name of the need for economic ‘rigour' to their own party's 
social concern deriving from its populist roots. In 1982, 
Western governments had still to discover that they could 
survive a ‘revolution of falling expectations' and the DC 
hoped to see the PRI (and PSI) pay a price for their enhanced 
involvement in harsh government decisions. In the event the 
DC's double game, seeking to retain its populist-welfare base 
whilst simultaneously appealing to those appreciating the 
need for economic discipline (Andreatta was a key economic 
minister) backfired. Disputes between Andreatta and the 
Socialist Minister Rino Formica were blamed for the failure 
of Spadolini's programme,35 whilst the successes of the 
government worked to the PRI's credit and to the credit of 
the ‘lay pole' which Craxi was now vigorously promoting.
As it became clear that the PSI could not be simply 
reabsorbed into a new edition of Centre-Left centrism, pres­
sure grew inside the DC to confront him rather than fudge the 
issue by trying to half use, half appease, him. This line 
was pushed by the DC-left, naturally, and they also used the 
sense of crisis inside the party which the loss of the pre­
miership had promoted in order to call an emergency National
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Assembly in November 1981. This was an extraordinary meeting 
of party leaders, members and concerned intellectuals and 
activists from the catholic world, concerned at the failure 
of the DC to revamp its image. Forlani, the organiser of the 
preambolo, and all those associated with the turn of 1980, 
were largely discredited. There was an evident need for new 
faces to emerge and it was not difficult to persuade the 
centre factions that a more combative approach to Craxi's 
attempted domination could be in the party's interests. 
Consequently, at the XV^*1 Congress in February 1982 Ciriaco 
De Mita, known for his robust character, long-term regard for 
the PCI and hostility to Craxi, was elected secretary.
B. The Emergency Anti-Craxi Coalition
De Mita came from the same la base faction as Zaccagni­
ni and he had the same respect for the PCI and the same 
interest in reforming the party, yet his election as secre­
tary was backed not only by the left, but also by key fac­
tional oligarchs like Flaminio Piccoli, a leading figure in 
the Dorotei, Amintore Fanfani and Giulio Andreotti. The 
first two of these had been amongst those who had brought 
Zaccagnini down only two years previously.36
1. De Mita's party-wide support
The point was, that now De Mita was expected to lead 
the coalition with the PSI. Thirty years earlier, it had 
been la base which had pushed for the establishment of the 
formal coalition with the PSI and this had been the dominant 
coalition strategy in the party from the time the Dorotei had 
accepted it, subject to their leadership, in the early 1960s.
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Even Moro's 'attention' towards the PCI had been forced on 
the party by the PSI's revolt against the Centre-Left, even 
if the powerful electoral drives behind this disengagement, 
like the turmoil in the catholic world, were the result of 
the Dorotei*s own conservatism in guiding that formula. Now, 
in the 1980s, the link with the PSI was inevitable, coalition 
with the PCI being out of the question, at least until the 
trauma of the Historic Compromise was well past.
What De Mita could do, as a known opponent of the PSI, 
was confront Craxi head on in his attempt to dominate the DC. 
Moreover, as a leader of the left, dependent on the centre 
for his power, De Mita was less likely to be able to use the 
personal prominence that would develop from the highly per­
sonal nature of the looming clash with Craxi in order to 
establish a dictatorial domination over the party - as Craxi 
had done in his.
The left continued to back De Mita because he re­
launched the 'renewal' of the party and because, in conjunc­
tion with this renewal, he reasserted the irrelevance of the 
lay sub-culture as an independent political force. Only two 
sub-cultures, two political alternatives existed in Italy, 
the reformist catholic and the Marxist.37 The PSI had to 
decide where it belonged, the DC had to 'pull its socks up', 
accept the formidable challenge of the PCI, and rebuild its 
links with the reformist catholic hinterland. The extraordi­
nary National Assembly of 1981 had already initiated this 
process. The problem for the centre was that this aspect of 
the strategy seemed to push the party towards abandoning 
party centrism in favour of accepting a two-block structure.
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2. De Mita and * bipolarity1
De Mitafs renewal of the party saw him encourage the 
promotion of younger cadres in the regions, seek to restore 
party organisation in several of the regions by dispatching 
party commissioners, and introduce prestigious catholic 
'externals', ie non-party members, into the National Council 
and into the 1983 electoral lists. Candidate selection in 
1983 saw a turnover of candidates almost as high as that in 
1976, thus producing a second wave of invigoration in the 
pariiamentary party.3 8
De Mita's redefinition of his party caught the mood of 
disgust in the catholic world with the corruption and 
clientelism, but it also linked this with the 'new conserva­
tism' of the 1980s. The attack on the DC's profligacy, led 
by the PRI, had hit home, and De Mita sought to steal Spadol­
ini 's clothes, promoting 'rigour' and co-opting Andreatta as 
one of his political advisors.39 In this way De Mita's 
championing of economic governability was a weapon with which 
to hit back at the criticisms of the lay-socialist (and 
Communist and neo-Fascist) area and with which to hit out at 
the unreformed parts of his own party.
This emphasis, and neo-liberal rhetoric, reinforced the 
argument that Italy had a fundamentally two-block political 
system, and it appeared to be an abandonment of the populist, 
welfarist and centrist orientation of the party. De Mita was 
widely portrayed as an Italian version of the Thatcher/Rea- 
ganite agenda, and of the switch from the SPD led government 
back to the CDU-CSU in Germany.
However, as we have seen, this neo-liberal position was
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not simply identifiable with the right in Italy. Andreatta 
came from the DC-left and, in many respects, De Mita was 
stealing the idea of economic rigour from opponents of the 
DC. He recognised the appeal of Spadolini's government to be 
what Craxi offered - governability and a basis for continued 
economic success. As for Thatcherism, we have seen that the 
DC's economic policies were fundamentally different to those 
followed in Britain. Moreover, the West German Christian 
Democratic Party, which was seen as relevant to parts of the 
DC because of its successful reorganisation and come-back, 
cannot be equated to the British Conservative Party,40 nor 
the West German party system with the British, not least 
because of the existence, as in Italy, of structural links 
between trade unions and the CDU.41
Classic definitions of left and right seemed almost 
irrelevant as the main challenge to the DC was now the PSI, 
and it appeared to have abandoned socialism for an ideology 
of nationalist modernisation.42 The programme analysis 
carried out by Mastropaolo and Slater saw the PSI to the 
right of the DC in 1979 in terms of the classic left/right 
spectrum (see reproduction, p.58). Competition was definite­
ly in the centre and about sound economic management. De 
Mita was not seeking to turn the party into the centre-right 
party of two-block system. What he was doing was comparable 
to the Spanish Socialist Party, itself rapidly turning into a 
centrist party.43 The situation throughout Western Europe 
was one of confusion regarding political identities in policy 
terms.44 In Italy, De Mita was competing in the centre for 
centre votes.
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De Mita*s economic position was not, thus, an unambigu­
ous attempt to redefine the party as the party of a centre- 
right block. As we shall, see, the electoral defeat of 1983 
forced De Mita to soften his position, but it is important 
not to mistake De Mita's intentions. We can reinforce the 
argument that De Mita was not seeking primarily to redefine 
the block structure and the location of his party if we 
consider a key motivation behind the assertion that the 
lay/lay-socialist area did not exist.
The argument that only two political cultures existed 
which could create the' bases for alternation and the comple­
tion of democracy was an impetuous challenge to the PSI. In 
effect, De Mita, like Moro before him, was asserting his 
conviction of the strength of the catholic political culture 
as enshrined in the DC. It was not afraid of the idea of 
alternation, of 1*alternativa, indeed it positively welcomed 
the idea as the culmination of the centrist political strate­
gy for which the DC, since De Gasperi, had fought. This was 
De Mita*s response to Craxi. It belittled the Socialist 
Party and Craxi*s claims. It proclaimed the democratic 
virtues and ambitions of the DC. It forced the PSI to choose 
between subordination to the PCI or DC. It complemented the 
'pro-PSI* tactic of Forlani, Andreotti et al. which was of 
enticing the PSI into an embrace with the DC from which it 
would not be able to escape because it had become dependent 
on access to government and its resources. Neither tactic 
was truly pro-PSI, far from it! Both were pro-DC.
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C. De Mita: Ambiguities and Downfall
The emergency anti-Craxi coalition of 1982 led to seven 
years of De Mita's secretaryship, the longest continuous 
occupation of the post in the party*s history (see Appendix 
3) . De Mita always vigorously denied that the DC was a 
conservative party. He was not even happy that it should be 
labelled a centre-right party, but stressing the need for 
Craxi to subordinate himself to one of the two major parties 
in a bipolar scheme clearly pushed the DC to the right.45 
The contradiction was blatant and Giorgio Galli devoted one 
of his comment column's in Panorama to it.46 More important 
to De Mita's fate was the conviction of his opponents that 
the contradiction was dangerous to the party.
In the late 1980s, the bulk of the party remained 
wedded to the idea that it was a centre party, ie that the 
centre party strategy and centrist political strategy should 
not be distinguished, as De Mita tended to do. Baget Bozzo 
even argued that the overall orientation of the party was 
'centre-left'.47 Certainly De Mita's apparent push to the 
neo-conservative right in 1983 had weakened him. He had only 
survived the 1984 Congress and the examination of the party's 
calamitous electoral weakening because of the absolute imper­
ative that the party remain loyal to its leader. To replace 
De Mita, when he had been specifically chosen to oppose 
Craxi, would have been to give Craxi a tremendous political 
gift, and De Mita's proud hostility to Craxi usefully echoed 
Moro's vindication of his party.
De Mita never challenged his opposition head on over 
the question of whether Italy had, or was developing a two-
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block system, but his insistence on the challenge presented 
by the PCI, and his verbal attacks on the inadequacies of the 
old-style party, especially in his first years as secretary, 
were unrelenting.48 His onslaught on his own party was 
useful, for he was preparing it for a fight against a poten­
tial left coalition by challenging its structures, practices 
and above all its image. De Mita's zeal and honesty appealed 
to broad swathes of the country's lay elite, not least in the 
business and opinion-making worlds. One of the prime con­
quests made by De Mita was Eugenio Scalfari, editor of the 
Repubblica which, since its foundation in 1976 had been 
identified with an independent left orientation because of 
its questioning of the assumption that the DC was bound to 
govern. Scalfari became a harsh critic of Craxi and the PSI, 
but he was only one of many who looked with favour on De Mita 
and his secretaryship.49
Nor was De Mita without backing in the catholic world, 
for his modernity and laicism remained fundamentally and 
openly inspired by Christian values. The Jesuits and Catho­
lic Action in particular encouraged his battle against the 
clientelist and oligarchic roots and structure of the 
party,50 being especially supportive of his attempts to 
improve the party's image at the local level in key regions 
like Palermo. By contrast, he caused outrage in the highly 
active and politically influential Communione e Liberazione 
which contributed to his downfall in 1989. That organisa­
tion, nevertheless, was not always looked on with favour by 
Rome, and in any case, after 1983 De Mita's rampant laicity 
was toned down as the attempt to rebuild bridges between the
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party and Catholicism continued, and in 1987 the Churchfs 
support for the DC was noticeably greater than it had been in 
1979 or 1983.51
The increased support for the DC from the Church did 
not prevent De Mita's internal opposition, in close collabo­
ration with Communione e liberazione, from putting out a 
dissenting document on the eve of the 1987 election. Known 
as the 'Document of the 39' from the number of signatories 
the document not only vigorously asserted the party*s catho­
lic and popular nature, rejecting the party*s creeping trans­
formation into a conservative party,52 but spelled out its 
alternative strategy. It expressed the fear that De Mita 
would drive Craxi into the arms of the Communist Party, 
provoking the creation of that bipolar situation which he too 
readily spoke of. What was needed was a more sincere cooper­
ation with the PSI. For several reasons the moment for the 
switch was ripe, De Mita*s days were numbered.
One pressing reason was the election of the youthful 
Achille Occhetto as General Vice-Secretary of the PCI at that 
party*s Congress in 1986. The post was newly created, and 
along with a generational revolution within the party pointed 
to a process of renewal in that party. In the aftermath of 
the 1987 election, Occhetto made a major speech acknowledging 
Craxi*s role in ushering in a new period in Italian politics 
and concluding that the 'consociational' temptation should be 
definitively abandoned in favour of the strategy of the 
'democratic alternative', unequivocally confirming the exist­
ence of a bipolar system.53 Shortly thereafter, the PSI 
allied with the PCI in Milan to switch the city's government
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to the left, and with the possibility of similar action in 
ten of Italy*s regions the PSI was clearly signalling its 
ability to hit back at an aggressive coalition partner.54
At the same time, the PSI had a certain vulnerability, 
in part derived from its new strength. The 1983 election had 
propelled Craxi into the Premier*s office, but this confirmed 
the PSI*s close relationship with the DC, however conflictual 
both sides made it, and was perhaps one reason why the PCI*s 
vote losses in 1987 were limited. Moreover, the 1983 elec­
tion results had seen the PSI fail to break through in the 
opinion-voting and urban electorate of the North, the very 
electorate to which its modernising image was aimed. In­
stead, the party was being transformed into a 'southern 
party*, and hence into a certain dependence on being in 
office for its access to state resources.55 Although the 
1987 election checked this trend, to go into the opposition, 
except during the next election campaign itself, was still 
out of the question, so the PSI was condemned to work with 
the DC for another four to five years. Better, then, thought 
De Mita*s opposition, that its links with the Communist Party 
should not be encouraged by continued hostility, particularly 
since, following the regional and urban elections of 1985, it 
appeared that the end of a ten year long cycle favouring the 
left had come to an end.56 Subsequently, the DC had been 
able to wind up many remaining left coalitions in favour of 
pentapartito coalitions which reflected the national govern­
ment, and the reversal of this, as in Milan, was not accept­
able.57
De Mita had done all that was needed. He had symbo­
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lised the 'new1 party and replaced the image of a politically 
and commercially corrupt party which had resulted from the 
1981 loss of the premiership in the P-2 scandal and 1978 loss 
of the presidency in the wake of the Lockheed scandal. In 
1985 he had engineered the election of Francesco Cossiga as 
President on the first ballot, and in the spring of 1987 
Craxi had been brought down, leading to his replacement by a 
Christian Democratic Prime Minister. Now the party had to do 
all it could to reassert its power and to convince the PSI to 
ignore the temptation to switch alliances. Since the PCI 
still had double the number of PSI deputies following the 
1987 election any hope entertained by Craxi of catching that 
party up and assuming the mantle of leadership of a left 
block had been dealt a severe blow.
THE PARLIAMENTARY BALANCE 
Number of Deputies
PSI PCI Ratio
1946 115 104 1 0.9
1953 75 143 1 1.9
1958 84 140 1 1.7
1963 87 166 1 1.9
1972 61 179 1 2.9
1976 57 228 1 4.0
1979 62 201 1 3.2
1983 73 198 1 2.7
1987 94 177 1 1.9
Already at the 1986 Congress the 'party of rigour' had 
been abandoned in favour of ‘White reformism', which in 
offering reform without danger echoed Craxi,58 whilst 'cen­
trality', not ' bipolar ism', was to the fore. In this devel­
opment the Communist newspaper L'Unita recognised the influ­
ence of Andreotti who had 'buried De Mita's Reaganism' to
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provide a guarantee for the party's popular tradition.59
Andreotti was the pivot of power inside the party. He 
had backed De Mita in 1982, but from 1983 he moved to counter 
his bipolarising tendency and by 1987 he was openly preparing 
to move against him. The size of his own faction doubled 
between 1980 and 1989 to eighteen per cent, so when Baget 
Bozzo wrote in March 1987 that the party had to choose be­
tween ‘Andreotti and Andreatta1, the decision had already 
been taken.60
In the autumn of 1987 the factions, relatively dormant 
since 1982, reappeared. Unity behind De Mita and the inevi­
tability of the link with Craxi had weakened the distinction 
between the left and the centre. Now the decision to back 
Craxi more positively reopened it. Armando Forlani, De 
Mita's narrowly defeated opponent in 1982, formed a grouping 
called the New Democratic Alliance61 which moved towards the 
grouping of southern notables known as the 'Gulf' faction 
thanks to their links with Naples. These then moved towards 
a regrouping of old Dorotei notables known as ‘Reformist 
Commitment',6  ^ whose birth Emilio Colombo described as the 
rebirth of the centre. This created ‘Popular Action', and at 
the Congress in 1989 Forlani floated the idea of changing the 
party's name to the Popular Party in order to stress its 
mass, hence, supposedly, anti-conservative nature. This 
change would also enable the party to discard the conserva­
tive aura surrounding the DC's name and reinforce the link 
with the PSI on a reformist basis. The proposal did not 
succeed, but De Mita was unhorsed as Andreotti switched back 
to the renewed centre block.
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Before De Mita lost power he made one final attempt to 
state the bipolar case, clearly signalling the division 
between the centrist political strategy and the centrist 
party strategy. But he made it only when the battle was, at 
least in the short term, lost. Andreotti*s position was 
critical to De Mita*s position, but Andreotti was bitterly 
opposed to the two-block scheme,63 being a committed support­
er of maintaining the party centrist strategy. In November 
1987, exploiting the ambiguity in the Secretary's position, 
he accused De Mita of having no strategy at all, and by 
February 1988 the key move in easing De Mita out of his post 
had made with the announcement that De Mita should become 
Prime Minister. In accordance with DC tradition and the 
realities of internal power, De Mita had to resign as Secre­
tary. 64
Whilst these manoeuvres were taking place, the bipolar 
strategy gained dramatic and bloody prominence with the 
assassination by the Red Brigades of one of De Mita's key 
advisors, Roberto Ruffilli.65 Ruffilli was a convinced 
exponent of the benefits of alternation in a modern democracy 
and De Mita's linkage with the idea gained sudden force, 
particularly as he became Prime Minister in the same period. 
De Mita was reinvigorated, and in his inaugural address he 
asserted the need for Westminster style democracy. But this 
was his swan-song and little came of it. Within a year he 
was unseated as Secretary and the left rapidly lost all 
prominence in the party. Andreotti became Prime Minister. 
The clearly stated aim of the party now was to prevent alter­
nation, but the fear of those who supported De Mita was that
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should alternation be forced on the party it would survive 
less well as a populist catholic party than as the centre- 
right catch-all party for which De Mita had pushed.66
Ill BETWEEN BIPOLARITY AND DIFFUSION
In making strategic political decisions the major party 
elites have to seek not merely to increase their party*s 
share of the votes, but also to consider how their relations 
with other parties will influence the shape, or structure, of 
the party system. Thus, in the 1980s, Craxi called for votes 
for the lay-socialist area, not merely his party, and vigor­
ously attacked the PCI, in order to break through in the 
centre, whilst Giorgio Napolitano of the PCI urged on his 
party the need somehow to maintain a positive relationship 
with the PSI if it was to make its stated strategy of the 
'democratic alternative1 even minimally realistic. For its 
part, the DC pursued a centrist orientation, but was torn 
between preparing for a two-block party system and striving 
to avoid it. How the system would develop was unclear, but 
the game was no longer between maintaining a three-block 
structure against a two-block threat. Now the collapse of 
the Right and the weakening of the two-block dynamic was 
accentuating the trend towards a confused and confusing 
mixture of diffusion, or multi-polarity, and of depolarisa­
tion, or so-called 'uni-polarity'. The DC could hope to 
retain its dominance if this trend dominated, by virtue of 
its size, able to aggregate, as necessary, a shifting coali­
tion of the other parties around its bulk.
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The key to the system*s development was the relation­
ship between the PCI and the PSI. If the two parties com­
bined in some fashion, the smaller parties and the electorate 
would be forced to take sides, as they had been in 1947/48. 
So long as political aggregation was not promoted in this 
way, the fragmentation of the party system and weakening 
polarisation would encourage diffusion,67 ie the disaggrega­
tion of the party system. Despite the frequent pronounce­
ments about their imminent demise, the small centre parties 
demonstrated a capacity to survive based on the meagre quan­
tity of votes required and their prominence in cabinet and 
the para-state, not to mention the support of state funding. 
The MSI, Radicals and DP, and from 1987 the Greens, could all 
rely on their non-governmental status to attract a variegated 
protest vote, whilst regional parties such as the Lombardy 
League and Sardinian Action Party were growing in signifi­
cance. It was in part the strength of the tendency to diffu­
sion which allowed the DC to reject De Mita. If the PSI 
fought off the embrace of its confirmation as the DC*s privi­
leged partner it would be accused of destabilising irrespon­
sibility. If it knuckled under, it would leave the PCI to 
dominate a hodgepodge of parties that was not a credible 
basis for an alternative government.
A. Left Unitv - the Key to Bipolarity
In the post-war period the Italian left was divided 
between Communists, Socialists and Social Democrats? between 
lay left and catholic left. The lay left itself was divided 
between socialists and liberals (the PRI), and even the rise
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of the New Left in the 1970s, itself a further fragmentation 
of the left, displayed this divide: the liberal Radicals 
contrasting with the socialist DP. As against this fragmen­
tation, there is great concentration: the PCI and PSI ac­
counted for some 40% of the valid vote. There were two 
problems to overcoming their division. The first was their 
internal division deriving from ideological orientation, 
historical antipathy and policy judgments. The second was 
the external question of the circumstances in which a narrow 
parliamentary majority for the left/centre-left would be 
politically adequate. Elected specifically to assert PSI 
'autonomy', Craxi went on to attack the PCI relentlessly for 
over a decade. Yet so long as the aim was to reweight the 
balance internal to the left, and so long as Craxi remained a 
potential Mitterrand, the purpose of this attack was al­
liance. The paradox of the 1980s was that left unity could 
only proceed on the basis of heightened discord.
Considerable progress towards a more balanced situation 
on the left was made in the 1980s. The PCI's parliamentary 
representation declined continuously from 1976 as it appar­
ently became locked into a circle of failure and irrelevance, 
whilst by contrast the PSI grew, though not in a steady 
fashion, nor at a corresponding rate. Growth was negligible 
in 1979, limited in 1983 and only reached the sort of levels 
hoped for in 1987. The slowness of the process was a problem 
for Craxi, but by 1987 the situation was transformed by
comparison with 1976. Then the PCI had had three times the
electorate and four times the number of deputies, by the end
of the eighties it was less than twice the size of the PSI
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and roughly the same size as the lay-socialist area.
As we have seen, the 1987 election and the triumphs of 
1988 led to talk of a Socialist sorpasso. somewhat vindicat­
ing Craxi's strategy. But the ball began to roll very late, 
perhaps too late to prevent the PCI sorting its problems out. 
The exclusion of the PCI came to an end in 1987.
Craxi's loss of the premiership weakened his position 
so that he himself needed the PCI in order to be able to 
withstand the pressure exerted against him. The logic of the 
DC's 34% of the vote compared to the PSI's 14% was that the 
Prime Minister would again be a Christian Democrat, and 
probably until 1992. The DC made it quite clear that it 
intended to run the country until at least 1992, not least 
because of the need to prepare for the challenge for the 
single market, and the minor government parties were no 
automatic allies of Craxi.68 Giorgio La Malfa in particular 
supported De Mita's argument that there was a need for deci­
sive government, whilst the PLI was growing aware that its 
reorientation to the left had left a potential gap on the 
right.69
Craxi's attempts to demonstrate the continuing authori­
ty of the PSI were of dubious value. Thus the Socialist 
power of veto on DC premier candidates merely delayed De 
Mita's appointment for nine months and played into Andreot­
ti 's hands.A Equally, the attempt to create a left/right 
polarisation isolating the DC via a series of referenda on 
nuclear and judicial issues failed to have the desired effect
A. Though this aspect of it may have been deliberate.
350
when the DC ducked the confrontation, whereas the campaign 
brought criticism within Italy's elite circles of Craxifs 
continuing demagoguery and the threat to the country's insti­
tutional development. The entire episode back-fired, as it 
was taken to be indicative of the negative potential of 
referenda, particularly when exploited as weapons in party 
political struggle.70
The DC too showed increasing interest in the PCI as a 
way of putting pressure on the PSI, De Mita's final initia­
tives in this direction being subsumed within a new strategy 
in which the neo-Dorotei, as we shall see in the next sec­
tion, sought to reorientate the DC to the left. By the late 
1980s both the DC and the PSI were seeking both to maintain 
the exclusion of the PCI to their own benefit, and to use 
that party against their coalition partner. Both tendencies 
encouraged the progressive assimilation of the PCI with the 
centre. This process has been traced as a continuous devel­
opment in the analysis of party programmes referred to in the 
introduction (see reproduction p.58), but at the coalition 
and electoral levels it had been less than obvious. From the 
mid-1980s the process became apparent at these levels too.
The initial reaction of the PCI to the assumption of 
the premiership by Craxi was one of undiluted hostility, a 
response to the confirmation of their isolation. The con­
frontation in the 1985 referendum on the wage-indexing system 
confirmed the intense antagonism between the parties, and 
Alessandro Natta, the new secretary who took over after 
Berlinguer's death, completely misjudged the party's strength 
in the face of the new government alliance. Nevertheless,
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under trade union and public pressure the PCI cooperated with 
the PSI over tax reform, whilst the party's 'right', led by 
Giorgio Napoletano, openly criticised the bankruptcy of 
aiming for a democratic alternative whilst relentlessly 
attacking the PSI.
The defeat in the referendum and the poor showing in 
the 1985 regional elections led to the election of the youth­
ful Achille Occhetto as Natta's deputy. As we have seen, 
Occhetto rejected the 'consociational temptation' in a major 
speech of November 1987 marking his appointment, but the 
intense hostility of the DC of a decade earlier was waning,71 
and despite Occhetto's new determination to follow a two- 
block strategy talks between De Mita, La Maifa and Natta took 
place in early 1988 which led to renewed Communist specula­
tion about a 'grand coalition' which would precede alterna­
tion.72
The PSI's cautious interest in the PCI thus competed 
with that of the DC. In the summer of 1988 the PSI re­
opened the question of left unity, and Craxi even tentatively 
aired a date for its realisation - 1992, ie coinciding with 
the next election and the new Europe of the single market.73 
That same summer, Natta resigned as Secretary of the PCI, not 
without rumours of internal intrigue exploiting his illness. 
Occhetto became Secretary and his decisively moderate beha­
viour and declarations encouraged the possibility of further 
rapprochement between the parties. He set out a ' new course' 
for the party which consisted in no less than ' conquering the 
centre', stressing the importance of serious policy initia­
tives, rather than rhetoric, in achieving this aim.74 Over
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the Winter of 1988-89 Occhetto established himself as a major 
new protagonist on the Italian political stage, and in Febru­
ary 1989, the month of the DC Congress, the PSI again aired 
the possibility of left unity in 1992.75
In the autumn of 1989, Occhetto set in motion a process 
which led to the extraordinary party congress of March 1990. 
Preceded by consultations of the entire party about the need 
to change the partyfs name and completely recast itself, the 
Congress aimed to win mass support for a dramatic modernisa­
tion of the party. The new elite had no intention of finding 
itself misunderstood and crossed by its own rank and file as 
it had been a decade earlier. The aim of the new leadership 
was not simply to update the party in a belated 'Bad Godes- 
berg1, but to present the Congress as marking the dissolution 
of the PCI and the opportunity for the recasting of the
entire left block of the party system.
In the 1990s an arithmetically marginal majority for
the left was likely to be politically adequate in a way that
it previously had not been. Not only was the possibility 
that the PCI harboured Leninist dreams inconceivably remote,
but at a more domestic and pragmatic level the reform of the
Italian state seemed in many ways more practicable with the 
DC in the opposition. Not least, the reform of the 'idiosyn­
cratic welfare state1 which the DC had built76 was all but 
inconceivable so long as the DC remained dominant. For the 
PSI the advantages of alternation range from the higher pay 
off in terms of ministerial portfolios through the need to 
reinforce success or inevitably to once more decline, to the
possibility of definitively overtaking the PCI to become the
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dominant party of the Left and of government, to say nothing 
of politico-ideological motivations. Even as a coequal 
government partner with the PCI, a status it could hardly 
ever hope to stabilise with the DC, it could hope to estab­
lish a new predominance such as that exercised by the DC 
since 1947. The motivations for the PCI were largely the 
same, though the Communists were driven by the hope of re­
gaining access to the cabinet from which they had been so 
rudely expelled forty years earlier.
If the left were to win an electoral victory and expel 
the DC from government, the enlarged centre of the 
quasi-one-block system would be transformed by 'fission*. 
The existence of a programmatic centre-left and centre-right 
would be matched by the existence of a two-block party sys­
tem. But such an outcome was not guaranteed, the DC might 
not be able to survive as a hegemonic centre-right party, and 
only this would secure the formation of a two-block struc­
ture, rather than a reversal of the three-block structure, 
with the left predominant.
B. Catholic Populism: A Strategy for the 1990s
The opposition which defeated De Mita at the February 
1989 Congress had sought to reinforce the coalition with the 
PSI throughout the 1980s, but had been wary of legitimising a 
two-block interpretation of the party system. As the DC 
sought to compete with the PSI*s tentative moves towards the 
Communist Party in the late 1980s it too moved towards the 
PCI, but whereas De Mita did so with a view to gaining sup­
port for constitutional reform, the neo-Dorotei did so in an
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electorally manipulative and competitive way. They sought to 
gain Communist support to cope with the problem of the 
state's growing indebtedness, for a broad consensus was 
required which would impose common political burden-sharing 
rather than loading it on one political block.77 At the same 
time, and the PCI's reassociation with the DC on a key eco­
nomic policy orientation would reinforce the ease of this, 
they hoped to gain votes from the left block themselves as 
the decline of the PCI continued. In the process they would 
demonstrate the non-existence of the two-block schema and the 
universal nature of the catholic party and its popular ap­
peal .
1. The PC's new courting of the PCI
Under Andreotti and Forlani the DC sought to reassert 
its ‘centre moving left' image to encourage the decline of 
the PCI and reinforce its own unchallenged plurality position 
in an increasingly unstructured party system. An expression 
of positive attitudes vis a vis the PCI was thus noticeable 
as the new leaders stressed the party's 'Popular' origins. 
Although a full-blown coalition was not the intention, even 
this remained a possibility according to Vittorio Sbardella, 
Andreotti's right-hand man.78 Sbardella, an ex-MSI man 
himself, has never been an admirer of the PCI, unlike many on 
the DC left, but in keeping with the neo-transformist tradi­
tion of the party, of which Andreotti is the supreme artist, 
he was not content to sit back and watch the PSI reap all the 
benefits of the PCI's decline. Even if the overall size of a 
potential left block was not increasing, a 40% block dominat­
ed by its centrist component would be intolerable, so votes
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leaving the PCI had to be intercepted.
The realism of the DC's new strategy is open to ques­
tion given that much contemporary analysis of electoral 
volatility in Western Europe indicates cross-block vote 
transfers to be rare.79 In Italy, the comprehensive analysis 
of vote flows by the Cattaneo Institute, covering the inter­
action of spoiled votes and abstention as well as positive 
voting, indicated that of recent elections only in 1979 did 
voters switch directly from the PCI to the DC to a signifi­
cant extent. This was tentatively interpreted as indicating 
a one-off 'release' of Communist sympathizers who had been 
'trapped' in the DC's embrace until released by the govern­
ments of national solidarity.80 Other analyses, however, 
tell a different story, and it must be noted that the Catta­
neo analysts acknowledged the difficulties which Italy's 
geographically and culturally fragmented political landscape 
presents, and in particular the unreliability of their data 
for southern Italy due to boundary changes.
It may be that the complex organisational web with 
which the DC covers Italy is well equipped to provide its 
leaders with information about electoral conditions at the 
local level, and it is particularly in the south that the 
PCI's vote is seen as vulnerable to the DC. This is under­
standable since it is alien to both the industrial proletar­
ian tradition of northern Italy and to the Red sub-culture of 
central Italy. Thus Remo Gaspari enabled local PCI/DC coali­
tions throughout the Abruzzi,8-*- and Vincenzo Scotti, a key 
leader of the Gulf faction, personally reinstated the DC's 
fortunes in Naples after the set-backs of 1975 and 1980.82
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The PCI's vulnerability to the DC was even reported in the 
party newspaper, l'Unita, with cross-block losses to the DC,
PRI and MSI outnumbering losses within the left.83 Whatever 
judgments are made about the accuracy and significance of 
such findings,A it is clear that the new leadership aimed in 
this direction. Referring to Fanfani's hopes of shifting the 
DC to the left in the 1950s and '60s, Antonio Gava, leader of 
the Grande centro, reiterated the DC's status as a popular 
party and affirmed ‘We can achieve today that breakthrough to 
the left which Fanfani did not achieve'.84 The difference 
was that whereas Fanfani sought out PSI voters, now it was 
votes from the PCI which were being chased.
This strategy was rendered possible by the crisis of 
Communism, the European wide confusion as to left and right 
when it came to finding economic strategies to deal with the 
crises of the 1970s and '80s, and by the decisive assimila­
tion of the PLI, PSI and even the PCI in the centre of the 
Italian party system. The result, as the philosopher Giacomo 
Marramao put it, was the danger of ‘the parties becoming 
identical, all the same', of ‘homologenisation, absolute 
indistinguishability'.85 Farneti's vision of unipolarity was 
coming true with a vengeance.
2. Catholic Populism: a universal/catch-all strategy
De Mita and his leading opponents, Forlani and Andreot­
ti, had a common interest in rebuilding the party's links 
with the catholic world. In organisational terms one of the
A. And these are subject to even more doubt in the light of the uncover­
ing of major electoral frauds in the aftermath of the 1987 election in 
southern Italy.
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key 'catholic' interest groups which the party had to win 
back if it was to avoid becoming a conservative party was 
CISL. As we have seen, in the late 1960s CISL moved into 
open confrontation with the DC and by 1979 its links with the 
catholic world were so attenuated that it elected a non­
catholic, Pierre Carniti, as its secretary. Carniti conduct­
ed an increasingly autonomous politics in the 1980s, deeply 
hostile to the various governments' financially 'conserva­
tive' tendencies, and at the 1984 Party Congress Carniti's 
deputy, Franco Marini, clashed bitterly with De Mita in 
precisely these terms.
Both sides, in fact, the union and the party/govern­
ment, were seeking out the other for their own purposes. 
Already the 1983 'Scotti Accords' had established a quasi- 
corporatist tripartitism, and Scotti was a key figure in the 
neo-Dorotei. By the time De Mita came to have responsibili­
ty, as prime minister, for the budget in 1988, his neo-liber- 
al conservatism was long past. His budget, as we noted, 
brought international criticism, but within weeks, and subse­
quent to De Mita's defeat at the 1989 Congress, the DC re­
gained the full allegiance of the powerful CISL union confed­
eration and its three million members.86 The DC was deliber­
ately seeking to outflank the PLI, PRI and PSI on their left.
To a considerable extent the handicap that identifica­
tion with the Catholic Church had presented in the 1970s and 
early '80s was a thing of the past now that legislation 
existed permitting both divorce and abortion. The party 
could accommodate fairly intransigent opponents to the legis­
lation because they would not leave the catholic party,
358
especially so long as exponents of Communione e Liberazione 
were active within its ranks, yet at the same time the widely 
recognised different approaches within the catholic world, 
and in particular papal backing for the legislation, made the 
DC's own tolerant attitudes easier to combine with a profes­
sion of catholic loyalty. Indeed, the party's combination of 
tolerance and catholic certitude made it able to contain and 
use the diffuse sense of moral disappointment that followed 
in the wake of legislative liberalisation. As we have seen, 
even PSI remained open to dialogue, even with harsh critics 
like Roberto Formigoni, whilst in the vast diaspora of envi­
ronmental politics too the support for ecological health, or 
more simply 'life', had brought a certain anti-abortion 
backlash.
The world of environmentalist politics in Italy is an 
extremely heterogeneous one, and one of its important compo­
nents is that of catholic pacifism and third worldwide. The 
environmental movement spans the party system, and in the 
1980s its challenge to left/right structuring complemented 
the fact that this was decaying of its own accord. It thus 
provided an important area in which the DC could seek to 
assert its catch-all nature and the irrelevance of the 
left/right schema, contrary to the rather contradictory 
arguments which De Mita (two blocks, but neither on the 
right) and Craxi ('bipolar government') were pushing.
Catholicism is an ideal universalist ideology with 
which to embrace new movements in Italian society, and after 
the trauma of the 1960s and '70s, the 1980s saw a resurgence 
of catholic culture as simultaneously both distinctive and
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all-embracing. This movement was both broadly cultural and 
specifically political, with large numbers of schools being 
set up from about 1986 to develop political skills and aware­
ness.87 To a large extent these were a response to the DC's 
failure to rid itself of its unacceptable features, but 
clearly there was no guarantee that the benefits of catholic 
organisation would not be channelled once more into the DC. 
As the revived, more pluralist, but still distinctly catho­
lic, sub-culture renewed its assault on Italian society in 
the 1980s, Laura Balbo of the Independent Left warned of the 
danger that catholic penetration of the various social move­
ments would smother their potential for radical change. 
There was a danger, she saw of 'a tendency towards the subor­
dination of the left vis a vis catholic values'.88 It was 
precisely this that the DC of Andreotti and Forlani was 
aiming for.
3. The inevitability of defeat?
Two strategies have been presented for the DC. On the 
one hand, De Mita pursued a centrist strategy which, never­
theless, saw the possibility that defeat was coming whatever 
the party did. Given this it sought to prepare the DC as a 
centre-right catch-all party able to aggregate an anti-so­
cialist opposition and confirm the validity of the principle 
of alternation by contributing to the creation of a strong 
two-block system on the basis of which it would at some point 
return to government. For Pietro Scoppola, De Mita's defeat 
put the party back into the hands of those who wanted to 
emphasise the party's catholic and populist roots, a strategy 
that would lead to the probable fragmentation of the right
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and the domination of a new 'socialist* hegemony.
But for De Mita's critics, his strategy was seen as 
alienating substantial sections of the party's traditional 
mass base, not least by fuelling CISL's antipathies, and as 
painting itself into the conservative corner. De Mita was 
guaranteeing the party's defeat, and once in the opposition 
its support base was likely to dissolve. Much of the DC's 
southern vote was a vote for it as the government party, and 
its working class support would be lost if CISL worked with 
the other unions and the left parties in a neo-corporatist 
strategy, as was likely. Finally, these losses would reduce 
the DC to a conservative rump and alienate catholic progres­
sives so that not even the party's Catholicism would serve as 
a mass aggregative basis.
The party's response to this situation was to reject De 
Mita, but it was a possibly vain attempt to avoid defeat, for 
the two-block dynamic was never adequately smothered for a 
strategy based on reasserting DC centrality and the marginal­
isation of all other forces to work. A decisive blow to 
Andreotti and Forlani was the arrival of Occhetto at the 
summit of the PCI. His decisive rejection of the 'consocia- 
tional temptation' and dramatic dissolution of the PCI to 
recast the left block was a fundamental assertion of the 
existence of a two-block dynamic in Italy. It was a recast­
ing which attempted to overcome the divisions of the left by 
appealing to Don Sturzo, the founder of the original catholic 
Populist Party, as well as to key figures of the radical 
liberal left like the Rossellis and Piero Gobetti, without 
forgetting the Soviet Union of Gorbachev.89
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IV CONFLICT IN THE 199OS
In the 1990s the party system no longer hovers between 
different versions of two- and three block structures, but 
between a two-block structure and ‘diffusion1. However, a 
fragmented and depolarised party landscape in which the DC 
alone was a major party able to bind a governing coalition 
together would be one in which domination, rather than a 
pluralist Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit, would continue to be 
the main theme of the polity. As against this possibility a 
two-block structure might finally assert itself.
The late ‘waning of opposition1 in Italy, ie the visi­
ble collapse of Communist Leninism, is, paradoxically, the 
very basis on which opposition in Italy can be made meaning­
ful. Competition between two political blocks could emerge 
in the 1990s as a bout of aggregation promoting bipolarism 
takes place between the DC and a post-Communist left block. 
However, a critical intervening question remains the position 
of the small parties. Will the lay parties side with the DC 
as they did in 1947? Will the PSI side with the ‘new1 not- 
the-PCI PCI as it did in 1947? Will the vote for the Greens 
prevent the left establishing a viable governmental block?
The unity of the left ultimately still depends on the 
interplay between the electorate and the party elites. One 
scenario for the development of a left block begins with the 
electorate indicating in the 1990 regional elections that it 
likes the idea of alternation. This leads to the PSI being 
encouraged to risk joining the PCI in open opposition to the 
DC, possibly provoking a confrontational early election in
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1991. But Italian election results are rarely so decisive. 
The Greens and the other parties might be squeezed, but it is 
not at all certain they would disappear. Perhaps Dahren- 
dorf's argument that greater party political conflict is what 
is needed in order to promote innovation and aggregation, or 
'strategic change*90 is applicable. It would suggest that 
the PCI and PSI should attack the DC uncompromisingly in 
order to squeeze the other parties into alignment and the 
electorate into aggregation. If this confrontation does not 
take place the lay parties are likely merely to continue 
their juggling act, surviving as permanently governing par­
ties, whilst the MSI, DP and Greens survive as permanently 
opposing parties. The system will remain 'blocked1.
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CHAPTER 8 CONCLUSION
This thesis has focused on what can justifiably be 
called the obsession of the Italian Christian Democratic 
Party with the 'centre' throughout the whole of the post-war 
period to the present. In the first chapter it was suggested 
that the centre exists in two senses in the Italian party 
system. Firstly, there is the centre as the centre block, 
dominated by the DC, secondly, there is the relational centre 
which is defined by the interaction of the core parties, and 
these span all three blocks. The body of the thesis examined 
the process in which these two centres were created, main­
tained and transformed, as well as their tendency to move 
closer together.
The analysis of the DC's strategy focused on the inter­
action between the elite of that party and the elites and 
electorates of the other parties. A distinction was drawn 
between a party-centrist strategy which sought to maintain 
the centre block through its electoral appeal, and a politi- 
cal-centrist strategy which sought to foster a cooperative 
relationship between the political blocks. The tension 
between the two strategies was highlighted and shown to have 
been particularly significant in two periods. Firstly, the 
decade from 1953, when the party-centrist strategy risked 
negating the political-centrist strategy, a situation de­
scribed as 'exclusionary centrism' to highlight its democrat­
ic ambiguity. Secondly, in the 1980s, when leading Christian 
Democrats thought the success of the centrist political 
strategy required the ending the party-centrist strategy, 
that is, the end of the DC's identification with a centre
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block, to create the possibility of alternation.
The analysis of the Italian party system and the Chris­
tian Democratic Party was undertaken as an analysis of centre 
domination, and the meaning of this term, and the key points 
established in the thesis, are now summarised in five sec­
tions. The first section makes explicit the argument that 
centre domination can be structurally organised in just three 
basic ways, whilst the second restates the important distinc­
tion to be made between blocks and poles, the centre and the 
core. The third section describes the functioning of centre 
domination as a process of 'polity management1 in which a 
'political class' plays a major role, and thus considers the 
relevance of the 'consociational democracy1 theme to Italy. 
The fourth section sketches the evolution of the Italian 
party system and the fifth assesses the impact of sustained 
party system interaction on state and nation-building in 
Italy.
I THREE FORMS OF CENTRE DOMINATION
Centre domination is a situation of political stability 
deriving from the existence of a working party system. The 
basis of this stability is the organisation of conflict as a 
competitive struggle between political blocks to determine 
who has access to government, and who does not. The exist­
ence of a stable, if shifting, pattern of interactions 
creates a 'relational centre', and this evolving centre can 
be said to be dominant. This dominance arises from the fact
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that the core parties who define the centre believe that its 
existence is to their advantage, even if they seek to change 
the structure on which it is based, eg from a three-block to 
a two-block system.
Given the need for government in multi-party systems to 
be based on the support of a parliamentary majority there are 
three basic ways in which political conflict can be struc­
tured, all of which have been relevant in post-war Italy. 
The first possibility is that a single, multipolar, block 
exists so that either shifting minorities secure a majority 
on a rotating basis, or else government is majoritarian to 
the point of unanimity. The CLN came very close to this 
latter form, and in the 1970s it seemed highly likely that a 
grand coalition would be formed. In the 1980s, both variants 
of the one-block structure, that is grand coalition and 
Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit, played minor roles in shaping 
party strategies.
The second way of structuring the existence of a rela­
tional centre is the two-block system in which two parties or 
coalitions are each able to secure the government. It is the 
creation of such a structure that the dominant elites of the 
Italian political class have consistently sought to avoid, 
fearing that direct two-block confrontation would see the 
destruction of the party system and the installation of a 
facade democracy.
Finally, the centre can be secured via the operation of 
a three-block system, one of the blocks being a centre block 
since there is not Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit. The fact 
that the centre block can vary in size gives rise to three
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variants of the three-block system: the flank-dominant vari­
ant, as found in West Germany, the parity variant, as found 
in the Netherlands, and the centre-dominant variant, as found 
in Italy. The last variant bears a host of dysfunctions but 
these, it is argued, were the price paid for the party 
system's survival beyond its ‘installation phase' (1943-53). 
Section five suggests there is no need for this price to 
continue to be paid, pace the conservative conclusion of La 
Palombara's otherwise radical work of revision.1
II TWO VIEWS OF PARTY SYSTEM STRUCTURE
The basis of party system stability is argued to be the 
formation of a stable pattern of interactions between parties 
grouped into blocks. But what constitutes a stable pattern 
of interactions? Here it helps to distinguish between blocks 
and poles, the centre block and the relational centre (or 
core centre), to show that block interaction does not take 
place between unitary and sovereign blocks.
Blocks may consist of single parties, but they are 
likely to be coalitions, and since parties are ‘poles' of 
attraction, blocks are likely to be multipolar. In Italy, 
all the blocks have been multipolar, though by the early 
1970s only the centre block remained so, right and left 
being identified with the MSI and the PCI respectively.
Whether block interaction will be stable depends partly 
on system structure, as discussed in the next section, and 
very much on the nature of cross-block relations. Usually, 
blocks will be internally divided over the question of the 
nature of the relations which ought to prevail across block
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divides, and in multipolar blocks different parties are 
likely to have different views on this matter. In Italy, 
cross-block relations have been of exceptional importance 
given the degree of formal hostility between the blocks. 
Often, factions, or tendencies, within parties have been of 
particular significance because of their attitudes to cross­
block relations.
The significance of linkages across blocks, including 
linkages based on electoral competitiveness, is obscured in 
the linear spatial logic of the block (or polar) model. 
Thus, whereas the concept of the centre block distinguishes 
sharply between blocks, the concept of the (relational or 
core) centreA points to what blocks have in common. Parties 
that contribute to the creation and definition of the centre 
should be considered to be core parties, regardless of the 
block they are in. In Italy, the PCI was a part of the core, 
and not to be counted-out as an anti-system party. The 
relationship between the PCI and the DC laid the foundations 
of the Italian party system and of the Republic. Without a 
party system core, there cannot be a party system at all, and 
it is a secondary point as to whether a centre block exists.
The model which sees party competition as taking place 
along a single, linear, left/right dimension uncovers only 
part of the truth. It discovers the irreducible difference 
between left and right, or perhaps between left and centre 
and right, but it fails to see another aspect of party compe-
A. Henceforward the term centre will refer to the relational 
centre.
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tition, which is about cooperation and overlap with regard to 
goals and/or the means of achieving divergent goals. A 
mechanical and/or multi-dimensional model of party interac­
tion must supplement the linear one. For this reason the 
concept of 'polarisation', whilst undoubtedly contributing to 
an explanation of the structure and dynamics of the Italian 
party system (and of party system interaction in general), is 
misleading.
'Polarisation' emphasises solely the ideological dis­
tance between parties, and completely overlooks the elements 
of overlap between parties which make the system manageable 
in the first place. Overlap is important in two principle 
areas. First, with regard to other elites, there is a common 
determination to establish a political class, that is to 
maintain political leadership in the hands of party elites, 
as far as possible. Secondly, and relatedly, with regard to 
the mass publics, there is agreement to pursue economic 
growth ('productivism') in order to gain their support.
Ill THE CENTRE AS DYNAMIC CONFLICT-HANDLING
The creation of a centre in Italy was the work of the 
new political class which asserted itself in the wake of the 
collapse of Fascism in and through the Committee for National 
Liberation, or CLN. De Gasperi and Togliatti were particu­
larly important figures since they claimed to represent 
parties which in turn represented the vast new, and initially 
untested, electorates. The importance of the relationship 
between Togliatti and De Gasperi was such that the DC and
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the PCI came to dominate the party system as parties of 
popular and catholic anti-socialism, and of socialism, re­
spectively.
Although many Socialists, Actionists and even Commu­
nists favoured a confrontational stance versus the DC, an 
attitude that many figures on the right shared, such a 
strategy was avoided until 1947. The two-block situation 
which developed as a result of the 1947 rupture was, however, 
highly unstable, and did not last out the first legislature. 
In fact, the election of 1953 confirmed the possibility of 
building a three-block party system in Italy. The creation 
of this party system, it was argued, was the work of a polit­
ical class which, although divided in its aims and in large 
part over the means for achieving them at least agreed to 
avoid the collapse of multi-party interaction and the estab­
lishment of a quasi-democracy such as followed the civil war 
in Greece.
Both the definition of the DC as a centre party and the 
establishment maintenance of the three-block system in the 
1950s and '60s were thus regarded as innovative and creative 
forms of political behaviour, for they enabled the collapse 
of the nascent party system to be avoided. Although De 
Gasperi specifically, and the DC in general, played a crucial 
role in this process, many other parties participated in it. 
The long-term evolution of the system was regarded as re­
flecting the interaction between the three blocks. Thus the 
evolution of the centre was the outcome of a process of 
interaction between a political class spanning all three 
blocks.
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The imperfect (because it excluded the right) grand 
coalition of the period 1944-47/48 did not last however, nor 
was it recreated during the late 1970s years of the Historic 
Compromise and governments of national solidarity. For this 
reason, the term 'consociational democracy1 has been widely 
regarded as irrelevant in Italy, since grand or extended 
coalitions are a major feature of such democracies.2 Howev­
er, it is not the case that the concept is simply inapplica­
ble to Italy: it has been suggested to be meaningless tout 
court, and for two reasons. First, the elite accommodation 
which it sees as an antidote to the lack of consensus at the 
societal level is, on the one hand, not always forthcoming 
when it ought to be, whilst on the other, elite cooperation 
is a basic feature of any working democracy.3 Secondly, the 
degree of conflict that consociational institutions supposed­
ly managed peacefully was probably not present in those 
societies anyway.4
What is striking about the Italian case is precisely 
that conflict at the mass level was intense, and that elites 
did exist who had no intention of smothering this conflict. 
Precisely for these reasons the political class that asserted 
its dominance against the confrontational alternative was 
unable to maintain the grand coalition which it had estab­
lished, at the elite level only, beyond the initiation of the 
full-blooded electoral campaign of 1947-48.
The establishment of the centre-dominant three-block 
system apparently based, as Sartori insists, on a pro- and 
anti-system or constitutional logic, thus instituted a form 
of more or less 'invisible' elite cooperation in circum­
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stances where 'visible' cooperation genuinely was difficult 
because of the high capacity for conflict in the polity. The 
high degree of elite accommodation of the CLN was, then, 
competing against an alternative approach to politics in 
which the low degree of cohesion in Italian society would 
have carried greater political weight. Equally the struggle 
to build and maintain the three-block system was a struggle 
to preserve and build upon the political cooperation that 
existed.
Nevertheless, to the extent that it can be doubted that 
either electorates or elites seeking a more confrontational 
politics sought to engage in a negative-sum game in which 
every one lost out, then it can be doubted that the political 
class did not give the Italian electorate as a whole more or 
less what it wanted, in broad political terms. This point 
reinforces Farneti's claim, backed up as we saw in Chapter 
One by Pasquino, that the general orientation of Italian 
government over time has corresponded to the general will of 
the electorate. None of which is to gainsay Pasquino's point 
that in the process of consolidating a functioning multi­
party democracy the political class also benefited itself in 
a way which was, in a significant sense uncontrollable by 
society at large. Nor is it to gainsay the argument that the 
continuity of this system is uncalled for if the evolution of 
political culture, pari passu with the evolution of the party 
system, has progressed to such a point that the centre- 
dominant three-block system is redundant.
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IV THE EVOLUTION OF THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM
The one-block system created at the elite level in 
Italy between 1944-47 could not be sustained, but the surviv­
al of the embryonic relational centre was provided for by the 
creation of the centre-dominant three block system which 
avoided the dangers of a two-block confrontation. The struc­
ture installed, however, froze visible conflict at a high 
intensity, as Sartori correctly saw. The new structure 
guaranteed the continuance of centre domination but in a way 
which favoured Christian Democratic influence over its devel­
opment whilst minimising the influence of other parties, even 
the DC's block allies.
Nevertheless, precisely the danger of Christian Demo­
crat hegemony maximised dissent within the centre block and 
within the catholic movement itself, encouraging linkages not 
only with the right block, but with the excluded left. These 
linkages were eventually consummated by the ‘opening to the 
left', which provoked tremendous political conflict as left 
and right fought bitterly against their renewed exclusion and 
the development of political tendencies which they opposed. 
The accession of the PSI to the centre confirmed the ability 
of the three-block system to prevent two-block confrontation 
yet to glory in political conflict.
The three-block system thus went through two phases, 
that of apparent domination by the DC, or ‘exclusionary 
centrism', with its paradoxically anti-centrist, quasi­
total itarian implications, and that of the Centre-Left. The 
succession of the Centre-Left to Centrism was indicative of
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the asymmetry of the three-block structure, and dissatisfac­
tion with the Centre-Left reinforced this asymmetry, leading 
towards the tendency for a two-block system to assert itself 
again, this time through alternation based solely on the PCI.
A SCHEMATIC HISTORY OF THE ITALIAN PARTY SYSTEM
Date Block Structure 
1944-47 One-Block
1947-53 Transitional
Two-/Three-Block
1953-68 Three-Block
1968-90 Transitional
Three-/Two-Block
(Diffusion)
1990s Two-/0ne-Block?
Comments
Synchronic centrism 
(Elite level only)
Crisis of centrism - two-block tendency 
(Party system installation phase)
Linear centrism: a) exclusionary 
b) Centre-Left 
(Party system consolidation phase)
Two-Block Tendency a) PCI-based
b) PSI-based 
(Mature democracy, cyclical challenge)
Flux. Absence of a dominant structure
The apparently unavoidable tendency to two-block struc­
turation was evident from 1968, but for many, by this time, 
the promise of alternation was not a matter of radical so­
cialism. For some it did mean this, for others it meant only 
the releasing of reformist energies trapped by the three- 
block structure, and for others still it meant little more 
than an invigorating change of leadership. The country's 
political culture was changing. Alternation, however, did 
mean transforming the block structure and by 1975, when this 
was inescapably on the agenda, the danger that a two-block 
confrontation would still provoke destabilisation was very 
real.
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The problem facing the political class in the 1970s was 
immense. Alternation based on the PCI was, as Moro and 
Berlinguer both realised, a matter of extreme difficulty, yet 
at the same time innovation was clearly required, for dissat­
isfaction with the partitocrazia was becoming critical. In 
the event, the failure of the PCI to end the three-block 
structure helped make that party as much the target of attack 
as the DC-regime, and the tendency to two-block structuration 
based on the PCI collapsed. This caused anti-party and 
anti-party system feeling to intensify, but the combination 
of terrorist and economic challenge did a great deal to 
reassert the legitimacy of party government.
Furthermore, a new basis for creating a two-block 
structure on an acceptable basis appeared as Craxi, the new 
leader of the PSI, rapidly set about trying to replace the 
PCI as the alternative to the DC. Unfortunately for Craxi, 
the PSI was a weak vessel with which to achieve this aim, and 
before he could follow in Mitterrand*s footsteps of rebuild­
ing a successful government-orientated left block, the PCI 
acquired its own new leadership. Occhetto rejected the 
'consociational temptation1 and defined the PCI as an im­
placable block enemy of the DC, but on a straightforward 
centre-left/centre-right basis.
By the late 1980s all the traditional core parties, MSI 
included, appeared to be rather close to each other, commonly 
overlapping a new, indistinctly defined, centre. For the 
first time, the intervention of non-party actors to prevent 
the creation of a two-block system looked highly unlikely. 
The centre-dominant three-block system was redundant.
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The question was, was the DC redundant too? The danger
was, that having lost its role as the ‘regime party1, the DC
would break up and a new centre block, dominated by the 
Socialists, be created. Opposition to De Mita's interest in 
establishing the DC as the core of one block of a two-block, 
alternating, system stemmed from the fear that the DC1s 
passage into the opposition would mean its collapse, provoked 
by the loss of the southern ‘vote of exchange1, to the new 
‘regime party', and of elites, militants and electorates 
unwilling to accept identification with a rightist block.
V THE CONTRIBUTION OF THE PARTY SYSTEM
TO NATION- AND STATE-BUILDING
The current destructuring of the post-war party system
is widely seen as reflecting the continuing absence of an
ethically meritorious, popularly respected, unified 'nation- 
state' in Italy. This thesis qualifies that interpretation, 
throwing further light on the nature of the DC's 'success' as 
a political party.
Though the Italian state is some one hundred and twenty 
years old, its political elites are widely regarded as having 
failed to construct a 'nation-state'. This failure is seen 
as having led to the collapse of Liberal Italy and the rise 
and fall of Fascism, whilst Republican Italy is typically 
described as a society still rent by deep cleavages and 
cursed by a fragmented and dysfunctional party system. 
Against this, it can be argued that the establishment of a 
parliamentary democracy based on solidly-rooted mass-based 
parties made a positive contribution to the process of na­
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tion-building, if not to that of state-building.
The contribution of the Italian party system and Chris­
tian Democratic strategy to constructing a successful nation­
state in Italy has been obscured by the intensity of con­
flict in the party system and by the fact that parliament 
remains primarily an arena for inter-party struggle, rather 
than a provider of government. That the parliamentary regime 
survived thanks to the creation of the three-block system was 
good? what was not good were the effects of that structure on 
political life.
Long-term multi-party interaction meant that by the 
1980s it was clear that Italian democracy had been consoli­
dated and that the party system could be restructured without 
bringing political disaster. National unity, in the sense of 
societal cohesion, had increased as a result of the process 
of peaceful party competition first put into motion in the 
1940s on the basis of anti-Fascist unity. There was, too, 
recognition in the 1980s that reform to complete the building 
of an efficient, constitutional and respected state was the 
principle task facing Italy's competing political parties. 
But only recognition.
Reforms were sought because the continuing, long-term, 
institutional failure of Italian government was self-evident 
but, with notable exceptions,A the political class was in no 
hurry to implement major constitutional reforms since it was 
easy to spot losers, difficult to be certain of who would be
A. For example the promoters of the referendum to abrogate 
the electoral laws, campaigning in 1990 with the aim of 
forcing new, hopefully less proportional, laws to be drafted.
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the winners. The problem was that whilst the parliamentary 
regime had survived thanks to the structure of the party 
system adopted, that structure had created a dysfunctional 
parliamentary system from the governmental point of view. As 
a result, the party system could be reformed only with the 
greatest difficulty, even though the three-block party system 
was redundant.
Right through into the 1990s the prominence of the 
antagonistic elements in the Italian party system intertwined 
with the dysfunctional aspects of the residual three-block 
structure so that the lingering failure to implement reform 
meant that Italian national unity and state capacity, partic­
ularly juridical, remained significantly weaker than in 
comparable countries. Consequently, as the hitherto prevail­
ing party system continued to unravel, and the sustainability 
of the second economic miracle was questioned, the failures 
of the political class, not their achievements, dominated 
attention. Yet the tendencies towards the construction of a 
one- or two-block party system structure were so strong that 
the reinforcement of national unity was undeniable.
It was the failure of state-building which was more 
marked. Thus, whilst, like the other countries of Western 
Europe in the 1990s, Italy could look forward to an 
economically successful, social-liberal future, it was en­
tirely uncertain whether the state would finally be reformed 
in such a way as to make it institutionally stronger and 
better able to earn the respect of its citizens. The con­
struction of a working party system in the late 194 0s and 
early 1950s was, thus, both a major contribution to state-
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and nation-building in Italy, and a hindrance to those proc­
esses, especially state-building, thanks to the particular 
form it took.
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Post-Fascist Civilian Governments 
(Notes overleaf)
APPENDIX 1
No. Prime Minister Ministers/Support Duration of Confidence
- I.Bonomi CLN June 1944 - Nov. 1944
- I.Bonomi CLN (less PSI & Pd*a) Dec. 1944 - June 1945
1 F.Parri CLN June 1945 - Dec. 1945
2 A.De Gasperi 1 CLN Dec. 1945 - July 1946
3 A.De Gasperi 2 CLN (less PLI; Pd’a +) July 1946 - Feb. 1947
4 A.De Gasperi 3 CLN (less PLI & Pd’a) July 1946 - Feb. 1947
5 A.De Gasperi 4 DC PLI (PSDI & PRI from Dec) May 1947 - May 1948
6 A.De Gasperi 5 DC PSDI PLI PRI May 1948 - Jan. 1950
7 A.De Gasperi 6 DC PSDI PRI PLI+ Jan. 1950 - July 1951
8 A.De Gasperi 7 DC PRI PSDI+ PLI+ July 1951 - June 1953
9 - A.De Gasperi 8 DC DC PRI* (July 1953)
10 G.Pella DC PRI* PLI* Mon* PSDI+ MSI+ Aug 1953 - Jan. 1954
11 - A.Fanfani 1 DC (Jan. 1954)
12 M.Scelba DC PSDI PLI PRI* Feb. 1954 - June 1955
13 A.Segni 1 DC PSDI PLI PRI* Mon+ July 1955 - May 1957
14 A.Zoli DC Mon* MSI* May 1957 - June 1958
15 A.Fanfani 2 DC PSDI PRI* July 1958 - Jan. 1959
16 A.Segni 2 DC PLI* Mon* MSI* Feb. 1959 - Feb. 1960
17 F.Tambroni DC MSI* Mar. 1960 - July 1960
18 A.Fanfani 3 DC PSDI* PRI* PLI* PSI+ Mon+ July 1960 - Feb. 1962
19 A.Fanfani 4 DC PSDI PRI PSI* Feb. 1962 - May 1963
20 G.Leone 1 DC PSI+ PSDI+ PRI+ Mon+ June 1963 - Nov. 1963
21 A.Moro 1 DC PSI PSDI PRI Dec. 1963 - June 1964
22 A.Moro 2 DC PSI PSDI PRI July 1964 - Jan. 1966
23 A.Moro 3 DC PSI PSDI (PSU 0ct*66) PRI Feb. 1966 - June 1968
24 G.Leone 2 DC PSU+ PRI+ June 1968 - Nov. 1968
25 M.Rumor 1 DC PSU PRI Dec. 1968 - July 1969
26 M.Rumor 2 DC PSI* PSDI* PRI+ Aug. 1969 - Feb. 1970
27 M.Rumor 3 DC PSI PSDI PRI Mar. 1970 - July 1970
28 E.Colombo DC PSI PSDI PRI Aug. 1970 - Jan. 1972
29 - G.Andreotti 1 DC (February 1972)
30 G.Andreotti 2 DC PSDI PLI PRI* June 1972 - June 1973
31 M.Rumor 4 DC PSI PSDI PRI July 1973 - Mar. 1974
32 M.Rumor 5 DC PSI PSDI PRI* Mar. 1974 - Oct. 1974
33 A.Moro 4 DC PRI PSI* PSDI* PLI+ Nov. 1974 - Jan. 1976
34 A.Moro 5 DC PSDI* PSI+ PRI+ PLI+ Feb. 1976 - Apr. 1976
35 G.Andreotti 3 DC PCI+ PSI+ PSDI+ PRI+ PLI+ July 1976 - Jan. 1978
36 G.Andreotti 4 DC PCI* PSI* PSDI* PRI* Mar. 1978 - Jan. 1979
37 - G.Andreotti 5 DC PSDI PRI (March 1979)
38 F.Cossiga 1 DC PSDI PLI PSI+ PRI+ Aug. 1979 - Mar. 1980
39 F.Cossiga 2 DC PSI PRI Apr. 1980 - Sep. 1980
40 A.Fori ani DC PSI PSDI PRI Oct. 1980 - May 1981
41 G.Spadolini 1 PRI DC PSI PSDI PLI June 1981 - Aug. 1982
42 G.Spadolini 2 PRI DC PSI PSDI PLI Aug. 1982 - Nov. 1982
43 A.Fanfani 5 DC PSI PSDI PLI PRI+ Dec. 1982 - Apr. 1983
44 B.Craxi 1 PSI DC PSDI PRI PLI Aug. 1983 - June 1986
45 B.Craxi 2 PSI DC PSDI PRI PLI Aug. 1986 - Mar. 1987
46 - A.Fanfani 6 DC! PSI* PSDI* DP* PR* (Apri 1 1987)
47 G.Goria 1 DC PSI PSDI PRI PLI July 1987 - Mar. 1988
48 C.De Mita DC PSI PSDI PRI PLI Apr. 1988 - May 1989
49 G.Andreotti 6 DC PSI PSDI PRI PLI July 1989 -
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The first party listed holds the premiership; underlining 
indicates vice-premiership, otherwise order indicates weight 
of portfolios held. * shows external support, + shows sup­
port by abstention in vote of confidence; ! the DC abstained 
so that opposition votes would bring down 'its* government, 
provoking an election. The other parties supported the 
government in protest at this manoeuvre. - shows failure to 
gain a vote of confidence.
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APPENDIX 2
Christian Democrat Secretaries
Alcide De Gasperi 
Attilio Piccioni 
Giuseppe Cappi 
Paolo Emilio Taviani 
Guido Gonella 
Alcide De Gasperi 
Amintore Fanfani 
Aldo Moro 
Mariano Rumor 
Flaminio Piccoli 
Arnaldo Forlani 
Amintore Fanfani 
Benigno Zaccagnini 
Flaminio Piccoli 
Ciriaco De Mita 
Arnaldo Forlani
April 1944 - September 1946 
September 1946 - January 1949 
January 1949 - June 1949 
June 1949 - April 1950 
April 1950 - September 1953 
September 1953 - June 1954 
June 1954 - January 1959 
January 1959 - January 1964 
January 1964 - December 1968 
December 1968 - November 1969 
November 1969 - June 1973 
June 1973 - July 1975 
July 1975 - February 1980 
February 1980 - May 1982 
May 1982 - February 1989 
February 1989 -
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APPENDIX
Election Results
1946 1948 1953 1958 1963 1968 1972 1976 1979 1983 1987
/PdUP . . 1.5 2.2 1.7 1.8
IUP - - - - - 4.4 1.9 - - - -
I 18.9 [31.01 22.6 22.7 25.3 26.9 27.2 34.4 30.4 29.9 26.6
I 20.7 [PF] 12.8 14.2 13.8 [14.5] 9.6 9.6 9.8 11.4 14.3
DI - 7.1 4.5 4.5 6.1 [PSU] 5.1 3.4 3.8 4.1 3.0
I (4.4) 2.5 1.6 1.4 1.4 2.0 2.9 3.1 3.0 5.1 3.7
35.1 48.5 40.1 42.4 38.3 39.1 38.8 38.7 38.3 32.9 34.3
I (6.8) 3.8 3.0 3.5 7.0 5.8 3.9 1.3 1.9 2.9 2.1
n. 2.8 2.8 6.9 4.8 1.7 1.3 - - - - -
I - 2.0 5.8 4.8 5.1 4.4 8.7 6.1 5.3 6.8 5.9
- - - - - - - 1.1 3.5 2.2 2.6
eens “ — * - " - 2.5
Notes
Figures are totals of votes cast. Several minor, mostly 
regional, parties are not included. Totals do not reach 100%. With 
the exception of the Radicals (PR) and the Greens, the parties are 
ordered according to prevailing images of party left/right ordering.
The PCI and PSI presented joint lists in 1946 as a Popular 
Front. The PSDI and PSI were united as the PSU from 1966-69. In 1964 
the left-PSI split to from the PSIUP, which gained representation in 
its own right in 1968, but dissolved after failure to gain parliamen­
tary representation in 1972. DP & PdUP are New Left parties outflank­
ing the PCI.
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PARTY SYSTEM STRUCTURE AND POLITY MANAGEMENT ANNEX 4
One aim of this thesis is to extend the study of 'the 
centre1 in West European party systems, a concept reviewed in 
detail by Hans Daalder in 1984.1 It is argued that the main 
advantage to be drawn from developing the theorisation of the 
centre lies in what can be learnt about party system struc­
ture and dynamics.
Daalder's article rebutted Duverger's argument that 
'the centre does not exist in politics'.2 Pointing to the 
widespread political use of the term and to its analytical 
importance, Daalder reversed the preoccupation with left and 
right and concluded his article by categorising West European 
party systems according to the nature and salience of the 
centre in them. The bulk of Daalder's article consists of a 
review of existing theory, and according to Daalder the 
centre had been analysed in three distinct ways: as a spa­
tial, as a mechanical and as a cleavage-related concept.
This appendix is concerned principally with the 
second, the mechanical, model of the centre. In Section I we 
shall see that according to the mechanical model the centre 
cannot be occupied. Since, it is clear that in some party 
systems a centre 'bloc'A exists the aim of this appendix is 
to explore the significance of this discrepancy for party 
system theory in general, and for the understanding of the
.. It is common to use the French term bloc when referring 
o political groupings. However, as this, chapter develops 
n argument based on block structure (one- two- and three- 
ilock), it seemed stylistically more agreeable to use the 
Inglish term. Moreover, the French term implies a degree 
if cohesion which the structural approach questions.
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Italian party system and its leading party in particular.
The analytical approach which receives least attention 
is the cleavage-based one, discussed in Section II. Accord­
ing to this approach, a centre block arises from the presence 
of multiple and cross-cutting cleavages whose interaction 
prevents a simple division between a 'left1 and a 'right*. 
Such simple division occurs only where there is just one 
cleavage in society, or where the several cleavages (eg 
religious and linguistic and/or socioeconomic) coincide.
As we shall see, Daalder himself is fairly dismissive 
of the cleavage-based approach as a way of understanding the 
centre, either conceptually or empirically, and, in fact, the 
concept of 'cleavage* has been much debated.3 It will be 
argued that this approach, and the idea that the social 
dimension can have an autonomous impact on the structure of 
the party system, can usefully be put to one side, if not 
ignored. This permits attention to be focused on just two of 
Daalder's three approaches, thus: competing parties not only 
exploit potential cleavages with varying degrees of success, 
they do so according to factors which can be understood as 
essentially either spatial or mechanical. By relating the 
spatial dimension to ideology and to electoral considera­
tions, and the mechanical dimension to inter-elite and coali- 
tional considerations, a distinction is drawn between two 
levels of party system interaction, the electoral/mobilisa- 
tional and the governmental.
The spatial approach is considered in Section III. It 
receives more attention than the cleavage-based one not only 
because in the hands of party elites spatial imagery becomes
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an active, rather than passive, creator of party system 
structure, but also because the spatial approach challenges 
the central axiom of the mechanical model. In it, the centre 
may be occupied. The section starts by briefly outlining the 
main points about the centre in spatial modelling and the 
major debates within the approach.
Section III continues by developing an argument to the 
effect that the existence of a centre is 'necessary* to a 
working party system, whatever the theoretical problems of 
establishing a centre in a 'nonreduceable multi-dimensional 
space*. This analysis shows that the necessary existence of 
a centre, described as 'centre dominance1, does not mean, 
even in the spatial model, that the centre must be occupied. 
Indeed, if other mechanisms, such as referenda (in Switzer­
land in partiuclar) do not 'locate' the centre, the proximity 
of many parties to each other, and hence to the centre is 
argued to be destabilising.
Section IV brings the three approaches together to 
consider their interaction in the 'real world', and in par­
ticular to analyse the significance of block structure for 
managing political change. Both uni- and multi-dimensional 
modelling are used in relation to the main argument about the 
block structuring of party systems to show that the distinc­
tion between the occupiable spatial centre and the non-occu- 
piable mechanical centre is an essential one if the structure 
and dynamics of party systems are to be better understood. 
The distinction between the two centres permits a new insight 
into the role of party elites as 'polity managers'.
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I THE MECHANICAL CENTRE - A PURE MODEL
In this model, the idea of the unoccupied centre is 
fundamental. The centre is NOT contingently unoccupied, 
which is the case with the spatial model, but necessarily 
unoccupied. The centre is an outcome, a result, something to 
be understood in a purely relational sense, so that any 
attempt to occupy the centre serves only to displace it.
Nevertheless, the idea that the centre exists, in some 
sense, is not abandoned. The argument developed in Section 
III, that the existence of the centre equates to the exist­
ence of the necessary minimum of order required for a party 
system to be operative, is applicable to the mechanical 
centre too. However, in order to emphasise the idea that the 
centre cannot exist in its own right, the term 'centre domi­
nation' which indicates the necessity of there being a cen­
tre, is dropped here in preference for the term 'core domina­
tion1 . The relational centre of the mechanical model is thus 
an outcome of the political interaction of 'core parties'. 
Non-core parties, defined below, are irrelevant parties.
In so far as the centre is defined by party competi­
tion, and not, say, by referenda or by a strong state bu­
reaucracy in a strongly depoliticised polity, the centre is 
always an outcome of party interaction so that its identifi­
cation with single parties is potentially misleading. Daald­
er is thus right to query the validity of using spatial 
terminology when moving from a spatial approach to mechanical 
modelling of the centre.4 Daalder even suggests that spa­
tial terminology per se is 'meaningless', in segmented
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societies, where parties which are ideologically and socio­
logically (but not culturally) nearly identical share out 
government posts etc., and in situations of Allgemeinkoali- 
tionsfahigkeit, that is, in situations where all parties are 
willing to form coalitions with any of the others. Daalder 
does not, however, follow up his observation theoretically.
The unsuitability of left/centre/right spatial termi­
nology in a mechanical theoretical approach is muddied in 
Daalder's review because his analysis of the mechanical 
centre is based on models which mix mechanical and spatial 
dynamics. Thus, Sartori's centripetal/centrifugal model 
focuses on movement towards or away from the central 'pole' 
in a tripoiar, left- centre-right, organised party system? 
whilst the models identify a pivot/hinge/key party which is 
seen in the same light. Empirically this is not unsatisfac­
tory, since it is doubtful that spatial terminology is ever 
meaningless in the real world, but it is essential to distin­
guish models and reality. A pure mechanical model of inter­
action is needed in which the existence of a 
left/centre/right axis is not taken for granted.
A. Block Structure
If spatial terminology is forsworn, we are left to 
consider the variety of purely mechanical relationships whose 
interaction will create a centre. Three distinct forms of 
party system organisation and their variants are described 
here, leading to a typology of ideal-type party system sub­
structure. Next, the relationship between party strategy and 
block structure is analysed, leading to a justification of 
there being only three basic structural alternatives.
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1. The one-block system.
The most straight-forward ideal type of block structure 
is the one-block system. Here, all the parties are willing 
to form coalitions with all other parties, that is, there is 
Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit. The one-block structure does 
not mean, however, that a party system is ‘unipolar1, as 
opposed to being 'bipolar* or ‘tripolar*.
Whilst Sartori*s 'pole-based* analysis inspires the 
mechanical approach, the polar terminology is best abandoned 
in favour of a block-based one, and for three reasons. 
First, since Sartori*s 'poles' will probably contain more 
than one party, each so-called 'pole' may contain what are, 
in effect, different poles of attraction, for that is what 
parties are. Sartori*s terminology is thus misleading.
Secondly, whilst one component of a party's attractive­
ness is undoubtedly its block location the two phenomena, 
party and block, should be kept distinct. Blocks are the 
result of coalition formation, thus of elite action, whereas 
parties straddle the elite and mass dimensions. Thus, not 
only may parties within a pole/block have much that distin­
guishes them from each other, as with the bourgeois block in 
Sweden, but for some parties the elite's decision to identify 
with a particular block may contradict the party's tradition­
al ideological identity. This is the case with the DC's more 
radical allies who, from Saragat's Social Democrats to Nen- 
nis's Socialists, suffered from their identification with a 
conservative centre block.
Thirdly, the polar sub-organisation of party systems 
encourages the importation of spatial analysis into the
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mechanical model because its imagery is spatial and linear. 
'Block1 terminology avoids this, for blocks may overlap, as 
we shall see. The spatial aspect of party system organisa­
tion is far from irrelevant to understanding party system 
dynamics and structure, but the theorisation of the interac­
tion between the mechanical and spatial forces in the real 
world should be distinct from the theorisation of either of 
the two models. Section IV uses the 'issue salience* ap­
proach to understanding voter behaviour and party competition 
to avoid collapsing the mechanical model back on to the 
spatial model.5 Polar terminology, then, is avoided and 
blocks are considered to be potentially multi-polar.A
The one-block system has two principle forms. The 
synchronic, or grand coalition, which involves all parties in 
government simultaneously; and the diachronic. The latter is 
the complexly rotating form which gave birth to the term 
Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit, and which lies at the root of 
mathematical coalition theory. An 'impure1 version of either 
would exclude parties incapable of creating an independent 
block.6
2. The two-block system
Systems structured in this way can vary according to 
two issues: according to whether they are balanced, and ac 
cording to the cohesion of the blocks. The first variation 
is relatively straight-forward. The cases of Austria and 
Northern Ireland can be taken as examples of two-block party
. Were the one-block structure not multipolar there would 
e a one-party state, with all that that entails.
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systems which have been respectively balanced and unbalanced.
The second variation, that of cohesion, descends from 
the distinction between blocks and poles. Duverger, for 
example, has spoken of a four-party system (left, centre- 
left, centre-right, right) as a variation of the two-block 
structure based on two pairs of parties.7 There is no rea­
son, of course, why there should be such pairing, ie such 
intrinsic block cohesion,8 and hence no reason why there 
should be only two parties on either side of a two-block 
system. Indeed, at this point there is no reason why there 
should be only two blocks - multiple conflict may surely 
induce the existence of more than two blocks. In fact, 
cohesion is imposed extrinsicallv. by the 'necessity' of 
maintaining governmental order (and, of course, such order is 
not always maintained). The assumption of block coherence 
derived from linear-spatial logic is misleading.
Given the weaknesses of the 'four-party system' ap­
proach it is better to define three variants of the two- 
block system: the 'pure' variant, which is balanced and con­
tain only two parties, and two 'impure' variants, each with 
more than two parties, but in one case balanced, and in the 
other case not.
The 'pure' two-block system is extremely rare. Even 
the British/UK party system is 'impure', and on both counts. 
Firstly, there are consistently more than two relevant par­
ties, even at the parliamentary level, let alone at the 
electoral level. The electoral system, of course, like the 
domination of parliament by two major parties with which it 
is linked, is a powerful feature of a political system which
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seeks to reinforce the two-block logic of party system struc­
turation to achieve strong, but controlled, government. 
Yet, despite the electoral system, the system*s 'third par­
ties* are far from 'irrelevant*, for their presence signals, 
and in part causes, the non-cohesion of the supposed second 
(non-Conservative) block - hence the constant denial that the 
term 'anti-Thatcher majority* was meaningful. The foremost 
consequence of non-two-partiness is that the British party 
system has been, and remains, seriously 'unbalanced* in the 
Conservative Party's favour.9
The more openly multi-polar two-block system demon­
strates an interesting relationship between block cohesion 
and balance. In Sweden, for example, a fairly cohesive 
'socialist* block has faced a near equal, but non-cohesive 
'bourgeois' one, resulting in the Social Democratic 'hegemo­
ny*. The non-cohesion of the bourgeois block in Sweden is a 
double one. First, the block is multi-polar, that is, it 
comprises three parties, not one, and this sees both elector­
al competitiveness and issue-based governmental antagonism 
within the block.10 Though intrinsic ideological tensions 
work against block cohesion they do not prevent a certain 
unity existing vis-a-vis the Social Democrats seen (with 
their Communist support) as a 'block'. It is, after all, 
useful to consider Sweden as having a two-block party system. 
Yet this cohesion is to a large extent extrinsically induced, 
and the two-block, mechanical, logic is only predominant, not 
unique.
In fact, the bourgeois block is not only divided ideo­
logically. It is also divided by differing evaluations of
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the utility of the two-block structure. The alternatives are 
not without appeal, particularly to the Agrarian/Centre Party 
and the Liberal (People*s) Party, so strategies differ inde­
pendently of ideological/policy considerations. Thus, the 
Moderate (Conservative) Party is the keenest promoter of 
two-block confrontation not just in order to win over sup­
porters to its ideological world view, but because it is the 
structure most likely to benefit the party. The party is too 
small to create a flank-dominant three-block system on its 
own, and has no potential block allies for such a develop­
ment. Equally, an imperfect one-block solution might exclude 
it. The Centre Party, like the Liberals in certain periods, 
has, however, been interested in the emergence of a three- 
block structure based on their party and the Social Demo­
crats, and in Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit, preferably 
imperfect. Party strategists may, thus, be oriented both by 
ideological/spatial motives and by a calculus of political 
prominence rooted in structural considerations.
3. The three-block party system
Party system interactions may be organised according to 
a three-block structure, in which case three distinct vari­
ants exist: flank dominant, parity and centre dominant.
First, the 'flank dominant1 variant where the centre block 
performs as a pivot or hinge. Germany is the obvious exam­
ple. Here one small party is able to constitute a block in 
its own right because its support is always, or nearly al­
ways, needed for government formation by two other blocks.
Although the temptation to identify the pivot block 
with the centre is strong, it must be resisted. The struc­
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ture of the West German party system can be considered to be 
triangular, rather than linear, so that the relational centre 
and the FDP do not coincide.11 The Free Democrats may be 
very close to the relational centre, and they may not. In 
principle, the smaller the centre block the nearer one could 
expect it to be pulled towards the relational centre. Howev­
er, even a small centre block (the FDP) may be able, thanks 
to its coalition power, to draw well away from the centre 
which would be created by the two larger parties alone, thus 
pulling the relational centre some distance from its expected 
linear location.
The second variant of the three-block system is the 
'parity* variant, where three blocks each take 25-40% of the 
seats, the Netherlands coming close to this. Little need be 
said about this other than that like most of the party system 
structures discussed it permits alternation. This is not 
true of the 'centre-dominant' three-block system. Here the 
centre block takes some 45% to 60% of seats, and the opposi­
tion is divided into two blocks, each taking at least ten per 
cent of the vote.
The figure of ten per cent as an important size thresh­
old for parties has been indicated in different contexts by 
Jean Blondel, Francis Castles and Peter Mair, and Gordon 
Smith.12 Here, parties smaller than this are considered to 
be unable to create relevant blocks in their own right, 
unless they have access to government (in which case the 
flank-dominant three-block system will exist). Thus it can 
be doubted that a three-block system has been structurally 
dominant in Italy since 1976 when the right's vote collapsed
400
from a stable level averaging 13.3% (1953-72) to a new stable 
level averaging 6.0% (1976-87), precipitating the Liberal 
Party's reorientation to the 'centre block', to the extent 
that this still existed by this stage of the party system's 
evolution.
A TYPOLOGY OF PARTY SYSTEM STRUCTURES
Ideal Types
One-block Two-block Three-block
1. Allgemein- 
koalitions- 
fahigkeit
Pure 
(two party) 
(balanced)
Flank Dominant
2. Grand Coalition
3. Impure
(3A Diachronic) 
(3B Synchronic)
Impure
(Balanced)
Impure
(Unbalanced)
Parity 
Centre dominant
The ten per cent rule goes a long way towards defining 
non-core parties and resolving the problem that the five-fold 
division of the 'typical' West European party system suggest­
ed by von Beyme,13 and/or the rise of the Greens and other 
parties which promote new ‘dimensions', could make for four- 
or five-block systems. In short, small parties which cannot 
act as a ‘hinge block' must gain at least ten per cent of the 
vote, perhaps more, singly or in coalition, in order to be 
relevant as a block. Parties which fail both to achieve
401
independent block relevance and fail to become components of 
a two- or three-block structure will be historical failures.
B Party Strategies and System Fluidity
As the three alternative modes of sub-structural organ­
isation by block discussed here are ideal types, more than 
one may be expected to be relevant for understanding the 
structuring of actual party systems. In looking at the 
Swedish party system we saw that several modes of interaction 
were relevant because different parties are interested in 
pursuing the interactions patterns of different systemic 
structures. The point can surely be generalised. In the 
Italian party system the added complication that party fac­
tions may develop over which block structure to favour is 
clearly evident.
It is, then, not only the pure one-block model of 
Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit which will render a party system 
fluid, but also the battle of different parties (and some­
times factions) to achieve a pattern of block structuration 
which benefits their interests. A consideration of the basic 
nature of block structuration in party systems should, then, 
be a key component of party strategy.
It is worth noting that structural considerations will 
not influence party strategy in the pure two-block system, 
where just two parties, both satisfied with the structure, 
exist. This raises a question of block 'rigidity* which 
bears on the discussion of the meaning of consensus and the 
nature of change in Sections III and IV. It can be argued 
that the structural fixity of the imperfect two-block form in
402
Britain, a consequence of exceptional constitutional rules 
and the conservatism of the second party (Labour), is actual­
ly a rigidity which has rendered the British party system 
increasingly dysfunctional.14 The differently structured 
Italian party system can be suggested as another example of 
rigidity which has tended to smother political innovation and 
flexibility. There, rigidity stemmed from the fact that any 
challenge to the centre-dominant three-block system seemed to 
undermine the entire political system, not just one particu­
lar way of structuring the party system.
The tenacity of the established block structures in 
Britain and Italy suggests that major party strategists, 
including those of 'second' parties (Labour, the PCI and 
PSI) , may not always be totally committed to challenging the 
existing structure. A major reason for such caution is the 
intensity of the impact which changing block structure, 
especially a rigid one, will have on government formation. 
It is time to consider the effect of the 'requirement' for 
government formation on block structuration.
C The Limitation of Structural Alternatives
Although competing block-based party strategies intro­
duce fluidity into a party system, party system fluidity will 
be limited if the number of feasible alternative structures 
is rather few. In fact, not many alternative modes of struc­
turation have been presented, and this needs to be justified. 
The argument is that it is the need of would-be governments 
to gain the support, or toleration, of at least half-plus-one 
of parliamentary seats which limits the alternatives avail­
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able.
If only one party can gain fifty per cent (plus one) of 
the seats, alone or as the core of a coalition, a three-block 
system will develop, for if two parties can gain half the 
seats, alone or as the cores of different coalitions, a two- 
block or flank-dominant three-block system, will develop. If 
three parties each gain 25-40% of the vote a parity three- 
block system will develop. If we move to consider a situa­
tion with four major parties it can be seen that we must 
start reproducing the two- or three-block schema set out 
above, or move to the one-block model.
Having considered various aspects of the mechanical 
model, including the importance of party strategy and the 
special significance of government formation, we can move on 
to consider the other two approaches identified by Daalder as 
contributing to the theorisation of the centre.
II THE CLEAVAGE-BASED CENTRE:
MOBILISATIONAL AND GOVERNMENTAL MANIPULATION
Daalder, we have said, dismisses the cleavage-based 
approach as unhelpful in two respects. First, this approach 
is unable to theorise the general significance of the centre 
in party systems given that it divides party systems in to 
those with a centre, and those without one. Secondly, where 
a centre does exist, this approach is inadequate to the task 
of explaining why. What is crucial, Daalder rightly points 
out, is how alternative potential cleavage bases have been,
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and are, made dominant or suppressed, through political 
competition.
Cleavages, then, are important in so far as they pro­
vide the raw material with which political elites work, but 
in so far as which dominate(s) is not pre-given, cleavages 
cannot be regarded as autonomously productive of party system 
structure. Two points can be made about the relationship 
between social structure and party system structure.15 
First, it is still a matter of debate as to whether 'reli­
gion* or 'class* has been more significant in structuring the 
post-war West European electorate.16 Thus, any claim about 
the direct impact of a particular social cleavage on party 
system structure faces the immediate objection that its 
impact is neither unmediated nor securely quantifiable. 
Secondly, the fact that there may be little or no connection 
between electoral-mobilisational strategies and inter-party 
relations at the governmental level17 indicates that a dis­
tinction should be made between two levels of party system 
interaction: the mobilisational and the governmental.
We have already seen that the governmental level of 
interaction can be influenced by mechanical/structural, that 
is non-ideological considerations. Of course, ideological 
gain and structural (or positional) gain are likely to be 
linked. Nevertheless, the two dimensions remain conceptually 
distinct. In fact, in distinguishing poles from blocks an 
example was given which saw parties make decisions about 
block structure which fundamentally challenge their ideologi­
cal image. There is no doubt that the Socialists, and espe­
cially the Social Democrats, weakened their ideological/
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electoral positions by joining the centre block.
No explanation for the behaviour of the Social­
ist/Social Democrat elites was attempted, but we are now in a 
position to suggest that the concern with maintaining govern­
ment order, indissolubly linked to the desire to build and/or 
maintain a three-block structure, as opposed to a two-block 
structure, was determinant. Consequently, whilst it would be 
absurd to suggest that the structuring of governmental rela­
tions is not influenced by ideology, a hypothesis can be put 
forward that a linear-spatial approach stressing ideological 
juxtaposition and identity will be more directly relevant to 
the analysis of electoral mobilisation since ideological 
confrontation and differentiation is the stuff of party 
competition. By contrast, at the governmental level, ques­
tions of ideology are frequently mediated by the requirements 
of government-making, so that the mechanical model will be of 
direct relevance.
Equally, if party elites handle cleavages differently 
at the electoral and governmental levels, so that in the 
former, cleavages are thorough-going, rigid divisions, where­
as in the latter pragmatic compromises and inspired innova­
tions blur differences of principle, then the two spatial 
models of competition, the multidimensional and the linear 
(or unidimensional) might more accurately explain conflict in 
each arena. Thus, the linear model of space, with its 
clear-cut divisions between left (and centre) and right would 
be appropriate for considering the electoral level, where 
partisanship, or at least block-loyalty, rather than volatil­
ity, tends to be the rule?18 whilst a multidimensional model,
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where complexity does permit flexibility, would be more 
appropriate for understanding party interaction at the gov­
ernmental level. These are sweeping hypotheses, and a proper 
consideration of the spatial approach to the centre is clear­
ly called for.
Ill THE SPATIAL CENTRE
Within the spatial approach 'space* is understood in 
two ways: as uni-dimensional, where a linear spectrum runs 
from left, through centre, to right, and as multi-dimension- 
al. At the heart of the discussion on the merits of each 
when applied to party competition lies an argument about 
whether the space under discussion is issue-determined, or 
party-based, or whether parties organise society according to 
a 'super issue*, for example, maintaining the status quo as 
opposed to greater social justice.19 Three key points about 
the centre in the spatial model can be made, with the first 
serving to provide a limited outline of the different under­
standings of 'space *.
First, the 'centre' does not have to be understood in 
linear terms, that is, as a median point between a 'left' and 
a 'right'. The centre can be a 'nexus' within a multi­
dimensional space. If space is perceived as 'party space' 
this nexus will equate to the relational centre in the me­
chanical model.
Multi-dimensionality is a difficult concept because it 
is difficult to visualise.20 It is, perhaps, easiest to 
understand as party space. Then we can take the example of a
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die, or some such polyhedron, where each face is a separate 
dimension, defined by a party. The dots on each die face can 
be regarded as the organisation of each party. The centre 
is then the 'nexus* within the cube (or whatever shape), 
which results from the multiple crossovers of the lines of 
interaction between the parties.
Where multi-dimensionality is a matter of issue-space, 
two inter-related problems arise which make understanding the 
nature of issue space, and the place of parties in it, diffi­
cult. The first problem is the connectedness or non-connect­
edness of different issues, the second the relationship 
between individual parties and issues. If issues are uncon­
nected and parties pursue different issues, say religious 
education on the one hand and economic justice on the other, 
the two parties concerned do not interact, at least at the 
level of issues. They may do so in terms of organisational 
ability in turning out the vote. Furthermore, in the mathe­
matical model of coalition formation, non-connectedness will 
mean that there is no basis for coalition formation, no 
stable, or determinate 'centre'.
The chief solution to these and other problems has been 
to insist that whilst parties may 'own' certain issues, or 
dimensions, giving them a 'core' electorate, parties do 
compete, and parties are connected, on at least one dimen­
sion. Usually, moreover, issues are roughly reducible to a 
single dominant 'super-dimension1, the left-right dimension, 
along which all parties can be placed. This solution, which 
Sartori advocates most strongly, returns to a predominantly 
linear model of space.21
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An alternative solution to the problems of connected­
ness is to not only accept that many issues are ‘owned* by 
parties, but to accept that parties compete past each other, 
stressing ‘their' preferred issues. Thus, parties compete by 
offering alternative Weltanschauungen, or world views. 
Nevertheless, a surprisingly large amount of the content of 
these alternative global political images may overlap, pro­
viding the basis for the construction of a centre.22
The second and third points to be noted about the 
centre in the spatial model can be dealt with quickly. Thus, 
secondly, the nexus, or nodal centre, in the multi­
dimensional model party-space model does not need to be occu­
pied (either by one, or more than one, party). It clearly is 
not in the example based on the die. Thirdly, however, in 
the spatial model (whether uni- or multi-dimensional), the 
centre MAY be occupied, by one or more parties. This may 
involve one or more parties being at the centre of the nexus 
whilst the other parties are distant from it, so that the 
centre party/ies is/are a sort of microcosm of the other 
parties. Clearly the nodality of the centre will give any 
party/ies which occupy it considerable strategic signifi­
cance. Alternatively, all the parties may be move to become 
more or less proximate to each other so that the centre nexus 
appears to embrace the parties, rather than being distinct 
from them.23
A Centre Domination
Having made these preliminary points it is time to 
consider the indispensability of the centre. In this re­
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spect, the spatial model should have priority of exposition 
over the mechanical model since spatially-based mathematical 
theories of coalition have been much concerned with the 
existence, or non-existence of a centre. Like Daalder, I 
claim little understanding of the mathematical arguments 
involved,2  ^ but there are grounds for arguing that the as­
sumption that a centre is necessary to there being a working 
party system is viable and useful. Starting from this pre­
miss turns the assumption that there is no 'equilibrium' 
position where space is irreducibly multidimensional on its 
head, avoiding the difficulties faced by those wishing to 
counter the negative proposition on its own grounds.25
This rejection of mathematically-based models which see 
disorder as the norm26 seems justified by the critical re­
sponse that such abstract modelling is, in the words of Ralf 
Dahrendorf, 'sociologically insensitive'.27 Given the doubts 
concerning the impact of the social dimension on party system 
structure the expression 'politically insensitive' might be 
more appropriate, and indeed the mathematical approach to 
coalition formation has been described elsewhere as 'policy 
blind'.28
Another reason for refusing to accept that the assump­
tion of centre domination is a problem is the striking con­
trast between the obsession of the mathematical approach with 
centre indeterminacy and instability, and the empirically 
founded assumption of electoral and party system analysis 
that the opposite holds, or has held, sway. The same is true 
of empirical party competition theory. Explicit in Anthony 
Downs' Economic Theory of Democracy29, it is implicit in the
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insistence of Sartori and others that a multiply-defined 
left/right axis of competition dominates, for where there is 
left/right linearity there must be a centre. Equally, the 
'issue salience1 approach of Budge et al. can be understood 
to confirm the importance of the centre.
A final, normative, reason for rejecting the apolit­
ical approach is that it facilitates an authoritarian anti­
politics. One response to political indeterminacy and insta­
bility is to limit government turnover by holding infrequent 
elections, another is to remove some issues from the politi­
cal arena. To an extent this already happens, so that more 
radical proposals might be thought only to extend a sound 
anti-democratic principle. For example, the assertion of a 
non-electoral basis for governmental legitimacy, such as 
expertise, or the shifting of decision-making from go 
vernment to markets. Combined, the two solutions create an 
authoritarian liberalism.30
IV THE 'REAL' WORLD AND THE MODELS
The three ways of viewing the centre have been sharply 
distinguished and presented as analytically distinct. To 
understand the 'real world1, nevertheless, all three per­
spectives must be considered, even if two approaches have 
been stressed as 'actively* shaping the possibilities which 
the third (cleavage structure) presents. Given this empha­
sis, the study of social cleavage as opposed to block struc­
ture or ideological confrontations is of interest not so much 
for any 'reflection' found in the party system so much as for
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the possible revelation of 'failed* cleavages. However, 
since it is the case not only that parties make class, but 
also that class makes parties,31 consideration of the inter­
dependence of social structure and party system structure is 
unavoidable in any concrete historical analysis.
If social cleavage cannot be ignored, neither can the 
spatial organisation of party systems which, despite the 
strictures of the mechanical model must be regarded as 
ubiquitous. This point is considered in the following sub­
section on the uni- and multi-dimensional models of space 
where the question of the interdependence of social structure 
and political ideology is also addressed. To whatever 
extent social structure and political ideology are interde­
pendent, it is clear that the ideological/spatial organisa­
tion of the party system reduces potential sociopolitical 
complexity drastically.32 Not least of the reasons for this 
is the fact that party-based ideological structuring of party 
systems tends to be predominantly uni-dimensional (left/ 
right), despite a deeper multi-dimensionality of both politi­
cal and social interactions. This simplification helps 
political elites gain a degree of autonomy from society 
since, as Lijphart has shown, and as the distinction between 
the governmental and the electoral level of party system 
interaction makes clear, the motivations which inform elec­
toral behaviour are not always directly reflected in govern­
ment behaviour.
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The Determination of Party System Structure33
Party system structure
\
Party strategies 
(electoral) 
Ideological space
Party strategies 
(coalitional) 
Block/Governmental base
Social structure
Finally, block structure too has to be considered both 
independently and in the context of the other approaches. 
Constitutional considerations, particularly electoral, play a 
major role here in empowering parties to shape the relation­
ship between social change and party system change, whilst 
influencing the development of both. But whilst the require­
ments of government reinforce the degree of independence 
which party elites have from sociological and ideological 
influences, they explain little in themselves. The totality 
of these, still inevitably simplified, interactions can be 
summarised diagrammatically.
A Unidimensional and Multidimensional Space
One of the dynamics which organises the process of 
structuration of party systems is that based in the unidimen­
sional, or linear-spatial, understanding of left and right. 
But as Sartori has pointed out (going so far to describe left 
and right as ‘empty boxes') the issue content of this dimen­
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sion is multiple, varying over time and from country to 
country. Whilst the linear dimension cannot be completely 
detached from issues and their historical evolution, a number 
of analyses of the left/right dimension have identified 
unilinearity as being party-based and party-related, rather 
than rooted in issues.34 It thus makes sense to see the 
linkage between issues and the linear left/right spectrum as 
indirect, mediated by parties and, above all, by block struc­
ture.
That left and right, and centre where relevant, are 
fundamentally defined in relation to the evolution of block 
structure, and hence of coalition arrangements, with all that 
that entails in terms of ideology and sociology, makes intui­
tive sense. Thus, pace Daalder's comment on sectional 
societies, where there are two blocks one will be seen as the 
left block, one the right block (as in Austria) , and where 
there are three blocks (as in Italy and the Netherlands) a 
centre block will exist too. Only in the ideal one-block 
structure of Allgemeinkoalitionsfahigkeit is there no left, 
centre or right.
Historically, block structure, which in the ideal model 
makes left and right irrelevant, has been inescapably spa­
tially organised. This is another reason why systemic struc­
tural change is such a significant event. Yet, despite the 
inevitability of linear spatial organisation, the pure me­
chanical model remains useful for two reasons. First, its 
view that it is entirely reasonable to see blocks as having 
much in common, and yet competing. Second, its insistence 
that the centre cannot be occupied. Let us look at these in
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turn.
According to the 'issue salience' model of competition, 
left/right competition is all but universal, so parties can 
be 'placed' on a left/right axis. Overall, however, parties 
compete for support by stressing those issues favourable to 
them, rather than confronting each other on specific issues. 
Thus, rather than confronting each other along any issue 
dimension, parties compete past each other, championing a 
multitude of different issues, even whilst an element of 
fundamental antagonism remains. The effect of this is that 
parties which occupy radically different parts of a block- 
based, linear, spectrum can have much in common, ie consider­
able and significant issue overlaps. In Chpater One we saw 
that Mastropaolo and Slater applied this mode of analysis to 
Italy and found just this mixture of juxtaposition and over­
lap to be true of the DC and the PCI.
B Party System Dynamics and the Relational Centre
The dynamic interaction of parties is what defines and 
locates the relational centre. Thus a degree of conflict 
between parties can be considered constructive since without 
it parties will lose their ability to define where society 
is, and where it is going. Either other institutions will 
carry out this function, or the polity will be marked by a 
stultifying consensus which inhibits innovation and 
change.
In the mechanical model the centre cannot be occupied, 
but clearly a situation of block proximity can arise that 
amounts to the same thing. The instability which consensus
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unalloyed with alternative mechanisms of political innova­
tion and information-exchange will produce an instability of 
the relational centre as the old parties falter, and as new 
ones challenge them. The relational centre, then, goes 
through phases of lesser and greater mobility, lesser and 
greater stability and instability.
The nature of the movement of the relational centre can 
be related to the structure of the party system. Where the 
interaction of strategies favouring different block struc­
tures, or patterns of interaction, is rather high, the rela­
tional centre will be more consistently mobile, reducing 
'stickiness1 and thus reducing instability. Such a picture 
might fit many party systems, with the post-war Scandinavian 
party systems providing an example.35
The British case, is a rather rigid system, and might, 
like Italy, be considered to exhibit a less evolutionary and 
markedly more erratic development of the relational centre.36 
In the 1950s and '60s the centre suffered from weakness of 
definition through lack of political conflict,37 yet in the 
1980s, the increase in conflict overwhelmed the ability of 
the system to tie government at or near the developing rela­
tional centre. Hence the 'extremism' of Thatcherism in 
contemporary comparative perspective. The rigidity of the 
British party system makes it consistently weak at mapping 
the location of the relational centre and at keeping govern­
ment close to the centre. Here 'government' is used in its 
longitudinal temporal sense, since individual governments 
will deviate from the relational centre to some extent given 
their partisan composition. Individual governments are both
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the outcome of the learning process which arises from the 
development of the entire, interactive, party system, and 
partisan. The only exception is pure grand coalition which, 
as a consensual arrangement, cannot last. Only as a dis­
guised form of multi-block competition can it endure, and 
even then its breakup is implicit.
Whether Italian government, with its rigid three-block 
system, has also developed in an erratic way is an important 
question and one which amounts to asking how well, in two 
senses, the party system has worked as a structure of inter­
action. The two performances to be measured concern the 
nature of the evolution of the relational centre and the 
proximity of individual governments to it. A clue to under­
standing why different structures perform more or less well 
is provided by Alan Ware's discussion of parties and democra­
cy. Ware describes party systems as performing three func­
tions with varying success: the provision of choice - who 
governs, and who does not; information exchange and education 
(of elites and of electorates); and innovation.38
In marked contrast to the British system, the centre- 
dominant three-block system has been permanently balanced on 
the brink of breakdown, but this very fact has provided an 
information-rich political environment. The evolution of 
party fortunes has thus been highly educational, as the 
hyper-politicisation of Italian culture demonstrates, and 
this has stimulated innovation as party strategists have run 
to stay on the same spot. Consequently, the relational 
centre has been in more or less constant evolution, and the
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government has been kept near to it.39 And yet the govern­
ment, coincident with the centre block, has not been the 
relational centre.
C The Party System as Contradictory Unitv
The distinction between government/the centre block and 
the relational centre is a feature of all party systems. It 
reflects the relationship of cooperation and conflict, or 
stable dissensus, necessary to party systems. The relational 
centre indicates the element of cooperation, or unity in a 
party system, whereas the fact that the relational centre 
cannot be occupied indicates that conflict, or contradiction 
is permanent. Party systems, are then, a form of 'contra­
dictory unity* in which cooperation and conflict combine.
The concept of contradictory unity, rooted in different 
understandings of the centre, provides a base for integrating 
the political scientists* analysis of Italian politics with 
Pizzorno*s critique of them. In other words, whilst the 
political scientists are right to insist that the disunity of 
the Italian political elite matters, Pizzorno is right to 
stress that a certain unity none the less exists.
V CONCLUSION
The spatial, mechanical and cleavage-based approaches 
to understanding the centre should be kept analytically 
distinct in order to assess the significance of each. If the 
cleavage approach identifies the variety of raw materials on 
which party elites operate, the spatial and mechanical ap­
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proaches identify the means by which party elites obtain a 
measure of political independence from cleavage determina­
tion. Simplifying tremendously, party system structure and 
dynamics can be seen as deriving from the political mediation 
of ideological [spatial], governmental [mechanical] and 
sociological [cleavage] processes of structuration.
The specification of a pure mechanical modelling 
of the centre is new and allows the identification of three 
useful features of party systems: 1) the existence of three 
ideal-typical patterns of coalitional mechanics? 2) the 
significance of attempts to change the substructural organi­
sation of a party system ie to change the number of blocks; 
3) the importance of interactions between different ideal- 
typical models of interaction within real party systems.
The interactions between parties in terms of encourag­
ing the development of feasible alternative block structures 
are significant in two ways. At the comparative level they 
permit a way of considering the differing efficiency of party 
systems in carrying out functions which can be said to be 
proper to party systems. Within party systems they help 
simplify the problem of identifying which ‘interaction 
streams' are more important, which less.40
The ‘issue salience' approach to party competition 
linked to a model of block structuration allows one to grasp 
the importance of left-and-right (or left-centre-right) in 
structuring party systems whilst confirming the importance of 
multi-dimensional space. It also suggests that the patterns 
of juxtaposition and confrontation which the linear method 
favours and which Sartori's ‘polar* methodology makes maximum
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use of, is more relevant to the electoral-mobilisational 
arena than the governmental one, though the connection be­
tween the two is intimate. Sartori himself distinguishes 
between the two arenas, differentiating between the 'open1, 
or public, and 'closed' spheres of inter-party interaction 
and arguing that his model of polarised pluralism 'works' 
principally because the electorate is structured according to 
the tripolar pattern.
The thesis argues that the centre-dominant three-block 
system resulted from elite cooperation which spanned the 
blocks, and that the vulnerablity of that structure constant­
ly reinforced cross-block elite cooperation, challenging the 
existence of polarisation. Sartori sees the power relation­
ships between the blocks as zero-sum, yet such an approach to 
coalition formation and to governing would have become a 
negative-sum game.
Sartori insisted that the party system could change, 
that depolarisation was possible, denying that he was a 
structural determinist, but he did not show how change could 
come about. It is in the distinction between the electoral 
and the governmental arenas, and their gradual unification 
through a forty year process of party system interaction that 
the basis of party system change can be found. The thesis 
emphasises the role of party strategy in this process to the 
extent to defining the core party strategists as a political 
class engaged in polity management.
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